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ORBIS

a quarterly journal of world affairs

Volume XVI Summer 1972 Number 2

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Reflections on the Quarter

The Moscow Summit Conference

SUMMITRY has lately grown in importance because of the increasing complexity of diplomacy and the need to mold the many facets of foreign relations—political, military, economic and cultural—into a coherent policy. The attractions of summit meetings to heads of state are numerous. In the American case, by combining maximum confidentiality with maximum publicity, they reconcile our penchant for "open diplomacy" with the exigencies of private negotiations. Moreover, a President has a unique opportunity to build popular support for his foreign policy initiatives by exploiting the drama of a summit meeting.

This was the setting in which President Nixon traveled to Moscow. The importance attached to the meeting by both sides was underscored by the circumstances under which it took place—on the American side, despite the massive military aid extended by the Soviet Union to North Viet Nam that had made possible the spring invasion of South Viet Nam; on the Soviet side, despite the U.S. blockade and the massive bombing of North Viet Nam initiated just two weeks previously.

In the period following announcement of the U.S. blockade on May 8, the Soviet leadership was divided over whether to cancel the summit conference. Opposition to the President's visit was reflected in the dismissal of Pyotr Shelest, a member of the Politburo, from the important post of First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. His removal stemmed from his opposition to a number of official policies, including the decision to hold the conference. Nevertheless, a majority of the Soviet leaders, chief among them Leonid Brezhnev, concluded that they had more to gain by meeting with the President than by turning him away, as Khrushchev had done to President Eisenhower in 1960 after the U-2 incident.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union concluded agreements on cooperation in environmental affairs, health, space, science and technology, maritime matters, and educational and cultural exchanges, the centerpiece of the Moscow summit was the two-part SALT accord limiting ABM deployment by treaty and placing quantitative restrictions on certain categories of offensive weapons systems by Executive Agreement. These accords make no effort to restrain research and development of either current or future technology. Basically, the United States has traded its lead in the number of individual warheads (which the Soviets are permitted to match or exceed under the accord) for a

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freeze on Soviet launchers at levels at least 40 per cent above existing U.S. land deployments and 30 per cent above undersea deployments. This Soviet advantage, coupled with Soviet superiority in throw-weight (i.e., the weight of the re-entry vehicle with its warhead package), makes a follow-on treaty on offensive systems indispensable for future U.S. security. Otherwise, the Soviet Union may add to its present advantages a developing MIRV designed to achieve a first-strike capability against the American ICBM and bomber force and the U.S. command and control system.

In addition to the SALT accord, the summit conference produced a joint Declaration of Principles. The United States apparently sought to impress upon the Soviet Union the fact that improved relations between Moscow and Washington depended on Soviet efforts to dampen regional conflict in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Specifically, the United States obtained Soviet agreement, as expressed in the Declaration of Principles, that efforts by either superpower "to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly," are inconsistent with the strengthening of "peaceful relations" between them. The joint declaration stressed the need for the superpowers to avoid nuclear war both through direct conflict and as a result of the escalation of third-party conflicts. In the effort to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, the declaration promised expanded trade as well as scientific and technological cooperation, both of which Moscow has long sought.

The joint communiqué issued at the end of the conference referred specifically to major international issues. A conference on European security and cooperation could begin after the signing of the Berlin Agreement negotiated in 1971. Both sides agreed that European security might be enhanced by "reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe." Washington has sought such negotiations in part as an alternative to unilateral reductions in U.S. troops stationed in Europe. Yet the superpowers did not reach agreement on the forum for such talks. The United States has favored negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, while the Soviet Union has opposed such negotiations in favor of a looser multilateral framework.

With respect to U.S.-Soviet relations in the Middle East, the communiqué provided evidence of major differences between the superpowers, although both affirmed their desire to bring about a "peaceful settlement." No mention was made of an interim settlement based on the reopening of the Suez Canal and the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula. A political settlement, both sides agreed, "would permit, in particular, consideration of further steps to bring about a military relaxation" in the Middle East.

The communiqué contained no promise of agreement on Viet

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Nam. Instead, both sides restated their positions. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to the principle that the political future of South Viet Nam should be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide without outside interference. The United States called for negotiations leading to the return of all Americans held captive, an internationally supervised ceasefire, the subsequent withdrawal of all U.S. forces stationed in South Viet Nam within four months, and resolution of political questions by the people of Indochina themselves. The Soviet Union stated again its firm support of the North Vietnamese proposals for the settlement of the conflict.

After the Moscow summit, however, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity in Paris surrounding the Viet Nam peace talks. Despite the silence of the joint summit communiqué on specific measures to end the Viet Nam war, the impression persisted that the Nixon-Brezhnev talks have helped at least temporarily to break the diplomatic logjam. There was evidence of suspicion in North Viet Nam that Moscow may wish to counsel caution to Hanoi in the pursuit of its goals in South Viet Nam.

Yet while the Soviet Union depicted itself as the advocate of "peaceful coexistence," the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported in its 1972 yearbook surveying trends in armaments that, shipments to Viet Nam excluded, Moscow has become the prime supplier of arms to the Third World. In 1971 alone, the Soviets reportedly had shipped $420 million worth of aircraft, missiles and other weapons to Egypt, even though Moscow, to the chagrin of President Sadat, was not prepared to make available to the Egyptians offensive weapons capable of tilting the military balance decisively against Israel and precipitating a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The next most favored beneficiary, not surprisingly, was India. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union, despite its apparent setback in Egypt with the withdrawal of Soviet personnel and the Declaration of Principles issuing from the summit conference, will continue to seek "unilateral advantage" through arms shipments to less-developed countries.

Mainland China reacted to the summit meeting by accusing both the Soviet Union and the United States of conspiring to maintain and strengthen superpower "hegemony" over the "middle and small powers." Peking charged that the Soviet Union, in collusion with the United States, has further abandoned the "national liberation" movement, and particularly North Viet Nam. These accusations paralleled those leveled by the Soviet Union against China at the time of President Nixon's trip to Peking. Presumably both Peking and Moscow fear that either communist power might one day enter into agreements with the United States detrimental to the other. As a result, the United States possesses leverage in its relations with both

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communist powers, a fact which became apparent at the time of the U.S. decision to blockade the harbors of North Viet Nam. Neither Moscow nor Peking wished to jeopardize its relationship with Washington on the issue of North Viet Nam. Mots of all, the Soviet Union saw the summit conference as vital to its diplomacy with the United States at a time of U.S. rapprochement with mainland China.

In marked contrast to Peking's reaction, East European response to the Moscow summit was favorable. For example, Polish leaders downplayed the U.S. blockade of North Viet Nam. The first private indication that Moscow had no intention of canceling the summit conference came not from the Kremlin but from Warsaw. The leaders of Poland, not unlike those of other East European states, anticipated an improvement in East-West relations and, in particular, an increase in East-West trade as a result of the conference. In addition, East European leaders saw the summit as providing an international climate conducive to a conference on European security and cooperation.

In Western Europe the reaction was more mixed. While leaders in Bonn, Paris, London and other capitals generally approved President Nixon's policies toward Moscow and Peking, there was reportedly concern over some of the specific outcomes of the Moscow summit. For example, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, at the end of an official visit to Belgium in July, refused to allow the inclusion of the phrase "self-determination" in the final Soviet-Belgian document on the grounds that it had not been included in the declaration at the end of President Nixon's visit to Moscow. West Europeans fear that in a future conference on European security and cooperation this U.S. concession to Moscow may weaken the Western effort to curtail the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty for the East European states. Another major point of concern was the omission, in the Moscow communiqué, of reference to Berlin as a political unit. Instead, the communiqué referred to the "quadripartite agreement relating to the *Western* sectors of Berlin." (Emphasis added.) The implied separation of the two halves of the city corresponds squarely with the Soviet and East German position while it conflicts with long-standing Western policy.

The Moscow summit conference represents but the latest of a series of meetings held by President Nixon with other heads of government. In the Nixon Doctrine, with its emphasis on negotiations, the holding of summit conferences occupies a position of great importance. The President has made dramatic visits to Peking and Moscow. Although in less spectacular fashion, he has also met with the heads of government of U.S. allies. Together, these visits symbolize a U.S. effort to evolve new and durable partnerships with the allies of the past generation, while seeking to maximize whatever diplo-

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matic leverage may accrue from the Sino-Soviet conflict and a world of emergent multipolarity. The extent to which the United States is able to achieve its goals through the conduct of summit conferences will determine its capacity to resolve one of the enduring problems of diplomacy and one of the specific dilemmas of the Nixon Doctrine: how to negotiate with adversaries while retaining intact alliances with countries vital to U.S. security in Europe and Asia.

The May 8 Decision: Setback for Hanoi

BEFORE the U.S. decision to blockade the harbors of North Viet Nam, the prospects of the South Vietnamese defenders against North Viet Nam's massive invasion seemed bleak to many observers. North Vietnamese troops had driven to within a few miles of the old imperial capital at Hue and were being tenuously held at the My Chanh River. Kontum, with its sole road link to Pleiku severed, appeared indefensible and on the verge of succumbing to North Vietnamese forces. The northern half of coastal Binh Dinh province had been overrun and Qui Nhon city was threatened. An Loc was being reduced to rubble by North Vietnamese artillery and the remnants of eight South Vietnamese battalions were besieged within. North Vietnamese divisions were probing the western Delta region. Morale in Saigon sagged noticeably, and many in the United States had become pessimistic about the future of South Viet Nam.

On May 8, President Nixon ordered the mining of North Vietnamese harbors and the intensive bombing of North Viet Nam while offering the most generous U.S. peace terms to date. Fears were raised by opponents of the President's policy that the then imminent Moscow summit and improved U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China would be jeopardized by this military initiative. Contrary to their expectations, however, the United States has maintained its dialogue with both China and the Soviet Union. The need perceived by Peking and Moscow to strengthen their relations with Washington because of differences with each other, appears to have outweighed whatever dissatisfaction they may have felt with the U.S. decisions of May 8.

Since the imposition of the U.S. blockade, South Vietnamese forces have halted and turned back invading forces on several fronts. In the northern First Military Region in Quang Tri province, Lieutenant General Truong launched a surprise raid in mid-May with 1,000 South Vietnamese marines. This force blocked the movement southward toward Hue of a newly infiltrated division from North Viet Nam. By the end of June, South Vietnamese troops had fought their way into Quang Tri city and were in the process of dislodging the entrenched enemy. Although Hue was bombarded by North Vietnamese long-range guns, the pur-

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pose of such attacks appeared to be to slow the South Vietnamese advance rather than to set the stage for an immediate assault.

In the Central Highlands, South Korean troops cleared the pass at An Khe, thus opening the road from Qui Nhon to Pleiku. Assaults by North Vietnamese forces, weakened by concentrated B-52 bombings, failed to breach the defenses at Kontum. The road from Kontum to Pleiku was opened, allowing thousands of refugees to flee to the south. In Binh Dinh province, pressure on Qui Nhon was reduced when the communist advance was repulsed at Phu My. The South Vietnamese have retaken most of the province.

To the northeast of Saigon, South Vietnamese troops finally entered An Loc and ended the siege. Repeated battles on the Cambodian border, in the shadow of Ha Tien in Kien Giang province and along the Parrot's Beak in Kien Tuong province, contained enemy divisions that had been infiltrated into that area from the North. Even in the absence of South Vietnamese units drawn off to other fronts, combined Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units had limited success in disrupting pacification in the densely populated Delta provinces of Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong.

As a result of the South Vietnamese counteroffensive, over a third of the 125,000 invaders from the North were lost and over half of the 500-600 tanks supporting them were destroyed. Of forty-four provinces in South Viet Nam, less than a dozen saw major action and most of those were in lightly populated border regions. Despite the assumption prevalent during the invasion that Vietnamization had failed, the resurgence of South Vietnamese initiative and morale provides evidence to the contrary. The South Vietnamese reeled under the first unexpected blows but did not crumble as the North Vietnamese hoped they would. The overwhelming number of South Vietnamese forces, from Popular and Regional Force militia to regular army and marine units, not only withstood the onslaught but regained the initiative on all fronts.

It was reported that one of Hanoi's five regional commanders was urging North Viet Nam's high command to seek a political settlement; over 4,000 North Vietnamese prisoners were taken and a few units, in an unprecedented action, deserted in the face of fire in the weeks after the imposition of the U.S. blockade and the South Vietnamese offensive. Local Viet Cong—never recovering from their losses during Tet 1968 and Saigon's concerted drive on them since that time—failed to initiate more than a few small unit attacks, which were repulsed, and in nearly all areas they faced an unsympathetic peasantry.

Although the North Vietnamese, according to testimony by Secretary of Defense Laird, wantonly "sprayed artillery into . . . civilian centers just as if they were using a water hose," including over 7,500 shells on besieged An Loc

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in one twenty-four-hour period, the interdiction of supplies by air strikes sharply reduced the rate of their artillery fire.

At the time of imposing the blockade, the United States brought to the scene additional air and sea power. Onstation aircraft carriers were increased from two to six (each carrying an average of sixty-five fighter-bombers), and more than forty destroyers and cruisers shelled North Vietnamese coastal targets. There were no challenges to the American flotilla, and the mining of North Vietnamese ports was effective in shutting off the flow of 200,000 tons per month of vital supplies upon which Hanoi is heavily dependent. The number of eighteen-plane F-4 Phantom squadrons in the Viet Nam theater more than doubled, the number of B-52's tripled to over 145, and between early April and late May the monthly rate of air sorties rose from 1,900 to 5,400. This was still short of the 8,000 sorties per month flown during the peak of the air war in 1967.

Key targets which were inaccessible or off-limits during the 1965-1968 air campaign over the North are now vulnerable. Major power plants at Hongaia, Nam Dinh, Bac Giang, Lang Chi and Viet Tri have been crippled. Both major rail lines from China to the Hanoi-Haiphong area have been cut, eliminating the 22,000 tons of supplies per month previously shipped over that route. Land communications between Hanoi and Haiphong have been severed as well as highway bridges between the North Vietnamese panhandle and Quang Tri.

In as candid an admission as may be expected from Hanoi of the serious problems brought on by the failure of the invasion and the success of the U.S. air campaign, *Nhan Dan*—the official North Vietnamese army daily—was moved to comment on July 15: "in the face of the requirements of the present situation and tasks, we must admit that there are many shortcomings and as a result of this, the work and combat efficiency is still low." Not only did the North fail in its maximum objective of a grand victory, but it fell short even in its minimum objectives of taking Hue and shattering morale in Saigon and Washington—goals attained during the Tet offensive in 1968.

If the timing of the North Vietnamese invasion was aimed at exploiting or exacerbating differences between the superpowers, the result may be quite the opposite. Not only did the Moscow summit proceed on schedule but the Soviet Union also refrained from a military reaction to the mining and air interdiction. In late May, *Nhan Dan* caustically noted, with special attention to the Soviets, that "Communists always consider the revolution of each nation an inseparable part of the world revolution. They never set national interests against the interests of the world revolution nor place private national interests above the common interests of the world revolution, much less serve their own

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national selfishness." Nevertheless, in mid-June President Podgorny flew to Hanoi for "frank" talks, saying afterward that the "Soviet Union will do everything possible for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war."

The Chinese, on their part, have refused to allow Soviet ships use of their harbors to load supplies for transshipment to North Viet Nam. Conceivably, Peking disagrees with Hanoi's military strategy and prefers an approach that would allow for U.S. withdrawal and thus produce conditions favorable to a later communist victory. As a sign of displeasure, it has not made available the large numbers of laborers on which Hanoi previously depended for the repair of road and rail linkages to China.

Another indication of an altered Chinese attitude emerged from recent initiatives to resolve long-standing differences between North and South Korea. Although North Korea maintains close ties with the Soviet Union, the rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China served to encourage negotiations between the two Koreas, and an article in Peking's *People's Daily* drew an analogy between the Korean and Viet Nam situations, stressing that the move toward "peaceful unification" is a "historical trend that no force can check."

In sharp contrast to the deteriorated military position and diplomatic vulnerability confronting the United States and South Viet Nam in the early spring, it is now North Viet Nam which faces intense pressure on the diplomatic front from its allies, on the battlefield in the South, and in severe logistic restraints imposed by mining and bombing. Some of these pressures have operated in the past, but never before at the same time and to the same extent.

The United States has offered to withdraw all American troops and stop "all acts of force" in Indochina within four months of a mutual cease-fire and an exchange of prisoners. On May 12, in Paris, Hanoi Politburo negotiator Le Duc Tho said "Everyone knows that the most arduous problem now existing between the two sides is the problem of power in South Vietnam." In public statements, Hanoi continues to demand that President Thieu and other members of the "repressive apparatus" of the Saigon government (i.e., those unequivocally opposed to communist rule) be excluded from participating in a new government, thereby virtually guaranteeing a communist takeover.

At the end of June, the North Vietnamese Politburo met to review events of the past months and to discuss future moves. In all likelihood, the agenda included an assessment not only of the serious damage to its logistics network and the setbacks administered to its troops in the South, but of the inability, or unwillingness, of Moscow and Peking to respond effectively to the U.S. blockade and air strikes against North Viet Nam. The North Vietnamese retain the

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capability to launch new attacks in the months ahead on the northern front near Hue and to intensify guerrilla warfare elsewhere in the South. Such renewed attacks would be primarily intended to put maximum pressure on the United States during the Presidential election campaign. However, the interdiction of supplies, the lack of fuel for armored vehicles, and the heavy losses already absorbed are likely to impair the effectiveness of a new offensive.

Talks resumed in Paris in mid-July, the first since April 27. On July 10, Dr. Kissinger told newsmen that there were indications of Hanoi's readiness to resume negotiations with a new attitude, and on July 19, Kissinger met with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy for six and one-half hours in Paris. There are hints of a shift in the North Vietnamese bargaining position. It is no longer demanded that a new government be "imposed" on Saigon by the United States. But, as of the end of July, Hanoi still insisted that the United States withdraw its support for President Thieu. Kissinger has raised the possibility of separating the military questions from the issues of a political settlement, which could then be reached separately between North and South Viet Nam.

The problems of negotiating a settlement to the conflict are formidable. The North Vietnamese may be convinced that prospects for a settlement favorable to their interests would be enhanced by a change of administration in the United States. If Hanoi concludes, however, that the Nixon Administration will remain in office, it may perceive advantages in a settlement before the election. The Nixon Administration appears to be attempting to persuade North Viet Nam that the weeks ahead—before the election—are the optimum time for negotiating an end to the war. Whether a settlement can be achieved which provides reasonable assurance of the continued political viability of South Viet Nam is uncertain. Nevertheless, the prospects for Vietnamization and for a settlement which satisfies essential U.S. interests have been enhanced by the decisions announced by President Nixon on May 8.

Egypt's Eviction of Soviet Military Advisers: Causes and Consequences

ON July 18, President Sadat announced Egypt's decisions to "terminate the mission" of Soviet military advisers and take over Soviet military installations and equipment in Egypt. Subsequently, Soviet experts and advisers were replaced by Egyptian army personnel, and Soviet installations became "sole property" of Egypt, under Egyptian administration. These measures astonished the world and engendered unceasing speculation over their causes and consequences.

The origins of the crisis lie deep within Soviet and Egyptian policies in the Middle East. For geopolitical reasons, the USSR has

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always been attracted to the Middle East, as the convenient land bridge between three continents and repository of most of the world's oil. As a world power, it has also been a potent source of arms and influence for the Arab states. The Arab-Israeli dispute, with the Western powers and the United States committed to Israel's survival, furnished the ideal vehicle for Soviet entry into the area on behalf of the Arabs. Thus, the important exchange between the Arabs and the Soviets was motivated on the one side by Soviet global objectives and on the other by Arab regional goals.

The leading Arab state, Egypt, was both the major exponent and the chief beneficiary of Soviet assistance. Until 1967 President Nasser's "positive neutrality," tilted heavily in the Soviet direction, yielded financial, diplomatic and military advantages. While Egypt faced growing difficulties before the Six-Day War, the volume of Soviet support could not be faulted.

The role the Soviet government played in the events leading to the Six-Day War was important but limited. Moscow encouraged Nasser's initial maneuvers, aimed at what the Soviets "confirmed" to be an impending Israeli attack on Syria. During and after the war, the Soviets were the staunchest and most vitriolic partisans of the Arabs in the UN Security Council. But military intervention to save the Arabs does not appear to have been a serious possibility, even though Soviet prestige was gravely impaired by the Arab defeat.

Within a week of the end of the war, the Soviets offered to resupply Egypt with arms. At the same time, Soviet policy seemed designed to counter the Arab feeling of having been encouraged to go to war and then let down by Moscow. An abiding question remained: How far could Moscow be pushed to save its Arab clients, Egypt in particular?

The tension in Soviet-Egyptian relations since the Six-Day War has derived from this question. Nasser probably understood that the Kremlin, despite the USSR's growing military strength and the problems the United States was experiencing at home and abroad, was not prepared to make war against Israel.

Nonetheless, a scheme was designed to "use" the Soviet position in Egypt as the lever for moving American policy. The scheme took a dangerous form: the War of Attrition, begun in the summer of 1969. While Soviet artillery, manned by Egyptians, made the Israeli position along the Suez Canal costly to hold, the Soviets pressed diplomatically for Israeli withdrawal, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. In the spring of 1970, Israel's deep penetration bombing brought more Soviet advisers and even Soviet pilots to Egypt. The implication was clear: unless Israel withdrew, she might be defeated; the alternative was confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In any case, the Soviets were

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being drawn even more deeply into the conflict. It was left to the United States to devise an appropriate formula to force Israeli withdrawal.

The American response in July 1970 was a cease-fire proposal with guarantees against military improvements along the canal and a plan for fresh diplomatic effort. All parties agreed to the proposal in August, but in order to maintain the threat of the War of Attrition, the Soviets and Egyptians violated the cease-fire by installing missiles along the canal—a tactic that had been frustrated previously by Israeli bombardment. This was logical but disastrously shortsighted. It embarrassed the United States and impaired the arguments that "guarantees" would safeguard Israel's security after withdrawal. It cast the worst possible light on Soviet intentions and Egyptian motives. It short-circuited both the American and UN initiatives for settlement. The United States was forced to "rectify" the violations by giving Israel more arms. Thus, in the cease-fire violations of 1970 the Soviet-Egyptian strategy reached its ultimate success and simultaneously overreached into failure.

By the summer of 1971, all of the attempts at general settlement or even an interim agreement reopening the Suez Canal had come to naught. American-Israeli friction, which surfaced noisily in March and April, never really threatened the American-Israeli relationship because Secretary of State Rogers' "guarantees" were too vague and the Soviet arms supply to Egypt was too steady to justify strong-arm tactics against Israel. The cease-fire, although officially renounced by Egypt, still endured, but both sides had been so well supplied with advanced weaponry that a new War of Attrition, limited to the canal area, was less and less conceivable.

Three events now occurred which gave the first clues that the War of Attrition strategy had run its course. First, Sadat sacked Ali Sabry, considered the major Egyptian exponent of pro-Soviet policies. The Soviets then hastily concluded a long-term treaty with Egypt, a device bound to arouse American suspicions that Egypt was no longer a free agent. In retrospect, it appears that this treaty had secret protocols or attachments, specifying fresh supplies of advanced Soviet weaponry suitable for renewing the war. Second, Sadat declared that 1971 would be the "year of decision," the end of the period for diplomacy; in other words, Egypt would go to war unless a satisfactory settlement was reached rapidly. Third, both Egypt and Libya helped Numieri of the Sudan to survive what appeared to be a communist coup d'état in June. This annoyed and angered Moscow. Despite the belligerency of Sadat's proclamation and the volume of Soviet arms, something was clearly amiss.

The Egyptian deadline for war came and passed. Sadat blamed the Indo-Pakistani conflict for Egypt's inaction during the last

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month of 1971. With respect to the Middle East, the Indo-Pakistani episode was to prove as shortsighted for the Soviets as the cease-fire violations of the year before, for Soviet activity before and after the war led Washington to make parallels between South Asia and the Middle East. The pattern of "incremental gains" in Soviet policy was profoundly alarming.

President Nixon's foreign policy message to Congress on February 9, 1972 enunciated a crucial change in the U.S. attitude toward the Middle East. The emphasis was now entirely upon U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and Moscow's record of frustrating attempts at peaceful settlement. Most important, the President declared that "injecting the global strategic rivalry into the region is incompatible with Middle East peace and with détente in U.S.-Soviet relations." This put the United States squarely against the War of Attrition strategy and gave the Soviets a simple choice: better Soviet-Egyptian relations or better Soviet-U.S. relations, but *not* both.

Sadat, suspicious since May of Soviet policies, now had graver difficulties. Plainly, the new American position underlined that the Soviet presence, far from hastening a victorious war or a favorable peace, meant the indefinite delay of both. This favored everyone except Egypt. Soviet policy was subject to the precise complaint against the British made by the Free Officers who overthrew King Farouk in 1952; the great power's global relationship restricted Egypt's freedom of action. In addition, the Egyptian army, although blamed for losing in 1967, was still the mainstay of the regime. The army's injured pride had been insulted further by the insensitivity of Soviet advisers; now the inactivity of the cease-fire was placed upon it as well.

In this context, the Moscow summit conference between President Nixon and Soviet leaders confirmed the superpowers' policies and condemned Egypt to mounting internal pressures. Sadat was quoted once as saying: "In Egypt, personalities have always been more important than ideologies." He had to choose between the army's demand to strike at the Soviets, which would endanger Egypt's hope to win a new war, or to resist the army's demand and purge its leadership, which would endanger Anwar Sadat's personal position. Since the Soviet Union could not keep Sadat in power, and the Egyptian army could probably put him out of power, the choice was self-evident.

While Egypt and the USSR still have strong bonds, and the Soviets still enjoy the use of naval bases, the basic rationale for the Soviet presence has been destroyed. Moscow clearly cannot produce a settlement favorable to Egypt and will not promote a war to recover Egyptian territory. This position has been highlighted by U.S. policy since February.

Until now, the United States and most Middle East experts were agreed that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute—the soon-

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er the better—was the only way to restrict Soviet influence in the area. Paradoxically, it turns out that the *lack* of a settlement has proved more disastrous to Moscow than to Washington. There are many reasons for this, but the basic one is simply that the Egyptians sought Soviet assistance because it promised to produce favorable results. When it clearly did not, when Soviet assistance disposed the United States to arm Israel more rather than less, the game was over. The War of Attrition proved to be a bluff.

This should not lessen U.S. concern for a settlement. There are those who believe that American initiative to produce Israeli withdrawal should now be undertaken to "reward" Sadat. Perhaps the Egyptian government is hoping this will happen, although Sadat would have had to move against the Soviets anyhow. U.S. initiatives, however, will probably have to await the American Presidential election. Meanwhile, the positions of both sides on the settlement continue implacably opposed. The presence of fewer Russians need not make Sadat any more pliable, although Israel's stipulations on the Suez Canal reopening may be reduced.

In any event, the real drama will not be in the diplomacy of the great powers, because both Egypt and Israel are now strong enough to resist such pressure. It will be in Egypt itself. Having dealt with one danger—the Soviets—Sadat must now deal with the army chiefs who threatened him. He is also put in an awkward position by the dangerous antics of Colonel Quaddafi, whose behavior menaces the Arab world with a fresh split. Although Libya, Egypt and Syria are associated in a federation, Quaddafi has demanded that Libya and Egypt combine in a single state. This will make it difficult for Syria to remain in the federation, because the Syrian government has two communist ministers and the Libyan leader, a ferocious anti-communist, would plainly have a prominent post in the combined state. Sadat is not alone in his embarrassment with Quaddafi's demands. The French have justified their sale of a hundred Mirages to Libya on the grounds that Libya is a noncombatant in the Arab-Israeli war. A new Libyan-Egyptian state would eliminate that justification and spell the official end of the French "embargo" on arms sales to combatants in the Six-Day war.

The United States and Israel have clearly benefited from the resounding failure of the Soviet-Egyptian alliance. The United States will gain greater influence in Arab capitals, as the re-establishment of relations with Yemen and Sudan indicates, and no price in pro-Arab gestures need be paid. Israel's greatest fear—a war in which Soviet prestige could not tolerate a defeat—has now been temporarily laid aside. Yet the Soviets, too, have gained by their "exodus" from Egypt: they are no longer committed to Sadat's regime or to Egypt's success in war. In the event that Egypt's internal

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crisis brings about a breakdown in the cease-fire, neither Soviet personnel nor Soviet prestige will be engaged in the battle. The great question now is whether the reduced Soviet presence contributes more to war or peace; the Soviet position before the "expulsion" failed to be decisive in either regard.

Britain and the Irish Question

IN Northern Ireland the British government faces a deepening crisis. What began in 1969 as a short-term deployment of British troops to separate warring Catholic and Protestant street gangs has become a large-scale armed confrontation between the British army and the modern version of the Irish Republican army, a guerrilla organization condemned by both the British government and the Irish Republic.

The present conflict has origins deeply rooted in the history of Anglo-Irish relations. In an effort to resolve the age-old "Irish Question," Britain partitioned Ireland in 1922 into two parts. The larger southern unit, the Catholic-dominated twenty-six county area which opted for independence from Britain, eventually became known as the Irish Republic. The remaining six counties, comprising the northeast section of the island and dominated by the Protestant descendants of the original Ulster colony, chose to remain an integral but semi-autonomous part of the United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland, by retaining control of the internal governmental functions, the Protestant majority was able to assure its continued political ascendancy. However, large numbers of Catholics in both parts of Ireland refused to accept the legitimacy of partition or the right of the Protestant majority in the North to deny the minority full equality.

Although feelings on the issues of partition and civil rights ran high on both sides of the border, there was hope by the mid-1960's that nonviolent solutions to the outstanding problems were becoming the norm. Then, in the 1967-1969 period, strident Catholic demands in Northern Ireland for civil equality engendered increasingly hostile responses from certain elements in the Protestant majority. When it became apparent that local authorities were unable to contain the situation, British troops were called in to separate the two sides. But the British army soon found itself engaged in an urban guerrilla war with the militant wing of the I.R.A.—the Provisionals—who claimed to be the legitimate protectors of the Catholic minority. The situation continued to deteriorate, with the consequence that in March of this year Britain suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament and assumed direct responsibility for the governing of the province. Since then, London has sought to effect a viable cease-fire as a prerequisite for negotiations on a permanent solution to the conflict. To date it has been unsuccessful.

In the early summer, hopes of achieving a durable cease-fire were raised and then dashed. On May 29 the "Official" wing of the

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I.R.A., with Marxist leanings, declared a halt to offensive operations, but retained the prerogative of defensive retaliation. Several weeks later the "Provisional" wing (the chief perpetrators of the latest wave of terrorism), pressured by supporters, agreed to a cease-fire to begin on June 26. Acceptance of the cease-fire was predicated on the following conditions: (1) the British army's policy of interning suspected I.R.A. members without trial would end; (2) British security forces would cease patrolling Catholic neighborhoods; (3) the security forces would not move against I.R.A. men "on the run," a euphemism to designate those being sought by the authorities; and (4) the I.R.A. would have some form of representation at any conference called to discuss the future of Northern Ireland. The *quid pro quo* offered by the Provisionals appeared to be simply a cessation of their attacks, an obligation not fully met during the short week and a half the cease-fire was in effect.

On the eve of the cease-fire two disconcerting developments signaled that the truce would be tenuous at best. First, the Provisionals stepped up their terror campaign "to show the army that we are quite capable of carrying out operations whenever we decide they are essential for the freedom of Ireland," according to one of their spokesmen. Second, the Vanguard movement, embracing the militant Protestant organizations, asserted through its leader, William Craig, that it would not recognize the existence of a cease-fire. Craig stated: "If the forces of the Crown do not discharge their duty in apprehending I.R.A. terrorists, the Loyalists will have no option but to clean them out themselves, and to take such action as is necessary against the republican community."

William Whitelaw, British Secretary for Northern Ireland and the chief administrative officer in the province since the suspension of the Northern Ireland Parliament, thus was once again forced to struggle with the dilemma in which Britain is caught. To enter into negotiations with the I.R.A. in order to bring an end to the killing and bombing is to risk alienation of the Protestant majority who see any accommodation with the terrorists as a concession to demands backed by violence. In recent months, the Protestants have been especially angered by British reluctance to dismantle I.R.A. barricades erected around Catholic neighborhoods. This anger has led them to establish their own barricaded areas.

The other aspect of the dilemma is illustrated by the British attempt to assuage the Protestants' fear of being forced into union with the Irish Republic. London has constantly reaffirmed its determination not to tolerate any change in the status of Northern Ireland except by majority choice of the inhabitants. Its announcement that a referendum on the partition issue would be held in Northern Ireland in the autumn of this year was greeted positively by the Protestant majority and roundly condemned by the Catholic minority. The Catholics, and

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especially the Provisional I.R.A., view British initiatives along this line as continued support of their "oppression." While striving to be equitable in its dealings with both sides, Britain is unable to placate either. In an atmosphere dominated by deep-seated hatreds and primordial fears, the traditional British belief in the efficacy of compromise has been severely tested.

On July 9 the Provisionals broke the fragile cease-fire. The ostensible reason for the rupture, at least from their viewpoint, was the delay in allowing displaced Catholic families to occupy empty housing in a Protestant district, caused by British fear of precipitating new sectarian strife. A clash between Catholic youths and British troops over this issue became the pretext for renewing guerrilla operations. In announcing the end of their participation in the cease-fire, the Provisionals threatened to strike at the British army "with the utmost ferocity." In reply, the army, altering past policy, decided to move in force against I.R.A. concentrations in order to round up terrorists and seize arms and bomb caches. This move placated the Protestants but risked further Catholic alienation. The effectiveness of Whitelaw's policy of conciliation, designed to weaken support for the terrorists within the Catholic community, was brought seriously into question.

While the fighting continued, Whitelaw met with I.R.A. officials to discuss the possibility of renegotiating a truce, drawing criticism from some members of Parliament as well as from the Protestants for his action. The I.R.A. leaders presented him with a list of demands that, if met, would have been tantamount to the British government's surrender to the terrorists. They included: (1) public recognition that the entire people of Ireland had a right to participate in deciding the future of Northern Ireland; (2) Britain's declaration that all its forces would withdraw from Irish soil before January 1, 1975; (3) immediate withdrawal of all British troops from "sensitive" areas, meaning those where the Provisionals had set up their own form of "military" government; and (4) general amnesty for political prisoners, internees, and wanted men "on the run."

Granted these demands, the I.R.A. could rightly have claimed that its campaign of terror had achieved its goals. Protestant fears of being abandoned by London would have been intensified, and the prospect of civil war would have loomed ever larger. However, the strong British response to terrorist attacks in Belfast on July 21 provided a signal that London remained adamant in its refusal to accede to terrorist demands.

To the south, the Irish Republic continued to be affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland. The government of Prime Minister Lynch, although critical of British management of the conflict and committed to the Republic's "official" position that partition is unnatural and should end, stepped up its pressure against the outlawed I.R.A. There has always existed a basic antagonism between

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the I.R.A. and the government of the Irish Republic. One of the ultimate I.R.A. goals is the destruction of the present form of government in Dublin and its replacement by an Irish Socialist Republic. Yet Lynch, aware of his slim majority in the Irish Parliament and the considerable public support for the end of partition, had allowed the leaders of both the Provisional and Official factions to move about freely in the South, and the Republic had remained an open sanctuary for I.R.A. members sought by Northern authorities. Recently this situation has changed. Encouraged by public support for Ireland's membership in the Common Market, and sensing a growing revulsion against I.R.A. terrorism, Lynch has stiffened his government's efforts to find and detain the leaders and suspected members of both wings of the I.R.A.

Whether or not this "hard-line" policy will continue is dependent upon developments in Northern Ireland. If Britain's renewed military efforts against the terrorists should result in a substantial increase in Catholic civilian casualties, caused either by British troops or Protestant militants, public sentiment in the Republic could swing back toward support for the I.R.A. and influence the Lynch government accordingly. On the other hand, should the excesses of the terrorists increase opposition in the Republic to such tactics, Lynch would have even greater latitude in attempting to limit I.R.A. movements.

The Catholic Church has made a major effort to dampen tensions by calling upon its membership, in all of Ireland, to denounce the terrorist campaign. In addition, Cardinal Conway, the Catholic Primate for Ireland, has reiterated his willingness to support a secularization of the Irish Republic's Constitution that would remove the various articles favoring the Catholic Church. This would eliminate *one* of the Protestant arguments against eventual union of the two parts of Ireland.

The longer the Irish conflict continues, the more frustrating grows the British attempt at mediation, and the more likely it becomes that Britain will be compelled to send additional troops to the troubled province. Britain has increased its troop levels in Northern Ireland, currently estimated at 21,000 men, at the expense of its commitment to NATO. While the redeployment has not yet reached critical proportions, if civil war should break out between the Protestants and Catholics, the number of British troops needed in Northern Ireland could well double or triple. The effect would be to weaken both the British commitment to NATO and the prospects for maintaining a NATO strategic doctrine based on "flexible response." The Irish question would consume British energies at a time when Britain, having joined the Common Market, could play a major role in building a more unified Western Europe as a potential power center in the multipolar world of the 1970's.

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ASSESSING THE MOSCOW SALT AGREEMENTS*

by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

AN ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles were signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev on May 26, 1972. Even though great powers have often negotiated and broken international agreements in response to their changing interests, these accords have been hailed, respectively by their supporters and opponents, as the beginning of a new era of peaceful coexistence between the superpowers, and as a mold which would lock the United States into permanent status as a second-rate power. Therefore, it is appropriate to inquire whether the agreements signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow contribute to international security and the security of the United States, or at least do not detract from existing security. Do they, in fact, restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Do they lead directly to superpower *détente* or improve the prospects for further agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union? Do they facilitate the reduction of military spending in favor of domestic needs? This article analyzes the outcome of SALT Phase I and seeks tentative answers to such questions.

The Treaty and the Executive Agreement

In Phase I of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty and an executive agreement; the former is unlimited, while the latter will terminate after five years unless renewed. The Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missiles limits these systems to the protection of the respective national command centers and permits each side to protect offensive missile sites. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are permitted two ABM sites, each of which is limited to 100 interceptor missiles. ABM's can be deployed to protect the capacity of each power to act in a crisis and to supply minimal protection of land-based ICBM's. The treaty applies only to the current state-of-the-art ABM, namely, phased-array radars and short-

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range and long-range interception. Innovations in missile defense — for example, those based on a new principle such as the laser — are not proscribed. The transfer of ABM systems or their components by either the United States or the Soviet Union to other states is prohibited. Each state is to use national technical means of verification, and each agrees not to engage in "deliberate concealment measures" which impede verification by the other signatory. Although the ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, it is subject to review every five years. Each state reserves the right to withdraw after giving six months' notice if it concludes that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized its national interests. The circumstances in which a signatory might feel compelled to withdraw from a strategic arms limitation agreement include suspicion that the other party is violating the accord, that new weapons have changed the impact of the restrictions, or that the agreement has simply not functioned in the manner originally contemplated.

The executive agreement, made for five years, freezes the number of fixed land-based launchers and permits no upgrading of warheads and only a marginal increase in the size of silos. No new silo starts are permitted after July 1, 1972. The Soviets are not allowed to turn their old and lighter missiles into heavy missiles (SS-9's), and there is a prohibition against the significant enlargement of missile silos defined as greater than 15 per cent of the diameter of the land-based ICBM silo. These restrictions are also applicable to the United States. There appears, however, to be some ambiguity about the definition of a heavy missile. The United States, after formally regretting that the Soviet Union had not agreed on a common definition of "heavy ICBM's" into which "light" ICBM's may not be converted, made a unilateral declaration that the agreement prohibits conversion of light ICBM's into missiles "having a volume significantly greater than the largest light ICBM now in operation."

The construction and deployment of fixed land-based ICBM's is limited to those under construction before July 1, 1972: 1,054 for the United States and approximately 1,618 for the Soviet Union.[1]

[1]According to public estimates, the USSR already possesses an advantage of about 60 per cent in ICBM's (U.S.—1,054;USSR—1,618) and under the SALT agreement could gain a similar advantage in missile-launching submarines (62-44), if it were willing to reduce its ICBM force to 1,408. By taking this option, the Soviets could acquire one-third more submarine-launched ballistic missiles (950-710) and a more than threefold advantage in megatonnage of total missile payload. See *The Military Balance 1971-1972* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), especially pp. 3-5; see also the *New York Times,* June 5, 1972.

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Because the Soviets never disclosed the number of ICBM's at their disposal, the United States arrived at the agreement on the assumption, derived from intelligence estimates, that the Soviet arsenal included 1,618 ICBM's. Although the Interim Agreement contains no prohibition on mobile land-based launchers, the United States issued a unilateral declaration that it would regard deployment of such missiles as inconsistent with the goals of the agreement.

The agreement also provides for limitations on the deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), restricting these to 710 for the United States and 950 for the Soviet Union. The United States is limited to 44 modern ballistic-missile-carrying submarines and the Soviet Union to 62 such submarines. According to the agreement, older ICBM launchers can be replaced by SLBM launchers. It is likely that the Soviet Union, at least, will exercise this option. For example, the United States could trade its 54 Titan missiles for three modern new submarines, each armed with 18 missiles, while the Soviet Union could substitute for 210 of its pre-1964 land-based missiles more advanced capabilities in the form of SLBM's on 20 additional submarines not yet operational or under construction. The Soviets may also convert 30 older sea-launched missiles into an equal number of modern SLBM's. Because the agreement prohibits new construction of fixed ICBM's rather than specifying a maximum allowable number of ICBM's, the parties may not build up to their previous ICBM strength after converting older ICBM's into SLBM's. Thus, if the Soviets convert 210 older missiles into an equal number of SLBM's, their total ICBM strength will fall from 1,618 to 1,408 as their SLBM's rise from 740 to 950.

If all options are taken, through exchange of obsolete ICBM's for submarines and completion of present programs, the Soviets will achieve numerical superiority in ICBM's (1,408 to 1,000) and SLBM's (950 to 710). U.S. willingness to accept this prospect suggests confidence in some qualitative advantage which offsets Soviet numerical superiority over the next five years.

The Soviet Union issued a unilateral declaration, rejected by the United States, that it reserved the right to increase the number of its SLBM submarines if the United States and its NATO allies undertook to build more than a combined total of 50 such submarines with 800 SLBM's. Since the British and French together have nine submarines in operation or under construction, the United States can increase the number of its submarines from 41

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to the 44 permitted by the agreement only at the risk of leading the Soviet Union to make commensurate increases in SLBM strength. Hence, if the United States exercises a mutually agreed upon option to exchange its old Titan missiles for modern SLBM's, it faces an expansion of the Soviet missile submarine fleet beyond the numbers set in the Interim Agreement. A similar Soviet expansion will probably result if the British and French build additional submarines to strengthen their strategic deterrents.

A Net Assessment of the Agreements

The gains and losses resulting from the Soviet-American agreements to limit some offensive and defensive missile systems may be calculated in the following terms: (1) mutual gains for both the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) net Soviet gains; (3) net U.S. gains; (4) mutual losses for both the United States and the Soviet Union; and (5) the unknown impact factor.

Mutual Gains for both the United States and the Soviet Union

(1) A limited step has been taken to curtail the arms race by restricting deployment of certain categories of weapons, thereby possibly reducing the danger of nuclear war, even though development of new weapons has not been halted.

(2) For the short term, at least, mutual confidence between Soviet and U.S. leaders may increase as a result of the SALT accord. But good-will atmospherics may also obscure important political differences between the superpowers. The effect of this situation is potentially greater for the United States than for the Soviet Union because of the fundamentally different role played by public opinion in the two countries. A major danger of this asymmetry is that domestic pressures may restrict the options available to the U.S. government, whereas the Soviet leadership, benefiting from a relatively "closed" foreign policy process, has greater latitude in pursuing its aims within the loose framework of a strategic arms control agreement.

(3) The influence of Soviet "hardliners" who have stressed the possibility of winning a strategic nuclear war may have been lessened. Soviet analysts who have advocated arms control measures and believe a nuclear war with the United States is unwinnable may enjoy enhanced influence. Only the passage of time will tell if this is, in fact, the outcome. It might be promoted if the United States began to think of bargaining on the basis of what

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U.S. goals could best support groups in the Soviet Union receptive to developments compatible with U.S. policies. This would be appropriate not only in future phases of the SALT but in other Soviet-American bargaining situations as well.

It is risky, however, to impute such differences to members of the Soviet policy community. Even if they exist, their implications for Soviet strategy may be questionable. Moscow may continue a large-scale R&D effort and the deployment of weapons in areas excluded from the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons in order to gain political and psychological advantages in its overall strategy. It is accepted that the two superpowers may have reached agreement in the SALT while retaining quite different objectives. Under such circumstances, the Soviets might seek to use the SALT as a device for increasing their capabilities in areas not included in the agreement.

Net Soviet Gains

(1) The SALT agreement freezes the arms race in fixed land-based ICBM and SLBM launchers in a condition of U.S. inferiority in numbers of launchers and, more important, in throw-weight. At the same time, it prohibits the United States from undertaking further measures for the survivability of its land-based forces through defense. The freeze comes at the best time for the Soviets, who are at or just over the peak of their strategic buildup, and who have developed a far more comprehensive civil defense program than the United States. It comes at a time when the United States has not yet taken the decision to respond to that buildup. So while the freeze may halt Soviet "momentum," it does so at the critical time when the United States must decide whether it will develop programs, like ULMS (Undersea Long-range Missile System), to offset the present Soviet superiority in numbers of launchers.

(2) The agreement cannot freeze the psychological dynamics of the arms race. Because of the Soviet strategic buildup over the last five years, the impression has been created that the USSR has seized the initiative from the United States and has achieved important elements of strategic superiority. Thus, the agreement tends to strengthen the idea abroad that the United States has been overtaken, quantitatively at least, in certain areas of strategic weaponry. And Soviet leaders can now deal with the United States on the basis, at least, of strategic equality.

(3) American technological superiority in MIRV's is *not*

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frozen, nor is the Soviet capacity to develop similar capabilities restricted. Sophisticated technical problems such as guidance, thrust termination, and adjustments for atmospheric variations become increasingly important as greater accuracy and reliability are sought in delivery systems. The Soviets will probably continue their strategic arms buildup by transferring resources previously committed to achieving superiority in numbers of launchers to MIRV development and production. Qualitative gains in the Soviet strategic arsenal will not be susceptible to effective U.S. monitoring. Moreover, although a second round of the SALT will probably be addressed to the complex question of limiting MIRV development, Soviet reluctance to permit on-site inspection will cause those talks to drag on for months if not years. (SALT I, without dealing with this troublesome issue, required two years of negotiation during which the Soviet buildup proceeded apace.) During SALT II, intense pressure will be placed on the U.S. government to make agreement possible by such conciliatory gestures as slowing down or halting its MIRV program. At the same time, Soviet leaders, who are largely immune from domestic political pressure, will be able to embark on a crash MIRV program if they so decide.

(4) The U.S. technological lead in ABM development is frozen effectively by the limit on ABM's to be deployed. Under the ABM Treaty, the United States forfeits the option of deploying on a national scale an anti-ballistic missile defense that would be technologically superior to its Soviet counterpart. The Soviet Union has already deployed a national capital area (NCA) defense system, but deployment of an ABM around Washington depends upon Congressional appropriations and support. Yet, Congress can be expected to consider skeptically, and possibly refuse, requests for further "unnecessary" expenditures for an NCA defense. For example, for a capital deployment the Administration cannot count on the invaluable support of such Congressional backers of its Safeguard program as Senator Jackson. The Senator disapproved of the ABM accord:

> In the course of our Senate hearings on SALT — long before the Moscow summit — we warned the administration many times that the Congress, at my initiative, had turned down funds for an ABM site around Washington, D.C., on the grounds it would not be effective. The Soviets could easily overwhelm that ABM site. I was amazed, therefore, to learn that the President had signed an agreement in Moscow that called for a deployment on our part that the Congress had previously rejected, while abandoning a sensible deployment that the Congress had approved —

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namely, additional ABM sites to protect our deterrent land-based missile forces.[2]

Even in the event an ABM system *is* erected around Washington, the Soviets retain an edge. The Moscow area is far more heavily industrialized than Washington and is the scientific center of the Soviet Union. In these respects, it is the equivalent of Washington and New York combined.

(5) The Soviet Union will achieve superiority in submarine-launched ballistic missiles by taking full advantage of the options provided by the executive agreement to convert obsolete ICBM's (SS-7's and SS-8's) and obsolete SLBM's (G and H class submarines) into Polaris-type SLBM's. An expanded Soviet SLBM capability will require substantial increases in the U.S. budget for ASW (anti-submarine warfare) since SLBM's can be fired from the seas south of the U.S. border — a direction from which the United States lacks warning. This contingency Washington has striven to avoid, from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 to the understandings worked out in 1970 with Moscow to prevent the stationing of Soviet submarines armed with strategic missiles in the Caribbean.

(6) Both the United States and the Soviet Union may feel compelled to allocate new resources to develop an alternative to the ABM that is new "in principle." The need for a new "principle" is already recognized in Moscow, and if Soviet leaders should devote resources to such a system while the United States does not, a direct loss may result for the United States. The U.S. government, in contrast to the Soviet, is likely to find it difficult to pursue a rigorous R&D program, even though research for ABM is not prohibited by the treaty. If the U.S. Congress opposes new defense programs, the Soviets may gain because of the problem of extended lead-times, which require decisions on weapons development to be made five to ten years before their actual production and deployment.

(7) Large ruble appropriations previously consumed by the Soviet strategic buildup may be freed for domestic programs serving to strengthen the USSR's political and economic base. Newly freed resources can be used to modernize and expand heavy industry (including conventional arms) and to increase consumer goods production. With greater resources available, the Soviet Union will also be in better position to overcome some of its perennial problems of agricultural production.

[2]Senator Henry M. Jackson, "Are We No. 2?," *Ideas*, June 18, 1972, p. 12.

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Net U.S. Gains

(1) The agreement leaves the United States with leads in strategic bombers and MIRV technology. In this respect it cuts both ways. While it allows the Soviets to reallocate resources to areas of U.S. strength, it also permits the United States to continue to develop its advantages *if we have the political will to do so.* The agreement may prove disadvantageous, however, if the United States pauses in its R&D program and production while the Soviet Union plunges full steam ahead.

(2) The Soviet numerical buildup in strategic offensive weapons is slowed. But the buildup is not halted, unless the Soviets fail to take advantage of their options to convert obsolete missiles into SLBM's. As suggested above, the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles prohibits the construction of new launchers rather than prescribing a limit on numbers of launchers. The figures utilized in the SALT by the United States were our own, since no Soviet data were made available — in itself reflecting a worrisome asymmetry between the superpowers. If the United States finds a new concentration of Soviet ICBM's, the question will arise as to when it was installed — before or after the agreement.[3] Thus, the agreement introduces a serious ambiguity into the U.S.-Soviet arms control relationship and leaves important questions potentially unanswered. Do we really know how many "operational" land-based ICBM's the Soviet Union possessed or had under construction as of July 1, 1972? Is disagreement likely to arise between Moscow and Washington over when construction of a particular missile site began? Can we monitor other aspects of the SALT for violations of prohibited activities, including upgrading surface-to-air missiles and giving them an ABM capability, increasing the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers by more than 15 per cent, or deploying ABM launchers with a capability for launching multiple interceptors?

(3) The agreement might provide impetus in Europe toward the assumption of a larger role in European security. This would be a net gain for the United States if we seek, over time, to devolve greater local security responsibilities to the Europeans. Western Europe would have more incentive to maintain national nuclear forces and perhaps even to collaborate technologically to build a new generation of strategic forces for the needs of deterrence in the 1980's. This is so because the accord freezes Soviet strategic

[3]For an examination of this point, see Donald G. Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review,* June 23, 1972, p. 685.

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defenses which European nuclear forces must be able to penetrate. The limitation of the Soviet ABM system leaves ample targets of value for European deterrent forces. An effective limitation on ABM's would have the effect of increasing, or at least not diminishing, the credibility of the offensive forces of nonsignatories. At the same time, however, the agreement creates an atmosphere of *détente,* real or perceived, that could make European nuclear forces appear less necessary to European publics eager to reduce defense spending.

Mutual Losses for both the United States and the Soviet Union

The credibility of the future Chinese nuclear capability is increased since, like the European forces, it will not have to cope with large-scale ABM defenses in either the Soviet Union or the United States. Both superpowers lose the advantage a "thin" area ABM might have provided against an accidental launch of an ICBM or an attack by a smaller nuclear power. If we assume that the Soviet Union, to a greater extent than the United States, has potential conflicts of interest with smaller nuclear powers present and emergent, the loss of ABM, in this regard, may be more severe for the Soviet Union than for the United States. In the absence of a comprehensive Soviet ABM, the result should be enhanced Chinese political-military influence vis-à-vis the superpowers in the next decade. For this reason, however, the Soviet Union may have an incentive to engage in intensive R&D to produce an ABM designed to counter potential "Nth country" nuclear forces in a more multipolar world of the 1980's.

The Unknown Impact Factor

(1) Often the most important impact of an international agreement is not known for years and cannot be anticipated by analysis at the time a decision is made. The history of past disarmament agreements cautions against euphoric interpretations of this most recent accord. Frequently the impact of such agreements is to rechannel military spending from one area to another; give one signatory a false sense of confidence; or ultimately arouse the antagonism of one power in the belief that the prohibitions to which it has agreed are asymmetrical. In the last case, the decision to rearm in contravention of an earlier agreement may gravely aggravate international tensions — beyond what they would have been had no agreement been reached in the first place,

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Several possible results of a "false sense of confidence" on the part of the United States may be set forth. They include the curtailment of Congressional appropriations for important defense and foreign policy initiatives; greater pressures for the decoupling of American security guarantees, not only from Europe or Japan but also from *de facto* allies like Israel; and the increase of domestic pressure for further agreements, to the point where it might hamper the U.S. ability to bargain from a position of "equality" in subsequent arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

(2) The impact of the agreement upon the proliferation question is uncertain. The SALT limit on offensive weapons may halt the trend toward proliferation, since the Soviet threat may appear to some governments to have been scaled down; yet the treaty limitations on defense, to the extent that they make nascent offensive systems more credible, may encourage proliferation. Under conditions of strategic parity and Soviet equality, symbolized by the SALT, the extended deterrent of the United States rests increasingly on uncertainty. The result could be to give impetus to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states fearful that the U.S. strategic deterrent has been, or will be, "decoupled" from their defense.

SALT, the Strategic Balance, and International Security

Even though the Soviet Union is permitted, under the terms of the SALT agreements, to maintain larger numbers of launchers with greater throw-weight than needed for a countercity-mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy, and to improve the accuracy of MIRV, some interpretations of the agreements suggest that a balance of terror has been recognized officially by both governments. This balance is to be sustained by preventing ABM deployment for area defense, which might make feasible a counterforce, first-strike strategy. Since the United States, with its advanced MIRVed missiles and smaller warheads, possesses a nuclear force largely but not exclusively designed for countercity targets, it is reasonable to allow the Soviet Union some numerical advantage to compensate for its less accurate and less advanced MIRVed weapons. The Soviets might be expected to have little incentive to exceed the quantitative limits of the agreements, already highly advantageous to them, because their own MIRV development or SLBM's could make up the difference. With their heavier missiles resulting in a four-to-one advantage in payload,

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the Soviets possess a capability with impressive counterforce characteristics. Under the SALT accords, they are permitted larger numbers of launchers with greater throw-weight than needed for a countercity strategy.

If the Soviet government has come to accept prevailing strategic thought in the United States, namely, that neither side could survive a nuclear war, has there been a major revision in Soviet strategic doctrine? It is difficult at this stage in the U.S.-Soviet strategic dialogue to discern whether or not a fundamental change has occurred. The answer to this question depends upon future Soviet arms control initiatives as well as Soviet R&D trends and deployments of weapons systems now under development. It depends on an accurate perception of the strategic calculus of the opponent, which has not always been achieved by U.S. analysts in the past. But the agreement on offensive missiles is for five years only. For example, it is possible, as suggested earlier, that a new-principle Soviet ABM will be developed. While researching and developing a new ABM system, the Soviets can deploy and MIRV the maximum ICBM or SLBM forces permitted by the SALT accord. If they showed marked restraint in such deployment, and in R&D, we would obviously have greater reason for optimism about a change in their strategic outlook than is now the case. It is conceivable, as critics of the SALT have contended, that Moscow seeks to utilize the accords to ratify Soviet-American strategic parity, to freeze U.S. quantitative inferiority in those areas where it presently exists, and to allow the Soviet Union to maximize its potential in *qualitative* dimensions of strategic armaments.

The transfer from competition through deployment to competition through R&D does not necessarily end the Soviet quest for strategic superiority. Indeed, the SALT agreement increases the likelihood of the Soviet Union catching up in ABM and MIRV technologies, in both of which it currently lags behind the United States. The United States, on the other hand, is hampered from developing a counterforce strategy since American megatonnage and weapons systems are countercity and the agreement forecloses the upgrading of silos and weights of a new generation of offensive missiles.

In sum, then, the treaty and executive agreement may delay the Soviet Union's deployment of a complete counterforce, first-strike arsenal with ABM for at least five years, pending new-principle qualitative improvements in its numerically superior counterforce weight missiles. If the Soviets chose to make such qualitative im-

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provements, the United States would be without any recourse save the rapid application of its R&D in new ABM and ASW systems, provided it could overcome lead-time barriers. But will the United States maintain a strong R&D program in a period of expectation of further arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union? Moreover, can the United States in future arms control negotiations influence the evolution of Soviet strategic posture toward a more stable and secure balance at lower levels of effort?

Implicit in much thought about arms control is the assumption that nonproliferation is good in itself. Especially in the changing international system of the 1970's, it is not fully within the capacity of the superpowers to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by "Nth countries." Will agreements that retard the deployment of nuclear weapons by the superpowers, in fact, slow the further development of nuclear weapons by existing nuclear powers and their acquisition by other states? This question concerns seven states in particular: China, India, Japan, Israel, Egypt, France and the United Kingdom.

China has its own reasons — prestige and defense — to continue construction of its arsenal, especially against the Soviet Union. As the Chinese arsenal grows, the nearby states of India and Japan may not maintain their faith in superpower protection. Hence, such countries cannot look to the bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements as an argument against proliferation, unless the Chinese also agree to limit their arms. The prospects for Peking's agreement are slim. China will probably eschew strategic arms control, while continuing to develop its military capabilities as rapidly as possible, and — without neglecting selective conventional weapons — will concentrate on a nuclear force oriented toward a regional capability.

Both Israel and Egypt see the deployment of nuclear weapons as the last resort, although there is some evidence that Israel has gone far toward the development of an atomic capability. So long as neither finds itself alone against the other in alliance with a superpower (e.g., Israel against Egypt and the Soviet Union), nuclear weapons have slight military utility. But the superpowers can do little to diminish the prospect of their acquisition through the SALT, unless the effect of the accords is clearly to decouple the nuclear deterrent of one superpower, but not the other, from the defense of its erstwhile ally.

Finally, there is the European question. Here the result of the SALT is ambiguous. The agreements signed in Moscow contain

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no reference to NATO. However, both the Soviet Union and the United States issued unilateral interpretations of the arms pact. The Soviet statement claimed the right of the Soviet Union to increase the number of its submarines if NATO, or the European countries, deployed additional submarines. The United States issued a statement of interpretation of Article IX of the treaty to limit ABM's. In this article, each side agrees not to transfer to other states or to deploy outside its national territory anti-ballistic missiles or their components. Although this forecloses one option available to the United States, namely, to assist Western Europe to acquire an ABM, the U.S. statement was to the effect that the no-transfer article of the ABM Treaty did not establish a precedent for any future offensive weapons treaty. According to the U.S. interpretation, "The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution."[4]

The question that arises is whether Article IX adds to the prohibitions contained in the Nonproliferation Treaty, which does not prevent the transfer of nuclear technology to existing nuclear powers, such as Britain and France. The potential for U.S.-Soviet disagreement heightens if the Soviets seek to use the no-transfer article to prevent U.S. technological assistance to nuclear allies. They might argue that any transfer of information about, for example, nuclear warhead design and construction, violates Article IX of the ABM Treaty because such data form a vital component of ballistic missile defense.

Agreements — tacit or formal — between the United States and the USSR on the transfer-of-technology issue will have important implications for European security. Since the British-French missile forces are not restricted by the SALT, these capabilities could be linked to form the core of a new European nuclear deterrent. In this process, the United States might play a crucial role, either by agreeing to Britain sharing nuclear technology jointly developed under the 1958 Amendment to the McMahon Act or by more actively assisting Britain and France in the development of a new-generation nuclear capability. This could improve NATO protection against Soviet MRBM capabilities and Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, and possibly remove some of the uncertainty regarding the extent to which the U.S. deterrent continues to underwrite Western Europe. Preservation of the option

[4]Texts of Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements with Arms Pacts, *New York Times*, June 14, 1972, p. 18.

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to grant such assistance to Britain and France could increase the U.S. leverage over Moscow to achieve a limitation of the 700 Soviet MRBM's and IRBM's targeted against Western Europe. This issue will be increased in importance in Phase II of the SALT if NATO forward-based systems are included in the negotiations.

SALT and the Evolving U.S.-Soviet Relationship

Will the strategic arms accords provide a sufficient foundation for U.S.-Soviet *détente*? Both the SALT and previous arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union have been hailed for their symbolic importance as much as for their intrinsic worth. The Moscow summit conference produced not only these latest accords but also a Declaration of Principles providing for the conduct of relations on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" and recognition that neither superpower should seek to obtain "unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly." The question facing the United States is the extent to which such general principles will be applied to the outstanding issues between the superpowers in the regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Latin America.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have claimed at one time or another that (1) regional tensions should not lead to superpower confrontation, and (2) short-term gains by one superpower may jeopardize the general superpower relationship. "Linkage" politics consists of determining where a regional dispute, aggravated by the superpowers, threatens the global balance of power and the vital interests of one of the superpowers and holds the potential for military confrontation. Under nuclear parity, however, a state can hardly compensate for conventional disadvantage by recourse to nuclear confrontation. The strategic arms control agreements thus emphasize anew the importance of local balances of power in coping with regional disputes. These agreements do not assure the local balance nor do they promise superpower cooperation to achieve it. They simply confirm that nuclear weapons provide no last resort for the superpowers to redress a conventional or regional defeat.

The resolution of such problems depends instead on the strength and will of local protagonists upheld by the assistance provided by one or the other superpower. The question that remains unanswered at this stage is the extent to which agreement in

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the SALT will be conducive to superpower efforts to collaborate in the reduction of tensions in such regions as Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Finally, the strategic agreements and the circumstances of their signing acknowledge U.S. acceptance of the Soviet Union as a political and psychological equal. The SALT codifies strategic parity and in some areas Soviet superiority. Thus, Moscow has attained a long-sought goal. Similarly, the earlier agreements between the German Federal Republic and the USSR contributed to the attainment of another of Moscow's long-term goals: international acceptance of the status quo in East Central Europe. These two achievements in themselves more than compensated for the embarrassment Soviet leaders suffered as a result of the U.S. blockade of North Vietnamese harbors prior to and during President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union.

Contrary to popular expectations, the arms agreements represent no real prospect for major reductions in military spending. This is because they retard the *quantity* of certain weapons only and restrict the *quality* of none. They even provide an incentive to both sides to continue major R&D programs, especially in offensive weapons systems, and emphasize the value of regional conventional forces. The United States must probably increase its spending for R&D and for deployment of an ABM around Washington. Failure to complete certain of its existing programs, such as the B-1 bomber and MIRV development, would reduce the U.S. bargaining position in future SALT negotiations and might even affect adversely the U.S. strategic posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the absence of Congressional approval of the ABM protection for Washington, the United States will end up with only one ABM system as opposed to two for the USSR — unless the Soviet Union decides to forgo deployment of one of its ABM complexes. Meanwhile, maximum reductions in other defense programs have already been made, and the cost of the U.S. Volunteer Army alone would easily consume any contemplated savings from the SALT. In the end, the conduct of research may not prove cheaper than deployment. Hence, the SALT may have the principal effect of shifting the concentration of military spending rather than reducing such expenditures.

In discussions of strategic "superiority," "sufficiency," "parity" and "inferiority," U.S. analysts have played a kind of numbers game. Some have minimized Soviet numerical superiority in launchers, throw-weight and warhead size, while suggesting that

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the United States retains an advantage in numbers of warheads and deliverable megatonnage, missile accuracy and new technology — for example, in MIRV. The United States, it is said, has a *qualitative* advantage which compensates for the Soviet quantitative gains of recent years. However, other analysts, fearful of the implications of the Soviet strategic buildup, have emphasized the political and psychological advantages that may accrue to the USSR from a growing perception around the world of the increased strength of Soviet strategic forces. As a result, it has been asked whether the Soviet Union seeks "the numbers and types of forces needed to attack and destroy vital elements of our own strategic forces" by developing "strategic capabilities beyond a level which by any reasonable standard already seems sufficient."[5]

If the numbers of weapons available to each superpower do not matter, since the strategic balance allegedly is stable under conditions of sufficiency, why has the Soviet Union devoted major resources to the deployment of strategic systems? Do the Soviets share U.S. conceptions about the numbers and quality of weapons necessary to assure a strategic balance? If not, a destabilizing element is introduced into the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, especially if Moscow seeks to extract political gain from the development and deployment of its strategic forces.[6]

Such questions may never be answerable. However, the goal of the United States in the SALT should be to produce a web of interlocking accords with the Soviet Union, in the preservation and extension of which each side has a stake. Under such circumstances the U.S.-Soviet relationship might eventually be transformed from confrontation to less acrimonious competition and eventually to collaboration in certain fields.

Although both sides sought, and made concessions, to achieve agreement in the SALT, the United States appears to have had the greater stake in the successful outcome of the negotiations. Because it was reluctant to embark on a major new armaments program to match the Soviet strategic buildup, it strove for a

[5]*U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace.* A Report to the Congress by President Nixon, February 9, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 159.

[6]For an analysis of this problem, see Uri Ra'anan, *The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications,* U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (Washington: GPO, 1972). See also William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Soviet Military Trends: Implications for U.S. Security,* Special Analysis, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1971.

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limited agreement to prevent a worsening in the U.S. position over the next five years. This situation prompted the various quantitative limitations on ICBM's and SLBM's written into the agreements. Moreover, for the most part the protocols which accompanied the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement were inserted unilaterally by the United States in order to set forth definitions and interpretations on which agreement had not been reached by the negotiators in Helsinki and Vienna.

Even if both the Soviet Union and the United States observe the SALT provisions to the letter, the Soviets can improve their relative strategic position during the next five years, and the constraints upon them to abide by the stipulations are fewer than those upon the United States. For the United States, more than for the USSR, however, the outcome of SALT I can best be justified by the successful conclusion of the next phase. In this respect, the Soviets have created a major incentive for the United States to engage in a new round of SALT negotiations in order to achieve a more permanent and far-reaching agreement on offensive missile systems. The problem posed is what Washington can offer to induce Moscow to scale down its offensive forces without jeopardizing U.S. relations with allies. The Soviet Union has suggested the inclusion of forward-based systems in the SALT, while the United States has sought to avoid discussion of a topic fraught with divisive implications for the Atlantic Alliance. In addition to the importance of forward-based systems for NATO, the presence of such capabilities outside the United States reduces the likelihood that the USSR could contemplate a first-strike attack against its superpower adversary. U.S. unwillingness to pay whatever price sought by the Soviets might not only jeopardize the outcome of SALT II, but also cast into doubt the existing agreements. The pivotal question concerns the degree of Soviet commitment to both the preservation of the agreements concluded thus far and the development of new SALT accords. In the absence of a *shared* commitment by the superpowers, the interlocking nature of the SALT will be highly disadvantageous to the United States.

Conclusions

Several major factors are central to an evaluation of the implications of the SALT for international security and especially for the United States.

(1) The arms agreements may provide a greater measure of security *if* the United States maintains a strong R&D program in

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areas vital to the strategic deterrent and at the same time monitors as closely as possible the Soviet R&D effort. An understanding of the nature of Soviet R&D efforts, both as to strategy and goals, becomes even more essential for the period ahead. The arms race is retarded in certain categories of deployment for the next five years. But the agreements will not necessarily deter the Soviet Union from an R&D effort designed to enhance its position at the end of the time period or to enable it to eliminate the gap with the United States in such areas as MIRV and warhead accuracy. The absence of a major U.S. R&D program would place the United States at a distinct disadvantage in future SALT negotiations.

(2) Public pressure against military spending could hamper defense programs both in the United States and Western Europe. While the U.S. deterrent becomes less certain for NATO, the credibility of European deterrents against a fixed Soviet defense capability is preserved in the absence of a large-scale Soviet ABM. Moreover, since the agreements make the Chinese arsenal more credible by limiting a Soviet ABM, the arguments for Indian and Japanese nuclear accession gain strength. Inherent in the concept of multipolarity is the problem of nuclear proliferation.

(3) Of crucial importance is the outcome of the next phase of the SALT. Other aspects of the SALT which are likely to be considered in coming years include forward-based systems, the transfer of technology to allies — particularly West European countries — the reduction of numbers of strategic offensive systems and the redeployment of such capabilities, and possibly the development of certain categories of future strategic systems.

(4) The "linkage" problem remains. That is, the arms agreements suggest but do not compel greater U.S.-Soviet cooperation in regional disputes. Instead, the delicate relationship between regional competition and great-power prestige persists, and the local conventional balance of power grows in significance. Under strategic parity, nuclear confrontation becomes more difficult, especially if the side initiating confrontation is inferior at the theater and battlefield levels. If one cannot deter his opponent at the strategic nuclear level, the latter is free to press whatever advantage he possesses at other levels of confrontation. The SALT contributes to the emergence of a more delicate form of competition between the superpowers, centering on R&D and regional balances of power which may include both nuclear and general-purpose forces.

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It is possible to attach alternative interpretations to the SALT accords. Whatever the Soviet motivation, the goal of U.S. national security policy, and especially arms control negotiations, should be to encourage a shift in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation from the military to the political arena. Crucial to such a shift is the abandonment by the Soviet Union of the notion that it can ever contemplate a nuclear first strike. In order to assure a strategic relationship in which neither superpower possesses a first-strike capability, the United States should take several steps designed to maintain its present strategic forces, including: (1) completion of the ABM for the ICBM missile defense field, and construction of an ABM for the national capital to protect the U.S. command center in time of crisis; (2) improvements in MIRV reliability and accuracy; and (3) development of both an ULMS and a bomber such as the B-1. Unless we relate R&D to such specific tasks, we will risk the possibility of falling behind the Soviets and jeopardizing parity, conceived as mutual incapacity to initiate a first strike.

If the SALT accords help to neutralize nuclear weapons at the global level under conditions of strategic parity, they enhance competition at the theater level as suggested above. The task of U.S. national security policy must be to render theater aggression improbable. Especially in the case of Europe, this requires the preservation of a linkage between the U.S. strategic force and European security, at least while Western Europe acquires a more credible defense capability of its own. In the Third World, local insurgency conflicts, unless supported on a large scale by one of the major communist powers, should not provoke massive U.S. military intervention.

In their explanations of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles, U.S. spokesmen have stressed the importance of the accords in slowing the development by the Soviet Union over the next several years of a strategic posture increasingly disadvantageous to the United States. Without the SALT and in the absence of a vast new U.S. weapons program, a strategic gap of potentially destabilizing proportions would have developed. The willingness of the United States to accept the agreements resulting from SALT I reflects both a desire to dampen the arms race and a realization that the alternative would have been a weapons program which most Americans seek to avoid. Hence, a freeze on ICBM's and sea-based systems is in the American interest to the extent that it will permit the United

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States to conclude more far-reaching and permanent agreements with the Soviet Union, while building national support for whatever strategic posture may be essential to provide for the defense of U.S. and major allies' interests in the late 1970's.

Arms control agreements, like other forms of international diplomacy, reflect the level of a nation's will, especially as perceived by those with whom it negotiates. The emergence of a disadvantageous strategic balance can be postponed, but not necessarily prevented, by the conclusion of agreements such as those in the SALT. The greatest need is to shift the focus of U.S.-Soviet conflict from military confrontation to political competition and, eventually, broadened cooperation in an international system in transition from bipolarity to multipolarity. Provided they are viewed as part of a broader U.S. national security policy, backed by an adequate political will, the SALT accords can contribute to the building of a world in which large powers and small nations can gain a greater measure of security and the incentive of states to use strategic capabilities to extract political gain can be minimized.

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THE NIXON DOCTRINE: DESIGN AND DILEMMAS*

by Walter F. Hahn

"DOCTRINE" in foreign policy is not an American invention, although in the postwar decades it has become a favorite American institution. The United States marched into the postwar world under the "Truman Doctrine," which began as an umbrella for military assistance to embattled and pressured governments in Greece and Turkey, and was expanded to cover American Cold War defenses more generally, merging with the "Containment Doctrine." This was followed by the "Doctrine of Massive Retaliation" and the "Eisenhower Doctrine." The "Kennedy Doctrine" had little time to blossom, but it was addressed vaguely to the American entry into the thickets of "counterinsurgency" in far-flung areas of the globe.[1] Lyndon Johnson stands thus far forlorn as the only postwar American President who cannot claim a doctrine in his own name; perhaps historians may yet give him one in retrospect.

The role of "doctrine" in American foreign policy has reflected the dynamics of the American political process. It is in the nature of that process, with its provision for regular and orderly changes of political power and its emphasis on "discontinuity within continuity," that each succeeding President feels impelled to place upon his tenure the distinct imprint of his political philosophy and programs. This tendency has been more pronounced with respect to domestic philosophy — witness Roosevelt's "New Deal," Truman's "Fair Deal," Kennedy's "New Frontier," and Johnson's "Great Society." But the imperative operates in foreign policy as well. Hence, "doctrine."

Doctrine thus reflects Presidential philosophy. It can be argued that in the postwar evolution doctrinal shifts have represented changes in American approach and emphasis rather than in basic substance of policy. Yet to cling to this hypothesis is to miss

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[1]See Louise FitzSimons, *The Kennedy Doctrine* (New York: Random House, 1972).

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historical significance. Doctrine has mirrored political needs and Presidential predilections; but it has also signaled adjustment of American policy to profound global change. In this respect the Nixon Doctrine may well herald as momentous a departure in American foreign policy as the Truman Doctrine did two decades earlier.

Stating this, however, does not render the task of interpretation any easier. Like its predecessors, the Nixon Doctrine is not a blueprint of policy; rather it has consisted of a set of broad principles, initially applied to United States policy in Asia, around which a more comprehensive global conception has taken shape. Given the ambiguities of the Doctrine, its evolving nature and its constant fashioning in the crucible of events and policy, interpretation must perforce be speculative and inferential. The analysis that follows leans as much upon a vicarious view from the White House as it does upon a random harvest of official statements and actions.

The "End of the Postwar Era"

"The postwar period in international relations has ended," declared Richard Nixon in his first State of the Nation address on foreign policy on February 18, 1970.[2] This theme has echoed and re-echoed in every major policy statement of the Nixon Administration.

What signals the end of an era? President Nixon and his adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose intellectual imprint on the features of the Nixon Doctrine is prominent, have consistently focused upon three pivots of change that, in their view, have rendered the global contours of power — and the imperatives of power — vastly different from those which confronted the United States in its postwar plunge into world politics.

The first such change, wrought by the revolution in the technology of war, has drastically revamped the nature of the military balance of power. The Soviet Union has raced to rough equality in military nuclear power with the United States. No longer can the United States gaze upon the world from the luxurious vantage points of nuclear monopoly or even superiority, as it was able to do in the first two postwar decades.

Second, along with the advent of superpower parity (and to some extent as a result of it), the relatively simple pattern of

[2] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace.* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 2.

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bipolar alignments in the earlier postwar period, in which the weak leaned more or less unreservedly upon the strong, has given way to more complex constellations. In his latest foreign policy summary President Nixon expressed this as a threefold phenomenon: the recovery of economic strength and political vitality by Western Europe and Japan, the increasing self-reliance of the states created by the dissolution of the colonial empires, and the breakdown in the unity of the communist bloc.[3] In short, the pattern of international relations has shifted from an essentially bipolar model into a kind of multipolarity — incipient, vaguely defined, but nevertheless increasingly real.

Finally, there is the changed temper of the American people. Kissinger has called it a "flagging of the psychological drive." President Nixon phrased it more euphemistically as the "growth among the American people of the conviction that the time had come for other nations to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership."[4] Others give it the blatant label of American neo-isolationism. Whatever may be the apt description of the phenomenon, it seems clear that there has been a dimming of the idealism and the American consensus which infused and sustained the active role of the United States in the postwar period.

The changed scenario confronting American foreign policy in the 1970's thus bears three salient features: parity, multipolarity and reduced American drive. The strategy cast by the Nixon Doctrine to grapple with the challenges of the new global environment revolves around three principal pillars: strength, partnership and negotiations. Taken together, the conception and the strategy trace the outlines of the transcendent goal of the Nixon Doctrine: a new global structure based upon a dynamic but hopefully stable multibalance of power.

The Concept of Multipolar Balance

In his 1972 foreign policy report, President Nixon listed among "items of unfinished business" the "need to continue, with both our friends and our adversaries, to build an international system which all will work to preserve because all recognize their stake in its preservation."[5]

What is the nature of this "international system" — this

[3] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace.* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 3.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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multipower balance? The statements of the Administration and the thrusts of its diplomatic initiatives have fairly sharply defined the centerpieces of the new structure: beyond the United States itself they consist of the Soviet Union, Communist China, Western Europe and Japan. But how do the pieces fit together? What will be their interrelationship? How will they weigh upon a distributive balance of power? Neither Nixon nor his principal adviser has shared the full sweep of his vision of global evolution or reconstitution. Yet, the emergent pattern of diplomatic endeavors emanating from Washington suggests at least the broad outlines of their vision.

The United States and the Soviet Union remain the heaviest weights on the scale. Their pre-eminence is ordained by nuclear arsenals and by the exponential curve of technological progress. The adversary relationship of the two superpowers will continue, if no longer so acutely because of ideological obsession, then simply because of the dictates of rival power. While continuing to confront each other, however, the two, recognizing their joint trusteeship of global survival, will grope progressively toward new ground rules of competition. They will try to stabilize their central (nuclear) relationship through SALT, and perhaps other arms constraints. Beneath the strategic-nuclear level, massive Soviet predominance in land power must continue to be balanced by countervailing American power, primarily in the air and in the oceans, augmented by the rising strength and self-sufficiency of countries and regions allied to the United States.

The Soviet Union is not likely to forfeit easily its revolutionary mission or expansionist instincts. In Eastern Europe Soviet power will remain dominant in the foreseeable future. However, the burgeoning forces of traditional nationalism in that region, aided by the tides of *détente* in Europe and by growing Soviet preoccupation with the perceived peril from China, may gradually loosen the rigid Soviet grasp into a more relaxed and tolerant exercise of old-fashioned hegemony. Beyond the reaches of the USSR's presently established power, any Soviet thrusts into new domains — in the Middle East, Western Europe, South Asia and the Far East — are to be blunted by the power of the United States and its allies.

The road of Soviet-American relations may still feature pitfalls and dangerous detours of confrontation. In time, however, perhaps the remaining ideological generators in the Soviet Union may slow down under the pressures of domestic problems, the

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complexities of multipolar balance and possibly the advent to leadership of a generation less motivated by the animus and nostalgia of early revolutionary Leninism. It is doubtful that anyone in the Nixon Administration wistfully expects the Soviet Union to be mellowed into a status quo power. Yet the implicit hope seems to be that the Soviets will more and more forsake ideological blinders for a calculating *Realpolitik*. And, so long as the United States maintains the requisite strength, we can play by the rules of *Realpolitik*. Indeed, as will be discussed below, *Realpolitik* appears to be the regulating mechanism of the multipower balance envisaged by the Nixon Doctrine.

The third major piece in the distributive balance is the People's Republic of China. She is not on a par with the United States or the Soviet Union in military power and technological wherewithal, but she derives superpower credentials from sheer geographical bulk and location, population resources and power potential. President Nixon described his journey to Peking as "the rapprochement between the most populous nation and the most powerful nation of the world. . . ."[6] Communist China draws additional weight from the obsessive concern she apparently has introduced into Moscow's perspective. By dint of geography and resources, China in effect balances Soviet power in Eurasia — at least to the extent of blocking any Soviet expansionist ambitions eastward. Because of the same credentials, she is bound to cast a lengthening shadow southward into Asia — perhaps progressively so as the United States withdraws from its direct footholds on the Asian land mass. By implication, the American rapprochement with Peking, along with American disengagement from the shelf of Southeast Asia, concedes to China this (possibly expanding) sphere of influence. Over the long run, there is probably no way to deny predominant Chinese influence in broad stretches of mainland Asia. Yet, the exercise of this influence — and particularly its extension via military muscle — should be constrained by China's task of internal modernization, by the abiding confrontation with the Soviet Union over a long common border, by emergent sub-spheres of influence in the region (e.g., the one commanded by North Viet Nam) and by sobriety of leadership in Peking. Moreover, China will continue to be "balanced" in Asia by American naval and air power deployed on forward island bases, and by Japan.

This brings us to the final two major weights in the global

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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balance: Japan and Western Europe. Geopolitically they constitute the anchors of regional balance on opposite sides of the Eurasian land mass. Both of them — one a country with limited endowments of geography but enormous popular resources and the other a (hopefully) tightening community of advanced industrial nations — command weight not only because of existing strength, but even more so through their power potential. Before reaching this potential, they will need in the foreseeable future the continued protection and assistance of the United States. But over time, and in an evolving partner relationship with the United States, both might be expected to muster a growing measure of intrinsic strength and shoulder a more equitable burden of partnership obligations.

The questions concerning the future roles of these two "partners" in the global structure differ markedly. In the case of Western Europe, the salient question is whether that region will find the harmonization of political will and cohesion of institutions and material (including military) resources to register telling power on the global scales. In the case of Japan, the question is twofold: whether that country can cross the psychological divide toward true independence of policy, with all of the political and military decisions this entails, and, once having made that transition, what specific course Tokyo will set in the shifting wakes of Chinese, Soviet and American power in the Pacific.

A host of other questions flourish with regard to Asia: e.g., about the future of Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and the Indian subcontinent. Much to the chagrin of anxious governments in Taipei, Seoul, Bangkok, Rawalpindi and elsewhere, no clear signals seem to have emanated from Washington to suggest to these countries their likely places in the unfolding scheme of things. Perhaps there is no ready answer in Washington. By implication, however, the broad reply seems to be the following: (1) the priority task in the construction of the new system based on the multipower balance is the fashioning of new relationships in the Sino-American-Soviet triangle; (2) these dramatic shifts at the highest levels of global power obviously will entail some traumas and rigors of adjustment on the part of nations that had direct and immediate stakes in the old confrontations; (3) in time, these nations will accommodate to change in their own, independent ways; (4) in the meantime, the United States must ease their pains of adjustment through reiterated commitment to their protection (if

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not to the previous array of their objectives) and through tranquillizing diplomacy.

The "De-Ideologization" of Policy

Reference was made earlier to *Realpolitik* as the regulating mechanism of the new international system envisaged by the Nixon Doctrine. Clearly, a multipolar balance can function only if there is common recognition of, and respect for, the weight of power in international relations.

The role of diplomacy in *Realpolitik* is a double one. On the one hand, diplomacy is the language of power and its reflection. On the other hand, notes Henry Kissinger in his treatise on Metternich and the Concert of Europe, diplomacy is also "the art of restraining the exercise of power."[7] Yet, in order to restrain, the language of diplomacy has to be understood. Kissinger argues:

> It is a mistake to assume that diplomacy can always settle international disputes if there is "good faith" and "willingness" to come to an agreement. For in a revolutionary international order, each power will seem to his opponent to lack precisely these qualities. Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same language.[8]

A fundamental premise of the Nixon Doctrine seems to be the "de-ideologization" of policy and diplomacy. President Nixon heralded this changed approach in his initial foreign policy report: "Then, [in the initial postwar period] the slogans formed in the past century were the ideological accessories of the intellectual debate. Today, the 'isms' have lost their vitality. . . ."[9] A related and remarkable feature of the Nixon policies has been the return to old-fashioned diplomacy. It has been remarkable not only for its intensity, but all the more so because it has unfolded in a society which traditionally has been disdainful and suspicious of the dark practices of power politics and has generally embraced Woodrow Wilson's prescription of "open covenants openly arrived at." It has been old-fashioned in its emphasis upon secrecy, directness and patience (somewhat strained patience in the case of the negotiations with Hanoi).

The Nixon diplomacy seems to be expanding on several levels. Vis-à-vis China, it is a diplomacy of dialogue. Administration spokesmen have been at pains in assuring that, contrary to ap-

[7]Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 2.
[8]*Ibid.*
[9]*U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace, op. cit.*, p. 3.

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prehensions and to various interpretations of the final communiqué, no deals were made behind closed doors in Peking. The President apparently engaged with his hosts in a broad dialogue that resembled almost a philosophical discussion. The purpose of the journey was dramatic stagemanship — to serve visible notice of "de-ideologization" and changes in the American global conception, and to open the gateways to a Sino-American relationship of mutual respect.

Vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the emphasis of the Nixon diplomacy is on what Kissinger terms its traditional role of "restraining the exercise of power." Recently a high-ranking member of the Administration privately explained the differences in diplomatic approaches in the following way: In Peking, the United States is dealing with hard-bitten, realistic and calculating men who are solidly and confidently in control of their country and are able to cast fundamental changes in directions of policy. In Moscow, by contrast, we face a collective leadership in which the often unpredictable virus of ideology is compounded by chronic factional dispute. The task of American diplomacy, beyond striking settlement in areas of mutual interest (e.g., SALT), is to maintain the kinds of communication that will prevent Soviet policy from veering into dangerous directions. Because of this, and given the vast range of global problems that impinge upon U.S.-Soviet relations, the task calls for a constant and patient dialogue. Most of the same items that were on Nixon's agenda in Moscow in May 1972 will probably recur on Soviet-American agendas six months, a year and two years from now. In the meantime, until we can communicate with Soviet leaders in a commonly understood language that might yield a consensus on ground rules of behavior, the dangers persist. As Nixon expressed it, pointing to Soviet actions in 1971, "it [is] unclear whether we are now witnessing a permanent change in Soviet policy or only a passing phase concerned more with tactics than with a fundamental commitment to a stable international system."[10]

The third level of diplomacy is addressed to America's allies. The emphasis here, in the initial phase of efforts to fashion the consensus upon which a new international system might be constructed, is on consultations — particularly consultations with respect to American negotiations with the "other side." Yet, the

[10] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, op. cit.*, p. 6.

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emphasis is also ostensibly on enlisting the aid and advice of traditional friends in the new construction.

The Nixon Doctrine and Western Europe

Broadly adumbrated, the Nixon Doctrine, in its application to Europe, implies a restructuring of American-European relations around the three pillars of strength, partnership and negotiations.

(1) Strength. In the shifting strategic environment of the 1970's, "strength" in the U.S.-European context means essentially maintaining the credibility of the NATO deterrent against aggression in Europe — and maintaining it under the overarching roof of strategic-nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. The task demands from the United States, in the words of Secretary of Defense Laird, the preservation of a "sufficient" strategic nuclear capability as "the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent."[11] More generally, it demands from the NATO alliance necessary improvements in conventional and tactical nuclear capabilities — the "planning of forces which are sufficient to cope with each level of potential conflict at that level."[12] And, in the broader and less tangible dimension of the alliance, "strength" relates to the continued economic and political growth and consolidation of the Western world.

(2) Partnership. In President Nixon's words: "To link together the foreign and defense policies of a uniting Europe and the United States will be another test of our sense of community and of our ability to perceive and pursue our common interest."[13] The ideal of partnership, under the Nixon Doctrine, is a relationship among equals. It means a retreat by the United States from the heavy-handedness and arrogance that often characterized its dealings with its allies in the past: "This administration does not view our allies as pieces in an American 'grand design.' "[14] But it also means greater cohesion on the part of our allies and their assumption of a more equitable share of the common alliance burden.

(3) Negotiations. The world, in Nixon's memorable statement, is moving into an "era of negotiations." Yet, successful

[11]Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 14.
[12]*Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
[13]*United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace.* A Report by President Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 30-31.
[14]*Ibid.*, p. 25.

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negotiations demand strength, and they demand the cohesion of partnership. Nixon articulated this principle in his foreign policy assessment of February 1971:

> When we conduct bilateral negotiations with the USSR, as in SALT, partnership involves close consultations with our allies both to protect their interests and solicit their views. In turn partnership requires our allies, in their negotiations, to pursue their course within a framework of common objectives.[15]

A New "Legitimacy?"

The Nixon Doctrine is bold in its design. The boldness does not derive so much from novelty. The vision of a "pentagonal" or "sextagonal" world has flitted through the political literature of America with increasing frequency during the past decade. At the risk of generalizing motive, it seems fair to say that the vision has beckoned in the past primarily to men who would claim membership in the "liberal establishment" of American politics and scholardom. Explicit or implicit in most of these articulations of global multipolarity have been the notions that (1) the United States erred in taking up the postwar cudgels of the Cold War, (2) in protracting its policies of "American globalism" the United States managed only to block or interfere with endemic forces in the world working toward a more stable equilibrium, and (3) there is still time for us, by ceding to these forces, to get "out from under" the excruciating and needless global burdens. In short, the vision has been advanced in the past to buttress a revisionist view of recent history and to justify a prescription for American retrenchment.

The charge of neo-isolationism cannot plausibly be leveled at the Nixon Doctrine. Its architect is a man whose experience harkens to the classrooms of conservative American philosophy and the command centers of Cold War battles. Although the Nixon Doctrine defers to American as well as global realities — including the "reduced American drive" — it cannot be deemed a subterfuge for an American escape from world affairs. Indeed, reverberating in the Nixon Administration's pronouncements are the positive strains of a new "American mission." The implicit message is that not only must global change be recognized and accommodated to, but the United States is uniquely outfitted by history to push these changes to their logical conclusion and thus to take the lead in fashioning a new international structure.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

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Skepticism regarding the Doctrine attaches less to design and more to implementation. One can quarrel with the design and with the implied definition of "power centers" in the world of the late twentieth century, in which the traditional measurements of national strength and influence on the international stage have been blurred by the rapids of technological, political and economic revolution. Yet, if one accepts the premise that the bipolar vise which gripped global politics in the post-World War II period is giving way to "something else," the vision of a pentagonal world is as plausible as any other prescription of the global future.

The more telling questions are: How do we get there from here? Is a classical balance of power (history knows of no other model) feasible amid the revolutionary currents of the fading twentieth century?

The classical model of a distributive balance implies a fundamental consensus among the major participants in the balance. President Nixon recognized this requirement in his reference, cited earlier, to "an international system which all will work to preserve because all recognize their stake in its preservation." Henry Kissinger equates the consensus, in historical terms, with the concept of "legitimacy." He writes:

> Stability . . . has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy. "Legitimacy" as here used should not be confused with justice. It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable agreements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international system by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy.[16]

Kissinger's admiring reference here is to the world of Count Metternich — to the Concert of Europe he created in the early nineteenth century and to the "chandelier balance" he so skillfully manipulated. Yet, what forged the world of Metternich and shaped the consensus in post-Napoleonic Europe was, above all, the fear among the restored monarchs of the revolutionary forces that had been spawned on the continent in the wake of the French Revolution and Napoleon's conquests — a fear that overshadowed the rivalries of power. Even should the current revolutionary powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China, retract

[16]Kissinger, *A World Restored . . . , op. cit.*, p. 1.

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some of their sharper ideological claws, what could constitute a similarly unifying consensus in the late twentieth century? Would it be the galvanizing fear of nuclear conflict? This fear, to be sure, already has functioned to cushion confrontations and to leash excesses of policy. Yet, paradoxically, world events are beginning to attest gradually to an inverse relationship between the fear and superpower accommodations undertaken in its name. To the extent that the superpowers take steps to "defuse" the nuclear confrontation between them, to that extent the previous terror of the nuclear Armageddon dwindles as a balancing and leavening element of international politics, let alone as a common denominator of great-power policies. The specter of the mushroom cloud no doubt will continue to narrow the horizons of permissible action. But will it sponsor a new and welding "legitimacy?"

There may conceivably be one other sponsor of future "legitimacy," one more directly parallel to the workings of the classical model of balance of power: namely, the unifying fear of revolutionary forces. Entailed here is a "north-south conflict" scenario, in which the industrialized "have" nations will progressively link in the face of a common danger posed by rampaging revolutionary forces in awaking "have-not" parts of the globe. In an American crystal ball, this scenario represents a global projection of the perceived legacy of the unhappy postwar American involvements in the Third World generally, and in Indochina specifically. The assumption is that not only will the Soviet Union and even Communist China come to recognize, like the United States, that the revolutionary forces of Africa, Asia and Latin America are insatiable and uncontrollable, but that these nations will gradually sue for membership in a protective club of status quo powers. Harbingers of such a prospect might be read into Moscow's tacit deference to American efforts to disengage from Viet Nam, into the Soviet Union's difficulties in Egypt, and into Peking's ostensible problems in dominating revolutionary forces in its own Asian backyard, notably in Hanoi.

There is not the space here to grapple with this scenario and all of its possible implications. Suffice it to say that it represents the ultimate of wistfulness based upon the flimsiest of current omens. It may be plausible to argue that, having been occasionally "burned," the Soviet Union and perhaps even the Chinese People's Republic may in the future muster greater caution in fishing in revolutionary waters. It is quite another thing to suggest that these nations will jettison their revolutionary heritage in

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order to join with the United States in a mutual protection society of "have" powers. Even the most generous assumptions on this score cannot trace the image of a new and embracing "legitimacy" as the consensus of balance.

Who Balances?

The metaphysics of "balance of power" as a phenomenon in modern history have been complex. Yet the sweep of past centuries supports a hypothesis that can be expressed in some simple propositions. "Balance of power" can describe a momentary situation in the world in which contending forces offset one another in a dynamic equilibrium. The postwar situation between the United States and the Soviet Union can be characterized as such a dynamic equilibrium. Yet, "balance of power" as a durable and more comprehensive mechanism of the international system requires a "regulator." History lists the basic credentials for this role. It may be akin to that of Great Britain vis-à-vis the European continent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when London played a deliberate game of dividing and balancing Europe — pitting its power this way and that — in order to prevent the hegemony of any one nation or combination of nations capable of challenging its own vast empire beyond Europe. Alternatively, the role may be that of a Count Metternich, trustee of the sagging fortunes of a once illustrious empire, who invests the dwindling stocks of that state and his own managerial brilliance into the creation of a system or "concert" which will permit the survival of his trust.

Both of these historic roles imply a measure of detachment on the part of the "regulator" from the system that he regulates. Neither role, now or prospectively, fits the United States. The United States, as a nation commanding a power unprecedented in history, remains a key and intrinsic part in any new distributive global balance of power. By dint of that power, it can neither practice detachment (as Britain did toward the Continent) nor aspire credibly to the role of arbiter (as Metternich did within the short-lived Concert of Europe).

Moreover, even if the United States could reconcile in theory the dilemma of being both stage-manager and leading actor in the new drama, the question of practical credentials for this duality of roles becomes a paramount one. Metternich and Castlereagh confronted each other across the negotiations table with unquestioned plenipotentiary powers and bargaining chips. A President Nixon

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or a Dr. Kissinger cannot bring the same measure of proxy power to the international poker game — a fact that has become painfully manifest to Washington in its frustrating negotiations with Hanoi. International diplomacy today embraces the very breadths of contending societies rather than simply their summits.

This raises the question whether American society as a whole can be captivated by a prescription of "global balance" or of a new *Realpolitik*. Probably more than any other people in history, Americans have required, in their plunges into world affairs, the inspiration of ideals and the identification of enemies. In the postwar years, anti-communism defined the principal mission and the principal enemy. What new idealism can now be substituted? Can an American consensus be harnessed to a largely abstract notion of "balance" and to a *Realpolitik* which sees no real enemies, but at best only *ad hoc* adversaries?

The Problems of Partnership in the Transaction

The Nixon Doctrine faces a more immediate dilemma — one that already has begun to assert itself amid the ripples of the new American diplomacy. That dilemma relates to the problem of reconciling the "era of negotiations" with the demands of alliance partnership. Can we maintain and strengthen the old alliance ties while we move toward new relationships with our adversaries? President Nixon has acknowledged this dilemma:

> In the nature of things, progress in all areas could not be achieved simultaneously [in 1971] — and this led for a time to understandable concern that our interests in some areas were being sacrificed to the need for progress in others. Our approach to China had an impact on Japan, as did our negotiations with the Soviet Union on our friends in Western Europe. Our unilateral economic measures affected both. As a result, our relations with our allies appeared for a period of several months to be somewhat out of phase with the innovations taken in our relations with our adversaries. By the end of the year, however, it was clear that our initiatives toward both our friends and our adversaries were in basic harmony.[17]

Yet, is there such a "basic harmony?" The problem far transcends the requirements of polite consultation with our allies — of keeping them informed of this or that American initiative in Moscow or Peking. Much more fundamentally at issue in the period of transition heralded by the Nixon Doctrine is the meaning of "partnership" and its prerequisites.

[17] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

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The Doctrine calls for a strong and "united" Western Europe, capable of casting its weight on the scales of power. But it is rapidly becoming clear that Western Europe will not be magically transformed into a unified center of power simply because the Nixon Doctrine wills it. There has been some progress in the harmonization of national policies in Western Europe, but the trends are uncertain and diverse. Generally, the advances in economic integration have not been matched by a tightening of the political sinews of the European Community.

The prospect of greater political cohesion in Western Europe becomes all the more elusive in the era of détente and negotiations which the Nixon Doctrine embraces as the transition period toward a new international system. As the former "cement of fear" crumbles, and especially to the extent that "partnership," as defined by the Doctrine, implies a more equitable sharing of the common defense burden between the United States and Western Europe, where are the new incentives for European unification and greater defense efforts supposed to come from?

It may be that the "shock treatment" of a substantial American military retrenchment from Europe could supply the galvanizing impulse to that region. This alternative has been suggested by Americans impatient at what they deem the continuing "free ride" by our allies, and even by some Europeans who despair over the likelihood of spontaneous cohesion. Yet, the risks of such a treatment loom larger than any of its possible therapeutic benefits for West European unity or the U.S.-European relationship. Indeed, it seems to be recognized in Washington that too rapid a shift of the common burden to the European partner will spur the forces of fear and disparity rather than the impulse of unification. Largely in deference to that danger, the Nixon Administration has held the line against Congressional pressures for American force reductions in Europe.

The "partnership" thus has bought precious time. Yet, if the partnership is to survive the crucial transition, that time must be exploited constructively. It must be exploited to gain a clear and honest understanding of reciprocal roles in a common policy. It must be exploited, also, to define and implement a realistic division of labor in the Atlantic Alliance. Central to this task is the comprehension in Washington that the changed relationship between the United States and Western Europe under the Nixon Doctrine can be fashioned neither by American fiat nor by American passivity. Western Europe still needs help. It needs help

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in the form of clear notice given by the United States that the relationship has *really* changed and that our European partners must begin to look to their own resources more than to the old magic of the American protective guarantee. It needs substantive American help in the creation of indigenous power.

And here we come to the last and large question for the Nixon Doctrine. Multipolar balance presupposes the emergence of independent, self-sufficient power centers where previously the American protective umbrella dominated. The credentials of power in the late twentieth century are inescapably nuclear credentials. The logic of the Nixon design thus cannot be reconciled with the past, almost obsessive American priority on nuclear nonproliferation. Will the United States give the needed help to its European partners in the fashioning of credible nuclear capabilities?

Perhaps these questions will be answered not so much by the Nixon Doctrine itself as by the tides of events which the Doctrine already is setting in motion.

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YUGOSLAVIA AT THE CROSSROADS*

by F. Stephen Larrabee

THE end of an era is approaching in Yugoslavia. In May 1972 Josip Broz Tito celebrated his eightieth birthday and his twenty-seventh year as *de facto* head of state. Provisions for a transition to an institutionalized collective leadership to replace Tito have already been incorporated into the amended constitution approved on June 30, 1971, and barring death, he will retire from the Presidency in 1976.[1]

The post-Tito prospect has led many observers to wonder whether the Yugoslav experiment will be able to survive its architect or, if it does, what form this survival will take. This question has been given added urgency by the sense of "permanent crisis" — one author has termed it "barely controlled chaos"[2] — that has beset the Yugoslav system in the past few years and that reached a climax with the student strike in Croatia last November-December.[3]

The strike, called in response to the unsolved foreign currency problem which the Croatian students maintained placed Croatia in a "colonial position," sparked the most severe crisis Yugoslavia has faced since the Stalin-Tito break.[4] Tito intervened with strong measures, claiming that had he not moved when he did, a civil war and possible outside intervention could have resulted.[5] While this may well have been an exaggeration for political effect, there is no denying that the repercussions from the strike have been far-

*The author would like to express his appreciation to Slobodan Stankovic, J. F. Brown and Professor George Hoffman for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

[1]Tito set 1976 as the official date for his retirement in a speech made in Zagreb on July 21, 1970; see *Borba*, July 23, 1970.

[2]Paul Shoup, "Evolution of a System," *Problems of Communism*, July/August/September/October 1967, p. 68.

[3]The decision to go on strike was taken by the student assembly of the University of Zagreb (in Croatia) on November 22, 1971 and confirmed the next day by the plenum of the Croatian Student Union, which extended the strike to all higher schools of learning, their departments, and the academies in Croatia.

[4]The Belgrade daily *Vecernje Novosti* in its December 9 editorial was even more emphatic: "There is no doubt that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is passing through what is perhaps its most serious crisis in its 50-year history." The Croatian students were striking in opposition to the constitutional amendments requiring each republic to turn over foreign exchange earnings to the federal government.

[5]Tanjug, December 18, 1971.

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reaching. It resulted in mass arrests, the removal of the top Croatian leadership, and extensive purges in every organ of Croatian life. As of the middle of January 1972, according to official statistics, 789 functionaries in the party, economy, mass media and government either had voluntarily resigned or had been removed.[6] Most important of those removed were three of the youngest and most popular of the Croatian leaders (the so-called inner leadership) — Miko Tripalo, a member of both the Yugoslav Party Presidium's Executive Bureau and the State Presidency; Mme. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, President of the Croatian Central Committee; and Pero Pirker, Secretary of the Croatian Party Executive Committee — who were accused by Tito of tolerating Croatian nationalism and chauvinism and allowing "counter-revolutionary" forces to emerge which endangered state security.[7] In addition, by mid-January 544 persons had been arrested in the "struggle against nationalism,"[8] among them the student leaders and eleven prominent members of Matica Hrvatska, the cultural organization that had been in the forefront of the nationalist revival in Croatia.[9]

The strike, moreover, served to dramatize fundamental problems in the Yugoslav system that have been developing over an extended period of time and that have become acute in the last few years. It revealed that escalating nationality conflicts have been a consequence, not a primary cause, of the present crisis and have been exacerbated by the failure to solve other problems, particularly in the economic sphere. As a Serbian party functionary, Miladin Gvozdenov, recently noted: "The basic problems of the present political and economic situation do not stem from the fact that our country is a multinational state. The problems are predominantly of a social and economic nature."[10]

The present crisis is to a large extent an outgrowth of the dislocations unleashed by the process of modernization undertaken by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) over

[6] *Die Zeit*, January 29, 1972. See also *New York Times*, January 21, 1972, and *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, January 24, 1972.

[7] *Borba*, December 31, 1971.

[8] *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, January 25, 1972. Reports as to the number of arrests vary. According to *Le Monde*, August 9, 1972, "the total number of arrests has considerably exceeded the figure of 1300 given by the authorities."

[9] The trial of four former student leaders accused of forming a counterrevolutionary group to undermine the state order and separate Croatia from Yugoslavia began on July 5, 1972.

Matica Hrvatska, founded in 1829 to promote Croatian cultural and national emancipation, is the oldest Croatian cultural organization.

[10] *Borba*, May 13, 1971.

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the last decade.[11] The emergence of nationalism has been related to the attempt to dismantle the Stalinist command economy. It has arisen in the course of the LCY's shift of emphasis from sheer growth to efficiency, from extensive to intensive methods of production. The 1961 and 1965 reforms, rather than leading to an increased integration in Yugoslav society as was their intent, have accentuated the nationality problem by stimulating an economic nationalism that has compounded historical national tensions. To understand how and why this has been the case, it will be helpful to review the historical and political framework within which the LCY attempted to achieve its social and economic transformation of Yugoslavia.

The Legacy of the Past

Political instability is often a consequence of rapid modernization, and Yugoslavia has been plagued by many of the same problems and dislocations as emerging nations elsewhere.[12] Like most of the new states, it came into existence without a large measure of internal unity and faced immediate problems arising out of the presence of several ethnic groups with distinct, often conflicting, cultural and religious traditions. The Yugoslav state created on December 1, 1918 was an artificial entity carved from the wreckage of several empires. It contained five principal ethnic and national groups — the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins, all belonging to the southern Slavic linguistic group — as well as three major non-Slavic minorities, the Albanians, Germans and Magyars. Ethnic differences were further compounded by religious differences: the Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins were Orthodox, the Croats and Slovenes were Catholic, and the Albanians, Turks and Islamized Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were Muslim.

The various nationalities shared neither significant elements of a common heritage nor any strong sense of a common destiny. Prior to the eighteenth century, as Ivo Lederer has observed, "The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes knew little about themselves and even less about each other."[13] The sense of Yugoslavism

[11]In this essay I will be primarily concerned with economic modernization and its impact on Yugoslav politics.

[12]For a discussion of the relationship of communist development to modernization, especially in the emerging world, see John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), and Robert Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," *American Political Science Review*, June 1961.

[13]Ivo Lederer, "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs," in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo Lederer, editors, *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), p. 398.

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(*Jugoslavenstvo*) which emerged in the nineteenth century, although echoing the same impulses as the Risorgimento and German national movements, was not as broadly based or as deeply rooted, and it never succeeded in shedding its particularistic aspects. The "Illyrian movement" of the 1830's and 1840's[14] — one of the early forerunners of the Yugoslav idea — was essentially a Croatian response to Magyarization, which had threatened neither the Slovenes nor the Serbs; Yugoslav stirrings later in that century became intertwined with Serbian irridentism and were consequently strongly suspect to the Catholic and highly anti-Orthodox Croat and Slovene nationalists.

Thus from the outset cultural, religious and political diversity inhibited a perception of national identity, which has been recognized as an essential, often crucial, requisite for withstanding the dislocations of modernization.[15] Moreover, the Yugoslav state was troubled by basic disagreement over how political authority should be organized. The dominant Serbs favored a centralized state that would both correspond to their political tradition and give them undisputed control, while the Croats and Slovenes wanted a federal state in which each nationality would enjoy autonomy. The fact that most prewar Yugoslav institutions were little more than transformed Serbian institutions also inhibited the growth of allegiance to a national political entity. To most of the nationalities the governing authority, resting as it did upon a police-army-bureaucracy triad, was regarded as an alien force employed to ensure Serbian hegemony, and the "Yugoslav idea" was perceived as a cloak for a "Greater Serbia."

The party system further intensified ethnic conflict, because the major parties, excluding the Communist Party — i.e., the Serbian Radicals (led by Nikola Pasic), the Croatian Peasant Party (led by Stjepan Radic) and the Slovene People's Party — were organized along ethnic, regional and confessional lines. King Alexander's attempt after 1929 to abolish parties, promote a national ideology, and overcome the strong ethnic allegiances by reorganizing the country into nine *banovina* which would cut across

[14]The movement developed from Napoleon's 1809-1813 experiment in uniting Slovene and Croatian territories into an "Illyrian" administrative unit.

[15]On the importance of national identity in political development see Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), Chapter 2; Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

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provincial boundaries, only succeeded in uniting all social forces against it and intensifying national hatreds and conflicts.

The LCY was therefore faced with a formidable task in trying to modernize a state that lacked both a sense of national identity and a tradition of national authority structures accepted as legitimate by all sides. This situation was complicated by the fact that the LCY was dedicated to carrying out the social and economic transformation of Yugoslavia within an ideological framework which by definition limited certain policies. Neither the original elements in Marx's vision nor the Leninist modification of them were to prove entirely applicable to Yugoslav conditions.

The unanticipated Stalin-Tito break in 1948 added to the problems of development. The dispute impelled the Yugoslavs unwittingly into a new ideological role. It both freed them from the shackles of Stalinism and forced them to evolve a new set of policies and ideologies to meet their changed circumstances. Once the break was an accomplished fact the Yugoslavs jumped from a defensive upholding of their own position to an offensive revolutionary critique of Soviet foreign policy, and thence to criticism of the Soviet Union's "bureaucratism" and "state capitalism." By December 1949 the latter attacks prompted Edvard Kardelj's treatise, "People's Democracy in Yugoslavia,"[16] which stressed the necessity of mass participation in the socialist state. Kardelj's pronouncement eventually was accepted as the official guideline for Yugoslav policy and led to the creation of the workers' councils and the commune system.

Thus, as a result of the Stalin-Tito break, decentralization of economic power — with the emphasis on self-management — became the official ideology. Workers' councils were introduced in 1950 and the right of self-management was formally incorporated into the 1953 Constitution. The idea of decentralization, however, was not originally linked with the concept of increased freedom for the republics or greater rights for the nationalities; the principal aim was to reduce state interference at all levels of the economy and society. In fact in the 1950's the LCY attempted to popularize a gradual blending of cultures and nationalities. This effort, which reached its high point in the 1958 party platform,[17] was abandoned as it came increasingly into conflict with other policies, notably in the economic sphere.

[16]See *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1949, pp. 1-83.

[17]For a discussion of the encouragement of an all-Yugoslav culture see Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Chapter 4.

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The Economic Roots of Nationalism

The roots of the nationalist revival can be traced in large part to the attempts at modernization undertaken by the LCY in the 1960's. The initial impetus for the revival lay in the party's assumption that the nationality question could be solved by eliminating inequalities in levels of economic development in the various republics.[18] As part of its goal to achieve equality of nationalities the LCY committed itself to the rapid industrialization of the underdeveloped regions by allocating to them investment funds and grants-in-aid to meet immediate financial needs.[19] The investment plan, however, conflicted with the need to channel investments where they would show the greatest return — i.e., in the more developed regions of Croatia and Slovenia. Like many emerging nations today, the underdeveloped regions lacked the trained cadres and managerial skill, as well as the technology, to utilize the funds effectively. Aid to these areas often duplicated facilities elsewhere and resulted in the establishment of "political factories" owing their origin more to the influence of political factors than to rational economic planning. The developed regions grew resentful because they felt they were earning capital that the central government then squandered by plowing it into unprofitable enterprises in the less developed regions. In the 1960's this opposition gave rise to increased calls for republican autonomy and economic decentralization which were reflected in the 1961 and 1965 economic reforms and the 1963 Constitution.

In essence, the 1961 reforms attempted four major innovations: (1) a new system of income distribution in which more authority was given to the workers' councils; (2) a new and more flexible foreign exchange system, including devaluation of the dinar from 300 to 750 against the dollar; (3) a new price system allowing the freer development of prices in the market, though proscribing "unjustifiable" price increases; and (4) a new banking and credit system, under which banks were "to replace state authorities in the field of economic processes."[20]

A number of factors, however, combined to render the reform

[18]Today 40 per cent of the country is officially considered underdeveloped, the disadvantaged areas including Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and parts of Serbia. The variance in development is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the per capita income in Slovenia, the most industrialized region, is $1,000 per year while in Kosovo, the least developed, it is barely $200. See *The Economist* (London), August 21, 1971.

[19]Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, op. cit.*

[20]See Paul Landy, "Reform in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1961.

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efforts largely ineffective. Chief among these was the controversy that developed among various sectors of society — and in the first instance, within the party itself — over the extent to which, and the means by which, political control should be abandoned in implementing changes in the national economy. The intense struggle within the party between the centralists and the decentralists formed mainly along national lines, for the dispute tended to pit the "haves" — Croatia and Slovenia — against Serbia, supported by the "have nots" which would be hurt by receiving a smaller share of the funds from Belgrade. As a result, the 1961 reforms were implemented in a haphazard fashion and the economic situation, despite a rather high growth rate, deteriorated further.

At the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in December 1964 the weaknesses of the economy were confronted and openly admitted:

> Administrative controls exercised by political factors, the heavy levies made on almost all funds, and inefficient investment have led to the disturbances and imbalances in our economic development with which we are all familiar, and to market instability. All these things have caused dissatisfaction among the citizens. . . . It is therefore necessary to ensure free market play and accelerate the abolition of price regulation by administrative measures. . . .[21]

This paved the way for the 1965 reform directed toward a greater degree of decentralization and a withdrawal of the state from economic decision-making.[22] Enterprises were given more freedom in planning and fixing prices as well as more freedom to base their production on the demands of the market rather than a central plan. The reform also sought to encourage self-reliance by reducing subsidies to enterprises so that only those making a profit would survive. This, of course, was bound to hit hardest the "political factories" functioning primarily by virtue of state subsidies.

Still, the centralists within the party, led by Alexander Rankovic, Tito's heir apparent and *de facto* head of both the Serbian communists and the Yugoslav security forces, continued to resist implementation of the reform. In seeking to mobilize support they stressed that the reform would work to the advantage of the developed regions over the underdeveloped, where nearly

[21] *Yugoslav Survey*, Belgrade, January-March 1965, pp. 2095-2096.

[22] For the texts relating to the reform see *Borba*, July 25, 1965. For a detailed analysis of the reform see George Macesich's chapter, "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy," in Wayne Vucinich, editor, *Contemporary Yugoslavia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

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2,000 nonviable "political factories" faced a shutdown. This resistance eventually culminated in Rankovic's removal as head of the security forces at the LCY Central Committee meeting in July 1966, and his ouster from the party three months later. The committee then ordered a purge and reorganization of the secret police.

Rankovic's downfall, however, while it marked a defeat of the Serb nationalists and the ascendance of the Slovenes and Croats in the battle over decentralization, was more a victory in appearance than in substance. In the years following his ouster resistance to decentralization continued, supported by three principal groups: the army and security leaders who have always favored a centralized system and whose leadership is predominantly Serbian; influential Belgrade banks and other financial agencies which objected to their power being reduced; and veterans' organizations.[23]

The Croatian Nationalist Revival

The opposition encountered in implementing the 1965 reform was an influential factor in the emergence of Croatian nationalism as more and more Croats, especially within the party leadership, began to feel that decentralization reforms were not proceeding rapidly enough and that resistance to the reform was hindering a true equality of nationalities.

Croatian discontent was rooted in three related problems: foreign currency, banks and foreign trade. The Croats believed they were being discriminated against economically by the federal banks and the bureaucracy located in Belgrade. Until the latest currency reform — carried out in the aftermath of the Croatian student strike — Croatian enterprises earned 40 per cent of Yugoslavia's Western currency but were allowed to retain only 7-10 per cent.[24] The rest went to the central banks or "authorized banks" which paid earners of the remaining 93 or 90 per cent of foreign currency in the domestic *valuta*, i.e., in dinars. Enterprises, therefore, were forced to buy dollars, German marks or French francs for dinars in the "authorized banks," at a higher cost (since the dinar is not convertible) in order to buy goods abroad. Moreover, Croatia, which was responsible for 33 per cent of in-

[23]See Zdenko Antic, "Croatian Leadership Confronted with Growing Nationalism," CAA Research Report 1152, *Radio Free Europe Research*, October 5, 1971.

[24]The latest reform allows enterprises to retain up to 20 per cent of their earnings.

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dustrial production and 27 per cent of the GNP, was allowed to retain only 18 per cent of capital assets.[25]

The Croats regarded this situation as a form of exploitation that made a sham of government and party rhetoric espousing the equality of nationalities. The inequalities in the economy thus served to accentuate the desire for greater decentralization and added a new economic nationalism to the existing ethnic nationalism. The question of which is more important, the "class struggle" or the "national struggle," has often been shrouded in ideological rhetoric. The Croats have tended to see in calls for "unitarism" or remarks that the "class struggle" must take priority over the "national struggle" a cloak for Serbian hegemony, while the Serbs have feared that the "national struggle" would lead to the eventual breakup of the Yugoslav state.

The first outward manifestation of the revival of Croatian nationalism was the March 1967 declaration, supported by several hundred Croatian intellectuals, demanding the separation of the Croatian and Serbian languages; because of it a number of Croatian nationalists were expelled from the party.[26] Yet nationalist fervor continued to grow, sparked in particular by forces in the Croatian cultural organization, Matica Hrvatska. The revival eventually flowed into the party as some of the younger leaders, feeling that reform on the economic level was being bogged down in compromises, sought to use the issue of nationalism to gain wider popular support for the struggle against "the bureaucratic centralists in Belgrade."

The turning point in the evolution of the Croatian attitude, however, was the January 1970 plenum of the Croatian CC. The plenum marked a change in the strategy of the Croatian leadership: instead of struggling on the wider Yugoslav front, they decided to promote Croatian national interests on the basis of the "natural right of every nation to dispose of its own resources and of its own realized surpluses," and to orient Croatia toward specific Croatian goals.[27] The new policy required a purge of all centralists and Belgrade-oriented Croatian communists whose loyalty to the Yugoslav cause was stronger than to the Croatian. At

[25]See Zdenko Antic, "Economic Aspects of the Yugoslav Crisis," CAA Research Report 0999, *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 6, 1971, and Paul Lendvai, *Financial Times* (London), May 26, 1971.

[26]Among those ousted were the Mayor of Zagreb, the late General Vjeceslav Holjevac, functionaries of the Croatian Central Committee such as General Franjo Tudjman, Professors Marko Veselica and Sime Djodan, and some prominent writers, Miroslav Krleza, Petar Segedin and Tomislav Ladan.

[27]See Antic, "Economic Aspects. . . ," *op. cit.*

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the same time portions of the leadership began to show an increased toleration, if not encouragement, of nationalistic activities. Said Mme. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, then the president of the Croatian CC, in a speech in Zagreb on April 1, 1971:

> A certain nationalist enthusiasm which we meet in our own ranks, in the League of Communists, and in our society, an enthusiasm which undoubtedly represents a very positive and significant sociopolitical phenomenon, is a big moving force toward a quicker and more successful solution of our accumulated political and economic problems.[28]

Events reached a critical stage in the spring of 1971 when the Croatian CC accused "unitarist and bureaucratic forces" — a euphemism for Serbian centralists — of a conspiracy to discredit the Croatian leaders by spreading rumors that they had maintained ties with extreme Croat separatists abroad. These rumors proved all the more explosive because they were circulated at a time when the exiles in West Germany were claiming support from Moscow in their efforts to create a separate Croatian national state[29] and at a time when Croatian extremists had assassinated the Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden.

Tito's intervention and the convocation of a special session of the LCY Presidium at Brioni in late April seemed to defuse the tension, at least temporarily; but it was clear from Tito's remarks at the conclusion of the conference that the situation had reached crisis proportions: "Had we published everything [from the Presidium's proceedings] we would have aggravated the general psychosis. . . . We would have created much more confusion than that which now exists."[30] This statement was evidence that whatever differences had been expressed were deep-seated and more likely to have been patched over at Brioni than removed. Moreover, despite Tito's assurances in September that nationalism was no longer a problem,[31] it became increasingly obvious that a conflict within both the Croatian CP and the LCY was nearing a head. Croatian leader Vladimir Bakaric complained in October about the emergence of factionalism in the Croatian party. At the

[28] *Vjesnik,* April 11, 1971.

[29] In a speech given in Munich in the middle of April, Dr. Branko Jelic, president of the right-wing Croatian National Committee and former associate of Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic, claimed that the Soviet Union supported Croatian demands for a separate state. See *The Times* (London), April 19, 1971, and *Hrvatska Drzava* (*The Croatian State*), published by Jelic, February/March 1971.

[30] *Borba,* May 9, 1971.

[31] After a ten-day tour of Croatia in September Tito stated: "I have seen that all kinds of stories about Croatia [which maintain] that there is no unity, that the people think differently, that there is a blooming nationalism — are completely absurd." *Vjesnik,* September 16, 1971.

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same time the more radical forces in Croatia, particularly the students, continued to escalate their demands, especially in regard to the resolution of the foreign currency situation,[32] and on November 22 the students called a strike. The Croatian inner leadership initially condemned the strike,[33] but by then it was too late. In their effort to secure greater equality for Croatia the leaders had encouraged a nationalist fervor which proved too explosive to control once it had been unleashed.

One of the dangers of the rise of Croatian nationalism was its potential for sparking nationalist protests in other republics. As *Politika* aptly noted on December 18, after Tito's intervention in the student strike: "This danger [nationalism] was not imminent in one republic alone. What happened in Croatia could happen tomorrow in a similar way in another part of the country." In particular Croatian nationalism provoked a backlash among the Serbs both within Croatia — where they comprise 15 per cent of the population (about 700,000) — and elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Mindful of the persecution of the Serb population in Serbia during World War II by the Ustasha government, Serbs are highly sensitive to Croatian nationalism, and as the Croatian fervor increased reports began to circulate that the Serbs in Croatia had begun to arm themselves.[34] Arrests in Serbia of individuals responsible for distributing material of a Serbian nationalist character were also reported.[35]

At about the same time, outbursts of nationalist tensions involving Albanians and Serbs made news in the autonomous province of the Kosovo. In a brawl between Serbian and Albanian students at Pristina University, several students — all apparently Serbs — were sentenced to thirty days in prison. Though the situation in Kosovo is not as serious as in Croatia, widespread purges have occurred at the grass roots level,[36] and on January 16, 1972 the Albanian-language daily *Rilindja* was prompted to carry the main address to the thirty-fifth provincial plenary session under the headline "Albanian Nationalism Has Not Subsided, Hence a

[32] *Vjesnik*, November 11, 1971.

[33] In Zadar on November 23 Miko Tripalo stressed the necessity of changing the currency regulations while simultaneously condemning the use of pressure tactics. Tripalo's position was echoed in a resolution of Zagreb party and administrative leaders who endorsed the legitimacy of the students' demands but noted that the strike was "not a contribution to the struggle led by the League of Communists" and called for its end. Radio Zagreb, November 23, 1971.

[34] *VUS (Vjesnik u Srijedu)*, Zagreb, September 15, 1971.

[35] *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, January 3, 1972.

[36] See "A Review of Current Developments in Kosovo," CAA Research Report 1273, *Radio Free Europe Research*, January 24, 1972.

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Sharper Struggle Must Be Waged Against It." The address by the CP head of the Kosovo, Mahmud Bakalli, urged all communists of Albanian nationality to be "more energetic in our struggle against Albanian nationalism."

In Macedonia the issue of nationalism was raised by Lazar Kolisevski, member of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, at a Central Committee session of the Macedonian League of Communists. He noted that the danger of Macedonian separatism and nationalism still existed.[37] Krste Crvenkovski, a leader of the Macedonian League, was attacked at a meeting of the Yugoslav veterans' organization presidium in Belgrade at the end of December 1971. Crvenkovski was known to be sympathetic to the Croatian line and had gone on record as an opponent of "unitarism."[38]

The Post-Tito Era: Problems and Prospects

The Croatian strike dramatized how fragile a balance now exists in Yugoslavia. While Tito's intervention may have prevented further repercussions, it has hardly eradicated the causes of the strike, which lay deeply embedded in the system itself. In the words of Milovan Djilas, "The thrust has been contained but the Croatian and other problems of the system are not settled."[39]

These problems are likely to become more acute after Tito steps down. Tito's leadership has been of a highly personal and charismatic nature. His role in the wartime resistance, his defiance of Stalin, and his persistent defense of Yugoslavia's independence and right to follow its own road to socialism once the country was cast adrift from the international communist movement, contributed to the establishment of a charismatic relationship with the population.[40] "No institution," Croatian leader Vladimir

[37]Tanjug, December 29, 1971.

[38]See, for instance, his interview given to *VUS*, June 3, 1970.

[39]*Le Monde,* December 29, 1971.

[40]The charismatic leader derives his authority from devotion to his person rather than from the institution he represents. He often emerges at a critical stage in a nation's development — in the wake of a crisis, when events are in flux, and when there is a perceived need for guidance or deliverance. He thus fills a political vacuum at an important moment when authority is lacking. See "Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership," *Daedalus*, Summer 1968, especially Robert Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," and Dankwart Rustow, "Ataturk as Founder of a State."

For an interesting application of the theory of charismatic leadership to Eastern Europe, see the controversial article by Svetozar Stoyanovic, "From Post-Revolutionary Dictatorship toward Socialist Democracy: Yugoslavia's Socialism at the Crossroads," *Praxis* (Zagreb), May-August 1972, pp. 375-398. Stoyanovic's article appeared after mine had been completed, but the similarity of his views serves to substantiate my own judgments.

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Bakaric said recently, "not even the army, has as much prestige as Tito."[41] The force of Tito's personality has molded the system, given it stability (however temporary), and prevented the proliferation of centrifugal forces. In times of crisis — such as the ouster of Rankovic in 1966, or the Croatian student strike in December 1971 — it is Tito who is the final arbitrator.[42]

The problem is that charismatic authority is essentially unstable and transitory. By its very nature it stands opposed to institutional authority. Its final success depends on its transforming itself into something more stable than charisma. The key question concerning the post-Tito era, therefore, is whether in the short time remaining Tito can transform his personal authority into some sort of institutionalized political authority which will survive him, or whether his departure will plunge Yugoslavia back into the political instability that characterized the interwar years. To date Tito has been the prime moderator of social conflict and the guarantor of the unity of the Yugoslav state. It is not quite clear what institution (if any) will — or can — perform that function once he has retired.

The economic and administrative reforms undertaken in the last few years have resulted in the fragmentation of political power. The introduction of market socialism has given rise to a proliferation of interest groups whose role in the policy process is not clearly delineated but which nonetheless exert an important influence, especially at the local level. Moreover, reforms in the constitution have contributed to an increasingly independent judiciary and a larger role for the legislature.[43] Thus, while the party remains the major center of decision-making, more and more policy is being influenced by competing institutions and informal groupings.

In addition, the trend in both party and government has been toward greater republican autonomy. Until 1963 the six constituent republics had few responsibilities except to carry out federal laws and decrees. The 1963 Constitution gave them a wide

[41]Interview by Harry Schleicher in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, December 17, 1971.

[42]Tito has been the archetype of the "heroic leader" who comes to the fore when change cannot be delayed any longer, i.e., when there is a widely felt need for direction from above. See Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," in Lewis Edinger, editor, *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 123.

[43]See Winston M. Fisk, "The Constitutionalism Movement in Yugoslavia: A Preliminary Survey," *Slavic Review*, June 1971.

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range of federal powers. Now, through the reforms incorporated into the newly amended constitution approved on June 30, 1971,[44] the federal government has transferred most of its former powers to the republics, retaining only responsibility for defense, foreign affairs and broad economic policy. The constitutional amendments also provided for the establishment of a collective body, called the State Presidency, to ease the transition and to rule when Tito departs. This is composed of twenty-three members — three delegates from each of the six republics and two each from the two autonomous provinces (plus Tito). It is increasingly doubtful, however, whether any form of collective leadership could successfully and decisively intervene in a crisis whose origin might lie in the nationality question.

The trend toward political pluralism has inevitably had important implications for the party. At present the party is a microcosm of the problems of Yugoslav society: it has been weakened by decentralization and nationalist tensions. The emphasis on economic and administrative decentralization has stimulated a shift in the loci of power to the republican level. In essence, there is not one Yugoslav party but six. Each of the six republics has its own party organization, congress, central committee and executive committee. Only at the level of the Presidium is the party national. The power shift was given particular impetus by reforms at the Ninth Party Congress which decided that members of the Presidium would henceforth be elected at the level of the republican congress and that the composition of the Executive Bureau would attempt to achieve "equal representation of nationalities." The republican parties were also given the right to draw up their own statutes.

The recent crisis, however, has sparked new calls for a return to "democratic centralism" and a paring down of the party designed, in Tito's words, "to bring about a faster and more regular development of socialist society and enable the working class to be present everywhere."[45] In line with this idea, Tito announced at

[44]Yugoslavia has had three constitutions since the communists came to power. The first, promulgated in January 1946, was merely a copy of the Soviet constitution. It was replaced by the Constitutional Law adopted in January 1953. In April 1963 a new constitution was proclaimed, which was then amended in April 1967 and December 1968. The latest draft amendments in effect amount to a new constitution. The text includes twenty-one amendments (numbered 20-40 because the amendments adopted in April 1967 were numbered 1-6 and those of December 1968, 7-19). According to the NIN information agency (January 30, 1972), a completely new constitution is being prepared.

[45]Radio Zagreb, January 27, 1972. In a speech on December 18, 1971, Tito even expressed dissatisfaction with the famous Sixth Party Congress (1952) which had

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the second conference of the Yugoslav party (held on January 25-27, 1972) that "large cumbersome party cells" of up to 1,000 members would be replaced by "smaller, more active units," and that the size of the party's Executive Bureau would be reduced from fifteen to eight members.[46] Moreover the secretary of the bureau, Stane Dolanc, though a Slovene, is known to be a strong opponent of the type of federalization advocated by the Croatian leaders. Despite this accent on a return to limited centralization and the attempt to instill more vigor into the party at the national level, the fact that the republics have so largely become the loci of power weighs against the probability that the party can provide the cohesive cement and political authority to prevent further instability.

A Praetorian Solution?

The prospect of future instability raises the question of the role of the Yugoslav army in the post-Tito era. Military intervention in politics, as theorists are becoming more and more aware, is less related to the characteristics of the military institution itself than to the absence or weakness of political institutions in the polity it is dedicated to defend.[47] Intervention most often occurs when power is fragmented and authority over the system as a whole is lacking.

Today in Yugoslavia the army is the only institution not affected by self-management. Thus, in an increasingly volatile

established the basis for the self-management system and decided that the party role would be that of a guiding ideological force rather than an administrative authority. See Tanjug, December 18, 1971.

[46]The eight members of the new Executive Bureau elected at the conference are:

Krsta Avramovic, 44, a Serb from Serbia
Jure Bilic, 50, a Croat from Croatia
Todo Kurtovic, 53, a Serb from Herzegovina
Stane Dolanc, 47, a Slovene
Stevan Doronjski, 53, a Serb from Vojvodina
Fadil Hoxha, 62, an Albanian from Kosovo
Kiro Gligorov, 55, a Macedonian
Budislav Soskic, 47, a Montenegrin

While such notables as Edvard Kardelj, Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, Krste Crvenkovski and Mijalko Todorovic lost their seats, the real power still remains in the Presidium, and this appears to be the reason for the inclusion of fewer prominent party members in the Executive Bureau.

[47]Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 194. For other general discussions of the problem of the military in politics see John J. Johnson, editor, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and Rustow, *A World of Nations, op. cit.*, Chapter 6.

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political situation it remains the only force with coherence and authority dedicated to the preservation of the unity of the Yugoslav state. In the absence of other institutions capable of organizing and maintaining authority — i.e., given Tito's departure and a party rent by nationality conflicts — the army is likely to play a more significant role.

It is not surprising that on several occasions during the student strike Tito made reference to the role of the army. He noted that in the face of continued nationalistic fervor which could endanger the state he would not hesitate to use "the ultimate means." And as if to dramatize his point, he said, "and you know what the ultimate means are."[48] He then went on to elaborate that the army was not only to defend the country from outside attack but also to defend socialism "when we see it is in danger and when there are no other means to defend it."[49] The next day, speaking to veterans celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the formation of the First Proletarian Brigade, he emphasized that the army was henceforth to play a dual role: to defend the country against foreign enemies; and to defend "the achievements of the revolution" within the country.[50] Further, he explicitly rejected any attempts to decentralize the army. In a speech before the Proletarian Brigade in Bosnia on December 22 he attacked the Croatians, who wanted "little by little to take the army [in Croatia] into their own, Croatian hands," and stressed that "we will put an end to all talk of dividing the army up in any way whatsoever."[51]

Similar sentiments were expressed by Nikola Ljubicic, Minister of Defense, who declared at a banquet for Tito that the military believed "the best way for us to repay our debts to our fallen comrades is to preserve *the revolutionary achievements* for which they gave their lives," and that the army was "a powerful *factor of social stability* and cohesion in our nation and nationalities."[52] A recent poll taken among high-ranking officers showed that 54 per cent felt that "nationalism and chauvinism" were the greatest threat to the country, while only 13.5 per cent thought the danger emanated from foreign aggression.[53] This is not surprising, in that 70 per cent of the officers are Serbs.[54]

[48]Tanjug, December 16, 1971.
[49]*Borba*, December 23, 1971.
[50]*Ibid.*, December 24, 1971.
[51]*Ibid.*
[52]Tanjug, December 21, 1971. (Emphasis added.)
[53]Slobodan Stankovic, "What Does the Yugoslav Army Think?," CAA Research Report 1058, *Radio Free Europe Research*, June 28, 1971.
[54]See Schleicher's interview of Bakaric, *op. cit.*

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While it would be extreme to conclude, as some have, that Tito's statements constitute "a carte blanche for the high command,"[55] it is clear that the army considers itself to be one of the prime guardians of public order and that Tito is encouraging this attitude. Moreover, when Tito steps down the real power of command — according to the newly amended constitution — will be transferred to the three-man Military Committee, headed by Defense Minister Ljubicic (a Serb). Although theoretically subordinate to the State Presidency, which is empowered to be "the supreme organ leading and commanding the Yugoslav People's Army," the Military Committee in fact is charged with defense on a day-to-day basis and could become a powerful vehicle for asserting the interests of the army. This need not imply that an army coup is imminent in Yugoslavia. The point made is that, in the turmoil induced by the departure of Tito and in situations where political authority is likely to be weak and fragmented, the army can be expected to play an active political role.[56]

More likely than a seizure of power would be a "Turkish solution," where the military does not rule directly but acts as a sort of umpire operating behind the scenes to set the political rules, ready to intervene if and when necessary. After the 1960 intervention by the Turkish army in the wake of student demonstrations and other disturbances, the military held power for a short period before it retreated from the political stage. In the ensuing years, however, the military command, meeting with political leaders in the Supreme Military Council or speaking through the Chief of Staff, continued to intervene in the political process to maintain its position of authority, and to keep pro-Menderes (the former Turkish premier ousted in the 1960 coup and later executed) extremists from exerting a strong political influence. The intervention of the military once again during the crisis in early 1971 demonstrated the persistence of this pattern. While the dynamics of the Yugoslav case are not entirely the same, some sort of a "civilian-military twilight," as Dankwart Rustow has termed it,[57] does seem likely in face of the powerful role given to the Military Committee under the constitution and the increased possibility of further instability once Tito departs.

[55]Paul Lendvai, *Baltimore Sun*, January 3, 1972.

[56]Indicative of this increased role is the appointment of General Ivan Miskovic as Secretary of the Council for State Security of the Yugoslav State Presidency. Miskovic already holds the position of Special Adviser to the President of the Republic and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia for Security Matters.

[57]Rustow, *A World of Nations, op. cit.*, p. 194.

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Much, of course, will also depend on external factors, particularly the attitude of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are undoubtedly looking forward to the post-Tito era and hoping that a Yugoslavia devoid of Tito's unifying personality will revert to the political instability of the interwar years and thus become more amenable to Soviet pressure and influence. At present it serves Moscow's best interests to pursue a policy of watchful waiting, alternating pressure (such as intrigue with Croatian nationalists, revival of the Macedonian polemics, and contact with pro-Soviet groups in the Yugoslav bureaucracy) with conciliatory gestures such as those implicit in Brezhnev's visit in September 1971 and Tito's return visit to Moscow in June 1972. In the long run, however, it is likely that Moscow is less interested in a breakup of Yugoslavia — as some commentators have recently suggested[58] — than in a weak, unified Yugoslavia. A breakup of the Yugoslav state would threaten to unleash a civil war, risk great-power intervention, and ultimately endanger peace in Europe, while a weak but unified state would mean a less obstreperous Yugoslavia, one of necessity more closely allied with Soviet foreign policy goals, and one that would probably give the Soviets the use of port facilities in the Adriatic. Yugoslavia's disintegration would not only discredit and remove an important alternative model of socialism but would leave Rumania in further isolation as a communist "independent."

So long as Tito remains at the helm, there is little prospect of a major change in Yugoslavia's domestic or international policy. His hope in the time remaining is to stem the centrifugal forces that have emerged in the last several years in order to leave the country in a stronger position to survive his departure. The student strike provided him with a ready-made excuse to move against these forces and to attempt to restore a limited form of centralization in the party. But the crucial question — whether it is possible to proceed with a policy of economic and administrative decentralization on the one hand and a recentralization of the party on the other — is still in doubt.

That the Brezhnev visit and Tito's talks in Washington just prior to the student strike may have influenced his later policy decisions is a moot point. Tito may have come away from

[58]See, for instance, Walter Guenzel, "Jugoslawien in der Zerreissprobe," *Die Welt*, December 15, 1971, and the *New York Times* editorial of December 23, 1971.

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Washington less than satisfied with the support he could expect from the United States and may thus have decided that his best recourse was to move against the centrifugal forces at the first opportune moment. Whatever his motives, the actions taken against the Croatian leaders and his call for a reassertion of the leading role of the party — as he knew — could only be greeted with approval in Moscow. In regard to the future this raises a question: At a time when other, more powerful countries seem to be seeking some sort of accommodation with Moscow, and when Soviet influence is increasing both in Europe and the Middle East, can a Yugoslavia increasingly beset with internal difficulties and devoid of Tito's unifying force fail to seek a *modus vivendi* of its own with the USSR?

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MORALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*

by Ernest W. Lefever

THE rising moral concern among Americans in recent years about the conduct and consequences of their government's foreign policy has often been accompanied by increased moral confusion and impassioned rhetoric. Moral and political perplexity is not without merit, because the uncertainty it betokens can sometimes lead to greater understanding and more responsible behavior. The deterioriation of moral discourse, not confined to critics or supporters of any particular foreign policy, is the product of recent external developments and a persistent philosophical ambiguity in the American character.

It is too simple to attribute the pervasive moral confusion to American involvement in Viet Nam, though that protracted trauma doubtless has brought to a head our growing weariness with the burdens of power and disenchantment with what Denis Brogan once called "the illusion of American omnipotence." Even before Viet Nam our earlier and more naive national self-confidence had been shattered by a series of disappointments and reverses — the "fall of China" in 1949, the inconclusive Korean War, the loss of Cuba to the communist camp, and the divisiveness, conflict and war following in the wake of decolonization. With these bitter lessons, most Americans have finally learned that even the mighty United States cannot shape the destiny of peoples in the larger world, at least not without violating our profound moral inhibitions against the exercise of unabashed force to aggrandize our power or nourish our vanity. Since Pearl Harbor, few spokesmen — Henry Luce is one — have advocated that we shed our cherished scruples in the quest for an American imperium.

Underlying the moral awakening and confusion has been a continuing struggle between two different ways of looking at history and politics, two streams of American thought that have vied for ascendancy, especially since the mid-nineteenth century. The late

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Reinhold Niebuhr called these inclinations "rational idealism" and "historical realism," each manifesting itself in diverging political attitudes, expectations and behavior.

Rational idealism in essence is the child of the Enlightenment and Social Darwinism, and in its pure form it affirms the perfectability, or at least improvability, of man and the possibility, if not inevitability, of progress in history. The diverse schools within this approach are united in their ultimate faith in the nobler nature of man. The earlier idealists saw reason as the redemptive agent that would save man and politics and eventually inaugurate an era of universal peace and brotherhood — the socialist paradise or the Kingdom of God on earth. The natural goodness of man, they believed, can be translated into the structures of politics. Poverty, injustice and war can be eliminated. The rational idealists were supported by the views of men such as Tom Paine, Walt Whitman and Walter Rauschenbusch, the articulate spokesmen of the Protestant Social Gospel movement. Wilsonian idealism, the manifestation of rationalism in the international sphere, reached its zenith in 1928 with the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war as an "instrument of national policy."

Historical realism, in contrast, emphasizes the moral limits of human nature and history and has its roots in St. Augustine, John Calvin, Edmund Burke, James Madison, and most other classical Western thinkers. Rejecting all forms of religious and secular utopianism — including fascism and communism — the post-Versailles realists have included men as varied as Niebuhr, Carl L. Becker, Winston Churchill and Dean Acheson. Noting that the extravagant expectations of the Wilsonians were not ratified by subsequent events, the self-designated realists hold that all political achievements are limited by man's dogged resistance to drastic reconstruction. With this recognition of "original sin," they argue that perfect peace, justice, security and freedom are not possible in this world, though approximations of these lofty goals are not beyond man's grasp. To the rational idealist, the "impossible ideal" is achievable because it is rationally conceivable. To the historical realist, the "impossible ideal" is relevant because it lends humility without despair and hope without illusion.

In the real world there are few wholly consistent adherents to either approach. Were Jefferson and Lincoln rational idealists or historical realists? Obviously they were a combination of both, Jefferson leaning toward the idealist view and Lincoln toward the realistic. Like most Americans, they tended to be optimistic about

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the more distant future and at the same time practical and realistic about immediate problems and possibilities.

Rational idealism and historical realism are not complete moral systems, but two different perspectives coexisting uneasily within the Western commitment to a political order of justice and freedom. As approaches, they are subject to certain limitations and weaknesses. In one sense each tends to balance and correct the other. Most moral philosophers, political theorists and statesmen tend toward one view or the other. On the practical level, virtually all political leaders have been realists, regardless of how idealistic their rhetoric may have been. Anyone, like me, who believes that the historical realist approach is a more adequate reading of the deepest Judaeo-Christian tradition and a sounder guide to the art of politics than its post-Enlightenment rival, must recognize that it, like rational idealism, is subject to corruption.

II

Both of these respectable philosophical approaches have in fact been demeaned and distorted by emphasizing certain of their virtues to the neglect or exclusion of other elements in the larger body of Western normative thought. Each is vulnerable in its own way to the vices of political aloofness on the one hand and crusading arrogance on the other. Rational idealists, frustrated by stubborn political realities, sometimes degenerate into sentimentalists whose strident demand for perfection becomes a substitute for responsible behavior. When personal purity becomes more important than political effectiveness, the resulting aloofness is virtually indistinguishable from that of the Machiavellians who cynically insist that might alone makes right. The historical realist becomes irresponsible when his preoccupation with man's baser nature cuts the taproot of social concern and permits him to become a defender of injustice or tyranny.

A lopsided realist can come to hold that what is good for America is good for the rest of the world and that it is our "manifest destiny" to make other peoples over in our own image, by force if necessary. An equally lopsided idealist can support efforts to reshape other societies by more subtle, but not necessarily less reprehensible, means. Members of each approach can degenerate into cynical isolationists or overbearing crusaders. Seen in this light, the extremists in both groups have more in common with each other than with the mainstream of their own tradition.

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The corruption of realism or idealism can be called *moralism* — the most popular rival and impostor of genuine *morality*. Morality or ethics (the Greek derivative with the same meaning) has to do with right or wrong behavior in all spheres. It is a discipline of ends and means. However primitive or sophisticated, all moral systems define normative ends and acceptable rules for achieving them. Moralism, on the other hand, is a sham morality, a partial ethic. Often it is expressed in self-righteous rhetoric or manipulative symbols designed to justify, enlist, condemn or deceive rather than to inform, inspire or serve the cause of justice. The moralism of the naive and well-intentioned may be sincere. The moralism of the ambitious and sophisticated is likely to be dishonest. Intellectually flabby and morally undisciplined, moralism tends to focus on private interests rather than the public good, on the immediate at the expense of the future, and on sentiment rather than reason. It is often more concerned with appearances than consequences. Morality is a synonym for responsibility. Moralism is a conscious or unconscious escape from accountability.

The varieties of moralism flowing from the corruption of the two approaches always subvert honest political dialogue and responsible behavior, but at the present point in American history *soft moralism* of the sentimental idealists is a greater threat than *hard moralism* of the power realists. The views of the hard cynics — the Machiavellis and imperialists — find little hospitality in the university, the church, the mass press, or in the public generally. Few Americans call for the reconquest of the Philippines or the "liberation" of Cuba or Eastern Europe. The small voice of the hard moralists is barely audible. In sharp contrast, the soft moralism of the rational idealists has had increasing appeal because many Americans are wearied by the burdens of power — the cost of nuclear deterrence and the perplexities of helping to keep the peace in distant places. Senator George McGovern in significant respects is a soft moralist, though his more extreme views have been chastened by his attempt during the 1972 Presidential campaign to develop a broad base of support among the American people.

Today the rational idealistic approach — in its religious and secular versions — and the various corruptions of this stance find wide acceptance among certain articulate leaders in the church and university and are actively promoted by a segment of the mass media. Given the high level of moral turbulence and uncertainty,

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it is important to take critical note of this more pervasive manifestation of American moralism, acknowledging that some of its attributes are also similar to those of hard moralism.

Single and Multiple Causes

Moralism, soft or hard, tends toward a single-factor approach to political problems, while mainstream Western morality emphasizes multiple causation, multiple ends and multiple responsibilities. Many Americans have demanded peace (often simplistically defined as the absence of war) with insufficient regard for the other two great social ends, justice and freedom. Some have urged the United States to withdraw immediately and totally from Viet Nam or to stop building nuclear arms without weighing the probable impact of their advice on the prospects for justice in Southeast Asia, freedom in Western Europe, or global stability. Others have insisted that U.S. involvement in the Third World has thwarted the march toward justice. If one of the valued goals — peace, justice or freedom — becomes the supreme political end, the other two are bound to suffer. Peace (or order) without justice and freedom is tyranny. Justice without freedom is another form of tryanny.

The statesman has a multiple mandate to use the resources at his command to maintain a tolerable balance among the competing claims of order, justice and freedom, though in grave crises he may be compelled to sacrifice one temporarily to save the other two. Confronted with the infamy of Pearl Harbor, the American people sacrificed peace in the interests of security and were prepared to accept limitations on their freedom for the same end. Any political community must enjoy minimal security before it can develop the discipline of justice and the safeguards of freedom.

Preoccupation with a particular value, such as "the right of self-determination" (one expression of freedom), undercuts wise statesmanship and often has dire consequences. Single-minded emphasis on self-determination insured the Balkanization of Eastern Europe after World War I. In the 1960's, when the Katanga and Biafra lobbies marched under the same banner of self-determination, the effect was to prolong conflict and suffering in the abortive secessionist attempts in the Congo (Zaire) and Nigeria. The pro-Biafra crusade, a dramatic example of the moral confusion of single-issue causes, was an improbable conglomeration of the New Left and Old Right, humanitarians and hirelings, churchmen and secularists, isolationists and interventionists.

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The State

The soft moralistic view tends to distrust the state, especially its coercive power, while Western ethical thought affirms the necessity of the state and insists on the responsible use of its power. Absolute power may corrupt absolutely, as Lord Acton asserted, but less-than-absolute power may or may not corrupt those who exercise it. There is little evidence that Lincoln, Churchill or Truman were corrupted by power; they may even have been ennobled by it. Hitler, Stalin and Mao were doubtless corrupted before they gained power. Power is amoral. It can be enlisted to liberate or enslave, to guarantee security or take it away. There is a vast difference between the Germany of Adolf Hitler and the Germany of Willy Brandt.

The state government must possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its domain. As the sovereign authority over a given territory — whether city, country or empire — the government is the ultimate agency for resolving internal conflicts of power and interest. Were it not for the state, St. Augustine said, men would devour one another as fishes. Martin Luther asserted that the central task of the state was to protect the innocent by restraining evil men. Of the modern democratic state, Professor Niebuhr wrote: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."[1] The problem is not to eliminate the state, the professed goal of Marxists and anarchists alike, but to make political power accountable to its citizens by a system that permits them peaceably to give or withhold consent and if necessary to throw the rascals out. If a government becomes tyrannical and all peaceful means for redressing grievances have been exhausted, the people, said Lincoln, have the right to rebel by violent means. The acceptance of Lincoln's view on the right of revolution does not negate the essential character of the responsible state. It is the fundamental agency for "insuring domestic tranquillity, providing for the common defense, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty." In serving these central social objectives there is no substitute for the state, the sovereign political community. In a democratic and pluralistic society, however, other agencies, such as the university, the church and economic organizations, have a positive role to play.

[1]Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. xi.

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Military Power

Soft moralism is highly critical of the exercise of American military power, except in self-defense, and this is often narrowly defined. America has been criticized for throwing its weight around, and even for repressive policies toward the Third World, though solid evidence is seldom adduced to buttress these charges. On the other hand, a few hard zealots have called for a stronger exercise of power to impose an American order in one part of the world or another. Classical moralists reject both the arbitrary abstention from power and its unrestrained use, and insist that the United States has a responsibility for international peace and order commensurate with its capacity to affect external events. Our military power — as a deterrent, a threat, or an active force — should be limited to dealing with real and present dangers to world peace. A workable international order can rest only on a propitious balance of forces with each of the two superpowers inescapably playing a vital role. U.S. military might, including its nuclear arsenal, is an essential factor in preventing a shift in the balance of forces that could lead to war or the capitulation of friendly states to nuclear blackmail.

The international security system led by the United States — involving NATO, other mutual defense arrangements and military assistance — has gone a long way to protect the weak against the ambitions of the strong. What would have been the fate of Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan if the United States had not extended its protection? Since the balance sheet on Southeast Asia is not yet completed, it is not certain that U.S. involvement has set back the long-range prospects for stability, order and freedom. American security assistance to some fifty Third World states in the past two decades has helped to maintain in many of them that minimal stability essential to constructive political and economic development.

To affirm an indispensable American responsibility for reinforcing the chance for peaceful change is not to define the specific disciplines of that role. How, when, and under what circumstances Washington should threaten or use how much coercion poses a perplexing political and moral question. It can be resolved only by statesmen who understand both the limits and possibilities of American power in situations where the United States has little control and an uncertain moral mandate. Because of these complexities and uncertainty about its own responsibilities, the

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United States has on occasion used too little or too much power or exercised it too early or too late. The Bay of Pigs comes to mind.

Interventionism and Reform

Some soft American moralists actively call for interventionist foreign policies designed to reshape the internal customs and institutions of other states. At the same time, they often downgrade or even deprecate the primary security role of foreign policy. This strange combination of reform-intervention and security-isolation turns foreign policy on its head. In the classical view, the first task of external policy is peace and security, and the first task of domestic policy is order and justice. The reform interventionists, soft or hard, blur the salient distinction between what can and ought to be done by a government for its own people, and what can and ought to be done by a government in the vast external realm over which it has no legal jurisdiction and where its moral and political mandate is severely limited. The insistence that the U.S. government employ extraordinary and sometimes coercive means to reshape the internal political, economic or social structures in other sovereign communities is morally arrogant; it flies in the face of the most basic international law which, in the words of the UN Charter, prohibits intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

Western morality respects the right of each political community to develop in its own way at its own pace, as long as it does not impinge coercively on other political communities. President Nixon's words in Rumania in 1969 were a refreshing restatement of this principle: "We seek normal relations with all countries, regardless of their domestic systems"; each state has the right to "preserve its national institutions." His trip to China underscored his words. Ignoring this self-constraint, moralistic voices keep urging the government to withhold security or economic aid in order to force domestic changes within Brazil, Greece and other friendly states whose structure or policies do not accord with the critic's preferences.

This peculiar American penchant to export our virtue reached a high-water mark, at least in rhetoric, under President Kennedy and found belated legislative sanction in 1966 in Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act. The latter declared that all U.S. economic aid programs should encourage the development of "democratic private and local governmental institutions" in the recipient

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countries by using their "intellectual resources" to stimulate "economic and social progress" and by supporting "civic education and training skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government." Still, this intrusive sally into other people's affairs, however naive or wrongheaded, does not compare to the breathtaking sweep or moral pretension of the Communist Manifesto with its strident call to the workers of the world (read self-appointed elect) to redeem societies everywhere without regard to state frontiers. Arrogance is the chief sin. Civilized human beings, observed Leopold Tyrmand, should "agree not to burden each other" with their "excessive humanity."

Viewing U.S. foreign policy as an instrument for reform rather than of stability is not only arrogant; it also overlooks the severely limited capacity of any external agency to influence and reshape alien cultures. As Gunnar Myrdal pointed out in *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*,[2] the economic and political development of low-income countries is determined largely by internal forces — static and dynamic — though well-considered trade, investment and aid from industrial states may spur development. Any government has the right to request American or Soviet technical assistance. By the same token, Washington and Moscow have the right to accept or turn down the request. The provision of economic or military aid that serves the interests of both parties presents few problems. It is wrong, however, for the donor government to give, withhold or modify aid to force significant domestic changes unacceptable to the recipient regime and unrelated to the efficient use of the assistance.

The crusading impulse to reform should be clearly distinguished from the humanitarian motive that has prompted the U.S. government over the years to do more for the foreign victims of famine, earthquake and war than any other government in history. Earthquake relief is not designed to restructure institutions, overthrow regimes or promote "free elections."

The Weak and the Powerful

Soft moralism tends to associate virtue with weakness, just as it associates vice with power. Western morality affirms the fundamental worth of the poor and the weak and recognizes that they are less able to defend their rights than the rich and powerful.

[2](New York: Pantheon, 1968).

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Further, under the rubric of *noblesse oblige,* men privileged by wealth or station are duty-bound to protect and assist the lowly. But this does not automatically endow the weak with innocence or virtue, whether they are deprived by nature, sloth, exploitation or other circumstances.

The behavior of all states, great and small, must be judged by the same moral yardstick, recognizing that the degree of responsibility is commensurate with the capacity to act. "He who has much given to him will have much required of him." Yet, there is a widespread tendency among moralistic Americans to regard the fledgling new states with a kind of perverse paternalism which excuses childish, demanding and otherwise irresponsible behavior, such as that of the delegates who applauded the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971 or those who charged Washington and Brussels with "deliberate genocide" and "massive cannibalism" for rescuing more than 2,000 innocent foreign hostages of nineteen nationalities in the Congo in 1964.

Neither the weak nor the strong are immune from error or corruption. The celebrated and much confessed "arrogance of power" should not blind us to the arrogance of weakness, which may express itself in simple claims of virtue, insistence on unjustified "reparations," or demands for minority control, all calculated to exploit a pervasive sense of guilt in the American character. As Churchill pointed out, we Anglo-Saxons tend to feel guilty because we possess power. Prime Minister Nehru and other Third World spokesmen often assumed an air of moral superiority, insisting that they were uncorrupted by power and therefore possessed an innocence and humanity denied the leaders of powerful, and hence guilty, states. In a UN speech in 1960, Premier Saeb Salaam of Lebanon said: "We, the small, uncommitted nations, can perhaps take a more objective view of the world situation. We can judge international issues with comparatively greater detachment and impartiality; in a sense, the small uncommitted nations can be said to represent the unbiased conscience of humanity."[3]

Recent official Swedish statements reflect this moralistic tendency. Though espousing neutrality, Swedish officials have been quick to condemn the behavior of the big powers, particularly the United States, and to take "moral" stands on a variety of international issues. Stockholm has supported Hanoi and the Viet Cong against America and has given moral and material aid to the

[3]*New York Times,* October 5, 1960.

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communist-assisted guerrilla fighters seeking to overthrow Western-oriented regimes in southern Africa. In November 1971, the Swedish government decided to prohibit arms shipment to insurgent groups in Africa so as not to become directly involved and thus remain "neutral." It is morally easy for politicians or religious leaders to cheer or condemn from the sidelines when they have no responsibility and are unwilling to become committed. With studied hyperbole John P. Roche makes the point: "Power corrupts. And the absence of power corrupts absolutely."

Preoccupation with the Present

The prevailing moralistic approach tends to be preoccupied with the present, neglectful of the past, and nonchalant about the future. Impatient with imperfection, the new romantics indulge in what Elton Trueblood has called the "sin of contemporaneity." It may be argued that enchantment with the chronological now represents a positive contribution from the existential emphasis on the present tense imperative, but evidence suggests it is usually an escape from the eternal now which binds the past and future in an endless chain of responsibility.

According to classical morality, man is not an isolated actor suddenly thrust onto an alien stage and expected to respond to the strange sights and sounds around him. Man is born and nurtured in an ongoing community, a continuous web of cause and effect, a tapestry of gifts and expectations. Man is a creature of history, a product of the past, an actor in the present, and an influence for the future. To reject the past, as so many radicals do, is to reject the fabric of human continuity that gives moral meaning to the present.

The widespread and strangely indiscriminate view that the status quo is bad and change is good suggests that history is "a tale told by an idiot," a story without meaning. Western morality insists that history, like man, is morally ambiguous and that the task of the present generation is to accept the best of the past and reject the worst. This selective dependence on history is not possible if there is no understanding of the major ideas, events and forces that have shaped the present. Many students today show no interest in the developments that had the most dramatic impact on the political outlook of their parents. If events like Pearl Harbor, Korea and the Budapest uprising are not known or have no common meaning, how can the two generations communicate? The understanding of recent history is vital, even if earlier eras must

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be shortchanged. This suggests the advisability of teaching history backward, starting with today's newspaper and covering the past decade before moving to the more distant past.

Moral and Political Calculation

In their disdain for history, ancient and recent, and their insistence on achieving quick solutions, many romantic idealists sell the future short by neglecting the disciplines of moral and political calculation. The principal practical test of any political decision is not the intention of the actor or the means he uses, but its immediate and long-range consequences. These consequences are also essential in making a moral assessment of the decision.

Moral choice demands calculation — an assessment of multiple causes, multiple alternatives and multiple consequences. Many critics of U.S. defense policy condemned the announced underground nuclear test which was carried out in Alaska in November 1971. Some said it would trigger a devastating earthquake or tidal wave or otherwise damage the natural environment. Other critics insisted that the test was a giant step in accelerating the strategic arms race. After careful calculation President Nixon decided to go ahead, convinced that the natural risks had been exaggerated and that the probable consequences were on balance good for U.S. security and world peace. Following the test there was no indication of a radioactive leak and the damage to the environment appeared to be slight. It did demonstrate the feasibility of the Spartan warhead, an essential component in any viable ABM system designed to protect America's land-based Minuteman missiles. These missiles in turn are designed to deter a nuclear attack against this country and thus avoid a conflagration. Further, the test may well have strengthened the U.S. position at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviets, which produced agreements in May 1972 on nuclear weapons. These and many other factors were considered in the calculus preceding the President's decision. Critics do not bear the burden of decision, but are they not obligated to consider all the major issues at stake before they pronounce final moral judgments?

The Devil-Theory

Some of the more extreme American moralists, baffled by complexity and impatient with the untidy state of the world, sometimes adopt what amounts to a devil-theory of politics, an ever-popular version of the single-issue approach. They attempt to

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identify the central flaw, the fatal error, the demonic force underlying our present plight.

The earlier rational idealists discovered a series of plausible devils that, separately or in combination, were held responsible for war, injustice, poverty, and many other afflictions of mankind. Each was fatally vulnerable to its rational and righteous counterpart. The prince of darkness, capitalism, could be slain by socialism. The confusion of tongues, the cause of international misunderstanding and conflict, could be cured by education and Esperanto. Nationalism could be exorcised by internationalism and world government. The military and the "merchants of death" could be abolished by the renunciation of war. The winding road from Versailles to Pearl Harbor and beyond is cluttered with the debris of well-intentioned crusades — the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and compulsory arbitration of interstate disputes, to name a few. The idealists and their ideal solutions failed. The Wilsonians, it has been said, reached for utopia and gave us hell.

The targets of present-day devil-theorists bear a striking resemblance to those of earlier decades. Now it is the military-industrial complex, the establishment, the system, the corporate structure, technology, or greed. For many of the radical dissenters the chief demon is "decadent liberalism," a menacing Mephistopheles embracing all the vices of gradualism, reform, due process and peaceful evolution — benign bourgeois beatitudes that blur the necessity to "destroy the system" and thus subvert revolutionary zeal. Some zealots prefer more personal devils, such as Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk or Richard Nixon. By the same token, they have personal messiahs such as Mao, Ho and Che.

The devil-theory approach lends itself to an apocalyptic interpretation of the political situation. The whole world is polarized and the golden mean, the vital center, and orderly change are thrown to the winds. The forces of good (read progressive or revolutionary) at home and abroad are arrayed against the forces of evil (read status quo or reactionary) and there is no compromise. The "establishment" will be crushed and "the people" will prevail. It is only a matter of time and dedication. Here one sees the rhetoric of the Maoists and Marxists being used loosely and without discipline by the soft romantics.

Limitations and Possibilities of Moral Reasoning

Most American moralists have an inadequate understanding of

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the limits and possibilities of logic, rationality and calculation. According to classical Western norms, moral reasoning is a possibility, indeed a necessity. Man is a reasoning creature. Within the limits of circumstance, he can plan, devise, calculate, though he can rarely control or determine events. Circumstances are too complex and intractable and human emotions too unpredictable to come up with solutions. Precise prediction is impossible and risk is never absent. Tolstoy dramatizes the human situation by describing the dilemma of a military commander who

> . . . is always in the midst of a series of shifting events and so he never can at any moment consider the whole import of an event that is occurring. Moment by moment the event is imperceptibly shaping itself, and at every moment of this continuous, uninterrupted shaping of events the commander in chief is in the midst of a most complex play of intrigues, worries, contingencies, authorities, projects, counsels, threats, and deceptions and is continually obliged to reply to innumerable questions addressed to him, which constantly conflict with one another.[4]

To acknowledge the serious limits of rational calculation in politics is not to deprecate reason, or the necessity to marshal relevant facts, or the desirability of projecting the probable consequences of competing lines of action. Politics is more an art than a science, but the scientific discipline of weighing evidence is a compelling moral obligation. To ignore evidence, to disdain logic or to overlook empirical data is to retreat into blind emotion which spawns illusions. If the romantics fail to discipline their desires with data or their passions with power, and persist in their illusions, they become almost indistinguishable from cynics or nihilistic troublemakers.

Just as the contemporary sentimentalists expect too little of reason, the earlier rational idealists expected too much. Reason provides the capacity to conceive of noble ends and to comprehend the barriers to their fulfillment, but reason cannot provide the will or the capacity to behave responsibly. Reason is not an independent human agency that transcends the self, but rather a servant of the self with all its pride and prejudice. A morally sensitive statesman can enlist reason in the pursuit of wise and prudent policies. A morally corrupt politician can likewise enlist reason for his ignoble ends. The old utopians believed that reason and good will unaided by power would transform politics, but the new romantics seem to despair of reason altogether.

[4]Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), pp. 921-922.

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III

Western morality, in sum, affirms the dignity of man and the necessity for the state. It is precisely because man is finite and inclined to pursue his selfish desires at the expense of his neighbor that structures of order and justice are needed. The responsible state alone is capable of insuring that basic human rights will not be trampled underfoot.

The great majority of American people, by temperament and their respect for law, are committed to a domestic order rooted in a prudent balance of justice and freedom, and to an international order that is safe for diversity and peaceful change. Movement toward these political goals at home and abroad requires a working combination of the "impossible ideal" and an appreciation of political limitations. A man's aim should exceed his grasp, but not by too much. Our times call for idealism without illusion and realism without despair.

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WILL WEST GERMANY GO NUCLEAR?

by Horst Mendershausen

GIVEN the strength of the Federal Republic of Germany's industrial economy and its substantial technical and production efforts in the field of nuclear energy, the country ranks high among those capable of undertaking a nuclear arms acquisition program. But considering the FRG's political position and political climate, it should not be expected to make use of this capability except under extraordinary assumptions about possible developments. West German evasion of a nuclear weapons test ban, under the current limited or a future comprehensive treaty, has an extremely low likelihood, lower than that of a Washington-Peking military alliance against Moscow. The FRG has every incentive to be above suspicion with regard to activities that could be construed as indications of an autonomous weapons acquisition program. There is ample and growing capacity, but no will.

West Germany is not a country without nuclear arms. Many nuclear warheads are located on its soil in the custody of allied, mainly American, stationed forces. The Bundeswehr has delivery vehicles (aircraft, missile launchers, artillery) capable of using these warheads. NATO arrangements govern the peacetime training of German units with American weapons and the release of weapons to such units in wartime. Up to now, the FRG has endorsed, even sought, this kind of nuclear status, i.e., the defense of the country by way of a deterrent posture through nuclear arms controlled by its allies. It has, however, rejected and continues to reject autonomous German nuclear armament.

Broadly speaking, there exists a consensus in the FRG on nuclear policy: Nuclear energy and technological development are desired and actively pursued for industrial and economic, including commerical, reasons. Nuclear armament in the hands and under control of the FRG's allies is accepted as an important contribution to the security of the country, although the presence of the allied warheads on German soil and some modalities of their possible employment cause misgivings. But German-owned nuclear weapons, employable as an adjunct to German policy outside the NATO framework, are rejected. This consensus stands

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in stark contrast to those one could draw up for countries such as Israel or India.

Industrial-Technical Aspects

With nuclear power capacity, operating and on order, second only to Great Britain's in Western Euorpe;[1] an active scientific-technical establishment conducting work on advanced reactor construction (e.g., fast-breeder reactors), uranium enrichment (notably by centrifugation and jet separation), and a long list of other projects; and with a versatile and capital-rich modern industrial system, the FRG's industrial-technical conditions might be envied by most countries aspiring to nuclear arms. The two principal electrical engineering concerns, AEG and Siemens, which dominate German nuclear industry, "will soon be in a position to rid themselves completely of their technological dependence on General Electric and Westinghouse, and thus to compete freely and fully, even on the American market, in the field of light-water reactors."[2]

In a few years, West German reactors will be producing 1,000 to 2,000 kg of plutonium per year, theoretically sufficient to make several hundred plutonium "bombs" of some kind. In addition there will be uranium enrichment capacities suitable for turning out weapon-grade fissile material. But German nuclear industry is not structured and used to turn out weapon-specific material. The facility for chemical plutonium separation is small, and plans to enlarge it have been put off. Facilities for uranium enrichment by centrifuge, which are being sought, will operate under a British-Dutch-German consortium. The FRG lacks a domestic raw material base. But all this is beside the point as far as a German arms program is concerned. Political restrictions militate against such a program for the foreseeable future.

If a future German government were to find it politically profitable to acquire nuclear weapons of its own, technical-industrial constraints would not stand in the way. Existing constraints of this kind could be overcome in finite time. Nor would domestic production capacities be necessarily involved in the execution of a sudden switch to nuclear arms acquisition. As long as the stockpiling of nuclear warheads under NATO auspices continues on FRG territory, a German government so inclined might seize a con-

[1] As of mid-1970, the megawattage of nuclear power plants, operating and on order, was 5,407 for the FRG, compared with the U.K.'s 10,531, France's 3,218, Japan's 6,949, the USSR's 8,005, and the United States' 83,484. *Atomwirtschaft,* September-October 1970, p. 428.

[2] *Bulletin of the European Communities,* June 1970, pp. 37-38.

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siderable number of allied warheads overnight and rush them into firing condition. Acquisition of nuclear arms — as we perceive them today in the form of high-powered fission and fusion explosives — by way of domestic production, seizure, or importation, belongs in the realm of extreme contingencies which will be discussed below.

This does not gainsay the possible significance of German industry and technology for the plans of other aspirants to nuclear weapons. The FRG is a major exporter of modern manufactures and technology and thus can make a contribution to the execution of nuclear weapons development programs elsewhere, despite present FRG policies which do not encourage such aspirations. It is quite conceivable that German exports of reactors, uranium centrifuges (when these are in production), and the thousand-and-one pieces of "hardware" and "software" that might close a gap in some country's weapons program, would in fact contribute to the realization of such a program. Perhaps they do so today, somewhere.

The organization of the governmental effort in support of nuclear research and development goes on under federal and *Land* auspices. In 1969 the federal government contributed 78 per cent, the *Länder* 22 per cent, to the aggregate German atomic program of DM 1.07 billion (up 16 per cent over 1968). Federal responsibility is exercised mainly by the Federal Ministry for Higher Education and Science (*Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft*), which draws on expert advice from a large German Atomic Energy Advisory Committee. The program finances research in the central public nuclear research institutes, which in 1969 absorbed 39 per cent of the budget (allocated notably to the Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe, with about 4,200 employees, one-half of whom are scientific-technical personnel, and the Jülich Nuclear Research Establishment); other nuclear research activities[3] (17 per cent); nuclear-technical development (25 per cent); and German contributions to the activities of EURATOM, CERN, IAEA, OECD/ENEA and EUROCHEMIC (18 per cent). Industrial firms, which operate or have on order a total of sixteen nuclear power plants, coordinate interests and public relations activities in the German Atom Forum, and specialized technical interests (e.g., isotope studies and ship propulsion) in other associations.

[3]By several basic research institutes in Munich, Hamburg and Berlin; the universities; and hospitals and medical centers.

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The Defense Ministry has kept aloof of nuclear research — indeed, of a considerable range of natural-science research in general — and failed to establish a regular framework for discussion with the relevant scientific groups. A natural-science/technical defense advisory council, founded in 1958, was dissolved after a few years of inactivity. Discussion groups called together by the Defense Minister in 1964 and 1965 proved to be short-lived, largely because of the aversion of German scientists to the military connection. The ministry owns no research institutions. Defense-technical research conducted by scientific institutes under contract had a total budget of DM 134 million in 1969 (DM 160 million in 1970), which included DM 5 million for research in defense against nuclear weapons.[4]

Treaty Commitments and Declaratory Policy

German leaders have pointed out repeatedly, in recent times in connection with the debate on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), that the FRG is the only country bound by an international commitment not to produce nuclear weapons. This commitment is contained in the Paris Treaties of 1954 with the United States, Britain and France, in which the FRG gained its sovereignty from the three postwar occupation powers, acceded to the Western European Union and NATO, and accepted the stationing of allied troops. It says that "the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons . . . [and] agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization to ensure that these undertakings are observed."[5]

This commitment to the three allies is not questioned in the FRG today and has never been. When Chancellor Brandt announced on November 28, 1969 that the FRG was signing the NPT, he referred to it and went on to say: "Moreover, the governments of the FRG have always refused to seek control [*Verfügungsgewalt*] over nuclear warheads. Therefore, our signature under this treaty does not constitute any new renunciation."[6]

[4]Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *White Paper 1970*, p. 152. The Defense White Paper for 1971/1972 offered no further data on research expenditures. It noted (p. 93) that since January 1972 there has been no classified defense research at universities.

[5]NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels, 1969), p. 287.

[6]Press Conference, November 28, 1969, reprinted in *Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (Bonn) (hereafter cited as *Bulletin*), November 29, 1970, p. 1236.

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On August 19, 1963 the FRG signed — and subsequently ratified — the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Public debate on this action was limited to misgivings about accepting the GDR (East Germany) as a co-signer of the treaty and the implicit measure of international recognition thus accorded to that Soviet-sponsored state on German soil. German accession to the limited test ban was not an issue.

The NPT, however, gave rise to hot debates in the FRG, and the Grand Coalition government, led by CDU Chancellor Kiesinger, registered many objections during and after its drafting. The key objection was that the treaty made nuclear weapons abstinence an FRG commitment toward the USSR, which was then still treated as an opponent threatening the country. The CDU/CSU, of which Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss was a vigorous spokesman, expressed fears that the Soviet Union would gain rights to interfere with German nuclear industry and technical development, military security (via Germany's role in NATO's nuclear defense), and foreign policy (European unification with the possibility of German sharing in the nuclear armament of a future West European power). These fears did not focus on the German commitment as such but on its extension, without appropriate *quid pro quo,* from allied partners to a hostile power. The Chancellor's distaste for the U.S. anti-proliferation policy that virtually forced the FRG to accept this course[7] found expression when he accused the United States of "nuclear complicity" with the USSR, and he and Strauss belabored the "discrimination" against the FRG.[8]

Thus the opposition of the leading government party to the NPT was essentially an opposition to U.S. détente policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It reflected on German policy toward nuclear arms only insofar as it expressed fear for the future of nuclear intimacy in the Western alliance — if not qualms about the alliance itself — and in a possible West European combination.

The Social Democratic junior partner in the Grand Coalition did not share these concerns, and Willy Brandt, then Foreign

[7]The article by William C. Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1965, had been particularly disquieting to CDU strategists.

[8]Before entering the Grand Coalition government as Minister and while enjoying the full freedom of a political agitator, Strauss had called the subjection of the FRG to a nonproliferation treaty "a military Versailles" that might ultimately usher in "a new Führer type who would promise and probably also require nuclear weapons or worse, for a Germany treated in this way." *Rheinischer Merkur,* August 26, 1965.

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Minister, was quite content with American assurances that the NPT would not shackle German nuclear research and development. In 1967 he had written: "We see in Germany's renunciation of the power to dispose over nuclear arms a given element of our policy, a German contribution to the relaxation of tensions in Europe, and not a discrimination."[9] After his investiture as Chancellor in October 1969, Brandt proceeded to sign the treaty as the first step of his détente policy which was soon to outdo the American version.[10] In signing, the SPD-FDP government noted its assumptions:

> that the Treaty will apply to the FRG as to the other partners;
>
> that the security of the FRG and its allies will continue to be guaranteed by NATO or a corresponding security system;
>
> that the . . . declarations of intentions of the USA, the USSR, and the UK [regarding nondiscrimination in peaceful nuclear and thermonuclear pursuits] apply without restriction to the FRG as well;
>
> that the Treaty does not hinder the integration of European states;
>
> that the partners will soon undertake the disarmament negotiations, notably regarding nuclear weapons, referred to in the Treaty.[11]

The Federal Republic declared the NPT compatible with the EURATOM treaty but announced that it would delay ratification until the European Commission and the IAEA had agreed on inspection procedures. Negotiations to this effect are still under way but do not seem to present serious difficulties. Speaking to the Bundestag, Brandt described the FRG's accession to the treaty as a contribution to its "comprehensive peace policy" and called on the nuclear powers to "make the world safer by agreements on the reduction of their nuclear and conventional potential."[12] Thus, under Social Democratic leadership, the FRG replaced opposition to a reaffirmation of Germany's nuclear arms abstinence via the NPT by espousal of the treaty as a step toward the nuclear disarmament of all. Unlike India, it did not object to the discrimination inherent in the treaty's distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear states. The reservation about a future European option served to placate domestic (CDU) opposition rather than to notify the world of German government expectations.

[9] *Aussenpolitik,* May 1967, p. 263.
[10] Foreign Minister Scheel noted in the Bundestag that failure to sign "would limit the freedom of action of our German [i.e., toward the GDR] and Eastern policy." *Bulletin,* November 14, 1969, p. 1188.
[11] *Ibid.,* November 29, 1969, p. 1234.
[12] *Ibid.,* November 14, 1969, p. 1183.

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Foreign Policy and Nuclear Arms

In Germany, as in all countries, policy toward nuclear weapons is a function of foreign policy. Nuclear weapons are a power instrument. Their acquisition entails economic costs and political risks, and it makes no sense to incur these costs and risks without a perception of substantial political gain resulting from possession of the instrument. It has long been suspected that in the case of the FRG a secret calculus of costs (risks) and gains tended to favor acquisition, and that the declaratory policy to the contrary veiled the real intentions. This suspicion is unwarranted. A sober assessment of the German calculus must conclude that, economic costs aside, the political risks greatly outweigh the possible political gains, under present and foreseeable conditions. This applies to the FRG and its political environment as we know them today, and it also applies to these constellations in the twenty years past, despite some German and foreign speculations.

There exists today no important FRG foreign policy objective that could be realized with the help of a nuclear arms acquisition program. The FRG cannot hope to expel Soviet power from East Germany and to regain former German territories in Eastern Europe by brandishing nuclear weapons. It faces a superpower in the East from which it seeks favors, and to which it has committed itself in the Moscow Treaty of 1970 to hold all European frontiers inviolable. The FRG could not insure its territorial security, let alone that of West Berlin, against the USSR or a Soviet-supported GDR by an autonomous, independent nuclear deterrent. It would be outclassed by the Soviets. Its government is content with an allied nuclear deterrent and prepared to place decreasing weight on any military deterrent. The FRG cannot hope to improve its status vis-à-vis its West European neighbors by any power play based on nuclear armaments. With no unsatisfied territorial ambitions and no fears for its security in this direction, it finds its status in the West quite agreeable and even enhanced by a deemphasis on military power. It has no vital foreign policy objectives outside Europe. The prospective political gains from nuclear weapons acquisition therefore appear quite indistinct, if not nil, to German policymakers.

The political risks, on the other hand, are formidable. German nuclear arms have no friends abroad, and few disinterested bystanders. Any sign of an autonomous weapons acquisition program would tend to create a combination of its opponents and allies against the FRG, including the two superpowers, the two West

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European nuclear powers, and other European states. By embarking on such a course to reconstitute national military power, the West German state would risk sinking back into the position of the European outcast, the enemy of all, from which it laboriously raised itself in the last twenty years. It would invite untold diplomatic difficulties, if not foreign military intervention. With the remnants of the World War II debacle still visible in the form of foreign troops and prerogatives on German soil, it is hard to imagine a West German government taking such a step.

Leaving all domestic factors aside for the moment, as well as the consideration of distant contingencies, the foreign policy calculus of nuclear arms acquisition leads to a decidedly negative result. Testing of nuclear devices for this purpose would appear unproductive and foolhardy.

The suspicion abroad that the FRG has nevertheless been vying for possession of nuclear weapons is explained in part by the assumption that the successor state to the German Reich must share the militaristic proclivities of its predecessor and revert to its style of armament, notably of the secretive sort. This assumption appears to have been a particularly easy one for the Soviets, who — at least until the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty with the FRG — have shown and spread a paranoid fear of German revanchism. But the suspicion was also nourished by certain German responses in the 1950's and 1960's to switches and troubles in the Western alliance and by American views, partly provoked by those responses and partly generated by American endeavors to prevent the development of nuclear weapons elsewhere, notably in France. In essence, the suspicion in the West of a German yearning for autonomous nuclear armament was the product of a kind of *teasing game* between certain allied and German politicians.

For Konrad Adenauer, German rearmament in NATO was above all a means to establish the FRG as an equal partner in the Western political system under the leadership and supreme protection of the United States. Originally this rearmament was conceived in purely conventional terms, leaving strategic nuclear protection to the United States. But at the very time (1956) when the German military draft law was voted in the Bundestag, Adenauer was startled by news of a swing in American defense planning from conventional to nuclear concepts, i.e., the Radford Plan. The provision of tactical nuclear weapons became a critical issue in NATO. American strategic thinking, which governed German

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thoughts on military matters, perceived nuclear weapons as the *sine qua non* of effective armament.

Thereupon Adenauer declared at a press conference in 1957: "Today, atomic armament is in flood tide. The Germans must adapt themselves to the new circumstances. In practical terms, tactical atomic weapons are a further development of modern artillery."[13] On another occasion he queried:

> How is it conceivable that the German troops in NATO are to be less well armed than the Americans; that the Americans, the Italians, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, have small atomic weapons and the German troops do not have them? That means, in other words, the unravelling of the entire Western defensive belt against the Soviet Union.[14]

This German view, with its anti-Soviet focus, was strongly encouraged by American and other allied military officials. During a German television interview in 1958, General Norstad (then SACEUR), said: "So long as the overall situation does not change, defensive atomic weapons are absolutely indispensable for the strengthening of the defensive power of the Bundeswehr."[15]

But while Americans were looking eastward, Adenauer's Germany looked at least partly westward as the Bundeswehr was being equipped with nuclear delivery vehicles[16] and American warheads were beginning to be held for its use. The issue of the *control* of nuclear weapons in NATO arose almost at the same time. It was raised most forcefully by France, together with the issue of sharing nuclear information, in the name of "equality" and opposition to Anglo-American "discrimination." The Germans were slow to warm up to this issue. German claims for "equality" of nuclear weapons status vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxons remained muted, although the FRG strongly supported demands for more data transfer, deemed so necessary for both "military education and political prestige." A capable student of the period wrote:

> Despite repeated official statements that the Federal Republic was not "unhappy" with existing control arrangements . . . the Adenauer government was basically agreed that some change must be made. . . . Germany

[13] *Der Spiegel*, April 17, 1957, p. 8.
[14] *Bulletin*, April 6, 1957.
[15] *Ibid.*, March 4, 1958.
[16] The Bundestag voted for the equipment of the Bundeswehr with nuclear delivery vehicles on March 25, 1958, following an election in which the SPD was defeated after having strongly campaigned against the policy under the slogan, "Fight Atomic Death."

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—just as the other allied states—had the basic right to some influence over decisions involving its continued existence or annihilation.[17]

Yet "the majority of the Adenauer government was unwilling to support or tolerate a special national nuclear status for France."[18] The prospect of a nuclear-armed France appeared as a setback to the FRG's striving for equality with its Western neighbors, quite apart from its danger for NATO and the future of American protection. The Germans were concerned to keep the French out of the "nuclear club" rather than to try to enter it themselves. Meanwhile, however, authoritative words from Washington suggested that the United States might begin to resign itself to *all* its European allies entering the club eventually. In July 1957, Secretary of State Dulles spoke of the spread of nuclear arms at a press conference: "Britain has them; France is working on them; Italy, West Germany, the Low Countries cannot forever be kept from nuclear weapons production if many other nations do it."[19]

The thrust of American policy, under President Eisenhower and even more so under President Kennedy, went in the direction of *stopping* the proliferation of national nuclear armament; but as the Dulles words showed, the American reasoning postulated a German readiness as more or less inevitable.[20] This reasoning had no secure basis in German nuclear thinking, which in all its confusion on technical matters was oriented to NATO and Europe, not the nation. The American reasoning was probably inspired by the desire to mobilize latent political fears in various parts of the world in support of the closure of the nuclear club. In turn, it may have induced some Germans to imagine that national nuclear armament might after all be in their destiny.

[17]Catherine M. Kelleher, *German Nuclear Dilemmas, 1955-1965,* Ph.D. dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1967, p. 297. Miss Kelleher's study is an excellent source of information on the process of the FRG's "education" in matters regarding nuclear weapons policy.

[18]*Ibid.,* pp. 298-299.

[19]*Christian Science Monitor,* July 17, 1957.

[20]This postulate is reflected in an important American essay on nuclear sharing in NATO that appeared in 1961. "The British nuclear force was a direct spur to the French, and every real or fancied discrimination made in favor of England has added more incentive for the French to follow suit. It is hard to believe that the Germans will not be moved to follow the French, if we reward the French for their efforts to develop an independent nuclear power." Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1961.

The American postulate was nourished by German striving for equality in NATO and in particular by Defense Minister Strauss' nuclear speculation responding in turn to American and French incitation. But as it happened, the United States neither "encouraged" nor stopped France, and the Germans made no move to follow the French. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, one could easily overestimate the importance of NATO and of nuclear weapons for the advancement of the FRG's international status.

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Contrary to a widely held belief, Franz-Josef Strauss, then Minister of Defense, was probably not one of them.[21] Much as he favored delivery vehicles for the Bundeswehr and sympathized with the French nuclear effort, much as he favored expansion of the German armament industry, and even participation in the production of IRBM's, his view of the FRG's nuclear role was oriented toward a Western combination, either a NATO nuclear force under SACEUR's control, or a "European" equivalent. He was quite responsive to General Norstad's ideas of NATO as a "fourth nuclear power." He was also responsive to French initiatives in the late days of the Fourth Republic to explore a pooling of French, German and Italian arms production, including nuclear arms, which opened the prospect of German access, in times of emergency, to French-held warheads.[22] Strauss can well be credited with having tried to climb on the back of one or the other of the FRG's two quarreling nuclear allies to get firm commitments of some of their nuclear assets to the FRG. But he was always realistic enough to see that it was hopeless for the FRG to seek such assets against their will. His statement (in 1958, in England) that "if other states, especially France, produce their own atomic bombs, Germany could also be dragged in," echoing Dulles' words and seemingly confirming them, should be regarded as a bargaining ploy in this game, to encourage hoped-for allied — in this instance, American — offers.

With de Gaulle in power in Paris, and Kennedy in Washington, with Norstad replaced as SACEUR, and Strauss as Defense Minister, this curious semblance of a German drive for nuclear autonomy soon evaporated. We need not trace its dissolution through the affirmation in the 1960's by both the French and American governments of their resolve to hold nuclear weapons in firm national control, the shift in NATO strategy to flexible (i.e., mainly conventional) "response," the conception and prenatal death of the MLF, the acceptance of the French nuclear force outside NATO, and U.S.-Soviet cooperation in preparing the Test Ban Treaty and the NPT. All these contributed to a sober recognition of the limits of German nuclear arms policy. When it came to German-controlled nuclear armament, arms controllers

[21]Kelleher, *op. cit.*, p. 181 and *passim.*

[22]Kelleher (*ibid.*, p. 330) cites the November 1964 assertion of C. L. Sulzberger in the *New York Times* that a secret verbal accord was reached between French Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas and Strauss, "which promised access to French weaponry in exchange for financial and technical help. But De Gaulle vetoed it when he resumed power."

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were winning out over arms cooperators in both Washington and Paris.

The later CDU governments concentrated on assuring the FRG of nuclear protection by its allies; of information and a part in allied deliberations on nuclear arms disposition, provided largely through the Nuclear Planning Group in NATO;[23] and of the Bundeswehr's continued share in NATO's delivery vehicles. With the coming to power of the SPD-FDP government in Bonn in 1969, German military nuclear interests became even less demanding. The debate between "Atlanticists" and "Gaullists" over which allied train might pull a German nuclear caboose was over. Détente policy came to overshadow deterrence policy, and Soviet opposition to German nuclear armament in any form therefore assumed more importance in Bonn.[24] German interest in a denuclearized Central European zone along the lines of the Rapacki plans was reawakened. Above all, the FRG's striving for higher international status ("equality") was satisfied by industrial, financial and diplomatic successes. Nor did the Germans fail to notice how little political gain and how great a burden the nuclear arms programs of Britain and France brought to these countries. By 1970, the "nuclear dilemmas" of the Federal Republic, of which there had been so much talk in the 1960's, practically vanished from public discussion. For the Germans, nuclear weapons had largely become other people's worry.

Domestic Forces and Conditions

The domestic political scene of the FRG presents an almost unbroken network of inhibitions to nuclear-arms-oriented research and development activities. This network comprises all political parties, the military establishment and the scientific community; it is completed by the relatively high degree of transparency of the German society with regard to military programs of all sorts.

Parties and Leaders

The preceding discussion noted the participation of the

[23] "Co-determination" (*Mitspracherecht*) proved to be attainable without "co-possession" (*Mitbesitz*) and attendant financial involvement, contrary to the assumption of CDU Defense Minister von Hassell, one of the few German partisans of the MLF.

[24] Not that Soviet opposition had ever been overlooked. Around 1960, Wilhelm Grewe, FRG ambassador in Washington, expressed the belief that fear of German nuclear armament had contributed importantly to the launching of Khrushchev's diplomatic Berlin offensive in 1958. (See his *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit* [Stuttgart, 1960], pp. 244-245.) But in those days Bonn used evidence of Soviet opposition as an argument to reinforce NATO, and not as advice to be respected.

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CDU/CSU leadership in the international teasing game about German nuclear armament. In particular, it sketched the role of the ambitious leader of its Bavarian wing who has for long been the most widely suspected protagonist of an autonomous arms policy. The game was practically over when the CDU relinquished the Chancellorship in October 1969. Even if the party had stayed in power, West Germany would probably have signed the NPT by now and continued to adhere to an abstentionist policy. Out of office, the CDU has registered virtually no opposition to the wholehearted abstentionism of the ruling Social Democrats.

The most important Strauss idea to be retained is that of the European nuclear triangle, which goes back to the teasing of the 1960's and which was exposed in his books of 1966 and 1968 and in a speech he gave in London in May 1969. This was the view (1) that Germany wants atom partnership, not patronage,[25] (2) that the nuclear competition between Britain and France is senseless,[26] (3) that the two should fuse their nuclear forces as part of the formation of a European defense force, and (4) that the FRG should participate in this development — accompanied by enlargement and political reinforcement of the EEC — by means of its economic power rather than in an executive capacity.[27] The idea hinged on Franco-British cooperation, which has not materialized so far and might not in any case extend to Germany.

A less mercurial foreign affairs spokesman of the CDU, Olaf von Wrangel, offered a forthright statement of his party's endorsement of German nuclear abstinence at the time of the MLF debate. Noting that the Federal Republic had committed itself (prior to the NPT) only to *produce* no weapons on its *territory*, he pointed out that theoretically it might seek possession, e.g., by importation, notably if the Western defense system were dissolved and the Paris treaties ceased to be binding. But for the FRG to exploit these theoretical possibilities would damage the prospects of German reunification, create international tensions and jeopardize the essential NATO system. "German nuclear abstinence is a compelling consequence of our geographic situation and German vital interests."[28] For the CDU, sobriety resulted from an unhappy flirt. There are no signs that the party is about to indulge again.

[25]F.-J. Strauss, *The Grand Design* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 64.
[26]F.-J Strauss, *Herausforderung und Antwort* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1968), p. 210.
[27]*Ibid.*, p. 219 ff., and *Le Monde*, May 21, 1969.
[28]D. Schwarzkopf and O. von Wrangel, *Chancen für Deutschland* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Kampe, 1965), p. 103.

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For the SPD, the way to sobriety passed through an unlucky hate affair. The party suffered its worst defeats in the federal elections of 1957 and the North Rhine-Westphalian *Land* elections of 1958, at the end of violent campaigns it had waged against rearmament, NATO and the Bundeswehr's nuclear role. These defeats led to its revamping under the leadership of Willy Brandt, Fritz Erler and Herbert Wehner, and the Godesberg program of 1959 in which the party "approved the defense of the country." The SPD accepted the Bundeswehr and NATO and refocused its opposition to the army's nuclear role by attacking procurement of "exclusively nuclear" arms and strategy predicated on early use of nuclear weapons. It liked the proposals of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki for the creation of a Central European "nuclear free zone."[29] It accused the CDU government of seeking to acquire nuclear weapons (thus making its contribution to the international teasing game).

The SPD views were elaborated by Erler until his death in 1966, and by Helmut Schmidt, who followed him in the role of the party's chief defense spokesman and became German Defense Minister in 1969. Schmidt developed the idea that the FRG must be able to veto "the employment of nuclear weapons on German soil or against targets on German [GDR] soil" by its own and allied forces.[30]

The Social Democrats have not repudiated Adenauer's thesis that in view of the nuclear armament of the Warsaw Pact powers and the FRG's allies, the NATO-integrated German army and air force must continue to have delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. But the 1970 Defense White Paper emphasized strongly (pp. 40, 41) that such weapons "must not be used except as a last resort, and even then only with restraint and on a selective basis," that "ultimate release authority rests exclusively with the President of the United States," and that the FRG has "fully adequate means of representing German interests in consultation on the possible release of nuclear weapons."

The Social Democratic defense policy is overshadowed by détente policy and thus inclined to reduce rather than augment the Bundeswehr's nuclear role in NATO. A nuclear role outside NATO, specifically outside the American connection, is beyond consideration. The FRG respects France's outsider role in this

[29]Helmut Schmidt, *Verteidigung oder Vergeltung* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961), p. 177 ff.
[30]*Ibid.*, p. 125.

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regard without endorsing it, but it does not favor a deployment of French tactical nuclear weapons in Germany outside the NATO context. This will probably make it impossible for France to put the Pluton weapon system, in particular the nuclear warheads, on German soil. It may also be noted in passing that under Schmidt the defense ministry has limited FRG exports of military equipment of all sorts to member states of the Atlantic Alliance.

To complete the review of political party positions, one should add a word on the National Democratic Party (NPD) which gained some notoriety in the late 1960's. This party of the extreme Right favored the withdrawal of American forces from Germany, the replacement of the American nuclear umbrella over Germany by the French, and the abandonment of nuclear delivery vehicles by the Bundeswehr.[31] On this evidence, even the German radical Right, presently in eclipse, does not act like a champion of nuclear armament.

Armed Forces

The Bundeswehr is troubled by a variety of problems, but concern about the insufficiency of its nuclear potential is not one of them. German military officers, retired and active, have of course concerned themselves with the complexities of nuclear weapons in warfare, deterrence and alliance politics.[32] They have speculated on the uncertainties attending their employment in the alliance framework, under varying NATO defense concepts, and on the technical difficulties they present to military planning and operation. In striking contrast to the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic, however, the generals of the Bundeswehr play virtually no role in West German defense and foreign policy debates. There is not one among them who can be identified as a protagonist of a national nuclear arms program.

Scientists

In 1957 eighteen leading German atomic scientists, most of whom had been engaged in wartime nuclear research, issued an important statement on the then ongoing armament debate. Their "Göttingen Appeal" said:

> We do believe that today a small country like the Federal Republic will best protect itself and do the most to advance world peace by expressly and voluntarily rejecting the possession of atomic weapons of any kind.

[31]Rudolf H. Brandt, *Die Militärpolitik der NPD* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969), p. 56 ff.

[32]See Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957).

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In any case none of the undersigned would be prepared to take any part in the production, testing, or use of atomic weapons.[33]

Catherine Kelleher's observation of 1967 that "nuclear research is still dominated, if not controlled, by those scientists (and their committed students) who have consistently held to their 1957 pledge not to participate in projects of potential military value"[34] continues to be true, as far as one can tell. There is evidence of strong agitation in German academic and scientific circles against any kind of war-related research, nuclear or otherwise.

This radical scientific opposition to nuclear military preoccupation goes hand in hand with the belief that nuclear research and development for economic uses may actually benefit from the absence of military priorities (which have misguided the French reactor program), and with the determination to keep the welcomed inspection and control arrangements under EURATOM and IAEA from interfering with the progress and the competitiveness (industrial secrets) of German nuclear industry.[35]

Transparency of the Society

No survey of the FRG scene from this point of view can be complete without a word on the relative openness of the society with regard to military matters. This has been fostered by both domestic political orientation and external pressures and suspicions, but it is also due to the rejection of pre-World War II Germany, the lost war, and ambivalences about the FRG's situation between East and West.

The German military establishment is intertwined with the stationed forces of the Western powers. West Germany is a crossroads of international business and industry. Contacts with East Germany and Eastern Europe are manifold. The governmental security system has proven to be failure-prone on numerous occasions, and the number of foreign agents in the FRG is large. The independent public press delights in uncovering facts that embarrass the government. These conditions would make em-

[33]Cited from Kelleher, *op. cit.*, p. 232. The signers included Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg and Karl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Today von Weizsäcker plays a leading role in the FRG's general science establishment, notably the government-promoted movement of "peace research."

[34]*Ibid.*, p. 657.

[35]See in particular the writings of Professor Wolfgang Häfele of the Nuclear Research Center, Karlsruhe. According to newspaper reports, the nuclear fuel at the center was inspected, weighed and analyzed five times in the course of 1967. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 22, 1968.

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barking on an arms-oriented nuclear program unobserved virtually impossible, if there existed the interest and the power center necessary to get one started. The burden of the preceding discussion is that these prerequisites do not exist — now.

Contingencies and Clandestinity

One has to assume drastic changes in the international situation and in West Germany to arrive at a possible shift toward acquisition in the FRG's nuclear arms policy. Contingencies of this sort appear extreme, perhaps fantastic. Even so, they do not encourage speculation about *clandestine German weapons testing,* because in a number of cases the shift to acquisition might not require clandestinity. It would result from a radical change in the environment and, if it were to come, would more likely be open than secretive. For the sake of simple exposition, this discussion will focus first on international changes and subsequently on domestic change in the FRG, but the reader should bear in mind that drastic change in both realms must be assumed to make a nuclear arms acquisition policy appear plausible. Neither change has a measurable probability today.

European Option

The European option is the only prospect that has received serious attention in public discussion — and is therefore least "extreme" — but it is also the only one that does not envisage a *national* arms acquisition program and for that reason is not really a contingency from the point of view of this inquiry. One of the clearest formulations of this option appeared in an article by Professor Wilhelm Grewe, an important foreign affairs adviser of Chancellor Adenauer and later CDU leaders. Grewe said that the security policy of the FRG must choose between neutrality, nuclear protection by an ally, and the formation of a collective nuclear force. He called the last choice, a European political union with a common nuclear force, "the only promising [*zukunftsträchtige*] option."[36] His view had much in common with the endeavors of Strauss noted above.

Although progress toward unification, even "political union," of Western Europe continues to be sought by European leaders, a decision by the governments of, say, Britain, France and the FRG to form a joint political executive of a West European Power

[36]Wilhelm G. Grewe, "Über den Einfluss der Kernwaffen auf die Politik," *Europa-Archiv,* February 10, 1967, p. 93.

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(WEP) and to create a joint nuclear force belongs in the realm of extreme, and for the foreseeable future most unlikely, contingencies. In this eventuality, the FRG would presumably cease to be a nonnuclear-weapon state in the sense of the NPT; but it would also presumably cease to be a *state* — i.e., an autonomous actor on the international plane — from the point of view of international law. If weapons production were to take place in the German region of the WEP, or command and control over WEP nuclear weapons were to be placed in the hands of WEP executives of German nationality, technically this would not amount to a production/acquisition activity of the German state.

The envisaged contingency consists of a change in the subject, not the predicate, of the sentence, "Germany gets nuclear weapons." Seen in this light, it is logically irrelevant here. It might be politically relevant if one assumed German political forces to dominate the WEP, but this is a further assumption. In any event, there is no reason to believe that this transfiguration of the European political and military scene would involve a German weapons testing program. WEP weapons tests, if any, would not be held under *German* state auspices anywhere in the world. French and British test experience would presumably be available to the WEP authorities, and further testing would depend on the relationship of the WEP to the Test Ban Treaty.

If the European option took the embryonic form of some cooperation between existing French and British strategic nuclear forces with deliberate exclusion of the FRG, some might expect a climate of opinion to develop in Germany that would favor national nuclear arms in retaliation. However, while some form of exclusive Franco-British cooperation should not be ruled out — if only because it continues to be discussed on both sides of the Channel — it is hard to believe that the FRG would feel slighted, especially if the development had the American blessing it may well have to have in order to get under way. If the FRG were to deplore this arrangement, it would under foreseeable circumstances not be out of pique for having been excluded but out of concern about Soviet opposition to a strengthening of the Western deterrent. This concern would rule out a national German "retaliation" program, because that would be bound to draw even heavier Soviet opposition.

Anglo-French nuclear cooperation of a strategic sort would pose many problems for the FRG, among them whether the nuclear

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forces of these countries would offer protection to Germany.[37] In contrast to Strauss' urgings, the present government does little to encourage its European partners to embark on this course. In the summer of 1971, *The Economist* alleged that when Prime Minister Heath visited Bonn in April, "he was given what amounted to a private ultimatum, subsequently passed on to Washington, that Germany would tolerate no joint Franco-British nuclear deal with America which excluded Germany. . . . "[38] Whatever substance there may be to this report, Defense Minister Schmidt declared publicly later in the year that (1) he saw "no great prospect for Anglo-French nuclear cooperation for the near future"; (2) he felt the process of European cooperation "should not be burdened with the question of a West European nuclear component in our common defense"; and (3) "If sooner or later Anglo-French nuclear cooperation should come to pass, Germany would, in such an event, not feel discriminated against. We do not want any stock in this business."[39]

West Germany Leaves NATO

The second extreme contingency is that the FRG ceases to be in NATO. Since West Germany is the European pivot of NATO, her departure may be considered tantamount to a dissolution of the organization. Such a dissociation/dissolution would change many things, among others the validity — at least in German eyes — of the Paris Treaties of 1954 and the NPT of 1969.[40] Whether these profound changes would usher in a German national weapons policy would still depend on domestic and international (e.g., Soviet) factors. It should not be regarded as an automatic consequence. But if these factors favored a German decision to acquire national nuclear arms, the FRG might conceivably make the decision.

It is in this setting of a break with NATO that the eventuality of a forceful seizure of nuclear warhead stocks on German soil by the FRG government might be contemplated. The attempt might

[37]This aspect besides others is discussed in Ian Smart, *Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 78, 1971).

[38]August 28, 1971, p. 13.

[39]Interview published in the *Baltimore Sun*, November 21, 1971.

[40]On July 10, 1968, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in reply to a question from Senator Clifford Case concerning Germany, that if NATO were to dissolve, some states might well consider that this was the kind of "extraordinary event . . . jeopardizing their supreme interests" that would justify their withdrawing from the NPT, in accordance with Article 10.

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or might not be successful. If it were successful it might put the government in possession of a stock of arms without the roundabout way of production and testing. A government making this extreme move might also have the experts to "unlock" warheads within a short span of time. This kind of FRG might become a "nuclear power" overnight, able to combine a number of warheads with delivery vehicles at its disposal. The state that would be prepared to do these things would, of course, not be the FRG we know today.

If the attempt at seizure failed, the outcome would be similar in one respect to a situation in which no such attempt was made and foreign (American) warheads were withdrawn from Germany. The FRG would have less access to nuclear weapons than heretofore.

West Germany Becomes a Military Ally of Communist China

This fairly fantastic idea has a link to reality in the chance that both the FRG and China may some day find themselves opposing the Soviet Union, short of war. Shared enmity might create alliance. The interesting feature of this contingency is that it might create a peacetime situation in which a clandestine German test program on Chinese soil could be envisaged, *provided* the then existing FRG government were willing and able to undertake it. Such a program could perhaps be carried out during a period of high risk in which detection and intervention by Western powers and the Soviet Union were feared. Otherwise, the alliance with China per se would do little to change the important parameters in the FRG's present nuclear weapons calculus, which pertain to national interests and to Soviet and Western opposition.

The United States (or France) Encourages German Nuclear Armament

There was a time when the Federal Republic might have decided to acquire nuclear weapons if the U.S. government had urged it to do so. This is probably not true today. Nevertheless, if it ever came to pass that a future President of the United States departed from the policy of his predecessors and found it expedient to release the FRG from its treaty commitments to nuclear abstinence, an important factor in the German policy calculus would change. The United States might offer to protect the FRG against the pressures of its Eastern and Western neighbors while it built up its capability, and this protection might suffice under the

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circumstances. Transition to the nuclear-armed status could be quick, thanks to the American arsenal, and German weapons testing would not be relevant.

If the policy shift occurred in the Elysée Palace rather than the White House, the German policy calculus would be affected similarly. Protection and transition assistance would, however, be weaker in this case, and the danger of outside intervention (Soviet — or American) correspondingly greater; but the possible tie-in of such a French policy shift with a "European option" might alleviate some of the danger and create some reasons for German acceptance that might be lacking in the eventuality of an American shift.

If both the United States and France encouraged German nuclear armament, the German temptation might seem great, especially to those who remember the maneuverings of the 1950's and 1960's. It is of course hard to conceive why either the White House or the Elysée, or both, would want to see the FRG become a nuclear power in its own right, or for that matter why the FRG would want to follow such urgings as long as it has no desire to pose a military threat to the USSR.

The USSR Encourages FRG Nuclear Armament

Among the fantastic changes in the international environment that might lead to a reversal of FRG policy, one should not omit consideration of a drastic change in Soviet policy. It would presuppose a state of the world in which an acutely troubled Soviet Union felt far more threatened by some other power than West Germany and could consider the FRG as clearly opposed to that same power. Perhaps the USSR might concede nuclear weapons possession to an FRG joined to it in a military alliance against the United States, i.e., in a wholesale reversal of the present European alignment. If Moscow made this concession — and that is by no means likely even in case of a reversal of the FRG's alignment — it might choose to hand over Soviet warheads to the FRG rather than encourage FRG production and testing.

East and West Germany Fuse While the Superpowers are Paralyzed

In another sharp departure from the world as we know it, one might imagine the FRG and the GDR forming a common state while both the United States and the USSR are unable — because of war or revolution — to exert influence in Europe. Freed from

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external constraints and facing international disorder compounded by the troubles of the superpowers, the reconstituted Reich might arm itself with nuclear weapons.

Which FRG Government?

No foreign permissiveness or encouragement could make the FRG acquire nuclear weapons unless its government wanted them. The foreign policy calculus that has led past and present West German governments away from acquisition includes, as we have shown, estimates of insignificant gain besides acknowledgment of high political costs. What kind of FRG government would perceive enough tangible political gain from weapons possession to capitalize on greater permissiveness of the environment and decide to go ahead?

This would require so drastic a rearrangement of the country's political scene that one cannot proceed by extrapolating any presently visible trends. The Germans would have to be affected by the "great power syndrome" that was so important in propelling Britain and France along the road of nuclear armament and that has not worked in the FRG so far.[41] Political forces would probably have to energize another German quest for the expansion of national territory and the subjugation of neighboring peoples, resembling the drives of the Hohenzollern Empire or the Hitler Reich. Such a development may figure in the nightmares (or dreams of glory) of some contemporaries, but it has no basis in the reality of the prosperous, welfare-minded and war-bitten country. It would presuppose some traumatic shocks to the society — much more than a reshuffling of presently visible forces, an election victory of an available opposition party, or the like.

In conclusion, the attempt to specify conditions in which the FRG might embark on a weapons acquisition program serves less well to develop plausible scenarios than to reinforce the prognosis that Germany will not follow such a course in the foreseeable future. In specifying the requirements for change in the current policy, one rapidly leaves behind the observable circumstances. This applies even more forcefully to the proposition of clandestine German weapons testing. Germans may learn whatever they do not already know about nuclear weapons without resorting to test explosions. Learning by testing is no critical factor in determining the government's course.

[41]Robert L. Rothstein, "Nuclear Proliferation and American Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1967, p. 15 ff.

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Implications for the United States

West Germany does not seek to acquire nuclear warheads. It is not evident that she ever sought national possession, or likely that she will do so in the foreseeable future. For this reason there appears to be no risk that the government will attempt to produce or test nuclear weapons. To the contrary, if the Social Democrats stay in power for some time, the FRG may reduce its current nuclear role in NATO and seek new constraints on nuclear weapons use in the general area of Germany.

The first consequence of this finding for the United States is that there appears to be no ground for spending U.S. diplomatic and investigative resources to detect or forestall an FRG weapons testing program. Should a complete nuclear test ban be negotiated some time in the future, other powers could be expected to see to it that whatever detection procedures might go with the ban would not have loopholes in and around Germany. From the American point of view, German nuclear arms ambitions furnish scant argument for negotiating such a test ban. Other arguments would have to carry the burden.

The second consequence is that it appears pointless for the United States to spend any financial resources on nuclear industrial projects in other countries for the purpose of preventing German industrial developments of possible usefulness to a national arms acquisition program. This purpose should play no role in U.S. decisions on international cooperation in, say, the production of enriched uranium.

The third consequence — as long as the U.S. government wishes to prevent West Germany from turning to an acquisition program — is that Washington should do all in its power to maintain the components of the political calculus that has led the FRG to uphold a policy of nuclear weapons abstinence. This task is complex, but it seems to require no significant innovation in U.S. policies. Nor, for that matter, does it require that all existing U.S. policies regarding the FRG or other West European countries be left entirely unchanged. There appears to be no close connection between, say, the size of American stationed forces in Germany or U.S. policy toward the French and British nuclear military programs, and the FRG's nuclear weapon calculus. But the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance, and particularly the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear counterpoise to the Soviet Union, continue to be important U.S.-controlled components.

For the short term at least, the FRG can be regarded as a

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faithful partner in efforts to prevent nuclear weapons acquisition by other nations not now so armed. It is probably a more reliable partner in this regard than most other states. But the extent of the country's industrial capacity, its technological development including that in the nuclear field, and the diversity of its international exchanges, make it possible that, its policy notwithstanding, weapon aspirants could derive from FRG contacts useful elements for their own clandestine arms programs. Knowledge of these connections might help the United States in some cases to work toward the closing of such channels, probably with the help of FRG authorities, if the objective deserved the effort.

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WEST EUROPEAN COLLABORATION IN WEAPONS PROCUREMENT*

by John Simpson and Frank Gregory

IT is almost a truism to call the current decade the age of transition. Changes believed to be occurring appear likely to alter drastically the structure and nature of the international system. One possible change is a move toward a more politically cohesive Western Europe. The prime indicator of this is usually regarded as the development of the European Economic Community and associated institutions, both in their initial and expanded forms. However, a further set of changes in the field of West European transnational weapons procurement, although less prominently reported than the developments in the EEC, may have a substantial impact on any process toward political cohesion, for they relate to what has traditionally been a much more politically sensitive area than economic cooperation, namely, national defense. These changes, which commenced in the late 1950's, have seen the United Kingdom operating as a full and leading partner of the other West European states. Their future impact on offset cost arrangements also seems likely to have a profound effect on the military relationships between the United States and its European allies, both within and outside the NATO context.

It is perhaps surprising in view of the political implications of the growth of transnational weapons procurement that the related literature is so limited. The dearth suggests that the subject is regarded as a highly technical and specialized one or as merely a dependent variable in national defense policy studies. However, weapons procurement forms a major component of West European defense budgets, second only to manpower costs,[1] and this is an age in which developed states plan to fight or deter wars with automated and technologically advanced military equipment. Procurement policies are therefore of crucial importance to defense, and the types of interdependence implicit in transnational procurement not only impose specific limitations upon the potential

*This is a revised version of a paper first presented to the Third NATO Colloquium, held at Wiston House, Steyning, Sussex, England, July 15-18, 1970.

[1]For example, the 1972 British Defense White Paper allocates 49.12 per cent of the defense budget to manpower and 33.82 per cent to equipment (weapons research, development and production). Cmnd. 4891, H.M.S.O., Annex B, p. 54.

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actions of individual states, but also represent political linkages of a continuing type which are difficult to sever. It could well be argued that transnational procurement thus helps to create and sustain a security community by making the military and industrial price of withdrawal abnormally high.

The literature that does exist tends to deal mainly with the difficulties of equipment and procedural standardization within NATO, with common infrastructure services within NATO, and with the possibilities of building an indigenous West European armaments base as an alternative to U.S. arms sales or licensing arrangements.[2] An underlying theme of much of this writing has been the unsatisfactory nature of the current *ad hoc* system of transnational procurement, and the probability or desirability that it will or should evolve into a more institutionalized system, organized by a central body similar to the Commission of the EEC.

The present study will discuss the procedures that have been devised to initiate and manage transnational projects, as well as those international institutions which have been associated with them; will outline the national motivations for collaboration, and attempt to evaluate the nature and potentialities of the current position in the light of an ideal type of West European procurement system. Finally, it will examine the political impact of these developments upon United States/West European relations and analyze their future implications.

The Current Structure of West European Procurement

The NATO Machinery

The earliest NATO attempt to achieve a measure of common procurement in the defense equipment field was the Military Production and Supply Board set up in 1949.[3] From 1959 to 1966 the major procurement procedure was the NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR). This operational requirement, originating from discussions within the alliance, led in practice

[2]Major contributions include: M. Edmonds, "International Collaboration in Weapons Procurement — The Implications of the Anglo/French Case," *International Affairs* (London), April 1967, pp. 252-264; *Defence Technology and the Western Alliance* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), Parts 1-6; G. Ashcroft, *Military Logistic Systems in NATO: The Goal of Integration* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers 62 and 68, 1969 and 1970); Brigadier General E. Vandevanter, Jr., *Coordinated Weapons Production in NATO: A Study of Alliance Processes* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Memorandum RN-5282-PR, 1967); W. Schutze, *European Defence Cooperation and NATO* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1969).

[3]For a good account of the evolution of NATO procurement machinery see F. A. Beer, *Integration and Disintegration in NATO* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 131-175.

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only indirectly to project sharing. Between 1959 and 1966 forty-nine projects came under the NBMR procedure. Of these, seven were met wholly or in part by one or more nations, twenty-three remained under study, and nineteen achieved no result or were allowed to lapse. R. Rhodes James noted: "A major failure in the NBMR concept was the lack of differentiation between items readily available or available in the near future without extended research and those involving *ab initio* research."[4]

The diagram below represents the system NATO has been using for about four years. It has replaced the NBMR system because this involved the NATO countries in seeking unanimity in their equipment requirements. The new procedures recognize that NATO is not a supranational authority and that just as each country is responsible for equipping its own forces, so collaboration must be on a voluntary basis evolving from points of common need arising between two or more participants.



The Service Armaments Groups exchange information on national concepts and doctrines, equipment programs and policies, and related research and development programs, for the purpose of identifying suitable areas for international cooperation. The Defense Research Group is charged with reviewing the possible military consequences of advances in science and technology and generally finding areas for collaboration in some of the more fundamental aspects of defense research. Responsibility for approving a proposal as a NATO project lies with the Conference of National Armaments Directors.[5]

[4]R. Rhodes James, *Defence, Technology and the Western Alliance*, No. 3, "Standardisation and Common Production of Weapons in NATO" (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 10.

[5]See P. V. Brown, "NATO's role in promoting co-operation on aircraft projects," *NATO Review*, September-October 1971, pp. 13-16.

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The report by the British House of Commons Select Committee on Defense Research in 1969[6] summarizes the working of the current NATO system.

To be listed as a NATO requirement, a project must be sponsored by two or more nations and, once listed, is recommended to other members of NATO. One advantage of this procedure is that NATO projects are those which are under active development by members of the alliance. This has been found to be more practical and has led to several specifically NATO requirements coming into existence for common funding and development. Examples of projects which are now proceeding under the new arrangements are the Jaguar aircraft, the Sea Sparrow air/sea missile, the Under Sea fixed Acoustic Range, the AN/USD 501 Reconnaissance Drone, the 155 mm Howitzer, and the SA 330, SA 340 and WG 13 helicopters. These and other projects similarly approved as NATO operational requirements are placed under the direction of project steering committees consisting of representatives of those nations which have expressed their willingness to carry them through on the basis of specific memoranda of understanding relating to individual projects. These memoranda remain open for signature by others who are prepared to contribute in accordance with their terms.[7]

The Select Committee added an important rider to this promising picture of NATO's current procurement system:

There was some fear that the new procedure, although currently productive because of the opportunities offered for the introduction into NATO of systems already in the process of development by members, might become less effective as time passed and the stock of already maturing projects became exhausted. This could only be overcome by ensuring that, in planning for the long-term future, nations should attempt joint consultation at a very early stage.[8]

NATO has also concerned itself with the standardization aspects of alliance procurement. This has been done through standardization agreements (STANAGS) covering materials and procedures. However, NATO officials informed the Commons Select Committee that, in general, standardization of defense equipment "has not gone very far, even in the more obvious cases of ammunition and signalling equipment."[9]

It now seems likely that the NATO procurement project approach will place greater emphasis on attempting to bring governments and firms together at the early planning stage. NATO has established an Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG),

[6] *Second Report from the Select Committee on Science and Technology* (Defence Research), Session 1968-69, House of Commons Paper, H.M.S.O., No. 213.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. lxxii.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, p. lxxiii.

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which receives all information originating from the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and suggests means of industrial cooperation in any matter concerning the defense industries. NIAG held its first meeting in January 1969.

Since its establishment, NIAG has been studying the general question of industrial property rights and making specific studies of the cost-effectiveness of military combat aircraft capable of vertical or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) and an advanced aircraft approach and landing system for post-1975. In addition, it has selected three other problems for study from a list supplied by CNAD. These are battlefield surveillance, cheap expendable high-speed targets, and low-angle radar tracking in the presence of sea reflections. With regard to NIAG's possible contribution to further cooperation on defense projects, John Stone, Director of NATO's Planning and Logistics Directorate, has noted:

> In the context of an alliance of free nations, such as NATO, it will undoubtedly take some time and considerable effort for NIAG to achieve significant increases in joint research, development and production, but there is optimism, in the longer run, for success in these areas and particularly for greater standardization and interchangeability of components and parts.[10]

There exist two further structures concerned with aspects of procurement by NATO members: one is the military agency for standardization (MAS), established in 1951; the other, the committees responsible for the Infrastructure Program.[11]

Government-inspired Transnational Procurement Projects

A number of projects have been designated NATO projects through the CNAD procedures, but most of them originated in bilateral or multilateral government-to-government agreements to collaborate on specific items of equipment, including aircraft, missile, army and some naval projects. The military aircraft projects include the Anglo-German-Italian Multi-Role Combat

[10]J. Stone, "NIAG helps stimulate allied research and development co-operation," *NATO Review*, January-February 1972, pp. 18-19.

[11]The work of MAS is summarized by its current chairman, Rear-Admiral H.-H. Wesche, Royal Danish Navy, in an article, "NATO agency works for increased military standardisation," *ibid.*, March-April 1972, pp. 23-24.

NATO has run three main infrastructure programs: the construction of airfields and missile sites and the laying of oil pipelines, an air defense scheme (NADGE), and a tactical communications program (TACSATCOM). For details of these programs see James, *op. cit.*; articles by A. Sington in *NATO Letters*, March, June, July-August, 1965; "NADGE — Frontline of NATO's Air Defense," *International Defense Review*, August 1969, pp. 337-340; and G. van Rossum, "NATO's communications satellite launched," *NATO Letter*, April 1970.

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Aircraft (MRCA),[12] the Anglo-French Jaguar advanced trainer and close support aircraft,[13] the Franco-German Transall military transport aircraft,[14] the three Anglo-French helicopter projects, the SA 330 Puma, SA 341 Gazelle and WG 13 Lynx,[15] and the Franco-German Alpha-Jet trainer and close support aircraft.[16] Unsuccessful attempts at cooperation in the aircraft field have included the Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft (AFVG)[17] and Anglo-French and Anglo-German versions of an airborne early warning aircraft.

Missile projects include the Anglo-French Martel air-launched missile,[18] the Anglo-French Exocet ship-to-ship and HLM helicopter-launched missile package,[19] and the Franco-German Hot and Milan anti-tank missiles and Roland anti-aircraft missile.[20] The army projects include Anglo-Belgian tracked combat and reconnaissance vehicles,[21] and the Anglo-German-Italian towed medium gun.[22] Few joint naval projects have been attempted[23] and even fewer have reached fruition. The Anglo-Dutch 3D radar is an example of such a terminated project.[24]

The basic form of agreement used to initiate government-to-government projects has been the Memorandum of Understanding. Its chief advantage, so far as the British are concerned, is that, not being a treaty, its contents need not be published, thus giving a measure of security protection. In addition, should anything go wrong with a project, no government can be put to the embarrassment of finding it necessary to default on a treaty. It also serves to engender mutual trust and responsiveness

[12]For a useful recent summary article, see *International Defense Review*, February 1971, pp. 84-87.

[13]See R. Salvy, "Progress with JAGUAR," *ibid.*, April 1972, pp. 146-148.

[14]See the following editions of *Jane's Aircraft* for a project history: 1960-1961, pp. 170-171; 1961-1962, p. 89; 1965-1966, p. 76.

[15]See, for example, the report on the SA 330 Puma in *Flight International*, May 14, 1970, pp. 810-817, and the *International Defense Review*, June 1970, p. 122.

[16]An early summary report is to be found in the *International Defense Review*, August 1971, p. 376. *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (February 2, 1972, p. 24) reported that a cooperative development agreement was recently signed.

[17]See the article by B. O. Heath, "The MRCA Project," *Aeronautical Journal*, June 1970, pp. 444-456.

[18]See *Jane's Weapons Systems, 1971-1972,* pp. 109-110.

[19]*Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

[20]*Ibid.*, pp. 16-17, for details of Hot. *Ibid.*, p. 61, for details of Roland (although the French have now withdrawn from this project). *Ibid.*, p. 17, for details of Milan.

[21]See *Daily Telegraph* (London), October 20, 1970, for details of the agreement.

[22]*Statement of British Defence Estimates 1971*, Cmnd. 4592, H.M.S.O., p. 52.

[23]Recent reports suggest that West Germany is now interested in cooperating with the United Kingdom in producing naval vessels. *The Times* (London), May 5 and 13, 1972.

[24]*The Navy*, April 1966, p. 116.

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among the partners, as the governments concerned have to commit resources to the project well into the future in their forward budgeting plans. The view of the British Ministry of Defense is that

> In all collaborative projects the participants have to strike a balance between the need to facilitate withdrawal should the project run into major technical or financial problems, or should the circumstances of a partner radically alter, and the need to deter withdrawal in order to ensure the stability of the programme. The normal practice with collaborative development is to allow unilateral withdrawal for reasons of national importance but subject to a period of notice (six, twelve or even eighteen months) which itself may be preceded by preliminary consultation, and with the obligation to continue to pay the appropriate share of costs in the meantime. Although Memoranda of Understanding do not have the status of formal International Agreements, the provisions relating to the duration of a programme nevertheless represent solemn undertakings which it would be a very serious breach of good faith for any country to break.[25]

The Anglo-French Jaguar project stems from a Memorandum of Understanding signed on May 17, 1965, which laid down the framework for all stages of the project. Jaguar does not appear, as does MRCA, to be subject to a series of separate memoranda.

The May 17 Memorandum also covered the proposed Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft (AFVG), which had its origins in the British Aircraft Corporation's P 45 project study and design work that led to France's Dassault Mirage G. On the AFVG agreement Defense Minister Denis Healey told the Commons that

> There is a break clause in the agreement because both the French Government and ourselves believe that it would be a great mistake to commit ourselves to a programme of this size without any right to renew it at any stage later on. . . . Development costs will be shared equally between the two countries, and it is expected that the two countries will take roughly the same number of aircraft and production costs will be shared in proportion to the number ordered by each country . . . . we have agreed on the very important principle that both research and development and production work should balance out across the programme as a whole.[26]

This last point, concerning a balanced effort, is a major characteristic of the detailed discussion that is a part of joint procurement projects. The three main industrial inputs in aircraft production come from airframe, aero-engine and electronics firms. An important aspect of collaboration for these firms in each coun-

[25] *Second Report from the Select Committee on Science and Technology, op. cit.*, Appendix 58, Collaborative Projects, Letter from the Ministry of Defence, p. 556.

[26] Healey to British House of Commons, 739 House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, Oral Answers, January 18, 1967, cols. 405-408.

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try is that their governments do not sacrifice their specific interests too readily simply to gain an agreement.

A further agreement to produce three Anglo-French helicopters was signed in January 1967. Healey reported to the Commons on January 18, 1967 that

> the helicopter package is in no way dependent on the first [the AFVG] agreement. The helicopter package stands on its own feet as an agreement for the joint production of three aircraft which both countries need, balanced in such a way as to ensure that they both get a fair share of the development and production work in relation to their orders.[27]

This was confirmed when the AFVG agreement was subsequently terminated in July 1967 by unilateral French withdrawal. From subsequent press reports it appears that, as with the other collaborative agreements apart from Jaguar, both governments have to authorize each major stage as it arises. For example, a *Times* report of November 1969 stated that the British and French governments had authorized the production of the SA 341 Gazelle and the development of the WG 13 Lynx.[28]

The procedure for MRCA has called for the negotiating of separate Memoranda of Understanding for each stage of the project. On May 14, 1969, Healey told the House of Commons that Britain, Italy and Germany had, that day, signed the Memoranda of Understanding to cooperate on a one-year Project Definition stage, and that "provision is made in the memoranda of understanding for countries to withdraw from the project without penalty at the end of a series of defined stages."[29] MRCA is currently in the prototype stage of development, and its engine, the Anglo-German MTU-RB199, should be bench-tested in 1972. The progress of the project is reviewed annually, with the next review scheduled for November 1, 1972. Proceeding by a series of cautious short stages is not a particularly good method of maintaining confidence in a project, especially within the participating industries.

A similar set of procedures appears to govern the latest major West European transnational project, the Franco-German Alpha-Jet aircraft. It is progressing by stages, at the end of which the governments have to agree to proceed further. The project definition stage terminated in February 1971 after competition among three potential transnational groupings. However, the air forces of

[27] *Ibid.*, col. 408.
[28] *The Times* (Business News Section), November 27, 1969.
[29] 783 House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, Statement by Defence Secretary Healey, May 14, 1969, col. 1417.

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the two countries had difficulty in coming to terms on the final specification, and it was not until February 1972 that an agreement to proceed with the development stage was signed.[30]

MRCA, Alpha-Jet, Jaguar and the Anglo-French helicopter projects, the major transnational procurement projects in cost terms, are thus based on similar types of government-to-government procedural agreements and display a basic similarity in project organization. They have a joint intergovernmental management body, called the NATO MRCA Management Organization (NAMMO) in the case of MRCA, and a transnational industrial management company owned by the prime contractors. In the cases of MRCA and Jaguar, the shares in the transnational companies, Panavia and Sepecat respectively, are distributed according to the work-sharing agreements reached on an intergovernmental level (42.5/42.5/15 and 50/50), and decisions are taken on a consortium basis. In the case of the Alpha-Jet, however, the French firm Dassault-Breguet is acting as a prime contractor, and the German Dornier concern as associate contractor.[31] The transnational companies also differ appreciably in their nature, for while Sepecat has no permanent staff, Panavia in 1971 had 100 employees, all located in Munich.[32] However, these companies are responsible only for airframe and avionic development and production; the RB199 power unit (for MRCA) is being built by the three selected companies comprising Turbo-Union, and this organization is directly responsible to NAMMO. A similar arrangement appears to exist with regard to Jaguar.

Industrial Initiatives in Procurement

Once a transnational weapon project has been initiated by government-to-government agreement, each government has then nominated a national firm to take part in the resulting industrial consortium. One consequence has been a lack of stable partnerships over time. Tensions have arisen from the airframe and missile sections of national companies working with different transnational partners. G. T. Smith of the British firm, Bristol Siddeley Engines, has pointed to some of the questions that firms must face:

> To what extent can a company collaborate with more than one partner — particularly when the partners are mutually competitive? To what extent can two companies collaborate on one project at the same time as

[30] *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 21, 1972, p. 24.
[31] *International Defense Review*, August 1971, p. 376.
[32] *Ibid.*, February 1971, p. 84.

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they are producing other projects in competition with each other? Will international collaboration lead to international mergers?[33]

In Britain this situation has produced an intradepartmental enquiry within the Civil Service on methods of alleviating the problem. Alternatives suggested include either merging the two major British aerospace companies, the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics and Aviation (HSD/A), or splitting their airframe interests and missile interests and merging the parts into a single airframe and a single missile group.[34] At least one leading British industrialist has advocated setting up permanent West European transnational companies, such as an extension of Panavia to include the French Aerospatiale Company. The proper method for dealing with this issue, in Britain at least, remains uncertain, though a decision is likely in the near future.

Three further types of transnational cooperation in the production of weapons are noted within Western Europe. The first is license production or simple buying of components produced by a firm resident in one state to assemble into a weapons system in another. An example of this is the use of the British Viper turbojet, produced under license in Italy, in the Italian MB 326 strike trainer aircraft. A more recent variation is the insistence by one government that it will buy a military system only if production of certain components is subcontracted to one of its national firms. The purchase by Belgium of French Mirage aircraft led to an arrangement of this type.

In the second type of cooperation, transnational groupings are set up to design, develop and produce a weapons system under contract to a single country. Thus, the Kormoran anti-shipping missile is being developed for Germany by MBB (Germany) and Aerospatiale (France), and the Otomat anti-shipping missile is being developed for Italy by Engins Matra (France) and Oto Melara (Italy). An anti-aircraft tank (PFZ-C) is under development for Holland by a combination of Kraus Maffei (Germany), Oerlikon (Switzerland) and N. V. Hollandse Signaalapparaten.

Finally, there are a number of examples of private transnational ventures in the weapons field, mainly oriented toward export markets, such as the Atlas light anti-tank missile under develop-

[33]G. T. Smith, Chief Engineer (Projects), B. S. E. Filton, "Some Aspects of International Collaboration between Bristol Siddeley and SNECMA," *Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society*, June 1966, pp. 615-617.

[34]The Marshall Enquiry is not a public one and only general press reports have appeared, e.g., in the *Daily Telegraph* (London), December 21, 1971.

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ment by the British firm BAC and the Belgian FN concern. Perhaps rather more widespread at the moment are Fast Patrol Boat designs and associated weapons systems often encompassing the equipment of several countries. In addition, there has been an agreement between the British Vickers Group and the German firm of Ingenieur Kontor Lubeck to design, develop and produce diesel-electric submarines.

Other Organizations Associated with West European Transnational Weapons Projects

Two additional transnational organizations in Western Europe are involved with weapons procurement. One is the Finabel organization, the other the Western European Union (WEU). Finabel (an acronym of the member-states of the EEC) was set up by the EEC members, following the demise of the NATO NBMR system, to try to produce joint operating requirements, collate West European defense requirements, and standardize equipment. In keeping with the NATO experience, the states have managed in some cases to agree on a common requirement, for example, a quarter-ton truck. However, because each state already has such equipment, a difficulty arises about which national version to adopt as the standard. Finabel has to date been concerned with relatively small and low-cost weapons systems, of which the largest have been helicopters. WEU could, in theory, deal with similar matters through its Standing Arms Committee (SAC), a permanent executive organ, but has confined itself to more general issues of European defense. Future development in this direction probably depends upon whether Britain decides to join in the Finabel discussions on entering the EEC, or prefers to give an expanded role to WEU, which currently comprises the EEC states plus Britain.

The Problems and Potentialities of the Current West European Procurement System

Motivations for Collaboration

Procurement on a collaborative basis has two main economic motivations. If research, development and production are centralized within one organization producing a single piece of equipment, the combined West European market benefits from increased through-put and lower unit costs. The latter occurs because costs other than the direct costs of production are spread

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over an increased number of units, and also because in most cases it is possible to reduce direct costs by continuing production down to a much lower point on the labor "learning curve."[35] In addition, if the total expenditure on the project is very high, the rate of spending required per annum, especially during the later stages of the development phase, may be unacceptable to an individual state, as it would form too high a proportion of its annual defense R&D budget. Collaboration and the sharing of these costs could bring this annual figure down to an acceptable level.[36]

The Anglo-German-Italian MRCA project is a good example of the advantages of collaboration. Total research and development cost is likely to be at least £700 million at 1971 prices, and production costs £3 billion. The cost of research and development for this type of aircraft in the United Kingdom has been estimated at three-quarters of the above figure, namely, £525 million.[37] By collaborating, the United Kingdom pays only 42.5 per cent of the total R&D costs, approximately £300 million. Thus, over an eight-year research and development period, the United Kingdom should spend approximately £38 million per year on the collaborative MRCA aircraft instead of approximately £66 million per year to develop it nationally. Further, the R&D component of total unit cost is likely to be only £0.7 million per unit spread over the approximately 1,000 MRCA's that are expected to be produced collaboratively, rather than £1.3 million per unit spread over some 400 MRCA's that the United Kingdom would build on its own. These economic motivations are likely to be very important in an era when the absolute unit cost of military equipment is rising rapidly[38] and defense budgets are under considerable pressure in Western Europe. On the basis of the above comparison of national and collaborative costs, it would appear that the United Kingdom could participate in research and development for two collaborative MRCA-type projects for approximately 1.25 times the R&D cost of one national MRCA project.

[35]For an explanation of the operation of 80 per cent labor "learning curves" in the aerospace industry, see K. Hartley, "The Pricing of Military Aircraft," *Flight International*, June 2, 1964, p. 25. The simple rule is that as cumulative output doubles, labor input falls by 20 per cent.

[36]See the views expressed in *Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Aircraft Industry, 1964-1965*, Cmnd. 2853, H.M.S.O., p. 38.

[37]Sir George Edwards (BAC), "Partnership in Major Technological Projects," *Aircraft Engineering*, September 1970, p. 64.

[38]A comprehensive discussion of this issue is to be found in F. D. Orazio, "From Technology to Systems in Military Aircraft," *Astronautics and Aeronautics*, July 1969, p. 54.

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Collaboration may be desired for a variety of other industrial, financial and political reasons. It may be seen as a means of enabling national firms to increase their expertise and knowledge in specific sectors of advanced technology, or as a means of maintaining highly skilled teams of applied scientists and engineers and production workers. It may also be a means of utilizing technical knowledge and expertise which, once having been acquired, is of no value to the state or company unless it can be applied to new projects and products. It may enable a state to obtain equipment with a minimum of foreign exchange costs, as a result of work-sharing arrangements. Furthermore, it can be seen as a means of increasing or retaining political influence, cementing amicable relationships, and underlining in a visible manner new departures in foreign relations. In addition, one by-product of collaboration is equipment standardization, leading, in an alliance context, to reductions in stockpiling and increases of inter-operability.

The Ideal Model of a Procurement System

The obvious model for a more formalized system of collaboration in the production of military equipment is the standard national system. In ideal form, this implies an agreed concept of the types of warfare that ought to be planned for; a ten- to fifteen-year rolling budget; a synthesis of plans and budgets to produce a procurement program; and the development and production of the relevant equipment by the most efficient firms or governmental establishments.

In practice, this ideal system provides little more than a useful point of departure for studying the nature of the West European weapons procurement process. On the national level, it is complicated by debates centering on the uncertain assumptions inherent in this type of process.[39] It does seem to have had some influence on thinking and action on a West European level, however. Although the NATO equivalent of a national Staff Target or Operational Requirement, the NBMR, no longer exists, attempts are being made through military staff talks, both on an alliance and a bilateral basis, to reach some agreement on European battle scenarios.

Talks have taken place on a bilateral basis between London and Paris and London and Bonn to try to merge viewpoints on what may prove to be the even more intractable problem of arriving at

[39]For an extended discussion on this point see J. Stanley and M. Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (London: Chatto and Windus, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), pp. 138-139.

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common tactical concepts. This is an area where genuine military disagreements often exist and prove difficult to resolve. Three examples will illustrate the problem.

In the field of tracked Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's), differing national military experiences have produced various concepts of the role and nature of the APC. U.S. types such as the M 59 and M 113 reflect the American view that the APC is simply an armored transport vehicle. By contrast, West Germany's HS 30 and its successor, the Marder, suggest the concept of mounted combat with the infantry using their weapons from *inside* the APC. Britain followed the American "battle-taxi" concept with the FV 432, though it was more heavily armored than the M 113. With the APC 70 project, however, Britain is moving toward a true combat carrier.[40]

The second example concerns the discussions under way about a new Anglo-German main battle tank to succeed Chieftain and Leopard, now that the United States-West German MBT 70 has been canceled. Whereas the British have tended in the last two decades to emphasize firepower, armor and mobility in that order, German tank design has been characterized by the reverse ordering of priorities. The purpose of current discussions is to achieve a compromise acceptable to both sides.

The third example is related to the MRCA. One of the major issues during the project definition stage was an apparent disagreement between the British and German air staffs on whether the aircraft would perform better in ground attack and strike roles if it had two crew members rather than one. The British appear to have argued that two were necessary in order to make maximum use of the avionics that could be built into the aircraft. The Germans, however, initially preferred the performance bonus obtainable in having only one crew member, in addition to the slightly reduced unit cost.[41]

These examples have been given in detail because it is rarely appreciated, outside of military circles, that even when agreement obtains on the types of threat to be met, there may be deep military disagreements on the tactics, and therefore the characteristics of weapons systems, to be employed.

The second requirement of a West European procurement system, a joint procurement budget, does not exist, despite plans

[40]See "The Tracked APC — some existing types reviewed," *International Defense Review*, August 1971, pp. 363-365.

[41]For a discussion of MRCA roles see *International Defense Review*, June 1970, p. 121, and Heath, *op. cit.*

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for it in the proposed European Defense Community of the early 1950's. A major problem is that few of NATO's national armed forces follow the British practice of drawing up a ten-year rolling budget, and even in the British case, appropriations are still actually voted on a year-to-year basis. The lack of guaranteed forward national budgeting means that uncertainty is always present in a joint project, making it extremely difficult to combine a number of nations' forward planning exercises so as to maximize collaborative opportunities.

Although the differing national demands for the introduction of replacement systems may foster joint production by enabling an interlocking production program to emerge, they may also prevent it from occurring. This is because it may be impossible to manufacture a collaborative product before existing systems become either unserviceable or obsolete, thus necessitating expensive refurbishment or interim replacements. Lastly, no real West European research and development base exists for military equipment outside of individual states, despite the activities of the SHAPE technical center, the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD), the Von Karman Institute, the German-French St. Louis Research Institute (ISL), and the Max Planck Institute.

The European Procurement System in Practice

The result of the situation outlined above is that transnational procurement in Western Europe has taken place to date on a largely *ad hoc* basis. It has been concentrated in the aerospace field because unit costs in this area are extremely high and the theoretical advantages of collaboration correspondingly great. Also, other types of military equipment with high unit costs, such as warships, do not readily lend themselves to the economies of larger scale production.

The standard method that has emerged is for a Staff Target to be identified nationally within the governmental structure and a search initiated for potential partners on a purely bilateral basis or via the CNAD system. Attempts are made to combine national operational requirements into a common international one. Alternatively, some form of package deal is designed, in which a number of projects are tied together on the understanding that each participating state's requirements are dominant in one or more of them. MRCA and the Alpha-Jet are examples of the

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former method; the Jaguar/AFVG combination and the Anglo-French helicopter package are examples of the latter. In addition to these illustrations of European developed weapons systems, NATO has sponsored license-building of U.S. weapons systems, e.g., the F-104 G, Hawk, Bullpup and Sidewinder projects.

None of the industrial consortia created to manage such projects has yet moved beyond the stage of cooperation among firms to a permanent transnational merger or takeover. Although government spokesmen and industrialists have stated that they favor such transformations,[42] little of substance has been accomplished to this end. The same applies to the intergovernmental management agencies, with the possible exception of NAMSO.[43] Thus, at the governmental and industrial levels slight evidence exists to indicate that a permanent and institutionalized weapons procurement process is being constructed, yet the idea of collaboration in this area seems to have gained political acceptability.[44]

One reason for the lack of formal European structures for joint procurement lies in other attitudes and motivations of national governments. National defense industries are either government-managed and therefore not suitable for commercial merger, or, especially in the case of the airframe, aero-engine, missile and electronics industries, regarded as part of a state's scientific and technological assets. Knowledge gained from defense research is considered to be a major resource, capable of being exploited in the future, and therefore these industries must be sustained and developed on a national basis if a state is not to lose its competitive position. It is hardly surprising that few states are currently prepared to contemplate permanent technological links with others. The most technologically advanced states of Western Europe are often the most reluctant to collaborate, because they see themselves transferring technology with little reciprocal gain in knowledge. The less advanced states are quite happy to col-

[42]See the report in the *Daily Telegraph* (London), April 17, 1972, of a conference organized by the EEC Commission, and the interview with Herr Ludwig Bolkow of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), in the *Sunday Times* (London), March 12, 1972.

[43]The NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization was originally set up to act as a common spares pool for U.S. weapons systems built under license in Western Europe, but the number of systems for which it acts as central supply organization has been steadily increasing over the last ten years.

[44]*Daily Telegraph* (London), April 24, 1972: Reports on speeches by Michael Hesaltine, British Minister for Aerospace, and Herr Karsten Rohwedder, State Secretary in the West German Economics and Finance Ministry, at the opening of the Hanover Air Show.

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laborate, as they can expect to build up their indigenous technological capability.

This politico-technological argument tends to acquire great significance in equipment projects encompassing research, development and production, where keen competition develops for project leadership because of the accompanying technological prestige. Equally hard bargaining goes into efforts to obtain as large a share as possible of research and development contracts for national firms, so that they may gain expertise and technological spin-offs for the nation concerned. A further complication is the issue of the differing production requirements of states. A state with a large unit requirement will naturally attempt to minimize its foreign exchange losses, as well as maximize its technological gains, by insisting on project leadership and a large share of the development and production contracts. This may mean, however, that a state with defense industries of limited experience and expertise will demand a larger part in a project than is granted to states with greater expertise. Such an arrangement is unlikely to produce the most efficient method of managing a project. In addition, once a development program is under way, a state may unilaterally withdraw, taking with it joint knowledge, some contributed by the other state, as in the case of the AFVG; or the size of a state's requirements may be altered, throwing work-sharing arrangements out of balance — as happened in the Hawk consortium, where the French obtained a work-sharing arrangement based on their need for ten batteries, and then, once the arrangements had been set, reduced this order to three batteries. Similarly, the MRCA work-sharing structure had to be reorganized when the size of West Germany's proposed order was cut to a figure approximately equal to the British one.

One solution to this serious problem of trading off orders against expertise would be to follow the Soviet practice[45] and the new U.S. "Packard" process of dealing with R&D and production separately. To a limited extent this seems to be the type of West European commercial structure Avions Marcel Dassault of France has been trying to create. Dassault has been insisting that it should do the design and development work and the final assembly and testing, but it is prepared to allow component production to take place on the basis of generous work-sharing agreements.

[45]See the paper by J. Simpson, "The Military Aircraft Procurement Process in the U.S.S.R.," in *The Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East: Her Capabilities and Intentions* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1972).

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Although this idea is unlikely to be welcomed by other states, which may view it as a device to persuade them to finance the technological development of the French aircraft industry, it undoubtedly offers a cheaper and more efficient method of European procurement than anything that has occurred to date. The Anglo-French Jaguar project, for example, has resulted only in joint development of the engines and airframe. There are two different avionic fits, one for the British and one for the French aircraft, and two assembly lines with their own separate learning curves, while component production has been allocated on a prearranged basis of cost sharing.[46] Actual cost saving for the British version over a nationally-produced product is not significant — probably in the order of 5 per cent — and is mainly concentrated in the engine development area. Cost saving on the French version is probably nil, as the original specification did not demand supersonic performance.

These facts have produced some vigorous criticism of the project in France. A Gaullist deputy, M. le Theule, stated in his report on the 1971 French defense budget that

> The French programme at its inception foresaw the building of a simple aircraft, with a unit cost of Fr. 5 million (£374,000). Defining another type of aeroplane brought about a serious revision of this price, and in the space of two years, from 1965-1967, the price, in effect, tripled. It has continued to climb ever since and reached, under the economic conditions of January 1970, an average (including fixed costs and spares at 30 per cent) of Fr. 25.5 million (£1.9 million) for the tactical strike version and Fr. 23.3 million (£1.75 million) for the trainer. . . . The result is that the Armée de l'Air is able in practice to retain in terms of developed types and within the framework of the third section of the financial programme, only the JAGUAR and the F.1, so that the G.4 or G.8 will remain as a prototype.[47]

A further "loss" may be in store for France on the Jaguar program, depending on whether the naval version of the Jaguar, the M.5, is too big and expensive to replace the Etendard[48] currently deployed on the two French carriers.

These experiences indicate that little progress has been made in the formation of an efficient West European procurement system. Attempts by two or more states to telescope national requirements into a common design may yield equipment which is feasible from

[46] J. Teague, of BAC, "Jaguar Project Management," *Flight International*, September 8, 1966.
[47] "France's Defence Expenditure," *ibid.*, November 12, 1970.
[48] *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, March 13, 1972, p. 21, and *Flight International*, March 16, 1972, pp. 370-371.

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an engineering point of view, but which fails to meet any state's original operational requirement. The equipment is also likely to be inordinately complex in comparison with that produced nationally, and too expensive, in both capital and servicing costs, to export. It may, however, help to maintain in being a number of advanced technology industries in Western Europe, which are pursuing innovative paths separate from those in the United States.

In light of this situation it is necessary to ask whether, on the military and other levels, West European development and procurement is preferable to buying or license-producing U.S. equipment. The latter arrangement, if properly managed, has the advantage of using established technology to provide a proven product within a relatively short time and at a predetermined price. It may also mean that more defense capability can be purchased within the confines of a fixed budget.[49] West European development and production, on the other hand, usually labors with an unproven product and an R&D process that even on the national level has been difficult to evaluate in advance and to control. In the case of equipment using state-of-the-art technology, and perhaps requiring a major advance in only one area, the Europeans can probably set up an efficient process. This may not be true in the case of the MRCA, which has an untested airframe configuration, a new engine, and an inexperienced main partner.

While the three or four largest industrial countries in Western Europe compete with each other to obtain project leadership for their national armaments industries, the advantages of joining a "Big Four" consortium, as against producing U.S. equipment under license, may not be obvious to the smaller states. The history of the MRCA illustrates this point well, for Belgium, Holland and Canada withdrew from the original consortium at an early stage. Indeed, a closer knit WEU group of countries may merely institutionalize the dominant position of Britain, France and West Germany in the defense procurement field and offer the smaller states few advantages over the current system.

Conclusions

A number of different trends have appeared in the area of transnational weapons procurement within Western Europe over the last decade. Many transnational projects have been initiated, accounting for a substantial part of national R&D budgets and an

[49]For an expansion of this argument see I. Bellamy, "Defence Procurement — a Heretical View?," *R.U.S.I. Journal*, March 1972, pp. 37-40.

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increasing part of weapons purchasing budgets. These projects have been initiated largely from a standpoint of national self-interest on an *ad hoc* basis, and no institutional framework has been set up to encourage their growth and proliferation. Further, so few projects have reached completion that one cannot yet point to successes to strengthen confidence in collaboration or to failures which could eventually destroy confidence in it. On the industrial front, no clear guidelines have emerged to help in selecting particular companies to take part in these *ad hoc* consortia.

Nevertheless, there are signs that transnational projects, despite their many military and industrial difficulties, have widespread political support. Both the Eurogroup[50] and the EEC Commission are believed to be seeking ways of stimulating such activities. Moreover, within the context of Anglo-French relationships in this field, the process of dealing with projects on an *ad hoc* basis is changing to one of regarding all projects as part of a single continuing process, under which compensations for changes in one project can be made in the arrangements for others. Thus, the British deficit in the work-sharing arrangements for the Martel air-to-ground missile will be compensated for in the helicopter projects, while British participation in the production of the French Exocet ship-to-ship missile has been compensated for by an agreement in principle that Britain will lead in the new helicopter-launched missile (HLM), if it advances beyond the project definition stage. Finally, industrial concerns are giving considerable thought to the nature and structure of permanent transnational associations within Western Europe. The current problem seems to be that such mergers may need to be related to contracts from governments to initiate new projects,[51] at a time when it is questionable whether any major defense projects will have to be initiated by West European governments for a number of years, except perhaps in the area of army equipment.

NATO, THE UNITED STATES AND WEST EUROPEAN PROCUREMENT

One of the wider issues raised by the growth of transnational weapons procurement within Western Europe is how far the

[50]This is the term usually applied to the regular meetings of the Defense Ministers of NATO's European members.

[51]For accounts of how a similar process was used to promote similar mergers within the British aircraft industry, see G. Turner, *Business in Britain* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 350, and G. Williams, F. Gregory and J. Simpson, *Crisis in Procurement: A Case Study of the TSR 2* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1969), pp. 19, 21.

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establishment of a semi-permanent multinational grouping in this field, comprising perhaps the six EEC countries plus Britain, is compatible with the nature and composition of NATO. This issue has two separate components: first, how the existence of such a grouping would interact with the West European need for the U.S. nuclear guarantee to sustain NATO's deterrent posture, and second, how it would interact with the perceived need of the United States to offset the foreign exchange costs of its forces in Western Europe, and possibly certain of the budgetary costs also.

The relationship of a procurement system to the U.S. position within NATO could be of crucial importance to the alliance's future. One of the major reasons for NATO's success has been the existence of a clearly defined alliance leader and a conscious abdication to the United States of a number of important roles that some West European states could conceivably play. An example of this has been in the provision of low-yield battlefield nuclear devices.

The continuance of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee and provision of battlefield nuclear weapons for NATO forces is essential, given the nature of NATO's current strategic doctrine in Europe. This is one of providing a resistance capacity, if not a war-winning capacity, at all levels, thus producing a situation of uncertain risk for any aggressor and preventing a *fait accompli*. With the USSR on the geographical periphery of Europe and armed with nuclear weapons, any West Europen defense system must have such weapons if it is to retain an effective deterrent capability.

Currently there is some relaxation of political tensions in Central Europe, as evidenced by the *Ostpolitik* pursued by West Germany, the Berlin agreements, and Western and Soviet suggestions for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions and a European Security Conference and System. However, it is highly unlikely that the West European states will voluntarily abandon the NATO security system for the uncertain benefits of any new structure. Thus, a major priority of their security policies will continue to be the maintenance of a clear and unambiguous U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe at all levels, including the stationing of substantial U.S. combat forces on the continent. The importance attached to the continued presence on their soil of U.S. troops is unlikely to diminish appreciably in the foreseeable future.

Beyond this perception of the need of U.S. military support

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runs a longer view that Western Europe must take preliminary steps to build up its own capabilities for the day when U.S. forces will be withdrawn, but in the meantime the short-term situation takes priority. Hence, it is unlikely that any West European procurement organization or grouping of European states within NATO will be permitted to alter the current security relationship between the United States and other NATO members. The Eurogroup meetings have been concerned more with measures to respond to U.S. difficulties than with any desire to form an embryo, exclusive defense organization.[52] Their only major initiative to date, the establishment in December 1970 of the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP), provided for extra contributions to NATO's common infrastructure programs and additional material force improvements, and set up a special intra-alliance aid program. However, the raising of Eurogroup defense expenditures by more than one billion dollars (at current prices) over five years adds only marginally to the defense effort of the European members of NATO. It certainly does not appear to signify the start of any major effort by them to reduce their dependence on the U.S. military capability and increase their reliance on indigenous forces.

In this situation of a continuing need for U.S. military support, one political problem facing the European states is the degree to which the American willingness to supply this need may be diminished by their own efforts to achieve greater cohesion and provide insurance against an eventual U.S. withdrawal. Specifically this means the degree to which the growth of transnational weapons procurement within Western Europe will affect the security relationship with the United States.

Two approaches to analyzing this problem are possible. The first is to see defense procurement as one of a number of sets of economic and political relationships that will have an impact on the views of U.S.-European relations held on both sides of the Atlantic and condition American policies toward West European security in the current decade. A second, and rather more precise if narrower approach is to relate transnational defense procurement to a reduction of U.S. troop levels in Western Europe.

The relationship between U.S. troop levels and the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent posture is difficult to define. A reduction of troops can have at least two possible effects: (1) It could lower

[52]For details see Lord Carrington, British Defense Secretary, "The Eurogroup," *NATO Review*, January-February 1972, pp. 10-11.

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both the allied capability to resist low-level aggression and the options available in the event of aggression, thus degrading NATO's overall deterrent posture. (2) The cutback in the size of the American "hostage" could reduce the credibility of Washington's commitment to use nuclear weapons should an all-out attack take place on NATO's central front.

A reduction in troop levels could be induced in part by foreign exchange difficulties arising out of the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe. The cost of maintaining them falls into two categories: budgetary costs incurred in training the troops for the role they perform, and local support costs paid in local currencies for bases, facilities, maintenance, food, local living expenses and local civilian employees. It has been argued by some in the U.S. Congress that the European states should pay a substantial part of the research and development costs of weapons procured by the United States for use in Europe.[53] On the other hand, it has been argued that the U.S. government would save little or nothing in budgetary costs if it pulled all its forces in Europe back to the United States.[54] Undoubtedly the former suggestion might lead to more efficient use of NATO members' defense budgets if it resulted in transnational procurement between the United States and Western Europe which would foster standardization of equipment, ease the supply of spare parts, and provide inter-operability. However, since it envisages that the European states would pay the United States to carry out research and development on equipment they would then buy, it is politically unrealistic, even if economically sound, and would not gain any more acceptance in Western Europe than Secretary McNamara's idea of a Common Market in defense equipment.[55]

Local exchange costs are not large in comparison with the total NATO national defense budgets, but they become significant if the methods used to offset them are examined in detail. For the years 1971 through 1973, the West German government has agreed to pay the United States $1,017 million per year at 1971 prices in support costs.[56] The crucial point is the predominant method of payment: the purchase of arms and equipment, including 200 U.S. F4F Phantom aircraft, at an annual cost of $600

[53] *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, September 13, 1971, p. 15.

[54] F. S. Wylie, "The United States and West European Security — Interests, Forces and Finances," *Survival*, January-February 1972, p. 13.

[55] Stanley and Pearton, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[56] For details of the offset agreement between the United States and West Germany see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 1-8, 1972, pp. 25017-25018.

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million,[57] out of a budget for equipment in 1972 of approximately $1,240 million.[58] By 1976 it is planned that West Germany will be a full participant in the production of the Anglo-German-Italian MRCA and the Franco-German Alpha-Jet, and may participate with the British in the production of a range of army guns and possibly tanks. It is doubtful whether this West European equipment can be procured and offset expenditures on U.S. military equipment can be maintained at the current level. The presence of U.S. produced or license-built electronic equipment in the MRCA may to some extent ameliorate this situation. Neither of the two simple methods of escaping this offset problem appears to be a likely solution, however. One would result from West German GNP increasing at a sufficiently rapid rate to finance both offset and collaborative purchases without any increase in the proportion of GNP devoted to defense. The second would be to increase the proportion of GNP allocated to defense.

The West German government may have to make a difficult choice between financing the production phase of those West European procurement programs in which it is participating, or abandoning them at the development stage in order to maintain offset payments by buying U.S. equipment. Given the political climate prevailing in Western Europe, the former seems a more likely choice than the latter.

It has been argued that the method of escaping from this dilemma is to "Europeanize" offset costs[59] by replacing the current bilateral arrangements with multilateral ones, in which the West German share of these costs would be considerably reduced. The central dilemma of effecting the offset while still sustaining the West European armaments base would remain, unless some purely financial device can be found that would be mutually acceptable *and* workable. The situation is analogous to that surrounding the British pullback from East of Suez, when foreign exchange difficulties become a major reason for withdrawal despite the small foreign exchange costs — as distinct from budgetary costs — actually involved.[60] Political will, rather than financial difficulty, could well be the crucial factor in such circumstances.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] This figure is derived from *White Paper 1971/1972: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces*, English Language version, Federal Ministry of Defence, Bonn, 1971, Table of Defence Expenditure 1966-72, p. 154.

[59] Schutze, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40 and C. Gasteyger, *Europe and America at the Crossroads* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1972).

[60] D. Greenwood, "Economic Constraints and the Defence Effort," *R.U.S.I. Journal*, November 1968, pp. 328-329.

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It is unlikely, therefore, that the growth of a West European procurement system and its impact on future offset cost arrangements will be so great that it will radically affect the relationship within NATO between the United States and her allies. However, it may be a source of serious political friction and act as a stimulus to those sections of the Congress wishing to see substantial cuts in U.S. commitments to NATO.

Key Factors in the Future Development of Transnational Weapons Procurement

In the previous sections an attempt has been made to outline the disparate forces that have led to the growth of transnational defense procurement within Western Europe, and to suggest that this process could have widespread political and security repercussions. The impetus for the existing developments appears to have derived initially from economic logic and limited defense budgets. On this level, the process probably would not have gone much beyond opportunist *ad hoc* arrangements. To economic logic, however, have been added two elements that appear to have transformed the procurement process and served to some extent to neutralize divisive national, industrial and technological interests which would be present in a collection of *ad hoc* arrangements. One is the politicization of the process, and the other its possible identification with a nascent European nationalism.

The precise nature of this politicization of transnational defense procurement is still somewhat unclear. At times, this form of procurement has served as an illustration of the benefits to be gained by closer West European cooperation in other fields. It has also provided a forum within which the basic processes and administrative institutions of transnational cooperation in advanced technology could evolve. Lastly, it has been pursued, especially in the case of Britain, for its politically symbolic connotations. Because it linked Britain with the EEC members, it has served as a symbolic commitment to the ideal of closer West European cooperation. This symbolism has been heightened by the apparently irreversible nature of certain transnational commitments, involving the sacrifice of elements of national weapons-manufacturing capability. It is also significant that the area of cooperation impinges on values that have traditionally been of supreme importance to the nation-state. The result has been a process with

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broadly based, if diffuse, political support, rather than merely a narrow economic or military rationale.

The building of a unified Western Europe, with which transnational weapons procurement is now in part identified, seems to require emphasis on the separateness of this kind of grouping and the need for more closely integrated relationships within it. This in turn suggests that functional cooperation among the West European states should be given priority over cooperation with states outside the area. The exclusion of the United States from these transnational weapons projects can be seen as a logical corollary of this process. Operationally, this is likely to produce a well-articulated desire to have an exclusively West European industrial and technological policy, and in particular an aerospace policy. Some evidence that such a trend already exists is provided by the attempts of Avions Marcel Dassault of France to pressure the EEC Commission into actively supporting a West European aerospace industry,[61] and by the discussions which are now starting within the EEC of the Ten on wider issues of industrial and technology policy.[62]

The potentially exclusive nature of these developments seems likely to create major difficulties in relations between the United States and Western Europe, especially if the demand for technological independence reaches extreme forms. Much of Europe's advanced technology in both the military and civil fields is heavily dependent on licensing agreements with American firms or on components developed or produced in the United States. In the weapons field this latter fact would probably create certain constraints on the freedom of West European consortia to sell aircraft, such as MRCA, outside Europe, thus reinforcing perceptions of the need for European independence rather than North Atlantic interdependence. On the much wider level, the desire to emphasize the exclusive nature of a West European entity conflicts with the acknowledged military dependence on the United States and creates an area of potential tension and many major policy choices for states such as West Germany.

Currently, the situation in the weapons procurement area is flexible, because of the *ad hoc* nature of cooperation and the lack of permanent and exclusive procedures and institutions. In practice, the only institution in use is the voluntaristic NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors. Crucial variables in

[61] *Times Business News* (London), June 19, 1970.
[62] *Daily Telegraph* (London), April 17, 1972.

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changing this situation are the evolution of relations among the three major West European states (Britain, France and Germany) and the nature of, and timetable for, any renewed process of economic and political integration. From the standpoint of a nascent unified Western Europe, the *ad hoc* procedure is inefficient and should be replaced by a more formal system, possibly including a joint defense planning, management and funding system. At the moment, however, national pressures prevent this. If they persist, *ad hoc* procedures will remain in operation, and there is the possibility of wider NATO cooperation in weapons procurement with the United States. On the other hand, if the current situation is merely the prelude to a process leading to a much more centralized and exclusive Western Europe, the long-term future for U.S.-West European relations, both in the field of collaboration in weapons development and in wider aspects of their security relationships, looks far from promising.

Given the cyclical nature of the relationship between the forces for unification and those for national assertion within Western Europe over the last twenty years, it is difficult to predict which will become dominant, and, therefore, which of these two future situations will develop. At present, one must conclude that political attitudes among the politicians in power in the three major countries suggest the trend is moving in the direction of closer collaboration, despite the acknowledgment that this may create problems for future United States-West European relations.

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NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESSES IN NATO

by Thomas C. Wiegele

THIS article represents an attempt to examine the processes by means of which allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization consult with each other on nuclear matters of common concern. After considering the idea of consultation both generally and in the alliance from the perspective of small group theory, it will explore the mechanisms that have been utilized by the alliance to discuss and formulate nuclear policies. Within this context, it will make an assessment concerning the effectiveness of the nuclear consultative processes.

The Concept of Consultation in Alliances

"The golden rule of an alliance," observes a study published by a U.S. legislative committee, "is to consult with others as you would have others consult with you."[1] At the heart of the concept of a properly functioning alliance are the ideas of consultation and communication, for effective decision-making depends upon a process of intimate consultation. This by no means suggests that consultation can "extinguish deep differences of judgment between policymakers over many issues, or erase basic disparities of power."[2] But it does offer the prospect to alliance members of "sharing information and analyses," "of allowing time for patterns of thought to change," "of reducing differences of opinion and developing common perspectives, and of minimizing the consequences of differences that remain."[3] Consultative processes, as we shall see later, are an alliance's surrogate for executive authority. If those processes are ineffective, an alliance will be unable to channel its energies in productive directions.

According to Webster's New Century Dictionary the word "consult" means to "deliberate, take counsel: to consider a matter, to mediate, plan or contrive to have regard for a person's interest, convenience, etc. in making plans; to seek counsel from, ask advice

[1]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *The Atlantic Alliance: Unfinished Business,* 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, p. 12.
[2]*Ibid.*
[3]*Ibid.*

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of, refer to for information." When we speak of consultation we will mean all of the elements of contact, communication and reciprocity included in this definition.

In order to examine the findings of experimental research in consultative situations, it will serve us well to focus briefly on an excellent review of the literature of consultation in small groups by Peter Blau and Richard Scott, entitled *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach.*[4] These writers extensively studied consultative arrangements made by caseworkers in a social welfare agency. Many of their conclusions are relevant by inference to the study of consultative mechanisms in alliance systems. While they do not formally define it, they implicitly use the term "consultation" in the sense of seeking counsel and information and asking for advice, together with reciprocation.

Blau and Scott have found that consultation among peers leads to the development of cohesion in groups. Consultation seems also to have reduced the anxiety which often accompanies the decision-making process. "The mere knowledge that one could ask a colleague for help when in difficulty decreased the anxiety engendered by the need to make complex decisions."[5]

Individuals further appear to set up reciprocal consultative relationships. The persons studied seemed to establish consultations not with those of superior expertise, but rather with fellows of like capabilities or even lesser competence. Why might a person approach someone of lesser ability in looking for advice while fully cognizant of the fact that he was not getting the best information? "By repeatedly approaching another for advice," Blau and Scott write, "the questioner is implicitly acknowledging the superior competence of the advisor."[6] But the person seeking advice may not be willing to place himself at such a psychological disadvantage. As a result, individuals often seek to create reciprocal consultative relationships which do no psychological harm to either party. This unwillingness to consult vertically within a hierarchy is an obvious impediment to effective communication.[7]

[4]Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962). See also Johan Galtung, "Small Group Theory and the Theory of International Relations," in Morton Kaplan, editor, *New Approaches to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968).

[5]Blau and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 133.

[7]The conclusion does not hold in low-reciprocity groups. In the case of poorly developed reciprocal-consultation structures, when a need arises for advice the questioner has a tendency to seek out an individual of competence who is usually highly placed in the hierarchy of the group.

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Intra-alliance groupings, displaying similar hierarchical structures, may find themselves subject to the same phenomenon. Organizations such as alliances, established for the purpose of facilitating consultation, may first have to overcome the psychological reluctance of some members to place themselves in a situation of immediate dependence on the expertise of a core power. This may be particularly important in the case of highly technical questions relating to intra-alliance nuclear affairs.

There are some significant questions of prestige involved in a consulting relationship. One-way or nonreciprocal relationships in which a single individual is the questioner and another is the source of information can create superior-subordinate situations with all of the attendant psychological difficulties such a relationship entails.

How, then, is reciprocity achieved in consultative relationships? Blau and Scott found that "workers under high pressure [i.e., heavy work load] were most likely to develop reciprocal partnerships to meet their need for consultation, since such networks make it easier to obtain advice."[8] Moreover, after reciprocal-consultation structures have been developed they appear to be continuously used and thus reinforced. Increases in work pressure in high-reciprocity groups tend to increase the frequency of consultations. However, in groups that have few established reciprocal-consultation structures, i.e., low-reciprocity groups, increases in work pressures have no effect upon the frequency of consultations. "Reciprocal-consultation networks made advice readily available to workers when they needed it most and not merely when relatively low work pressure permitted them to devote special energy to obtaining it."[9] In considering consultation structures within alliances, we note an important implication in the above observation, viz., that structures that have been created to foster cooperation and consultation among member states probably need to be "forced" to develop high-reciprocity operational techniques. If these are not developed when work pressures are low, attempts at consultation in crisis situations will probably be less than satisfactory.

George Liska's contributions help us to formulate generalizations as to why nations engage in the act of consultation.[10] The most obvious reason is for the purpose of concerting behavior,

[8]Blau and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
[9]*Ibid.*, p. 136.
[10]This section is based on Liska's *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968 edition).

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usually toward third parties or issues of common concern. While it need not be the case, consultation often takes place within the context of alliance processes and structures. A sense of community may develop between the consulting parties even though, as Liska maintains, "The typical 'community' between parties to a negotiation is the negative one of apprehending the effects of failure."[11]

In its most elementary form, alliance consultation can seek merely to provide a forum for the exchange of information, a sort of mutual education program. This may involve a prior commitment among members to keep each other cognizant of any unilateral initiatives contemplated, particularly if those initiatives are related to the external policies of other members.

One form of information exchange is "policy-clearing."[12] Within the NATO context this phrase probably has an odious ring, because policy-clearing implies the transmission by a core power of a pre-decided policy to less powerful alliance members in order to achieve their endorsement of that policy. Frequently the weaker members of an alliance have little choice and unmeasurable input into policy decisions, so that they find themselves under strong pressure to subscribe to the dominant power's request for approval. If a member seeks to clear a policy with his partners and is willing to alter his policy as a result of their collective judgment, policy-clearing might properly be called a form of consultation. On the other hand, if policy-clearing is simply the search for approval within a limited circle of friends, it is not truly consultation but a sophisticated form of policy-announcement. The latter procedure is at the heart of a good deal of mischief within alliances.

However, there are questions of degree involved in the policy-clearing concept. "Most lesser allies," writes Liska, "take a realistic view of their proper share in consultations. They wish to be consulted in a way which would give a decent semblance of reality to their standing as partners and to the representative character of the major ally's diplomacy."[13] The chief concerns of the inferior powers revolve around policy initiatives of a major ally which might involve them directly.

From a negative point of view there may be disincentives to consult: "the non-consulting ally may prefer the advantages of a free hand and pay for it with a diminution of allied backing."[14] Yet

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 74.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

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the development of resentment in the nonconsulted ally might exact a high price for the practice of unilateralism. The temptations toward unilateral policies are, of course, greater to a power which has the capacity to act unilaterally than to one that does not.

Analogous to the work of Blau and Scott with regard to reciprocal consultation systems in small groups is Liska's description of two distinct patterns of alliance consultation. These are (1) "a relatively stable pattern of more frequent and intimate consultation among major allies as distinct from all allies," and (2) "an *ad hoc* pattern of consultation in cases of special concern to a particular ally."[15] But this twofold breakdown is inadequate as a description of NATO's patterns of nuclear consultation. It does not provide for the permanent, functional type of consultation system between unequal partners that NATO has developed on the questions of the role and use of nuclear weapons within the alliance.

Consultation in NATO

There is no lack of quotations from a variety of Atlantic sources to support the concept of undiluted faith in consultation among the members of the NATO alliance, though the written and spoken words often show scant resemblance to the reality of the deeds. In spite of this, and in order to make the record complete, we ought to review two of NATO's basic official references to the process of consultation.

In 1956 the Report of the Committee of Three pointed out rather frankly that

> Consultation within an Alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.[16]

This is a good description of how the alliance ideally conceives of the consultation process. The report also emphasized that to be truly effective consultation should be more than broad in scope and deep in character; it ought to become an intimate part of the

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[16] "Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO," reprinted in *NATO: Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 309.

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members' national decision-making process.[17] In emergency situations, the report indicates, it might be necessary for a nation to act unilaterally before the consultation mechanism can be brought into action. While this seems obvious, the mechanisms of nuclear consultation which we shall examine in detail represent an effort to pre-plan alliance activities in such a way as to lessen the likelihood of unilateral actions even in emergency situations. However, as the report underscores, one problem in pre-planning "is the difficulty, and indeed the unwisdom of trying to specify in advance all the subjects and all the situations where consultation is necessary; [and] to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern."[18]

A seemingly simple appeal for members of an alliance to make consultation with their cohorts an integral part of their national policy-making process is far from simple to put into practice. "The internal workings of modern government are so complex," writes Henry Kissinger, "that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation."[19] Indeed, he continues, "nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in international forums." The United States, for example, tends to restrict consultation to an explanation of its policy initiatives because it desires "to avoid complicating still further [its] own increasingly complex decision-making process."[20]

The Harmel Report, approved by the NATO Council on December 14, 1967, made the customary plea that "the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved." But it also noted, in keeping with the age-old argument about the supremacy and inviolability of the nation-state, that "as sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decisions."[21] To a great extent effective consultation involves reconciling national interests with the collective interests of an alliance. This has proved to be a far from easy task. Undoubtedly many of the shortcomings of the consultative process spring from basic nationalistic attitudes and positions. However,

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 310.
[18] *Ibid.* For some general observations on consultation see Joachim Jaenicke, "Political Consultation — Reality or Formality," *NATO Letter*, April 1969, pp. 15-17.
[19] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Edition, 1966), p. 223.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 223-224.
[21] Text of the "Harmel Report," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Spring 1968, pp. 115-116.

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any discussion of consultation assumes, for the most part, that a nation in an alliance will not insist upon complete freedom of action and the complete expression of sovereignty since, if it did, consultation would be impossible and alliance cohesion would be destroyed. In its public pronouncements, therefore, NATO, as an alliance, has declared itself to be fully committed toward extending and deepening the process of consultation.

In examining the mechanisms of the consultative process, we will limit ourselves to those related to the planning and employment of nuclear weapons within the alliance. This limitation has been imposed for three reasons. First, consultation in a highly structured alliance system can be rather broadly manifested. For example, within NATO consultation can range from the coordination of economic aid programs to underdeveloped countries to the establishment and apportionment of academic fellowships in natural science research. By focusing on the question of nuclear consultation, we have restricted ourselves to a functionally manageable area.

Second, the nuclear field is appropriate because it is concerned with the *raison d'être* of the alliance. Since NATO depends upon nuclear weapons to achieve a large measure of its security, consultation as a technique of reconciling interests and exchanging information is put to its most significant test in this area.

Third, because of the importance of nuclear weapons, the mechanisms of nuclear consultation are reasonably well developed; that is, channels and forums for the consideration of nuclear issues exist. Over the years NATO has experienced an evolutionary life that has pointed it in the direction of more and more sophisticated and functionally differentiated structures for this purpose.

The Mechanisms of Nuclear Consultation

The Multilateral Nuclear Force

Until the early 1960's NATO had not developed any *structured* mechanisms of nuclear consultation on the policymaking level. The major reason for this was that the United States monopolized the doctrine for and employment of the nuclear deterrent on behalf of the alliance. Toward the end of President Eisenhower's tenure in office and at the beginning of President Kennedy's, however, there began to develop a more or less general interest in the collective control of nuclear weapons committed to the defense

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of the treaty area.[22] Some European nations expressed a desire to participate in the development of policies for the possible employment of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO defense requirements. Wanting to contribute to the planning and decisions to use the nuclear weapons committed to their security, they sought a voice in the highest decisional levels of the U.S. government. After a variety of momentarily explored and rejected proposals for solving the control issue, the United States finally settled on what it termed the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF).

Briefly, the MLF was a proposal for a fleet of twenty-five surface vessels armed with Polaris nuclear missiles that would be deployed in the Mediterranean and North seas. These multinationally-manned ships were to be committed to the nuclear defense of NATO, and their missiles were to be launched by the unanimous vote of the participant nations.[23] The MLF proposal provoked a spirited debate in NATO over the issue of the control of nuclear weapons. We are not concerned here with the arguments for and against the fleet plan. Our interest is the fact that the MLF, as a diplomatic proposal offered by the predominant power within the alliance, was a mechanism by which interested alliance members consulted on nuclear matters. Therefore, we want to examine how a diplomatic initiative became a mechanism of nuclear consultation.

It was all relatively simple. The United States offered the proposal for the MLF to the NATO Council and asked the other member governments to accede to it. Realistically, the United States could not ask for immediate approval, and so it entered into bilateral discussions on the MLF with three other powers in NATO: Britain, Italy and Germany.[24] Dealing with each nation individually, of course, risked creating suspicions among the other members. After initial bilateral contacts, Washington, apparently recognizing that it would have a difficult and long effort in obtaining approval for the proposal, established a structure within the Department of State — the Office for MLF Negotiations — in order to prosecute the initiative. The creation of this small group

[22]There is a good deal of debate about this statement. Some have argued that the United States intentionally created the "control issue"; others have insisted that the Europeans were expressing a felt need for the control of the deterrent. We will not debate the point here. Regardless of the genesis of the control issue, it existed.

[23]Before the fleet plan "died," the release formula was altered to a two-vote scheme: one by the United States and one by the Europeans as a group. The Europeans could cast their single vote by majority decisions.

[24]France was not included because she announced her absolute and permanent opposition to the proposal as soon as it was offered.

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meant that vested interests in the fleet proposal would develop and grow, as indeed they did. It also established the likelihood that the personal reputations of key officials would become attached to the success of the plan. This perhaps became a certainty when President Kennedy appointed a highly respected diplomat, Livingston Merchant, as his emissary to European capitals to explain the MLF proposal.

Up to this point, bilateral nuclear consultation between the core power in the alliance and significant lesser powers conformed to traditional diplomacy. But it should be pointed out that this meant that the structure of the alliance was not being used as an intimate forum to discuss alliance security. While part of the explanation for this apparently ambiguous procedure was the United States' desire to avoid an open confrontation with France, a more important reason was undoubtedly the calculation by Washington that it had a better chance of convincing interested parties of the wisdom of its nuclear policies on a one-to-one basis than in a group situation.

This method of consultation has advantages as well as disadvantages. From the point of view of the core power, there is an opportunity to dominate the situation and perhaps monopolize the input into the consultation process. One disadvantage inheres in risking the alienation of alliance members outside the bilateral connection; another results from the non-use of the alliance format in the discussion of issues highly central to the *raison d'être* of the alliance. This can only result ultimately in a disinclination to make adequate use of the alliance's structures. From the point of view of an inferior power, the procedure signifies a serious disadvantage to the extent that it finds itself under strong pressure to accede to the positions of the dominant partner.

Ironically the United States, in spite of its great strength, found itself unable to gain acceptance for its nuclear plan through the bilateral technique. Therefore it proposed that parties having an interest in further consultation on the MLF form a group to discuss the proposal at length. This was the origin of the so-called Working Group.

As in the case of the bilateral arrangements, the Working Group was established outside the existing structure of the alliance, probably because of the unwillingness of France to associate herself with the effort. Again, a consultative technique of this character risked alienating those members who chose not to participate in the group. Moreover, since the Working Group was

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composed chiefly of the stronger members of the alliance, there existed the possibility that the less powerful members might view this procedure as one that could develop into some type of caucus arrangement, and thus become divisive of the general cohesion within the alliance.

With regard to the functioning of the Working Group, the proposal for the MLF became the issue around which alliance nuclear strategy was discussed; that is, the fleet plan was the occasion for nuclear consultation. While the proposal was never adopted — it foundered on the control issue — nevertheless, it provided for an intimate exchange of views on nuclear matters, particularly in the Working Group. Thus, nuclear security, the central subject area of the alliance membership, was handled on an *ad hoc* basis outside established alliance structures.[25] Furthermore, consultation on this important topic should have been continuous and ongoing, in the form of a permanent agenda item in alliance councils. Instead, it was treated as a temporary issue.

There are a number of lessons regarding the consultative process to be learned from the MLF experience. First, to the best of our knowledge, the fleet plan was conceived by U.S. decision-makers with minimal input from other alliance members.[26] Had European nations been consulted more adequately in the conception of the proposal, it might have had a better chance of adoption since, presumably, it then would have more accurately reflected European viewpoints. Second, because the proposal did not meet the general nuclear requirements of the alliance, the longer the consultation process lasted, the more divisive of group cohesion it became. Increasing the length and intensity of a consultative effort will not guarantee its ultimate success. Third, the MLF experience indicated to the allied nations that on an issue as crucial as nuclear security a far more structured and permanent effort was required to meet the nuclear consultative needs of the partners. While a diplomatic proposal can become the occasion for extended consultation on a circumscribed topic, it will not be adequate, in all likelihood, to satisfy the permanent interests of alliance members.

[25]It could be argued that the MLF episode was not truly a NATO undertaking, since it was considered outside the fabric of the alliance. But this ignores the fact that the proposal was a topic of discussion at four NATO Council meetings: February 1963, May 1963, December 1963 and May 1964.

[26]See Thomas C. Wiegele, "The Origins of the MLF Concept, 1957-1960," ORBIS, Summer 1968.

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The Nuclear Planning Group

Though the MLF proposal was abandoned in late 1964, the persistent and perplexing problems of how to establish a consultative arrangement to deal with the security issues of the alliance and to give a voice in planning to the lesser members remained. Several months after the demise of the MLF, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara proposed to a NATO defense ministers meeting that a "select" or restricted committee of "four or five" alliance members be formed for the purpose of improving collective participation in the use of the strategic weapons available to the alliance, as well as to "improve communications to insure that agreed consultations concerning a decision to use nuclear forces can take place as expeditiously as possible."[27]

McNamara suggested that the committee be constituted at the defense ministers level. The fact that the U.S. Secretary of Defense proposed a restricted grouping to deal with the most sensitive issues of the alliance is of some significance. The use of the word "select" indicated that he conceived of the group as being a special portion of the fifteen-nation alliance. Which nations were to be included in the select four or five? While McNamara did not identify them, it was reasonable to assume that those eligible were the two major nuclear powers in NATO, the United States and Britain, together with France and West Germany, and probably Italy. In that case, NATO would be creating a small group caucus of the major powers within the alliance. Would the smaller nations, whose security also depended on the nuclear deterrent, be willing to accept a consultative arrangement in which they played no direct role? Within such a group, what kinds of pressures to conform would be brought to bear on, let us say, nationalistic France? Might this small group create even stronger pressure for conformity with the dominant power than a larger group? What would be the status of the group with regard to the larger alliance structure? In spite of the fact that the plan answered none of these questions, the defense ministers "agreed that further consideration should be given to a proposal for ways in which consultation might be improved and participation by interested allied countries extended in the planning of nuclear forces, including strategic forces."[28]

"Further consideration" was given at a subsequent meeting of

[27] *New York Times*, June 1, 1965, p. 11.
[28] Text of communiqué, *Department of State Bulletin*, June 21, 1965, p. 993.

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defense ministers in the fall of 1965. Ten defense ministers meeting as an *ad hoc* Special Committee on Nuclear Consultation, with the Secretary-General of NATO presiding, discussed nuclear policies and planning procedures. On the basis of these discussions, the Special Committee decided to establish three apparently experimental working groups, similar in structure to the MLF Working Group. These groups, intimately associated with the consultation concept, were to explore questions of communications, data exchange and nuclear planning.[29] The French, who previously had rejected participation in the Select Committee, charged that the Special Committee was not a bona fide NATO committee.[30] They argued that in order to be authentic the committee should have been created by the unanimous approval of the NATO Council. Thus, though little heed was paid to the French charge, some doubt was cast on the legitimacy of ten of the fifteen NATO defense ministers declaring themselves to be a NATO committee.

Of the three working groups established, that dealing with nuclear planning was the most significant. Its official title became the Nuclear Planning Working Group of the NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers. All three of the groups were temporary in nature, and presumably the principle of interallied consultation in each area was being extended on an experimental basis. Five nations, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Great Britain and the United States, participated at the defense ministers level in the first meeting of the nuclear working group which was held in Washington during February 1966. According to a U.S. Department of Defense press release, the group concentrated its efforts in the area of strategic nuclear weapons planning:

> This included an appraisal of the process by which the threat to NATO is measured; consideration of the ways in which nuclear forces are planned, procured, and managed; and discussion of the problems and procedures in the development of plans with respect to such forces, as well as the command and control arrangements which govern them.[31]

Of particular interest to European members of the group was "a detailed examination of targeting procedures, planning with respect to Allied strategic forces, and an evaluation of what the

[29]See the text of the communiqué, *ibid.*, December 13, 1965, p. 939. Only the United States and Britain were members of all three working groups.
[30]*New York Times*, July 10, 1965, p. 3, and November 28, 1965, p. 5.
[31]The text of the announcement is reprinted in the *Department of State Bulletin*, March 7, 1966, p. 368.

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various kinds of forces could be expected to achieve under different conditions of nuclear war."[32]

This was the most comprehensive briefing the United States had ever provided to its allies regarding its management of the nuclear deterrent for the alliance. As a Defense Department spokesman was quoted as saying, "this is the first time that we have really lifted the curtain and showed them how we select targets [and] how we plan and order follow-up weapons systems. . . ."[33]

It seems reasonable to assume that the United States was making a major effort to convince skeptical allies that nuclear consultation within the framework of U.S. control of the deterrent was possible. The effort was apparently successful, because in London two months later the five nuclear working group defense ministers announced that they had agreed to recommend to the NATO Council the establishment of a permanent group to consult on the use of nuclear weapons.[34] One problem, which the ministers recognized, would be the composition of the group. This was particularly delicate because the alliance was "divided" into nuclear and nonnuclear powers. A major consideration involved providing adequate representation in the group for the nonnuclear nations, so that it might be a truly consultative body. But the division between nuclear and nonnuclear powers does not accurately represent the full range of alliance members.

There are, first, the nuclear powers, Britain and the United States. Second, there are the smaller nonnuclear powers: for example, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece and Italy. But there is also a third category of nations: West Germany, and perhaps Canada, whose relationship to the nuclear powers is somewhat different from that of the small countries because they have the potentiality to become nuclear powers — i.e., great powers. Though neither promises to move in the nuclear direction, their potential for great or near-great power status marks them differently in the intra-group dynamics of the alliance.

The recognition of three different types of nations within the pool of available members is highly significant with regard to the nature of the group that ultimately emerged from the composition process. Had it been composed of only nuclear and near-nuclear powers, as the United States originally suggested, the prospects for

[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *New York Times*, February 19, 1966, p. 9.
[34] *Ibid.*, April 30, 1966, p. 1.

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true consultation might not have been good: the nuclear powers might have judged that any amount of nuclear information relayed to the near-nuclear nations would enhance not only their prestige but also their desire to achieve great-power status. In such a situation, information flows might have been held to a minimum, and worthwhile consultation might not have taken place. On the other hand, if the near-nuclear nations had been excluded from the group and a nuclear power-small power combination had been effected, the nuclear nations would have dominated the relationship and felt themselves under minimal pressure to engage in consultation. An effort on the part of the small powers to broaden consultation would probably have failed.

While the ultimate form was not decided at this point, the decision by the *ad hoc* nuclear working group and the Special Committee to recommend that the alliance establish a permanent nuclear planning group represented something of a watershed in NATO history. It meant, first, that the "hardware" solution to the problem of nuclear sharing was being downgraded if not altogether abandoned. Second, it indicated that the alliance, and in particular the premier ally, was willing to engage in frank and intimate consultation on the sensitive issue of nuclear security. Parenthetically, this decision was supported by a U.S. study group headed by Dean Acheson which assessed the feasibility of reintroducing the MLF proposal or supporting some type of permanent nuclear planning enterprise; it endorsed the latter alternative.

The carefully conceived efforts of the *ad hoc* Special Committee came to fruition at the December 1966 meetings of the NATO Council. As the text of the final communiqué states, the NATO ministers, not including the French, "agreed to establish in NATO two permanent bodies for nuclear planning — a policy body called the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries, and subordinate to it, a Nuclear Planning Group of seven members which will handle the detailed work."[35] Also growing out of the experimentation and discussion of the previous year, the ministers, again not including the French, approved "new arrangements for the rapid exchange and more effective use of relevant information and data," which encompassed a "NATO-wide communications scheme."[36]

[35]Text of the communiqué in *Department of State Bulletin*, January 9, 1967, p. 51.
[36]*Ibid.*

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Thus, the alliance established a two-pronged approach to solving the problem of nuclear consultation. There would be a large group, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), in which every member of the alliance was eligible to participate and in which general policy would be discussed; but there would also be a smaller group, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), limited to seven members, in which more detailed planning would take place. We will return to the question of group responsibilities later, but it should be pointed out that, in spite of the language of the communiqué, the ministers clearly intended to invest major responsibilities in the NPG.

While the dual approach also opened the door to jurisdictional disputes, this eventually was mitigated by the method of constituting the NPG. It will be recalled that McNamara's original proposal sought a committee of "four or five." This proved to be much too exclusive for the Dutch, who believed that "the larger the group, the greater the influence of the smaller members."[37] The Dutch were in the forefront in opposing any alliance structure that did not allow in some way for general participation in principle.[38] According to Robert Russell, while the United States ultimately sought a five-member NPG composed of the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, and a single small nation chosen randomly from the larger NDAC, the Dutch insisted on a larger group and an assured seat for one of the Benelux nations. The compromise reached provided for an NPG of seven members: four permanent seats (two nuclear and two potentially nuclear powers) and three eighteen-month-term, rotating seats apportioned among the smaller powers.[39] From the point of view of limiting membership to manageable proportions, and at the same time encouraging consultation as well as adequate representation among the three types of allies, the compromise arrangement was highly functional.

With regard to the seats for the smaller powers — so essential to effective consultation — Russell observes that the formula agreed upon meant "that one seat could alternate between the Netherlands and Belgium, one between Turkey and Greece, and

[37]Robert W. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance in Dutch Foreign Policy," *International Spectator*, Jaargang 23, Nr. 13, p. 1194.

[38]*Ibid.* See also W. F. van Eekelen, "Development of NATO's Nuclear Consultation," *NATO Letter*, July-August 1970, pp. 2-6.

[39]Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 1196. At a later date, Norway was admitted to the NPG as a rotating member. The rotation formula was revised but the details of this revision have never been made public.

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one between Canada and Denmark."[40] This unique assignment of seats to pairs of powers was not without its momentary shortcomings. Shortly after the creation of the NPG, Canada and the Netherlands were announced as the holders of the first two rotating seats; however, Greece and Turkey, apparently unable to reach agreement concerning which would serve the initial eighteen-month term, decided to share the third seat during the term, with Greece serving in the beginning and Turkey following "at an appropriate moment."[41] The "pairing scheme" appears to be a reasonably effective method to weight the small powers vis-à-vis the major powers, i.e., two small powers presumably equal one major power.

The Ten Nuclear Planning Group Meetings

At the ten NPG meetings held from 1967 to 1971 a variety of topics has been discussed. The first meeting, held in Washington during April 1967, saw Turkey raise the question of control over nuclear land mines emplaced along the Turkish-Soviet border.[42] The Turks argued for greater local military control over these defensive weapons in wartime. It was pointed out that existing decisional arrangements to detonate the mines were too slow to be effective. The Germans offered the same argument in regard to nuclear weapons emplaced in Western Europe.[43] No decision was taken on this issue at this time.

At the second meeting, in Ankara, McNamara explained the U.S. rationale for the development of a "thin" anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system against Communist China.[44] Reportedly Britain objected strongly that she had merely been "notified" of the American decision rather than consulted, and other members of the group supported this position. Objections to the U.S. method of handling what was judged to be a critical decision centered on the opinion that a strategic weapons system such as an ABM would affect Soviet-American relationships. Any alteration in the character of those relationships was of intimate concern to the members of the NPG. One observer was quoted as saying that "McNamara managed to allay most of the concerns of the ministers, but he could have had a far better reception for the plan if he had provided them with adequate information before an-

[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *New York Times*, December 20, 1966, p. 4.
[42] *Ibid.*, April 6, 1967, p. 1.
[43] *Ibid.*, April 8, 1967, p. 8.
[44] *Ibid.*, September 29, 1967, p. 13.

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nouncing the system."[45] Turkey again brought up the issue of local military control of nuclear land mines. It was decided by the NPG to defer action on this matter until the next meeting.[46]

The question of nuclear land mines is not an insignificant issue. Many of the smaller members of the alliance feel that such mines constitute a guarantee that any aggressive incursion into their territories will automatically be raised to a nuclear threshold, which in turn will guarantee the employment of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. When West Germany and Turkey reintroduced the issue during the April 1968 NPG meeting at The Hague,[47] however, questions regarding fallout and control prevented the group again from reaching any decisions, and further consideration was delayed pending more extensive studies. Also at The Hague the United States briefed members regarding the effect a nuclear nonproliferation treaty might have on consultation procedures within the NPG. U.S. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford is reported to have declared that such a treaty would not adversely affect or inhibit the process of nuclear consultation within the alliance.[48] Finally at this session, the NPG decided against the construction of a European-based ABM system.

Bonn was the site of the fourth meeting, held during the fall of 1968. In one respect, at least, this meeting represented a major departure from past sessions. For the first time European nations were principals in the presentation of important strategic studies. Four papers were presented for consideration and discussion: a British paper examining the use of nuclear weapons on and under the sea, a West German paper dealing with the tactical use of nuclear weapons, an Italian paper devoted to questions of defense on the southern flank of the alliance, and a U.S. study on the bargaining value of nuclear weapons.[49] It was clear that (1) the planning duties of the NPG were being broadened through the delegation of responsibility, and (2) the general nuclear expertise of the alliance was steadily developing to the point where the European members were in a position to make a substantive contribution to NATO's nuclear doctrines. In terms of developing confidence and mutual respect these efforts were no doubt highly functional. In still another procedure the Bonn meeting was unusual. Great Britain and West Germany were assigned the

[45] *Ibid.*, September 30, 1967, p. 6.
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] *Ibid.*, April 20, 1968, p. 2.
[48] *Ibid.*, April 19, 1968, p. 3.
[49] *Ibid.*, October 11, 1968, p. 10.

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cooperative task of working out general defensive guidelines for the alliance, particularly in the use of tactical nuclear weapons.[50] In all likelihood, this was the first time two nations formed a bilateral pairing within the NPG in order to engage in a task for the larger group.

The Anglo-German report on the political control of tactical nuclear weapons became the central topic of discussion at the fifth NPG session in London during May 1969.[51] Given the doctrine of flexible response to an aggressive attack, which the alliance had officially adopted in 1967, the question of procedures regarding the use of smaller nuclear weapons was crucial. However, no decisions apparently were taken on the report because the documents, in the form of two policy papers, became the major agenda item for the sixth NPG meeting at Warrenton, Virginia.[52] One paper established guidelines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons; the other described the methods of consultation between alliance members to be followed prior to their employment. The procedures were reported to be not only flexible but extensive, including both bilateral and multilateral contacts.[53] It was further reported that the NPG refused to subscribe to the use of a veto by any member over the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, even on its own territory. The decision to detonate such weapons would remain in the hands of the President of the United States. In addition, the papers set firm guidelines regarding collateral damage and signaling principles. The NPG endorsed the Anglo-German papers and they were subsequently approved by the NDAC.[54] The overall effect of the new policies, which were embodied in a forty-page document, was to build into the NATO decision system some caution and careful evaluation before the use of even the smallest tactical nuclear weapons.

According to the brief communiqué issued at the conclusion of the seventh NPG session, held at Venice during June 1970, the conferees reviewed "substantive policy issues pertaining to the possible defensive employment of nuclear weapons in the context of NATO strategy of flexibility in response."[55] This bland statement, however, masked some highly significant alliance concerns.

[50] *Ibid.*, October 12, 1968, p. 13.
[51] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1969, p. 9.
[52] *Ibid.*, November 13, 1969, p. 8.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] *Ibid.*, December 4, 1969, p. 1.
[55] *Ibid.*, June 10, 1970, p. 8.

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It was reported that the primary interest at the meetings was the development of a policy to deal with an aggressive invasion into the European treaty area which had not been halted by an initial use of tactical nuclear weapons.[56] The ministers debated the advisability of a secondary tactical nuclear strike, but a decision on this point was deferred to a future meeting. General strategic issues were introduced into the discussions by U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who briefed his fellow conferees on developments relating to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. This probably signaled the shift of the discussion of strategic nuclear weapons away from the NPG and into the SALT forum. True, the NPG members would continue to receive briefings on strategic developments, but these would be no more than reports of U.S. negotiating tactics rather than substantive interchanges.

It seems clear from press reports of the three most recent meetings that the NPG has concentrated its attention on nuclear issues below the strategic level. The Ottawa meeting in the fall of 1970 endorsed a proposal which would allow local military commanders to shift nuclear land mines to potential crisis areas without seeking prior approval from political authorities.[57] Though the final authority to detonate these devices would remain in the hands of the U.S. President, this policy substantially reduced the interlude between the request to fire the weapons and the decision to grant it.

The Mittenwald meeting in May 1971 was apparently routine, with no major policy questions up for discussion. During it Laird assured West German officials that the SALT effort was not meant in any way to undercut the negotiations then in progress on West Berlin.[58]

Tactical nuclear weapons were again the subject of the fall 1971 Brussels session. Laird and West German Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt jointly presented a report dealing with situations and circumstances in which tactical nuclear weapons might be utilized for the defense of an alliance member.[59] This meeting, however, was also the occasion for an extremely sharp exchange between Schmidt and Laird, with the German Defense Minister demanding from the United States much more frank and intimate discussions of its views on the nuclear defense of the treaty area.

[56] *Ibid.*, June 9, 1970.
[57] *Ibid.*, October 28, 1970, p. 9.
[58] *Ibid.*, May 27, 1971, p. 4.
[59] *Ibid.*, October 28, 1971, p. 15.

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That attack took the American delegation by surprise because over the course of the previous few years Washington had developed what might be termed a "special nuclear relationship" with the West Germans. There had been numerous bilateral contacts between the two powers for the clear purpose of providing the Germans with as much explanatory information on American nuclear doctrine as was realistically possible.

The Consultative Process

Inside the NPG system consultation takes place on three levels: the ministerial level at general meetings, a bilateral and/or multilateral national staff level, and the permanent staff level.

As originally conceived by Secretary of Defense McNamara, nuclear consultation was to be carried out by the defense ministers of the member nations in sessions chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO. The ministers were to meet twice each year, in spring and winter, to discuss and plan the nuclear business of the alliance. In such an insulated atmosphere, however, consultation was held to a minimum. Essentially the United States found itself performing an educational function for its allies as it reported on the details of its nuclear arsenal or perhaps on shifts in less important doctrinal areas. This situation persisted for the first year and a half of the NPG.

But a superior-subordinate relationship was inadequate to the long-term interests of NPG member nations and to the alliance as a whole. Consultation, if it was to be truly cooperative, had to take place, at least in the initial consideration of an issue, at a much lower level. Consequently, there developed a process of intimate national staff activity in the joint production of position papers to be discussed at forthcoming NPG sessions. The relevant national staffs develop working papers on a nuclear topic of interest to them. Prior to the plenary NPG meetings they will meet with their counterparts in other nations in order to determine their views. In certain situations, multilateral staff activity can take place. Thus, there is a good deal of staff activity between the less powerful members of the NPG — i.e., the process of consultation between equals we discussed earlier. But there is also reference to the core power. American officials are frequently involved in discussions of NATO nuclear policies with European national staff members who are in the process of writing position papers.

It is here, in the intermingling of national staffs, that some of

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the most important consultative activity of the NPG takes place. In this arena national positions and prejudices first become known and are argued. This is significant because such a process provides the psychological safety valves for an effectively functioning small group. If this sifting and discussion of positions did not take place prior to the NPG meetings, national positions might become hardened and therefore much less susceptible to compromise at the ministerial level. Furthermore, discussions between national staffs have had the effect of pushing nuclear doctrines toward more and more precision. This strong tendency toward spelling out the details of certain nuclear policies is a sign that the exposition of general principles is no longer adequate to the needs of the non-American NPG members. Thus, inter-staff activity has had the effect of strengthening the consultative character of the Nuclear Planning Group.

Finally, some interchange of opinion takes place on the level of the permanent NPG staff in Brussels. This staff, which has organizational links to the various allied Ambassadors to NATO, performs an important secretarial function of the NPG nations, but it is difficult to ascertain its inputs into the nuclear planning process. The permanent staff deserves to be studied far more extensively than has hitherto been possible.

Four general conclusions can be noted concerning the functioning of the NPG and the NDAC.

(1) The NPG is apparently contributing substantially to the solution of the nuclear planning, control and consultation tasks in NATO. We might hypothesize that the higher the frequency of national participation in making decisions, the more likely the nation is to accept those decisions. On this basis, the NPG system is working well. The effort to create a small planning group — seven out of fifteen alliance members — while restrictive, appears also to be quite functional. Pressures toward conformity are usually stronger in a smaller group, and this may explain what appears to be concerted group behavior.

(2) Though the NPG is restricted in membership at any given time, rotating members who are out of the group are allowed to attend the meetings of the NPG permanent staff.[60] It is significant that the "out-members" participate in NPG staff sessions. For this purpose the group is expanded by three to a membership of eleven. Moreover, as one authoritative observer has written, "NPG staff activity is quite vigorous, and there exists a continuous

[60]Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 1196-1197. See also van Eekelen, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

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exchange of views between staffs of the various member nations and between those staffs and the nations they represent."[61] This suggests that the "shadow committee" of eleven constitutes a high-reciprocity group which has developed intimate consultation procedures and minimized the hierarchical aspects of the NPG. It should also be pointed out that the committee of eleven includes both Greece and Turkey; presumably, working together on a staff level is ameliorating some of the quarrels these two allies have had.

(3) The Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee is something of an enigma. The question that immediately arises is why such a committee is needed at all, since it seems to be merely a bureaucratic layer between the NPG and the NATO Council. But without the NDAC it perhaps could not be justified that such a necessarily restricted group as the NPG could act on behalf of the entire alliance in the sensitive area of strategic security planning. The NDAC was needed to maintain the principle that on questions of nuclear defense there was a specialized committee to which *all* members might belong. In practice it is simply a mechanism of the alliance functioning as a whole, used to ratify the work that has been carefully discussed, debated and approved by the NPG at both the staff and ambassadorial levels. It has met only three times since its inception.

(4) Finally, a question must be raised which cannot, at the present time, be answered satisfactorily. Is a nation that has developed a functional, reciprocal, working relationship with the central power or any other power in a group inclined, on the basis of its in-group contacts, to exploit the rapport so developed to encourage an intimate out-group bilateral relationship? Nations finding that they work well together in a group context may decide at some point that it is to their advantage to emphasize their bilateral dealings at the expense of the group. For example, the joint effort that led to the Anglo-German paper presented at Warrenton was a catalyst toward the cooperation of those two nations outside the NPG framework. Britain and Germany have decided to consult with other European nations on how to approach the United States on defense issues. In such a way the very success of a group may lead to its disintegration. This is not to suggest that a development of this order is taking place, but it could occur.

[61]John C. Burney, Jr., "Nuclear Sharing in NATO," *Military Review*, June 1969, p. 64. At the time he wrote this article, Burney was Assistant for Nuclear Planning in the Office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

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The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff

We have seen how both the diplomatic proposal and the NPG system provide methods of political consultation on the policy level. Given certain policy decisions, however, a measure of latitude among choices is available to operational planners. Moreover, many of the decisions rendered in the operational realm have strong political overtones and implications. For instance, the list of possible targets to be retaliated against in the event a nation is the victim of an aggressive attack must of necessity be finite. Which targets to include on the list, distasteful as that might be, can become a delicate issue involving the reconciliation of disparate interests. Once a list has been developed, the question of priorities — which targets are to be attacked first, which last — immediately arises. In addition there are questions involving the assignment of specific weapons systems to individual or multiple targets. Relatively speaking, one nation should be able to make these determinations with few difficulties; however, if more than a single nation is involved, say five or six, the task of reconciling interests becomes complex.

In 1960 the United States established the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, and assigned it the responsibility to integrate the plans and operations of all national nuclear strategic forces in the event of a major conflict. In its work the JSTPS deals with the sensitive issues of security and reconciliation of interests just mentioned. An effort to coordinate the operation of the JSTPS with representatives of other nations would indicate not only a high degree of trust, but also a general willingness to cooperate on the foremost concerns of the alliance.

At its spring 1963 meeting the NATO Council approved "arrangements for broader participation by officers of NATO member countries in nuclear activities in Allied Command Europe and in coordination of operational planning at Omaha [JSTPS]."[62] As Secretary McNamara described the program, "European officers from the SHAPE staff now participate in nuclear weapons planning and targeting at SAC Headquarters in Omaha."[63] To what extent meaningful consultation takes place among participating allies is impossible to state, since the entire

[62]Text of communiqué, *Department of State Bulletin*, June 10, 1963, p. 895.
[63]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, *Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967*, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 43.

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JSTPS is so sensitive that virtually nothing has been written about it.[64] Nevertheless, the sensitiveness of the mechanism is an indication that alliance partners may be engaged in acts of consultation on an operational level of considerable intimacy.

We do have some information about the structure of the NATO connection to the JSTPS. In the initial period, from 1963 to 1966, officers from Italy, Germany, Great Britain and France were assigned to the planning staff at Omaha. These four positions were established on the assumption that they would be rotated among the nations contributing forces to NATO's nuclear missions.[65] The rotational system was followed until late 1968, when Germany, Great Britain and Italy were made permanent members with the fourth seat retained on a rotational basis. The tour of duty for an officer occupying one of these posts is three years, thus allowing him to become intimately acquainted with the planning system.

It should be pointed out that the officers assigned to the JSTPS represent the office of SACEUR and as such deal only with information relevant to NATO-connected missions. They do not have access to all United States strategic plans, but only to those related to SACEUR's command responsibilities.[66]

The mechanism of consultation at the operational level, therefore, is similar to that at the policy level in the NPG. The key powers are represented on a permanent basis while the lesser powers rotate, in this instance one at a time rather than three simultaneously as in the NPG.

What observations can be made from this necessarily cursory examination of the JSTPS? First, a means for face-to-face nuclear consultation at the operational level has been established within the alliance. Second, these intimate contacts in respect to nuclear targeting reveal a high degree of trust on the part of the nations concerned. The core power of the group is apparently willing to make known highly secret information to its allies; and those allies, in turn, have shown themselves to be trustworthy partners. Though circumscribed, these contacts encourage the development of alliance cohesion. Third, given the nature of the enterprise, it seems safe to assume that hierarchical factors are important. For

[64]For a few random insights see Arthur Hockaday, "Nuclear Management in NATO," *NATO Letter*, May 1967, pp. 3-7.

[65]When the French withdrew their forces from the NATO command during the summer of 1966, the French seat was filled by Belgium.

[66]John B. Kotch, "NATO Nuclear Arrangements in the Aftermath of the MLF," *Air University Review*, March-April 1967, p. 87, note 32.

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example, since the United States has a virtual monopoly of deterrent forces within the alliance, only the United States can realistically talk about targeting. When its NATO associates discuss target planning, they do so with the good graces of the United States. Finally, the JSTPS is not a major consultative body. Its value in this regard is chiefly psychological; it allows allied officers to observe the U.S. target planning process without actually participating in the decisions which guide that process.

Some General Observations

In questions regarding NATO's nuclear affairs most members of the alliance have endorsed strongly the principle of group consultation and decision-making at both the policy and the operational levels. While this might appear to be stating the obvious, one has only to look back to the mid-1960's to find the alliance in disarray and on the brink of dissolution over the nuclear control issue. Thus, the structures which have been created, though far from perfect, have worked exceedingly well. The central security concerns of NATO are being dealt with and managed to members' apparent satisfaction. This has been an important accomplishment, one which this writer feels has been seriously neglected in the scholarly literature.

By approaching the problem of nuclear defense from a group perspective, the participating nations have provided for the built-in error-correcting procedures most groups generate, as well as for dealing with problems on a face-to-face basis. Yet groups are often unimaginative in their activities, and this tendency might be dangerous with regard to so important an issue as nuclear strategy. Moreover, complex situations and problems often evoke hierarchical dispositions that have the effect of reducing interaction and social support within the group. By the same token, tasks of coordination, which are often performed by the group member at the top of a hierarchy, weaken the common rapport.

The nuclear goals of the alliance seem to be well understood by the participants in the nuclear planning process. While the preeminence of the United States as a nuclear actor is accepted by the smaller powers, nevertheless the United States seems receptive toward *modifying* its non-core nuclear policies at the suggestion of the nations associated with the NPG.

The nuclear planning system as it now exists has unquestionably reduced the intense and often bitter argumentation

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that NATO experienced during the 1960's. That period, which historians might some day look upon as one of significant transition or perhaps evolution, witnessed the weakening of numerous cultural, social and political bonds between the allies. It is possible to argue that only on the nuclear issue has the alliance met a challenge successfully and developed new and viable forms of cooperative behavior. There might even be some justification for asserting that for all practical purposes the nuclear planning system constitutes the substance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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ITALIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY: A RECONSIDERATION

by Anthony James Joes

AMONG the superlatives used to describe present-day Italy, one of the most widely employed, and believed, is "the most unstable democracy in the West." A kaleidoscopic record of cabinet crises (more than thirty since Mussolini) and the largest Communist electorate in the West would seem overwhelmingly to justify this appraisal of the Italian Republic as the "weak link" in the North Atlantic defense system. Pessimistic predictions about its future role in that system are not hard to find. Italy has long been considered, if not "on the brink," close enough to it to cause her well-wishers and allies profound concern.

It is the thesis of this article, however, that those phenomena which are generally appraised as indicators of a serious and mounting instability in the Italian system are something other than they seem; that concentration on them obscures more fundamental aspects of Italian political life; in short, that Italy's reputation as the most unstable state in the West is not deserved, at least not for the reasons usually advanced.

I

Cabinet instability is nothing new in Italy; within two years of the death of Cavour in 1861 there were four different prime ministers. In the period between the coming to power of the Christian Democrats under DeGasperi (December 1945) and the resignation of the first Colombo Government (January 1972), we find that the early tradition carried on: in twenty-six years there were twenty-seven cabinets. Many questions come immediately to mind: What are the major reasons for this instability? Is it increasing or decreasing? What are the implications for the future of parliamentary government in Italy, and for Italy's relations with other Western states?

Ignoring the confused period after the fall of Mussolini, postwar Italian politics can be divided into three neat segments: (1) the DeGasperi period, 1945-1953; (2) the transition, 1953-1963; and (3) the period of the Center-Left coalitions, from 1963 to the

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present, i.e., up to the resignation of the Colombo cabinet in January 1972.

We can examine and compare these three periods with regard to cabinet stability to see if there are any discernible trends, noting especially whether the *apertura a sinistra* (the Opening to the Left which included Nenni's mainstream Socialists in a long-awaited coalition with the Christian Democrats and their leftist allies) has had any appreciable effect on the longevity of Italian cabinets. We will also compare our Italian data on these questions with the record of the Fourth French Republic, a regime noted like Italy's for its short-lived cabinets and raucous multiparty system containing a large Communist element. The French regime is reputed to have collapsed in large part because of these weaknesses.

In Table I, Period I extends from the accession of DeGasperi in December 1945 to the fall of his last cabinet in August 1953; Period II, from the investiture of Pella (August 1953) to the resignation of the first Leone cabinet (November 1963); Period III, from the investiture of the first Center-Left coalition under Moro (December 1963) to the resignation of the Colombo cabinet in January 1972. Period IV (the Fourth French Republic) extends from the investiture of de Gaulle in September 1944 to his investiture of June 1958.

TABLE I
CABINET LONGEVITY IN ITALY AND FRANCE[1]

	ITALY			FRANCE
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*
Number of cabinets	8	11	8	27
Average life (months)	11.5	11	11.5	6.1
Number of men as Premier	1	7	4	18
Average crisis*	7	14	31	13

*Number of days between the resignation of one cabinet and the investiture of its successor.

While the average life span of Italian cabinets compares favorably with the record of the Fourth Republic, it is apparent that this span it not getting longer, but that crises are. These

[1]Data for Italian cabinets are derived from *Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana, 1961-1964* (Roma: Cinque Lune, 1965), pp. 994-995, and Milan's *Corriere della Sera*. French cabinet data are derived from Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise* (London: Longmans, Green, 1964), pp. 494-495.

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averages are not encouraging. Still, averages can be deceiving, as we shall now see.

Why such short-lived cabinets? Many believe that the principal cause is the presence of Western Europe's largest Communist parliamentary delegation; in a comprehensive survey of parliamentary systems, Michael Taylor and V. M. Herman have shown that "the proportion of seats held by anti-system parties was the best single indicator of governmental instability."[2] There are, however, other reasons for cabinet instability in Italy which should not be overlooked.

First of all, the Center-Left coalition (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans) contains a sort of built-in instability. The PSI (the "Nenni" Socialists), in danger of losing votes to the parties on its left, must push for more and more governmental intervention in the economy and more and more efforts at a redistribution of wealth, while maintaining an appropriately anti-clerical and anti-American rhetorical posture. The DC (Christian Democrats), on the other hand, has to protect itself from leakage on the right to the pro-business Liberals, and, to a lesser degree, the neo-Fascists. This tension will continue as long as the ruling coalition consists of an essentially centrist bloc flanked by enemies on the right and left, whether the PSI is in this coalition in the future or not.

Second, Italy's dominant party is the aggregative party par excellence, and hence quite prone to the effects of factionalism. Not only do well-organized interest groups compete for influence within the DC, but there are highly disciplined and long-lived *correnti* (internal factions), with their own leadership groups and even their own publications, which vigorously and successfully resist any attempts (such as those by Fanfani in the 1950's and by Moro in the 1960's) to impose discipline on the party as a whole. The principal reason for the fall of almost any cabinet since 1951 has been its loss of the support of one or another of the *correnti*, and this normally for reasons of internal factional advantage, never over questions of basic foreign and domestic policy commitments.[3]

Not only is the DC no monolith, but its natural tendencies toward factionalism are reinforced by the conviction of the party

[2]"Party Systems and Government Stability," *American Political Science Review*, March 1971, p. 37.

[3]Giorgio Galli, *Il Bipartitismo Imperfetto* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1966), Chapter IX. American newspapers, by concentrating on rhetoric rather than reality, rarely present the true reasons for the fall of any given cabinet.

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leaders that they have the time and space to play their factional games, because there is no alternative to a coalition dominated by the DC. If a cabinet falls, what of it? Its successor will resemble it to an extraordinary degree: the same parties, same faces, same policies. This attitude among Christian Democratic leaders is predicated on the assumption that the DC will continue to receive an electoral plurality, and that no coalition could be viable that did not contain it. We will consider these assumptions in a moment.

To repeat: averages can be misleading, especially on the question of cabinet instability. Of the twenty-seven cabinets in the years under consideration (1945-1972), fully two-thirds were headed by only four men (DeGasperi, Fanfani, Moro and Rumor). In this twenty-six-year time span, almost eight years went by with DeGasperi at the helm; Moro and Fanfani together held the premiership for another eight years. While, moreover, the longest-lived cabinet in the Fourth Republic was that of Mollet (sixteen months), in Italy the first Segni Government (1955-1957) lasted twenty-two months, the seventh DeGasperi (1951-1953), twenty-four months, and the third Moro (1966-1968), twenty-eight months. This last cabinet, most durable of the postwar period, held office during Period III.

Thus, the instability of cabinet government in Italy should not be overdramatized. Longevity is, after all, not the *summum bonum,* especially when one considers that every cabinet in Italy in nearly three decades has been headed by a Christian Democrat, has contained at least a majority of DC ministers, and has been committed to constitutional democracy, friendly relations with the Church, the furtherance of European integration, and adherence to the Atlantic Alliance.

II

Can the constant increase in the Communist Party's electoral strength also be put in a less alarming perspective? The Communist share of the vote has indeed grown impressively, from 19 per cent in 1946 to 27.2 per cent in 1972. There are a number of reasons for this growth, the chief one perhaps being that since 1948 the PCI has been by far the largest opposition party to the entrenched Christian Democrats. Historical, economic and technological factors also help to explain the expansion of the PCI from its already considerable base in the immediate postwar period. Among these, along with the belief on the part of many

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that the Italian Communists are "different," are the fact that some 90 per cent of the PCI's voters are illiterate or have had an elementary education at best,[4] and the disintegration in the early 1960's of the rightist Monarchists, many of whose adherents went from Right to Left as they went from South to North.

If we project into the future the 1946-1972 rate of increase of the PCI vote, we can expect the Communists to win a majority in Italy in the year 2043, a date when, presumably, nobody reading this article will be concerned one way or the other. Of course, it is the crudest error to project recent trends so far into the future. All available evidence indicates that the PCI is fast approaching its peak, and that this peak should be less than a third of the Italian electorate.

Significantly, it is not in the great and spreading cities, and among the growing urban working class, that the PCI has made its major gains. One of the most salient features of Italian political life is that *the Communists have failed to capture the industrial working class.* In the urban complexes of Rome, Milan, Naples and Turin, less than half of the working class votes for the PCI.[5] In the elections of 1958, mid-point in time between the fall of Mussolini and today, one authority estimates that only 38 per cent of the industrial workers voted Communist (with 26 per cent for the DC and 24 per cent for the Socialists).[6] While Communist strength continues to increase in all sections of the country, its progress in the industrial centers north of Rome between 1946 and 1963, the period of Italy's "Second Industrial Revolution," has not been impressive, as Table II shows.

TABLE II

COMMUNIST PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL CENTERS, 1946-1963[7]

Province	*1946*	*1963*
Genoa	27.5	28.3
Milano	22.7	23.0
Cremona	22.7	22.8
Turin	22.1	24.6
Livorno	45.3	43.7

[4]Mattei Dogan, "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, editors, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 168.

[5]Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), especially Chapters 9 and 10.

[6]Dogan, *op. cit.*, p. 137. See also Tarrow, *op.cit., passim.*

[7]Dogan, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

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It is, rather, in the South that the PCI has made most progress. "While the migratory movement pushed northward," writes Mattei Dogan, "Communism slipped southward; while the country became more and more urban, Communism became more and more rural."[8] The South is slowly modernizing, and age-old structural deformities are being corrected, with all the pains such procedures entail, but modern communications and political organization have made such pains more painful, and the PCI has reaped a harvest of votes in these pre-modern areas. From 1953 to 1968, the Communist percentage of the vote in backward Sicily was equal to or greater than its percentage in Lombardy. Between 1946 and 1963, when the PCI gained 3.4 million votes nationally, fully 1.99 million (58.5 per cent) of the new votes came from the South and the islands.[9]

One should expect further Communist gains in the South. There is, however, no reason to expect Communist strength in the southern provinces to approach that in the party's most redoubtable "Red Belt" regional stronghold, Emilia-Romagna, with its venerable revolutionary and anti-clerical traditions, its highly developed network of social and economic as well as political grassroots organizations, where local administration has been largely under Communist control for decades. Even with all these and other advantages, the PCI has never managed to attract anything like a majority of the Emilian voters. Since the South lacks the conditions prevailing in the Red Belt, we may feel some safety in predicting that the Communist vote should peak at considerably less than 40 per cent of the total, if it goes that high. Eventually the expanding Communist vote is bound to bump against the stone wall of groups not susceptible to PCI blandishments: Catholics, bourgeoisie, small-holders, libertarians, social democrats, rightists, skeptics.

However, even if the PCI should attain a third or more of the national vote some time in the 1980's, even if it should advance to 40 per cent or more, what would happen to so swollen a Communist Party? It would have to combine within its ranks large elements of the middle classes along with workers, peasants and intellectuals exhibiting profound regional differences. Is it conceivable that a Communist Party of such size and composition would be able to insist upon centralized discipline and doctrinal

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[9] V. Capecchi, *et al.*, *Il Comportamento Elettorale in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968), pp. 349-353.

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unity, and still avoid schism? If it could not reasonably hope to do both, what would become of the Communist "peril?" The tremendous doctrinal and tactical strains involved in attracting and holding the vote of the Turin factory worker, the Emilian landless day laborer, and the Calabrian small peasant, have already produced a Communist Party that would appall Lenin.[10]

Besides, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there are a number of Italians who vote Communist without wishing the PCI ever to come to power, especially in light of the fact that as the PCI vote grows larger, PCI membership gets smaller. Might not some of these protest voters, confronted with a Communist Party approaching within range of an electoral majority (or even a plurality), begin to cast their votes to some other party, or stay home? Certainly the leaders of the PCI do not expect to obtain even a plurality in the foreseeable future; how else explain their extraordinary efforts, in season and out, to maintain and increase their vote however marginally and to insulate their membership against any contact with the outside world, and their insistent demands after every election that they be admitted *now* to a coalition dominated by their enemies?

Actually, it is not Communist gains but overall stability which is the most striking aspect of Italian electoral behavior. Consider the vote of the anti-constitutional Left: in 1919 the Socialists received 34.3 per cent of the vote; in 1948 the Popular Front got 31.0 per cent; in 1972 the PCI and its allies polled 29.1 per cent. That is, a half-century has produced a change of five percentage points (and that in a negative direction) in the proportion of votes garnered by the alienated Left. Table III presents the percentages received by the Left, the DC, and the Right over the past quarter-century.

TABLE III

PERCENTAGES OF POPULAR VOTE BY BLOC, 1946-1972

	1946	*1963*	*1968*	*1972*
*Left	44.1	46.6	47.9	46.7
DC	35.2	38.3	39.1	38.8
**Right	14.9	13.8	11.6	12.6

*Communists, Social Proletarians, Socialists, Social Democrats, Republicans
**Liberals, Monarchists, Neo-Fascists (MSI)
Source: Dogan, *op. cit.*, and figures published in *Corriere della Sera.*

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 334-343.

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It should be noted that the term "Left" includes the *democratic* Left as well as the Communists, that a majority of the rightist vote went to constitutional parties in both 1963 and 1968, and that the single biggest change from 1946 to 1972 has been the increase in the vote of the Christian Democrats.

Table IV shows another aspect of electoral stability: the enduring strength of Christian Democracy in its traditional strongholds in the vote-rich North, in four national elections (including the first postwar and the most recent) and the regional elections of 1970.

TABLE IV

DC PERCENTAGES IN NORTHERN REGIONS, 1946-1972

	1946	*1963*	*1968*	*1970*	*1972*
Piedmont	35.2	36.0	36.7	36.7	36.6
Veneto	49.6	52.7	52.9	51.9	53.4
Lombardy	38.6	39.8	41.8	40.9	41.8

Source: Capecchi, *op. cit.*, and *Italy: Documents and Notes* (Rome: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, July-October 1970).

In light of these figures, it would seem rash for anyone to predict a dramatic drop in DC voting strength in the foreseeable future, at least in those populous and devoutly Catholic regions on which the DC plurality rests. (In 1963, 1968 and 1972 more DC ballots were cast in Lombardy than in all of Sicily, Sardinia, Calabria and Basilicata combined.) The Northern vote, added to a normal (or even decreased) DC turnout in the rest of the country, will keep the Christian Democrats in the position of largest party for a long time.[11]

III

One of the most extraordinary characteristics of this electoral stability is that political behavior in Italy somehow seems resistant or even immune to the influence of international events. Certainly the world of the early 1970's is profoundly different from that of the 1940's, but this fact appears to have had little effect on Italians, at least on election day.

Many Italians are aware, of course, of the great international events of the day, and they do react to them, but the prevailing

[11]Communist gains have come less at the expense of the DC than of the anti-democratic Right. See Dogan, *op.cit.*, p. 191; Capecchi, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

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mode of reaction is to interpret international happenings in such a way as to reinforce one's already firmly held convictions or behavior patterns, which it would be too inconvenient to break. (Obviously, this phenomenon is by no means peculiar to the Italians.) When we note how deeply the two principal parties have penetrated even the lower levels of Italian society, with party newspapers, magazines, sports clubs, union halls and teen-age auxiliaries, it is not hard to imagine how all political events, but especially those originating outside the Italian arena, must inevitably be filtered and refined by the party network extending from Rome to the grassroots, so that they provide not a stumbling block to the faithful but merely more proof of the overall correctness of the party's world view.

Consider the Communists. If the above brief analysis is incorrect, certainly the sights and sounds of the events of Budapest and Prague might have been expected to produce a significant falling off of Communist electoral support. This has not happened. We must therefore assume that the PCI can take international events, however gloomy or embarrassing, is its stride. In fact, one might hypothesize that a "Prague" is really good for the Italian Communist Party. It winnows out the chaff, serves to further the psychological isolation of millions of Communists from their fellow citizens, and provides a test of faith which, once experienced, must render every succeeding trial less difficult. The slogan of Italian communism in its relation to the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China might most appropriately be: "I am appalled, therefore I believe."

IV

If the PCI cannot gain power through the ballot box, what about a coalition? Would the other Left parties in Italy be able to deny participation in the government to a Communist Party that received a third of the vote, was already in power in many local jurisdictions, and promised good behavior? The answer is yes, they would.

Assuming that the PCI vote stabilized at around 33 per cent of the total in the early 1980's, the minimum coalition necessary to produce a majority in the Chamber of Deputies would have to include the Communists and *all* the parties to the left of the DC: Social Proletarians, Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans. If any of these segments were unable or unwilling to join such a coalition (or disappeared, as the Social Proletarians seem about to

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do), elements of the DC would have to be detached from their party to help complete the collective majority. But let us entertain for the moment only the possibility of a coalition of the classic anti-clerical Left, from Communists to Republicans, inclusive.

To begin with, the Social Democrats would not join. This is the party that came into existence in 1947 (and was reborn in 1969) on the principle of absolutely no cooperation with the Communists; the only justification for its continued existence (and the record of its leaders) is adherence to the proposition that the PCI is intrinsically unfit to participate in governing a democratic republic. For the Social Democrats to join any coalition including the Communists would be a repudiation of their ideological position, present and past; it would be moral and political suicide. Their vital 5-6 per cent of the vote will not be added to any coalition that includes the PCI.

As to the Republicans, both they and anyone familiar with their traditions, leadership and ideology would greet with incredulous laughter a suggestion that because their party is on the left, it is therefore a potential partner in a coalition dominated by the weight and discipline of the Communists.

Then bear in mind what entering into a coalition government with the Communists would mean to the mainstream Socialists (PSI). First, they would be admitting by implication that the entire course of their party since the 1953 break with the Communists was erroneous, that for decades the leaders and followers of the PSI had lost their ideological bearings and had "betrayed the workers." Second, justification for the continued independent existence of the Socialist Party would evaporate once it had found the PCI pure enough to participate in power; the Socialists would be branded as less zealous in advocating the cause of the "workers" than their newly-sanitized Communist competitors. As the Socialists discovered in the late 1940's, close cooperation between them and the larger, richer, more disciplined, more "glamorous" and more sanguine Communist Party could be suicidal.

There remains the DC. Could it leap across its fractious socialist allies of various hues and deal directly with the PCI, making an *apertura* to end all *aperturas*? Yes — if those labor leaders, farm spokesmen, prelates, politicians and intellectuals who make up the left wing of the Christian Democratic conglomeration decide that such a maneuver is necessary and safe; if they are willing to repudiate their long-time Social Democratic allies and are able to convince the great center of their party to go along with them.

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Surely it is not necessary to enumerate all the gigantic obstacles to such an undertaking. We might remind ourselves, moreover, that the Italian Christian Democrats know all about what happened to the Catholic Church, to Catholic education, trade unions and peasant leagues in those European countries which fell under communism. They know about Budapest 1956 and Prague 1968; they grasp the implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine. They were not born yesterday. They have not been waging an eyeball-to-eyeball struggle with communism in Italy for thirty years without learning something of their opponents. In talking about the possibilities of a Catholic-Communist coalition, one is therefore not talking about the clever Communist fox gobbling up the fatuous Catholic hen. Besides, what argument could be used by the DC left wing to justify the entrance of the Communists into the cabinet when the parties to the DC's left oppose such a move?

We can sum up the prospects of a DC-PCI coalition by saying that it can come about if and when the Italian Communists have become something quite different from communists as that term is usually understood in the DC and the Vatican (and in the U.S.A.). Meanwhile, there will continue to be a lot of talk about such a coalition, a lot of "dialogue"; such talk serves many purposes, not least of which is acting as a substitute for the Sisyphean task of creating that coalition.

V

We have been concerned in this article with what are generally advanced to be the two main indicators of profound political instability in Italian politics: frequent changes of prime minister and cabinet, and the steady growth and potential access to power of the Communist Party.

With respect to the first indicator, we are forced to conclude that stability is in the eye of the beholder. If stability means that one man remains at the head of a cabinet for several years as the normal situation, Italy is quite unstable in this important regard. If, however, we define cabinet instability to be relevant only when, and insofar as, frequent changes of prime minister lead to frequent changes in broad policy objectives and implementation, the phenomenon of short-lived cabinets is not an indicator of disturbing instability in the Italian context. We have seen, moreover, that in postwar Italy three men alone (DeGasperi, Fanfani and Moro) held the premiership for sixteen years, equaling the presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.

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As for the Communists' chances of winning a share in the government through the ballot box, there are cogent reasons for doubting that they will obtain even a plurality of the vote. This conclusion is based on an examination of past and current behavior for clues to future behavior, a tricky business. Where else is one to look, however, except at the record, and the record has said clearly and repeatedly (as lately as May 1972) that the growth rate of Communist electoral power is considerably less than alarming.

In regarding the possibility of the Communists entering into a majority coalition through the side door we are on more dangerous, less predictable, ground. To argue that because other Italian parties have refused to admit the Communists to the cabinet in the past, they will continue to do so in the future, is patently untenable. But if the factors which prevented such an admission in the past continue to be operative in the future (and reasons have been advanced to substantiate the belief that they will), logic demands assent to the proposition that the sudden reversal of the behavior patterns of over two decades is unlikely.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE SINO-AMERICAN DETENTE*

by T. C. Rhee

NO matter how uncertain and vague the new phase in Asian diplomacy may seem for the moment, President Nixon's China visit signified the end of an era and the beginning of another.

How do we appraise the events surrounding this diplomatic revolution, particularly in light of the inflamed and "irreconcilable" differences between China and the United States for over two decades? There are a myriad of examples of seemingly insurmountable disputes, conflicts and misunderstandings in the way of a reconciliation. However, if the overall record of Sino-American relations since the 1940's stands as a long dismal story, it was not bereft of momentary glimmers of hope. The short-lived euphorics of Stilwell's period, the politically charged atmosphere of the "Dixie Mission," the hopeful expectations born of the Marshall Mission, the brief but highly significant "roundtable discussions" of Dean Acheson's State Department after the communist victory in mainland China and before the Korean War, the political contacts at Geneva and other tell-tale signals from Peking in the 1950's — these are all but forgotten. But taking a second look at them, they were not the pages of a closed book; the opportunity for renewed relations was always present.[1]

In the immediate past, subtly hidden beneath the façade of persistent hostility and the madness of the Cultural Revolution, one could discern important changes in Chinese attitudes that portended a tide of mellowing. First and foremost, the ominous escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Ussuri border clashes implied inevitable changes in Peking's policy and a resultant realignment in Sino-American relations. Second, Peking's fre-

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[1]In a fierce Cold War atmosphere certain important revelations regarding the Chinese communists were easily ignored and soon forgotten. See, among others, Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953) Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962).

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quent and increasing attacks on Japan's emerging "militarism" and economic and political influences in Asia coincided with parallel disputes between Washington and Tokyo. Third, the various signs of a relaxed domestic atmosphere in China since the Ninth National Party Congress, and an apparent restructuring of national priorities, were soon reflected in Peking's policy positions. Fourth, the well-timed release of foreign prisoners and other notable changes in propaganda clarified China's willingness to improve relations with the outside powers. Fifth, well-spaced quips of good will and friendly gestures toward the United States, planted strategically among foreign visitors, gradually accomplished the necessary groundwork for an eventual diplomatic contact. Last, but not least important, the rapid resumption of diplomatic ties disrupted by the Cultural Revolution, and Peking's discernible desire to establish new diplomatic accords — on conditions far more flexible and less dogmatic than the years of revolutionary polemics had led us to believe would be possible — finally convinced other governments, including Washington, of China's "sincere" desire for accommodation.

Whether these initial developments, the subsequent visits to Peking of President Nixon in February and Dr. Kissinger in June, and the talks in Paris between Ambassadors Watson and Huang, will ultimately lead to a successful *détente* and/or entente between China and the United States is yet to be seen. The degree of accord will undoubtedly depend on other primary considerations, such as the evolving content of Soviet-American, Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-American relations, and to a minor extent the situation with regard to India, the Middle East and Western Europe. Should there indeed be a rapprochement between the two, what are the fundamental bases for this epoch-making *volte face*?

Admittedly there are stark contradictions in China's behavior — between her avowed goals expressed in ideological dogmas of Marxism-Leninism (the "aspirational" aspect) and her actual conduct geared toward promoting national interest through the more traditional instrument of power politics (the "operational" aspect).[2] Confronted with this duality, we in the West have been constantly puzzled by questions about the nature, motivation and consistency of China's foreign policy. For a brief analysis, however,

[2]See Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); for contrast see Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War" (Peking, 1965).

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one can safely make the following assumptions: (1) Whenever China is challenged by acute threats to her national existence, she will most certainly opt for policies of national interest at the expense of ideology. (2) The immutability of geographical factors plus historical experiences will assure the basic consistency and continuity of her responses to adverse outside pressures.

In addition, the contents of the Shanghai communiqué issued at the end of the Nixon visit, and recent evidence of other Chinese attitudes, reveal some key indicators: (1) the defensive nature of Peking's foreign policy, including nonimplementation of the much touted "wars of national liberation"; (2) disavowal of the exaggerated and distorted "irrationality" of Chinese views on nuclear warfare, and hence the possibility of multilateral agreement on general arms control and disarmament; (3) peaceful solution of the Taiwan question and probable restraint on North Viet Nam and North Korea; and (4) the qualified and lowered nature of anti-American propaganda.[3]

II

Peking's basic policy considerations hinge to an important degree on the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States and Japan, i.e., relations among themselves and toward China. Japan's evolving posture — already fairly well defined as far as China is concerned — clearly has a vital impact on Peking's actions.[4] Renascent Japanese power is fast becoming a serious matter

[3]See Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1963); T. C. Rhee, "The Concept of the Rural Guerrilla in the Chinese Communist Military Philosophy," *World Survey,* November 1970, pp. 11-20. For a different view see Franz Michael, "Is China Expansionist?: A Design for Aggression," *Problems of Communism,* January-April 1971, pp. 62-68.

As reported originally in *Avanti,* the Italian Socialist Party daily, in November 1971, in a conversation with Pietro Nenni, Chou En-Lai stated (1) China's willingness to agree to nuclear disarmament "under certain [unspecified] conditions"; (2) China's wish to see Japan neutralized; and (3) the local [self-help] formula for revolutionary movements without China's active assistance. *Dong-A Ilbo* (Seoul), November 23, 1971.

Besides subscribing to the Shanghai communiqué and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Peking abnegates the use of force on Taiwan due primarily to the gradually deteriorating central control of the KMT government on the island. The increasing flight of Taiwanese capital overseas, the political unrest among the youth and the intelligentsia, and the demoralization during recent months are important signs to watch in the near future. There is even a possibility of internal disintegration, against which even the most optimistic economic factors could not be foolproof insurance. See "Taiwanese Students Poll the People," *New York Times,* February 20, 1972; Richard Halloran, "Ex-Agent Sees 'Revolutionary Potential' on Taiwan," *ibid.,* March 12, 1972: Donald Kirk, "Nixon's China Trip Hits Taiwan's Economy," *Chicago Tribune,* January 16, 1972.

[4]See T. C. Rhee, "The United States, China and Japan in a Post-Vietnam Era," *The University of Dayton Review,* Winter 1969, pp. 3-16; James Reston's interview

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to the Chinese, in the long-range perspective more threatening to their interests than the immediate perils posed by the other two powers, whose stakes in Asia are less vital.

At least for the near future, Moscow's role would seem to be predominantly Europe-oriented; the evolution of the Warsaw Pact nations, the German question, the reforming Common Market and the expected European Security Conference will occupy the Soviets' main attention. Additionally, Soviet commitments in the Middle East, compounded by anxieties in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the adjacent areas, will force Kremlin concentration away from the Asian continent. If possible, Moscow will maintain a low profile vis-à-vis China and may attempt even a minor accommodation with Peking.[5]

The recent treaty banning biological weapons, the Berlin agreement, the agreement to improve the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, the procedures to prevent accidental wars, and possible Soviet-American cooperation in a space program — not to mention Nixon's Moscow visit — are all strong indications of Moscow's determination to improve the European situation for the sake of ultimately improving the USSR's global position, especially in Asia. Again, the extensive travel schedules of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny have undoubtedly been designed to minimize or offset potential damages to the Soviet position arising from Nixon's visit to China. Particularly interesting in this regard are: (1) the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation including military clauses; (2) a similar agreement with India preceding the Indo-Pakistani conflict; (3) the Soviet treaty with Iraq; (4) Moscow's extensive interest shown in the birth of Bangladesh; (5) Brezhnev's general agreement with Pompidou; (6) the Brezhnev-Tito Belgrade Declaration, reversing Moscow's earlier stand on the "limited sovereignty" of the socialist countries (the Brezhnev Doctrine); and (7) Moscow's recently stated desire for a reconciliation with Rumania.[6]

with Chou En-lai, *New York Times,* August 10, 1971; Koji Nakamura, "The Dispensable Ally," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* August 28, 1971, pp. 21-22.

[5]Some interesting shifts in Soviet anti-China propaganda are noticeable in recent months — from the vitriolic tone of last year to a moderated desire for accommodation. See "Soviet-Chinese Relations: Supporters and Opponents of Their Improvement (A Discussion of O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *Soviet-Chinese Relations,* 1945-1970: *Brief Essays,* Moscow, 1971)," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* September 14, 1971, pp. 10-11; and Brezhnev's speech at the Trade Union Congress on March 20, 1972, *New York Times,* March 26, 1972.

[6]Hedrick Smith, "Moscow, in a Shift, Seeks Better Ties with Rumania," *New York Times,* March 2, 1972. For a report (from *Der Spiegel,* March 6, 1972) that there was an agreement between Rumania and China, whereby the latter offered to

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A similar evolution should be expected in the United States' role in the Pacific region. The bitter experiences in Viet Nam, which might still undo the accommodations so far achieved with Peking, disrupted relations with Japan, potential disequilibrium in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area, uncertain and potentially serious difficulties in the Western Hemisphere, and most of all growing domestic discontent,[7] will gradually but assuredly erode the American presence in Asia. Even apart from American intentions in Asia, Washington will find it increasingly difficult to maintain a high level of influence.[8]

For China, however, a rapid and crucial metamorphosis in the Asian power balance would be a cause of anxiety. Contrary to the generally accepted notion, the import of recent developments suggests that the Nixon Doctrine will, at least in the shortrange, undermine the Chinese national interest rather than be a source of comfort. Notwithstanding Peking's repeated accusations against America's role in Asia since the 1940's, China of late has come to appreciate the enormous "balancing" value of the residual presence of the United States in the region, irreplaceable until the Chinese possess an effective nuclear capability and have made greater progress in economic growth.[9]

In the developing polycentric political situation marked by the spectacular emergence of Japan as a "superpower," the disrupted balance in the subcontinent wrought by reinvigorated Indian power, increasing difficulties with North Viet Nam and Moscow's

supply nuclear weapons to the former in case of war with Moscow; and for the reported July 1971 military plot in Rumania in reaction to the above agreement, see *Dong-A Ilbo,* March 7, 1972.

President Anwar Sadat's sudden ouster of Soviet military personnel from Egypt may not have radically altered the basic meaning of the Soviet-Egyptian agreement. For a somewhat different interpretation, see Edward R. F. Sheehan, "Why Sadat Packed Off the Russians," *New York Times Magazine,* August 6, 1972, pp. 10-11, 39-43, 51-54.

[7]In the long run, the growing mood of black rebelliousness in the United States could lead to a major debility in U.S. foreign policy. For Peking's earlier position on the American racial problem, see Yuan-li Wu, *As Peking Sees Us: 'People's War' in the United States and Communist China's American Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

[8]Various difficulties with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, India and others will eventually narrow the available U.S. options. Japan's accelerated diplomatic moves toward Moscow, Pyongyang, Hanoi, Dacca and New Delhi will certainly be a serious concern for the United States and China. See Rhee: "The United States, China and Japan. . .," *op. cit.;* "Sino-Soviet Military Conflict and the Global Balance of Power," *The World Today,* January 1970, pp. 29-37; "Japan: Same Bed, Different Dreams," *Interplay,* August 1970, pp. 4-10; "Japan and the Soviet Union," *World Affairs,* December 1970, pp. 240-256; "Japan: 'Security' and 'Militarism'," *The World Today,* September 1971, pp. 390-400.

[9]See Alice Langley Hsieh, "China's Nuclear-Missile Programme: Regional or Intercontinental?," *The China Quarterly,* January-March 1971, pp. 85-99; Helmut

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renewed hold on Hanoi, American withdrawal in any form or disguise could ironically cause serious damage to China's general position in East Asia. To the degree that the American presence in Asia is lowered, the Soviet Union, Japan and India (in conjunction with Moscow) will gain increased leverage to effect an Asian balance unfavorable for China as well as the United States. Exploitation of this change by Moscow and Tokyo would in turn have a disastrous impact on the sensitive questions of Taiwan, Korea, Southeast and South Asia.[10]

Under these circumstances, if Peking continued its militant support of Hanoi[11] and Pyongyang, accompanied by largely unmitigated pressures against the other governments, nations on China's periphery traditionally dependent on American security guarantees would have little viable alternative but to increase their reliance on Japan and the Soviet Union to the point of partial or total loss of independence. The Japanese, given the present structure and character of the conservative leadership (both economic and political),[12] would thoroughly exploit any

Martin, "China's Bomb and the Balance of Power," *Hannoversche Allgemeine,* January 25, 1972, in *The German Tribune,* February 10, 1972.

Recent visitors to China (French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, U.S. Representatives Hale Boggs and Gerald Ford) have reported that Peking is greatly worried about the American withdrawal from the Pacific region — an indication of China's apprehension over the Nixon Doctrine. See *New York Times,* July 9, 1972; "Chinese Disown Chou Statement as Related by Boggs and Ford," *ibid.,* July 18, 1972; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. "The Peking Factor in the November Elections," *The Journal Herald* (Dayton), August 2, 1972; Peter Scholl-Latour, "China fears U.S. withdrawal from Asia," *Deutsche Zeitung,* July 21, 1972, reprinted in *The German Tribune,* August 3, 1972.

[10]See Tad Szulc, "Japan Rejected U.S. Plea on Hanoi," *New York Times,* February 25, 1972; "Premier to Invite Mujib Here," *Japan Times,* March 10, 1972. The dispatch of a high-level Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) delegation, led by Hayakawa Takashi, to Bangladesh, India and Nepal should be noted. See also "Japanese Reactionaries' Aggression and Expansion in South Korea," *Peking Review,* December 10, 1971, pp. 25-26; Tillman Durdin, "China Denounces Japan on Taiwan," *New York Times,* March 12, 1972.

[11]Hanoi remains highly suspicious of the developing ties between Peking and Washington, and presently leans more heavily on Moscow and Tokyo for "counterweight."

[12]The LDP's draft for constitutional amendments is indicative of the regime's basic character and intentions, in both domestic and external policies. The most significant of the proposed amendments would (1) change the Emperor's legal status, so that he would have a position somewhat similar to the one enjoyed under the Meiji Constitution; (2) revise Article 9 so as to give the Self-Defense Forces a constitutional status and give Japan "the right to belligerency"; (3) change the Diet from a bicameral to a unicameral system; (4) permit a suspension of civil liberties and freedom in order to protect the "public welfare"; and (5) change the family system by adopting the basic principles of the Meiji Constitution. See *Dong-A Ilbo,* October 21, 1971; Richard Halloran, "Japanese Weigh 'Charter Revision': Party Studying Constitution Imposed by MacArthur," *New York Times,* October 31, 1971; Rhee, "Japan: 'Security' and 'Militarism'," *op.cit.*

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opportunity for national gains offered by China's continued hostility and/or ill-defined posture toward smaller Asian nations. The Soviet Union would probably do the same. For this reason, eventually and possibly in the near future, China can be expected to re-evaluate her position and accordingly de-escalate her high-pressure tactics in favor of greater accommodation with the neighboring nations.

Peking's awareness of this danger is indicated in its relaxed attitude toward Thailand, the Philippines, and the Indochina war itself, if not yet toward South Korea. However, even in Korea the continuing Red Cross contacts between North and South and the apparently rapidly changing North Korean position signify the shifting attitude of the Chinese regime. Peking's decision to join the Panmunjom talks and the tone of the Shanghai communiqué concerning the presence of American forces in South Korea seem to corroborate this shift in China's stance on the Korean question.[13]

However, should Japan's penetration into these areas come to pass either through China's misjudgment or tardiness in readjustment and a continued failure in restructuring Japanese-American relations, or other presently unforeseen causes, the new Asian situation would not only be extremely damaging to the Chinese and to other Asian nations in the long run, but also to U.S. interests in the entire Pacific region.[14]

III

One immediate and unmistakable result of Japanese penetra-

[13]The recent visit of a Philippine delegation was a significant move for China. Although Thailand's position since the military takeover is not clear, Peking is known to have expressed a desire to achieve diplomatic ties with Bangkok. (See "China Ready for Normalization Talk with Thailand," *Dong-A Ilbo,* November 15, 1971.) Concerning North Korea, it is interesting to note the parallel development of increasing Japanese ties with Pyongyang and the latter's diplomatic overtures both to the United States and to South Korea. (See *ibid.,* January 22, 24, 1972.) Apparently as a part of her initiative toward Washington, several American journalists have been invited to Pyongyang — Selig Harrison of the *Washington Post,* Harrison Salisbury and John M. Lee of the *New York Times,* and others from television networks. See *Yomiuri Shimbun,* March 24, 1972, and *Washington Post,* March 25, 1972.

[14]See "The Danger of Japanese Imperialism's Policies of Aggression and Expansion in Asia," *Peking Review,* September 10, 1971, pp. 14-16; "Japanese Reactionaries Step Up Economic Expansion in Taiwan," *ibid.,* September 17, 1971, p. 11; the Japanese Foreign Ministry's composite report on this question, *Dong-A Ilbo,* September 16, 1971; Tokyo University Professor Eto Shinkichi's concern about Japan's policy of political as well as economic influence (or ambition) in Asia, *ibid.,* January 5, 1972; "Japan's 'Two China Policy' and Increasing Trade and Investment," *ibid.,* November 14, 1971. For Walter Lippmann's remarks on Japan, see *Washington Post,* October 10, 1971. For André Malraux's interesting comments in a similar vein, see *New York Times Magazine,* August 6, 1972, p. 56.

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tion and entrenchment in Asia would be the serious aggravation of Asian problems.[15] Some worrisome problems could arise in Korea as well as in Viet Nam, especially after the American withdrawal.[16] Most serious of all, the Taiwan problem might be so complicated because of Japan's consolidated presence that it would become immeasurably more difficult for China to bring the island under its jurisdiction — especially if the American influence counterbalancing Japan were dissipated due to a premature American pullout. This possibility is even greater in light of the series of diplomatic defeats suffered by Taiwan. The fundamental difference between Japan's interest in Taiwan and that of the United States could inflame the crisis to a level unknown since 1945.

The Taiwan problem will be magnified if the island becomes a *de facto* Japanese sphere of influence or colony in the economic, if not political, sense. Trends in Tokyo's economic and political policies under Sato have not been reassuring on this count. Japan's continuing inability or aversion to take a stand on the controversial "Yoshida Letter," Sato-Fukuda's ambivalent China policy, the potentially disruptive ultra-right-wing influences of Kishi and his supporters in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the calculating and equivocal reactions of Japanese financial circles toward China, and other distractions such as the evolving Siberian deal and the treaty with Outer Mongolia, all have pointed to her obvious reluctance to resolve differences with Peking and to the somewhat unclear motives behind her policies in Asia.[17]

[15]Increasing speculation on the neutralization of Southeast Asia is indicated in "Chou: Interested in Plan to Neutralize Southeast Asia," *Dong-A Ilbo,* May 19, 1971; Lothar Ruehl, "U.S. and China may be trying to neutralise Indo-China," *Die Welt,* March 13, 1972, reprinted in *The German Tribune,* March 23, 1972. Also note in this regard Marshall Green's statements after the China visit, in the *New York Times,* February 29, 1972.

[16]On South Korea's reported assurances to China regarding a nonmilitary alliance with Tokyo, see Hedley Burrell's article in the *Washington Post,* September 1, 1971, and the *New York Times,* September 2, 1971. For Japan's increasing military ties with Seoul, see *Dong-A Ilbo,* May 31, 1971.

[17]The LDP government's attitude regarding the "Letter" has been one of constantly shifting ambiguity. Although Sato's cabinet often denied the Letter's validity, actual policies indicated otherwise. The Tanaka cabinet's approach seems to be clearer since the statements of nullification usually come from higher authorities and are therefore more credible. However, Tanaka's tenuous position at the head of the LDP and lingering opposition from powerful pro-Taiwan elements — both economic and political — seem so far to have prevented him from making a clean break. On the other hand, his own ambassador's activities in Taipei and other signs indicate that the new cabinet may not, after all, modify the position radically in the near future. The likely development could be the continuation of Sato's policies without formal subscription to the Letter. (See, for instance, "Japan Is Assuring

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The advent of Tanaka Kakuei's new cabinet in Japan cannot bring immediate or radical changes in Sato's basic stance for several reasons. First, Tanaka's election as the new LDP president, and hence as the new Prime Minister, did not gain support from all of the party's important factions, but was achieved largely through factional maneuvers and by a precariously slim margin. His cabinet is not a broad-based coalition, for the potent political force under the control of Sato and Fukuda remains largely on the outside. Without this faction's active support for major policy decisions, Tanaka will be severely handicapped in carrying out any flexible or radically different initiatives on important problems. The Taiwan problem is an extremely sensitive issue for Sato, Fukuda and Kishi, and any fundamental concessions on this to Peking could produce tensions and disunity in the party.

Second, Tanaka's seemingly "outgoing" style might not lead to a policy substantially different from Sato's. Despite the recent publicity surrounding his rise to power, his differences with Sato and Fukuda may be more apparent than real. After all, Tanaka had been a loyal member of Sato's faction since the mid-1960's. Third, Tanaka's election was assured virtually at the last minute by the shifting positions of the Nakasone, Ohira and Miki factions, whose views will no doubt be decisive in the new cabinet's various moves and may be close to those of Sato-Fukuda. Under these circumstances, Tanaka's visit to China in September is unlikely to produce significant results.[18]

Other considerations must be borne in mind in analyzing the apparently warming relations between Peking and Tokyo. On Japan's side, the primary objective can be nothing more than securing tactical gains without fundamentally altering the existing framework: by making gestures to improve ties with Peking, Tokyo might be looking for additional negotiating strength vis-à-vis Moscow on pending issues such as the Kuriles and the "peace treaty," and might at the same time hope to force a series of valuable concessions from the United States on major issues. From Peking's perspective, better relations with Tokyo could forestall a

Taiwan on Trade: Envoy Seeks to Ease Fears of Many Businessmen," *New York Times,* August 20, 1972.) Henry Kissinger's June and August visits to Tokyo were part of America's attempt to ascertain Japan's future position on Taipei. See also *Dong-A Ilbo,* March 31, 1972.

For Kishi's imperialistic philosophy, see Dan Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun* (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1960). For some of the mysterious activities of Kazuo Yasuki, a leading member of Kishi's group, see *Dong-A Ilbo,* July 29, 1972.

[18]"The Beginning of Tanaka Era in Japan," *Dong-A Ilbo,* July 6, 1972.

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Soviet effort to add Japan to India and Bangladesh in an arc of protective shields against China—part of Brezhnev's Asian security design.[19]

There could be several explanations for Japan's ambivalence. First, the Japanese government realizes that numerous hurdles must be surmounted in cultivating closer ties with the Chinese and sees no immediate or even remote value in making the required efforts. Second, even were the difficulties overcome, Tokyo feels that, due to the Chinese emphasis on economic "self-sufficiency," it could not expect a profitable expansion of trade comparable in volume to that of other international markets on the Chinese mainland. Third, the LDP regime might feel that the political price for an accommodation with Peking could become an irritant in relations with the Soviet Union, and as a result detrimental to Japan's overall interest in Asia. In addition, the psychological bent of the present leadership, reflecting a strong sense of pride in Japan's recent successes and future ambitions in Asia, may not countenance such a turn of events. Hence, despite the anxious public moods at variance with the views of the governing group, Tokyo might continue to place main emphasis for the foreseeable future on Taiwan (armed with a subtle "One China, One Taiwan" policy),[20] Southeast Asia (exploring the possibility of cooperation even with North Viet Nam), India, and on a major political accord with the Soviet Union— as shown recently in the talks on Siberia, the Kuriles and the treaty with Outer Mongolia. In view of the sensitive situation in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Outer Mongolia is an important indication of Japan's deliberate ambivalence, helping neither her relations with China nor those with the United States.

The Taiwan question could be a thorny issue apart from the context of Peking-Washington relations. As long as an acceptable solution is not found and present conditions persist, two adverse effects are portended: (1) increased opportunities for Japan's heightened influence; (2) the not-too-remote possibility of a Soviet-Taipei accord supporting an anti-Peking stance. In either case, depending on the trend of Taipei-Washington relations, the

[19]Stung by Sino-Japanese moves toward the early establishment of relations, Moscow is reportedly trying to schedule high-level meetings with Japan as soon as possible. *Ibid.*, July 24, 1972. See also "Nippon Air Visit Is Hailed in China," *New York Times*, August 20, 1972.

[20]A certain contradiction in Japan's position can be detected in the recent activities of her ambassador to Taiwan. See "Japan Is Assuring Taiwan on Trade," *op. cit.* This position is not wholly in accord with oft-stated Japanese governmental views on the Yoshida Letter and Chou En-lai's Four Principles of Trade.

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Taiwan problem would be a serious impediment to Asian peace. It would also signify a kind of stalemate preferable to Japan, provided the ruling Japanese conservatives plan no fundamental political settlement of continuing difficulties with China and the United States, and seek other avenues for attaining a new Asian role. Japan's influence over Taiwan seems already irreversible, notwithstanding Tokyo's altered political rhetoric — allusions to the annulment of the "Yoshida Letter" and a somewhat dubious endorsement of the contents of the Shanghai communiqué on Taiwan's legal status.

In actuality, Japan appears to be in no hurry to follow the path of the United States, Britain and others vis-à-vis China. This reluctance is quietly acquiesced in and abetted by the re-emerging imperial wing of the ruling LDP (the Kishi-Sato-Fukuda circle). The latest demonstration of intent from Sato's wing was the well-publicized disciplinary proceeding taken by the LDP against Fujiyama Aiichiro, a leading member of the left-wing faction and an old China hand, long committed to the activities of the memorandum trade with the mainland. This party action, tantamount to a purge, reflected the regime's intense displeasure, not particularly directed against Fujiyama as a person but against the policies he represents. The strong indications are that Tanaka's immediate objective might not be *détente* with Peking, even if the Chinese are serious in their approaches to Tokyo, but a continuation of historical ties with Taiwan in some altered form, less provocative and under various subterfuges.

Sato's own preference, stated in his Sapporo speech, seemed to be *détente* with the Soviet Union on the Kuriles, Siberia and related issues. It is not yet certain whether Tanaka will entirely forgo Sato's formula, which remains valid given the great-power relations in East Asia. Japan's diplomatic ties with Outer Mongolia, the most pliable of the Soviet "satellites" — negotiated in Moscow at the Soviets' behest — suggests a pro-Soviet orientation. One of the leading proponents of pro-Soviet policy in Japan, former Agriculture Minister Agaki, has said "[We] should establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union [instead] of dancing to the U.S.A.'s tune."[21] Meanwhile, Japan seems determined to expand its interests in Taiwan — a menacing possibility to an enduring Asian peace. That the Shanghai com-

[21] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* September 28, 1971, p. 19. See also Alan Sanders, "Mongolia, Tokyo Tie-Up," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 11, 1972, pp. 16-18.

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muniqué took note of this could be assumed: the American withdrawal from the island would be of measured speed and wholly dependent on Japan's attitude and, to a degree, Moscow's future moves in the area.

Similarly, the gradual withdrawal of the American presence from South Korea, attended by an ill-defined policy, would have the adverse effect of forcing the Seoul leadership toward politicially disastrous dependence on Japan.[22] Although Japan's latest moves (i.e., more contacts with North Korea, partial withdrawal from economic cooperation with South Korea, and a hinted desire to abolish ASPAC in the present form — all against Seoul's interests) seem to indicate some wavering in her close ties with the Seoul regime, there is no conclusive evidence of a basic change in her support for the present South Korean government. In analyzing Tokyo's feverish diplomatic activities, its main intentions are not altogether clear.[23]

Given the nature and composition of the regime in Seoul, its flexibility in foreign affairs is rather restricted. To be sure, minor adjustments are being made, such as the initiation of trade ties with "non-hostile" communist states; the Red Cross meetings with North Korea which have produced an agreement; the admittance into South Korea of the first Soviet citizen, Neto Igor Aleksandrovich, soccer coach to the Iranian team; the recently declared intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, and the clearance for Japanese air lines' overflights through Korean air space en route to China.[24] However, these gestures, both significant and insignificant, do not yet betoken modification of Seoul's basic policy. As things stand, South Korea's

[22]Although the Shanghai communiqué and Secretary of State Rogers' and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's statements imply the continuation for the time being of the American defense commitment, this certainly could not be interpreted as a permanent arrangement. For Seoul's expressed worries over the reported American intention to neutralize Korea, see *Dong-A Ilbo,* August 14, 1971.

[23]Ambiguity in present Japanese policy seems to be intentional. Japan's primary goal seems to be at least some form of control over South Korea, Taiwan and possibly even North Korea — a proposition not altogether distasteful to the Soviet Union. Evidence substantiating this point recently surfaced during an academic conference with Japanese scholars at Korea University in Seoul. Professor Okabe Tasumi admitted that, although the Japanese in general welcome the improved political atmosphere in Korea as a result of the Red Cross meetings, they are fearful of the possibility of Korea's unification and an increasing anti-Japanese posture. This statement and other evidence, including Tokyo's official stance, suggests that Japan's overriding desire is to "divide and rule." *Ibid.*, August 2, 1972.

[24]*Ibid.*, August 12, 1972. *Asahi Shimbun* (August 12, 1972) reported that South Korea and the Soviet Union had been in secret contact since about February 1972 in various national capitals, and that Moscow in the spring of 1972 had proposed the use of a port in Cheju Island for Soviet naval vessels.

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lingering involvement in the Indochina conflict and her traditional hard-line policies toward Communist China and North Korea will prove to be insurmountable obstacles to improving her diplomatic position. Such a position will unwittingly abet Japan's manipulation of South Korea's foreign relations. Considering the rapidly changing balance in Asia, Seoul's attitude may eventually spell the downfall of the present regime.[25]

A corresponding scenario of growing Japanese influence in both Viet Nams (assuming the failure of Vietnamization and total American withdrawal) is not farfetched. The process would be facilitated if: (1) the unpopular Thieu regime continues to rule in Saigon without the necessary changes; (2) this leads to an indefinite deadlock in dialogue with the NLF and North Viet Nam concerning an acceptable political solution; and (3) Hanoi's relations with Peking are marred beyond repair due to the rapid progress of Sino-American *détente* or to a further deterioration between Peking and Moscow detrimental to Hanoi's interests. That Japan is giving more attention to Southeast and South Asia is evidenced by a series of diplomatic maneuvers — a high-level delegation's visit to Hanoi in February, General Kinugasa Hayao's visit to Bangkok and Saigon (Hayao is Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Self Defense Forces), Hayakawa Takashi's LDP delegation to Dacca, New Delhi and Nepal — and other economic-political activities in the general area.[26]

Japan's increasing presence in Korea, Taiwan, the Viet Nams, and possibly in Cambodia, Laos and other countries in the region in varying degrees, should be a formidable political force, which, it has to be assumed under prevailing conditions, Tokyo will not hesitate to exploit for purposes contrary to the desirable power balance in Asia, damaging to the atmosphere of peace, and incompatible with the Nixon Doctrine. In that event a minor evil will have been replaced by one of higher damage potentiality.

IV

Conversely, if the Nixon Doctrine is to be as effective as originally intended, and if East Asian peace is to be secured on the

[25]For a useful analysis of this situation, the panel on "Korea in Developmental Perspective — II (North Korea)," at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies is of some interest.

[26]For instance, see John M. Lee, "Oil for Japan: A Global Project," *New York Times,* April 9, 1972. Also, on Japan's increasing economic involvement in Indonesia, see S. Iskandar, "Japan's Indonesian Inroads," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* May 27, 1972, pp. 33, 35.

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basis of a realistic and viable power alignment, the new order will have to be accomplished through a political understanding between Peking and Washington. Such an agreement, desirable for both capitals in view of their escalating difficulties with Moscow and Tokyo, could constitute the restraining and moderating force conducive to a reduction of tension, which would enable the Seoul, Taipei, Saigon and other governments to resist Japan's or the Soviet Union's overtures aiming at eventual domination.[27]

Moreover, a Sino-American *détente*/entente would be an "equalizer" in the tense and explosive situation between China and the USSR. Unquestionably China's uncertainty and apprehension originate from her conflict with Moscow, which in turn is being heavily influenced by the West German *Ostpolitik*. Both of these factors have provided Moscow with unique tactical opportunities in its approaches to Japan, and vice versa. Bonn's recognition of the postwar European boundaries, the nonaggression pact, and the Four-Power Berlin agreement have bolstered Moscow's position over the Kuriles; under these circumstances Soviet concessions on the "northern islands" would go a long way toward inducing Japanese cooperation in other areas. Soviet difficulties with the Chinese have also allowed the necessary flexibility to tempt Japanese capital and technical know-how into contributing to Siberian development – an arrangement not so much economic as politically expedient for both sides.[28] By exorcising the specter of West German "revanchism," tightening Moscow's control over the unreliable East European allies through the Czechoslovak invasion and the Brezhnev Doctrine, and promoting the case for a European Security Conference, the Soviet government was relatively free to choose its favorable position toward Japan.

Seen in light of conditions of the 1970's, many differences of the past appear inconsequential, and a significant degree of entente is probable between the Soviet Union and Japan. Barring sudden and highly unlikely radical changes in domestic politics, the conservative regime will continue to govern Japan for the foreseeable future. It is also certain, given the economic forces and the present power structure, that the LDP will continue to be controlled by its extreme right wing. Furthermore, there are several specific factors which explain Japan's coolness toward China and coziness

[27]On Japan's position and her potential threats, see *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 18, 1971; *Asahi Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun*, September 15, 1971.

[28]See Rhee, "Sino-Soviet Military Conflict and the Global Balance of Power" and "Japan and the Soviet Union," *op.cit.*

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toward Moscow: (1) the alarming upswing of shrill Chinese criticism of Sato's policy and implied denunciation of the LDP as a party; (2) the disappointing trade record with Peking, despite Japan's dominant position as a trading partner; (3) the urgent need for diversified supplies of industrial resources, and the consequent need for economic penetration of sensitive areas; (4) Nixon's China trip and the accompanying agreements both known and suspected; and (5) the virtual rupture of Japan-U.S. relations.[29]

A political agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union, which would presumably be an evolving type, could denote: (1) Moscow's tacit acquiescence in or even approval of Japan's "locally" dominant position in Asia – provided that it constitutes no serious challenge to the Soviet line of interest in the region and is primarily geared to diminishing the Chinese and American roles; (2) Soviet assent to Japan's controlling influence over Taiwan, South Korea and even both Viet Nams, under the same reservation.[30]

It may be assumed, too, that the Soviets might go so far as to place the Taiwan question in the broader context of the Asian situation; under some form of Japanese control, the island would constitute not only an immense embarrassment and threat to Peking but a source of continuing friction among China, Japan and the United States. By the same logic, the weakening of close North Korean ties to Peking in order to deny the Chinese sole leverage on the peninsula question[31] may be an important factor in Moscow's "desire" to see Seoul and Pyongyang come under increasing Japanese influence. Japan's advances to Hanoi in recent months should also be considered in the broader context of Sino-

[29]Speaking at Japan House in New York, on September 17, 1971, Eto Jun, a leading literary critic in Japan, stated that "Relations between Japan and the United States have now become so bad that there is nothing further to be said." Although this blunt statement did not by itself reflect the official views of Sato's government, similar sentiment has been frequently aired in Japan in recent months. Japan's willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union, North Korea and North Viet Nam verifies her determination to hew a new path independent of Washington's ties and the common interests maintained so far. See "Japan and the United States: A Reflection," *Chuo Koron*, December 1971, cited in *Japan Quarterly*, January-March 1972, p. 96.

[30]The Soviet intention would be to enhance the USSR's global position at the temporary expense of interests in selected areas. In this regard, the possibility of Japanese-Soviet accords in various areas takes on special meaning.

[31]This situation is well within the realm of reality, should Japan adroitly advance her own interests behind the façade of nominal ties with Washington — a formula the Japanese leaders would prefer as long as it is feasible. See, among others, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); John K. Emmerson, *The Japanese Dilemma: Arms, Yen and Power* (New York: Dunellen, 1971).

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American contacts and the increasing difficulties between China and Hanoi, Japan and the United States. These arrangements are well suited to promote Moscow's role in opposition to Peking and Washington in reshaping the Asian political and military balance to its advantage.

V

With all these considerations in mind, especially their desire to negate the dangerous upperhands of Moscow and Tokyo, the Chinese appear to be genuinely motivated to reach an overall understanding with the United States. There are serious obstacles to achieving such a settlement. Although it is unlikely at the moment, internal resistance to the *détente* could again emerge in Peking. One cannot easily speculate on the possible policy changes and the shifts to be expected in the Central Committee of the CCP after the passing of the Mao-Chou leadership. Internal upheavals and intraparty conflicts could be renewed, as the events of 1971 seem to testify. While Chou En-lai is presently in firm control, it is hard to judge how deep and solid a support he commands in the party hierarchy on the new turn in China's policy — especially among those potential leaders who might be in a position to step into the vacuum once Mao and Chou are gone. One thing seems certain about China's future policy, however: the continuity of Peking's stance would be closely tied to Moscow's attitude toward various problem areas, on which Peking could not entertain compromise. Some minor concessions are possible and even to be expected from Moscow, but it is difficult to see how the Soviet Union could agree to a fundamental reconciliation satisfactory to the Chinese without irrevocably damaging her own long-range control of the East European "satellites."

On the side of the United States, the outcome of the forthcoming Presidential election could have an impact on Sino-American relations. What that might be is not predictable, due mainly to the ambiguity of the Democrats' China policy views, although it is within reason to surmise a certain degree of continuation of Nixon's progress made so far with Peking.

Looking beyond short-range speculations, for the distant future the Chinese and American national interests would find widening common ground for mutual accommodation, devoid of ideological obsessions and based purely on respective national requirements. In this sense, Sino-American *détente* is an inevitable manifestation of international structural problems and dynamics; it is not mere-

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ly a move for tactical advantages but essentially for long-term strategic gains for both sides.[32].

Assessing the possible *détente* from the position of the United States, a political understanding with Peking could be expected to have two primary results. First, as a measure of containment of the Soviet Union, it could lead to a more reasonable and accommodating attitude on Moscow's part on several key issues. Cases in point are (a) the improvement of Canadian-Soviet relations, despite Canada's recognition of China and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking; (b) the reported relaxation of Soviet pressure on Rumania and Yugoslavia, and the quiet shelving of the Brezhnev Doctrine; and (c) renewed and reaffirmed Soviet interest in West German *Ostpolitik* notwithstanding the controversial Bundestag debate in recent months. In this regard, one cannot overemphasize Secretary of State Rogers' warning to Moscow that "harmonious" relations with the United States are not possible so long as the Soviet Union tries to "exploit explosive situations" and claims the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other socialist nations.[33]

Second, a Washington-Peking agreement should have a restraining influence on Japan's future policy, and even a possible check on Tokyo's tendency toward "military" revival (i.e., a nuclear program). In devising the contents of the projected Fourth and Fifth defense buildup plans, Japan would have to be cautious not to arouse undesirable reactions from other Asian nations, including China.

Additionally, the changing Soviet attitude — particularly noticeable since February — should be conducive to a political settlement in the Middle East (possibly beneficial to Israel) as well as on Berlin, and agreement on the reduction of European force levels and other matters such as the World War II debts. It may already have contributed to the Moscow SALT agreements. Ultimately, it might even have a healing effect on the Sino-Soviet discord, despite Moscow's lingering suspicion of secret deals between the United States and China.

Without a doubt, a Sino-American accord on major political issues would have the effect of stabilizing the Asian equilibrium by denying Japan and the Soviet Union otherwise unusually

[32]See Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).
[33]*New York Times*, March 8, 1972.

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favorable opportunities to establish a *de facto* pre-eminence in the East Asian rimlands.

The reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan on May 15 was a highly significant historical event. Notwithstanding the complicated problems of trade, currency and Senkaku (Tiao-yu-tai) Island, Japan no longer has compelling reasons to accord protective treatment to American interests in Asia. Unless and until considerable headway is made in concrete agreements between Peking and Washington, a degree of damage to the regional and eventually the global balance may not be avoidable.

Settlement of the Ryukyus problem is another reason why the United States and China should be especially attentive to devising a Taiwan solution least damaging to both. Meantime, one can expect China's willingness to accept America's continued presence in Taipei and Washington's reluctance to beat a hasty retreat from the island. Such a qualified stance would no doubt take the form of reaffirmation — explicit and implicit — of the American defense commitment to Taiwan and China's pledge to a pacific formula of direct negotiation.

The Japanese reaction to Peking-Washington contacts since the advent of "ping-pong diplomacy" is noteworthy. Cautioning the United States about the minimal sincerity of Peking. Tokyo warned that China's diplomatic moves were not "sunrise" but mere "candlelight." Japan's greatest concern is unquestionably the prospect of dealing with the Chinese after a Peking-Washington understanding — under conditions far more prohibitive than they have been with China and the United States in conflict. Potential Chinese gains from an understanding with the United States could so easily outweigh the gains achievable through Tokyo at this point that unless Japan was prepared to increase her enticement spectacularly, beyond the point acceptable to the LDP's present leadership, an agreement palatable to Japan would be impossible. Barring fundamental changes, this should be true for some time to come.

In analyzing the Japanese predicament, one could argue that, with the exception of a few farsighted leaders, the LDP did not foresee Washington's growing flexibility and realism toward Peking. Japan failed to perceive the meaning of Viet Nam, of Soviet ascendancy and the Sino-Soviet conflict to the American requirement for a global reassessment. In a way, the Japanese government had fallen victim to Cold War rhetoric more rigidly than the Americans — a legacy perhaps of the Yoshida and Kishi

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periods, which the present leadership finds difficult to overcome. Or, since most of the leaders had backgrounds in the imperial bureaucracy dealing with the former colonies, they had developed the unhealthy mentality of contempt for the Chinese and other Asians. It seems obvious that Sato and his close advisers dismissed Nixon's policy goals as mere rhetoric signifying no basic changes in American policy, and possibly overestimated the counter-*détente* forces in American domestic politics.

Understandably, Japan's primary aim is either to sabotage any political agreement between China and the United States or to retard the progress of the *détente* so as to realign her policy posture in a countermove. She could be expected to achieve this by: (1) sustained diplomatic "gestures" (without substance) toward Peking; (2) the vicarious route of aligning peripheral nations under her increasing economic and political influence; and (3) extensive economic and political agreement with the Soviet Union. Her existing policies support this judgment, and in this attempt she would find growing cooperation from Moscow.

Over the years much confusion about what motivates China's policy, and to what ends, has been generated deliberately and almost openly by the Soviet Union and more subtly and covertly by Japan. Morton Halperin dispelled some of the misconceptions held in the West about China and revealed their sources in his excellent study, *China and the Bomb*. However, Japan's role as a spoiler has been virtually ignored. Japanese interpretations of the Cultural Revolution, along with the Soviet version, portrayed a highly misleading picture of the movement, and to a great extent helped to color the American response during the Johnson-Rusk years. Since the mid-1960's, and the Viet Nam escalation, the carefully advanced theme has been that Japan could and would serve as an indispensable bridge between the West (especially the United States) and China. This was an enticing and plausible idea, in a way reminiscent of the Amau Doctrine of the 1930's, but it lacked substance and was frequently discounted by Japanese intellectuals themselves.

The question is whether Japan was genuinely interested in a constructive role or in a role designed for selfish motives to frustrate possible approaches between the Chinese and the West. The history of her relations with China is a long series of "super" failures. Her recent aspirations bring to mind ambitious imperial policies of the past: the Twenty-One Demands, the Shantung Question, the Tanaka Memorial, the Manchurian Crisis, the

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Amau Doctrine, New Japanism, the New Order, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, to cite a few.

From the vantage point of a post-mortem, it can be argued that China's Cultural Revolution was not so much the result of ideological conflicts between the moderates/modernists (Liu Shao-chi *et al.*) and the orthodox revolutionaries/Mao cultists as a struggle about retooling the power centers to bring China abreast of changing conditions in the international order.[34] Judging from the present trend, it would seem that the Maoists' primary objective was to reorganize China in such a way as to assure the leadership's unchallenged control of the party and the army in order to effect realistic changes in foreign policy.[35]

VI

Thus, the various implications of a Sino-American *détente* are subsumed under two main points. First, in the realities of the Sino-Soviet crisis, China is an important counterbalance to Soviet ambitions in Asia and the Pacific — a role of enormous value to the United States and others. Second, the American presence in Asia has been a stabilizing force and can in the future be an indispensable constraint on Japan's ambitions as a growing superpower. The Chinese and other Asian nations could ill afford to ignore this fact. Only Chinese-American cooperation can assure peace and security in the newly emerging Asian order, and hopefully the two governments will not fail to seize the opportunity for constructive diplomacy.

[34]See Rhee, "The Concept of the Rural Guerrilla . . . ," and "The United States, China and Japan . . . ," *op. cit.*; and Michael Yahuda, "China's New Foreign Policy," *The World Today*, January 1972, pp. 14-22.

[35]See Edgar Snow's interview of Chou En-lai as reported in *Epoca*, reprinted in the *New York Times*, December 11, 1970.

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SOVIET STRATEGIC CLAIMS, 1964-1970*

by Alfred L. Monks and Kenyon N. Griffin

CLAIMS of strategic military capability have been employed as a favorite stratagem by Soviet leaders during the last two decades as the USSR sought to achieve a strategic balance with the United States. Yet these claims have been shrouded in considerable ambiguity, and because their meaning and functions remain unclear their assessment has been controversial among Western analysts. Some observers are convinced that the main thrust of Soviet strategic claims is aimed at asserting military superiority; others declare that the Soviets claim only a position of parity with the West. Some analysts assume that strategic claims provide an accurate reflection of capabilities, but others dismiss such claims as mere propaganda. The purpose of this article is to analyze specific functions of Soviet strategic claims for the period 1964-1970 in an effort to clarify these various interpretations.

Review of the Literature

Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, by Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, is the only Western analysis that deals explicitly with Soviet claims, although certain assumptions about strategic claims are made in other works in which the subject has been treated implicitly. Within the focus of the Horelick-Rush book, on the political uses of strategic claims, several chapters are devoted to Soviet claims per se. The authors' thesis is that Soviet claims made during 1957-1961 were designed to heighten Western uncertainties regarding the strategic balance and to conceal the Soviets' own uncertainties.[1] In addition, they affirm that subordinate purposes served by Soviet claims at that time were: (1) to conceal from the West the decision not to begin deployment of a first-generation ICBM, although the Soviets apparently

*From a paper delivered at the Rocky Mountain Social Science Association Annual Convention held in Fort Collins, Colorado, in May 1971. Various individuals assisted the authors in the researching and writing of the paper. They include members of the Reference Department at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, members of the Reference Department, Radio Liberty Library, Munich, Germany, and Michael Slawson, a graduate student at the University of Wyoming. The editorial assistance of Leah Griffin is also acknowledged with thanks.

[1]Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 5-6.

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had the capability to do so; (2) to deter the United States from launching an attack when the USSR was strategically vulnerable; and (3) to lessen the political benefits the United States might reap from its position of strategic superiority and correspondingly increase opportunities to exploit the USSR's strategic power.[2]

Another work, *Soviet Naval Strategy,* by Robert Herrick, treats strategic claims rather obliquely. Herrick assigns three purposes to Soviet claims: (1) to enhance the credibility of the USSR's nuclear capabilities; (2) to sustain as a support of its foreign policy the military prestige of the USSR within the West; (3) to discredit the capabilities of the West, especially those of the United States.[3]

The question of the relationship between Soviet strategic claims and actual capabilities is also treated by Horelick and Rush. They feel that while capabilities cannot be directly inferred from claims, such claims impose a constraint upon the official who makes them — i.e., they must be credible to the major protagonist.[4] Thus, a strategic claim made by State A will be measured by State B on the basis of what the latter already knows and believes about State A's actual capabilities. If the discrepancy between the claim and this evaluation made by the opposing state is too great the claim will be discounted.

In the period 1957-1961 it was possible, given the difficulty of overcoming Soviet secrecy, for Soviet leaders to make boastful and irresponsible claims, thus deceiving the West concerning their actual military capabilities. After the collapse of the missile gap in late 1961, Soviet strategic claims became less boastful and more responsible in order to avoid damaging Soviet credibility.[5] Therefore, we can conclude that with improved intelligence facilities within the West, this constraint becomes greater, and the gap between claims and real capabilities narrows.

Other writers have asserted that the Soviets have often made boastful and brash claims. Yet it is evident from a perusal of these studies that Western analysts treat such claims seriously, assuming that they serve as indicators of Soviet capabilities. Thomas Wolfe, a noted specialist on Soviet military affairs, clearly makes this assumption.[6]

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 66-69.
[3] Robert Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1968), p. 115.
[4] Horelick and Rush, *op. cit.,* pp. 5-6.
[5] Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 438-440.
[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 435, 439.

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That Soviet claims form the basis of evaluations of Soviet capabilities is apparent in a work published by the Stanford Research Institute. From a select number of assertive ABM claims made in early 1967 ("We can destroy all incoming enemy missiles," for example), the authors inferred an "increased Soviet ABM capability."[7] In another interpretation of Soviet military efforts, several analysts concluded from discrepancies noted in strategic claims made on the same day ("We can destroy all enemy incoming missiles"/"We can destroy virtually all enemy missiles") that a debate concerning the efficacy of continued ABM deployment was occurring within Soviet military circles.[8]

Western specialists have also placed stress on the relationship between Soviet claims and the strategic environment. Such sources have emphasized the use of claims made by the USSR with the aim of influencing domestic developments within the United States. The American debates surrounding the ABM controversy in early 1969, the deployment of the Safeguard system in early 1970, and the decision to deploy MIRV vehicles in early 1970 are examples frequently cited.[9]

Although Western analysts also assume that there is some link, however tenuous, between Soviet strategic claims and Soviet intentions to prepare a first or second strike,[10] this proposition is not often advanced, presumably because of the difficulty of ascertaining a state's intentions. But Wolfe has asserted that Soviet thinking on such matters as the intent to further ABM deployment can be deduced from select claims made by leading Soviet officials. He avers that a negative opinion about the desirability of extending ABM deployment in the USSR can be inferred from highly assertive offensive claims. Thus, by claiming a high offensive capability, Soviet military leaders are implicitly downgrading defensive forces.[11]

Another Western viewpoint suggests that the pronouncements made by senior Soviet military officials (marshals and ranking admirals) merit special attention. This approach is based on the following assumptions: (1) marshals and top admirals are the military's chief spokesmen in the USSR; (2) the main avenue of their influence is through the Party Central Committee; and (3)

[7]R. B. Foster, *et al., Soviet Views of the ABM and Military Strategy* (Washington: Stanford Research Institute, 1969), pp. 53-54.
[8]Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, editors, *Why ABM?* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 153; see also Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 153, 439.
[9]News items in *New York Times,* March 8 and March 15, 1970.
[10]*Ibid.,* May 1, 1969.
[11]Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

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they constitute a homogeneous group with uniform opinions in crucial matters of military doctrine, strategy and tactics.[12]

Despite the lack of consensus noted, this review of the literature suggests that Soviet strategic claims are taken seriously. Western analysts feel that strategic claims made by the USSR serve several domestic and external functions and usually assume that there is some connection, however indefinable, between them and actual Soviet strategic capabilities. It is also assumed that the strategic environment is related in some fashion to such claims.

Research Methodology

Statement of the Problem

In order to explore the underlying functions of claims made by Soviet officials and the meaning that can be inferred from their claims, we sought to gather data which would shed light on the following questions: (1) What relationship exists between Soviet strategic claims and actual capabilities? (2) Do Soviet claims serve as a means of communication to influence domestic political debates in the United States? (3) What differences exist between the claims made by top-echelon Soviet military officers and their subordinate officers which would suggest that the former constituted a pressure group of notable consequence?

We believe the importance of this problem of the functions of Soviet strategic claims is justified by the following considerations. First, this research fills a gap on a strategic problem in Soviet-American relations; second, it seeks to clarify the relationship between Soviet claims and capabilities, which has not been explored systematically; and, third, it has developed and operationalized several measures differentiating Soviet claims based on their nature, their assertiveness, and the strategic state claimed.

Data Collection

Data for this analysis were collected from a survey of Soviet strategic claims appearing in various Russian-language newspapers, periodicals and books.[13] These publications, both

[12]Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 42-62.

[13]Our sources were selected as follows: (1) eight nonmilitary newspapers with nationwide distribution, because of their importance as prestige papers; (2) fifteen nonmilitary newspapers from the republics (the major paper in each republic), because of their regional importance; (3) two daily newspapers, published as military organs, because of their importance in communicating information within the military; (4) nine military periodicals, published as official organs of the various military branches, because of their importance in communicating information within each branch — here it should be noted that the Soviet strategic missile forces have no specific military journal of their own; (5) three nonmilitary

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military and nonmilitary, constitute the "open literature" of the Soviet Union, which is important as a data source since it is the primary mode by which the Soviet leadership communicates strategic information and intentions within the country and to other nations. The publications included in the study are listed in Appendix I.

An initial survey of the nonmilitary newspapers revealed that only on select commemorative holidays[14] did strategic claims appear, although they were made in the official daily military newspapers on other days as well as on commemorative days during a year. The research strategy, based on these observations, called for the coding and analysis of strategic claims made during the commemorative holidays in nonmilitary newspapers, during the entire year in military newspapers and during the entire year in military periodicals. The period under consideration began January 1, 1964 and terminated December 31, 1970.[15]

Coding

The coding of the Soviet claims was done from English translations of the Russian-language publications. Three coders were employed for this task, with each individual reading, assessing and coding each claim separately. When discrepancies arose among the coders, a joint meeting was held to attempt to achieve consensus on the disputed claim; but when this was not possible, the discrepancy was resolved by a majority vote.[16]

periodicals, published as official organs of the Communist Party's Central Committee, because they reflect the party's position on military matters; and (6) ten military studies, published by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, because they represent the major works on Soviet military thinking during the period examined.

[14]February 23 —Soviet Armed Forces Day
May 9 —Victory Day
July 26 —Navy Day (this date varies from July 26 to July 30)
August 18 —Air Force Day (in 1972, this was observed on August 20 for the first time)
November 7 —October Revolution Day
November 19 —Soviet Artillery and Rocket Day

[15]For a review of content analytic techniques see Richard L. Merritt, *Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), pp. 64-103, and Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969). Other useful discussions of this approach are found in Robert C. North, *et al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), and Milton Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," *The American Political Science Review,* September 1968, pp. 827-839.

[16]The translations from Russian to English were done by Alfred L. Monks. The coding was done by Dr. Monks with the assistance of Major Richard Timmermeyer, U.S. Army, a graduate student at the University of Wyoming, and Russell Nichols and Wyatt Skaggs, undergraduate students at the University of Wyoming.

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For each claim the information was broken down into six variables, each containing several categories. The complete coding sheet with examples is found in Appendix II. We defined each strategic claim in terms of three variables which we believe measure salient dimensions. The first variable focused on the *nature of the claim* — that is, whether the claim gave evidence of an offensive capability, a defensive capability or whether it was ambiguous as to offensive or defensive capability. The second variable focused on the *assertiveness of the claim* — that is, whether the claim (based on the use of key expressions) warranted an ordinal ranking of being very strong, strong or moderate. Very strong claims denoted an assertion of superlative or absolute capability; strong claims, a comparable capability or an absolute capability with some qualification; and moderate claims, adequate capability. The third measure of the strategic claims focused on the *strategic state claimed by the Soviets* — that is, whether the claim, based again on the use of key expressions, gave evidence of strategic parity or strategic superiority vis-à-vis the United States. A category was also included for those claims impossible to classify as signifying either parity or superiority.

Three additional variables had reference to: (1) when the claim was made (by month and year), (2) the military rank of the official making the claim, and (3) Party Central Committee membership. Two classifications were used to assess authoritative status. On the one hand, claims made by marshals and admirals, generals and colonels, and political officials were categorized separately. On the other hand, the officials making the claims were categorized into those who held membership in the Party Central Committee (PCC) and those who did not. The categories included PCC political officials, PCC military officials, and non-PCC military officials. With each strategic claim coded into six different variables, we were able to analyze them in various relationships.

Research Questions

Soviet Claims and Actual Capabilities

As suggested by the review of literature, considerable ambiguity surrounds the relationship between strategic claims and actual capabilities of the Soviet Union. It is unclear whether the claims represent Soviet leaders' estimates of their own capabilities vis-à-vis the United States, or whether they are utilized for various political purposes, or both. In any case, how accurate they may be in rela-

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tion to actual capabilities has been considered by American strategists and political leaders to be a salient problem.

Our data on claims,[17] when combined with estimates of Soviet and American strategic capabilities, provided an opportunity to analyze this relationship systematically. We began the analysis by positing the null hypothesis that no association would be found between capabilities and claims, and tested this by using a parity index of Soviet capabilities and the three measures of strategic claims previously discussed.

The operationalization of Soviet capabilities is critical for testing the above hypothesis. The details should be made explicit. We began with an assumption that consensus did exist among many Soviet, as well as American, observers that the Soviet Union had recently achieved "rough strategic parity" with the United States.[18] Therefore, we sought to devise an index which approximated this position. Second, we decided that the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) provided the most reliable assessments of Soviet and American strategic capabilities and that we would use the ISS data. Third, we contend that in building a parity index the utility of efforts to assign relative weights to the various factors which make up actual strategic capabilities for any nation is questionable. Such determinants as megatonnage, relative positioning of nuclear bases, the reliability and survivability of the weapons, the accuracy of the delivery systems, and a state's MIRV capability would need to be considered. Since, under these circumstances, no totally reliable formula exists for assessing Soviet or American strategic capabilities, we selected the ISS estimates of ICBM's and SLBM's for both nations for our index.

We justify this selection with the following arguments: (1) The ISS assessments of ICBM's and SLBM's are most frequently cited by both specialists and nonspecialists as indices of actual strategic capability. (2) The other factors cited above apparently balance specific advantages of one side (i.e., the Soviet Union's superior megatonnage) against the other (i.e., the United States' superior accuracy). The comparison of Soviet and American ICBM's and

[17]The total number of claims by year is:

1964	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*
35	53	77	74	81	45	47

[18]See William Beecher, "The Nuclear Arsenals: A Balance of Terror," in the *New York Times,* November 18, 1969; *Pravda,* March 8, 1970; Morton H. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 75; and John Foster, "Russia vs. U.S. — Coming Crisis in Arms," *U.S. News and World Report,* November 30, 1970, pp. 24-30.

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SLBM's, drawn from the numerical ISS estimates, thus indicates "rough strategic parity."

On this assumption, a strategic parity index was developed to give a yearly percentage figure of Soviet strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. For each year, the total number of ICBM's and SLBM's was computed for each nation. These figures are given in Table I. The Soviet totals were then divided by the totals

TABLE I
GROWTH OF STRATEGIC MISSILE STRENGTH, 1964-1970

	1964	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*
USA ICBM	834	854	904	1054	1054	1054	1074
USA SLBM	416	496	592	656	656	656	656
Total	1250	1350	1496	1710	1710	1710	1730
USSR ICBM	200	270	300	460	800	1050	1300
USSR SLBM	120	120	125	130	130	160	286
Total	320	390	425	590	930	1210	1586

Sources: The Military Balance: 1969-1970 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 55, and *The Military Balance: 1970-1971* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 89.

for the United States to arrive at the per cent of parity achieved by the Soviet Union. For example:

$$\frac{\text{USSR ICBM} + \text{SLBM}}{\text{USA ICBM} + \text{SLBM}} = \text{USSR per cent of parity with USA.}$$

As the Soviet Union approaches parity with the United States, the percentage figure approaches 100 per cent. Soviet parity ranged from 26 per cent in 1964 to 92 per cent in 1970, the latter figure indicating a close approach to 100 per cent, or "rough parity." The percentage figures, or the parity index, were used as the first value in computing the correlation coefficients expressed in the following tables.

The second value for the correlations was derived by focusing on the strongest dimension of each variable:

NATURE OF CLAIMS = "Offensive Claims"
ASSERTIVENESS OF CLAIMS = "Very Strong Claims"
STRATEGIC STATE OF CLAIMS = "Claims of Superiority"

The per cent of each of these claims from the total for each variable was used in computing the correlations. Thus, we devised a parity index for the Soviet Union and ran correlations between this index and the strongest dimensions of the claims listed above for the seven-year period, 1964-1970. Tables II-A,

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II-B and II-C show the relationships between actual Soviet capabilities and strategic claims, with correlation coefficients.[19]

A review of the tables suggests that an inverse relationship exists between capabilities and claims based on the assertiveness of the claim (Table II-B) and the strategic state of the claim (Table II-C). That is, as Soviet capabilities increase, the temper and tone of the claims diminish. However, no consistent relationship is shown between the parity index and offensive claims (Table II-A).

The correlations derived from these data support the above interpretations. The correlation between the strategic state of the claim and the parity index shows a *very strong* inverse association (r= —.73); the correlation between the assertiveness of the claims

TABLE II
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC CLAIMS

Table II-A



[19]The correlation coefficient r, frequently referred to as the Pearsonian product-moment correlation, measures the amount of spread about the linear least squares equation. The equation used to calculate the correlation is:

$$r = \frac{\Sigma\ (X-\bar{X})\ (Y-\bar{Y})}{\sqrt{[\Sigma(X-\bar{X})^2]\ [\Sigma(Y-\bar{Y})^2]}} = \frac{\Sigma xy}{\sqrt{(\Sigma x^2)\ (\Sigma y^2)}}$$

Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 286-287.

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and the parity index shows a *strong* inverse association (r=—.51); and the correlation between offensive claims and the parity index shows only a *very weak* positive association (r=.07). Based on these findings, we tentatively reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between actual Soviet capabilities and

Table II-B



Table II-C



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claims. Instead, we conclude that an inverse relationship exists, even though no significant relationship was found for the measure of offensive claims.

These findings enable us to clarify the divergent interpretations given to strategic claims by other writers. Previous studies have suggested that Soviet claims either represent estimates of actual Soviet capabilities vis-à-vis the United States or are used for political purposes. Three inferences may be drawn from our data.

First, the data clearly reject the contention that Soviet strategic claims represent an accurate assessment of capabilities from 1964 to 1970. The three measures of association support this rejection. If the claims had reflected an accurate assessment of capabilities there would have been a strong positive relationship between each of the measures derived from Table II. Instead, two of the relationships were strong and inverse, and the third indicated only a weak positive relationship.

Second, our findings support the assumption that Soviet claims are designed to serve political purposes, for example, to heighten uncertainty in the West, especially in the United States. Such claims have at least two obfuscating functions: (1) they may have served to conceal Soviet vulnerability during a period when the USSR was strategically inferior to the United States; and (2) they may have served to enhance Soviet strategic credibility when the USSR did not, in fact, possess a potent capability.[20]

Third, our data on the kinds and numbers of claims made during the 1964-1970 period suggest that as actual capabilities increase, the USSR feels less need to heighten American uncertainty regarding its strategic capability. Thus, Soviet claims were not intended to convey accurate information until the USSR had achieved some measure of strategic parity with its major adversary.

Continuing research on the functions of Soviet strategic claims is necessary to provide further confirmation of these findings. We posit that one of the significant questions to be explored is the changing function of Soviet claims. As changes occur in the strategic balance, an opportunity will be made available for other tests of the following hypothesis:

When the Soviets perceive that they are strategically inferior to the United States, their strategic claims are intended to deepen American uncertainty and enhance their strategic credibility vis-à-vis the United States.

[20]This appears to be borne out by the fact that in 1964, when Soviet claims reached the apex of intensity and assertiveness, Soviet capabilities vis-à-vis the United States were at their lowest point.

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In contrast, when the Soviets perceive that they have achieved strategic parity or strategic superiority versus the United States, their strategic claims are intended to convey a more accurate assessment of their strategic capabilities.

Soviet Claims and the Communication Function

The communication function in international relations involves the use of symbols to convey information among the actors. Andrew Scott has suggested that such communication "is an essential part of virtually every interaction process on the international scene [and] . . . is central to the psychological processes of decision making."[21]

In an effort to understand better the communication function of Soviet claims, we selected two questions for analysis: (1) Are there differences in the kinds of Soviet strategic claims which suggest that such claims attempt to influence the discussion surrounding Presidential election campaigns in the United States? (2) Are there differences in kind which suggest that such claims attempt to influence domestic debates in the United States on issues of strategic weapons systems or peace initiatives?

Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact function of Soviet claims, due in part to the multiplicity of variables involved, we contend that the data provide some interesting insights into their use. Our conclusions derive from three assumptions. First, it was assumed that strategic claims are intended by Soviet leaders to convey strategic information or misinformation to decision-makers abroad, thereby performing a communication function. Second, we assumed that Soviet leaders utilize strategic claims to influence the United States' decision-making body. Third, we assumed that Soviets intend for their claims to influence the American interpretation of Soviet strategic intent.

The first question addressed focuses on the Presidential election years, 1964 and 1968. In both elections, American strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union became an issue.[22] Our analysis sought to establish a relationship between Soviet strategic claims and American Presidential years; we expected to find significant differences between the claims made during 1964 and 1968 and those made in the five nonelection years under consideration, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1970. We began by positing the null hypothesis that no differences would be found.

[21]Andrew Scott, *The Functioning of the International System* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 68.
[22]See the *New York Times,* August 11, 1964 and February 22, 1968.

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TABLE III

STRATEGIC CLAIMS—PRESIDENTIAL/NON-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS

Table III-A

Nature of Claim	*Presidential Election Years*	*Non-Presidential Election Years*
Offensive	60%	52%
Defensive	28%	29%
Ambiguous	13%	19%
Total	101% (N=116)	100% (N=296)
	X^2=2.58	
	df=2	
	N.S.	

Table III-B

Assertiveness of Claim	*Presidential Election Years*	*Non-Presidential Election Years*
Very Strong	60%	45%
Strong	36%	39%
Moderate	4%	16%
Total	100% (N=116)	100% (N=296)
	X^2=12.95	
	df=2	
	Sig. @ .005	

Table III-C

Soviet Strategic State Claimed	*Presidential Election Years*	*Non-Presidential Election Years*
Superiority	53%	40%
Parity	22%	32%
Not Ascertainable	26%	28%
Total	101% (N=116)	100% (N=296)
	X^2=6.86	
	df=2	
	Sig. @ .05	

Note: Chi Square (X^2) is a test used to determine whether two variables are dependent or independent of one another. A low Chi Square indicates that a frequency distribution deviates only slightly or not at all from one which could be expected simply by chance. A significant difference indicates that two variables are somehow related or dependent upon one another. Generally, a .05 level of significance is used. This can be interpreted to mean that the observed distribution could occur by chance if the null hypothesis were true only five times out of a hundred.

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Tables III-A, III-B and III-C show the relationships between the three indicators of claims and the two time periods. The findings in III-B and III-C, based on the assertiveness of the claims and the strategic state claimed by the Soviets, led us tentatively to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that Soviet strategic claims did vary significantly between Presidential and non-Presidential election years.

Our data suggest that the contention sometimes advanced by Americans — that the Soviets would want to moderate their communications toward the United States during elections — is not valid. Soviet strategic claims were more strongly assertive, claimed superiority more frequently, and referred slightly more to offensive capabilities during the two election years than during the five nonelection years. We can infer that if this pattern was intentional, the Soviets utilized strategic claims to communicate their intent to cope with any threat or capability American decision-makers could employ. Further, the data suggest that the Soviets may be less interested in influencing the outcome of Presidential elections, in terms of the election of "their" candidate, than in communicating information to the Presidential candidates and other decision-makers regarding the parameters of Soviet strategic capabilities and strategic intent.[23]

The second question relating to the communication function of Soviet claims focuses on two divergent strategic developments in the United States during 1969 and 1970: agreement to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which endeavored to limit or perhaps reduce the vast strategic arsenals of both nuclear superpowers, and the effort to strengthen American strategic capabilities through the development and deployment of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) and Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV). Each of these developments precipitated spirited debate in the United States. Some Americans questioned the wisdom of ratifying the present

[23]We want to point out the possibility that the distribution of Soviet claims in 1964 and 1968 may have resulted from the changing function of Soviet capabilities. As noted in the previous discussion, changes in capabilities appear to cause changes in strategic claims. The 1972 U.S. Presidential election will provide another opportunity to test whether the Soviet leadership utilizes more bombastic claims during election years to influence American election debates through an assertion of strategic strength, or whether our findings are attributable to the fact that the USSR had not achieved strategic parity in 1964 or 1968. If the Soviets are able to maintain their strategic parity with the United States throughout 1972, and if their claims are more moderate during the 1972 election, we suspect that actual Soviet capabilities act as an intervening variable in the communication function of Soviet strategic claims.

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strategic balance which the SALT talks implied. Others were disturbed about the potentially destabilizing effects that development and deployment of the new weapons systems would produce.

The outcome of each of these domestic U.S. issues affected the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. Therefore, we made two assumptions about the perceptions of the Soviet leadership: (1) It would be in Soviet interests to enter into arms control discussions, especially in view of the USSR's presumed strategic parity. (2) It would not be in Soviet interests for the United States to develop and/or deploy either an ABM or a MIRV system. We believed that if these assumptions were valid, Soviet strategic claims would differ significantly between the years 1964-1968 and 1969-1970. Soviet leaders could presumably communicate their strategic intentions to American decision-makers by modifying their claims in an effort to influence the outcome of the American debates.[24] We began the analysis by positing the null hypothesis that no difference would be found between the strategic claims made during the two periods.

Tables IV-A, IV-B and IV-C show the relationships between the two periods distinguished by the three measures of claims. They were not the relationships we expected. Not only was there less difference than had been anticipated, but the directions of the findings were mixed, making it difficult either to accept or reject the null hypothesis. A significant difference was found in the strategic state claimed in the periods 1964-1968 and 1969-1970. As expected, this change was toward a more attenuated strategic posture. The other two relationships show ambiguous results. In one case, Soviet claims were slightly less assertive; in the other, they were slightly more offensive in nature. Neither type of claim represented a significant difference for the two time periods.

These findings suggest that the initial direction of the relationships anticipated for the 1964-1968 and 1969-1970 periods was false. We assumed that during the latter period the Soviets would attenuate their strategic claims in an effort to communicate a low strategic profile to the United States. Our data tentatively indicate

[24]In early 1969, Soviet Chief of Staff M. V. Zakharov asserted that Soviet offensive missiles could penetrate an American ABM system. By making this statement he lent support to those opponents of ABM within this country who maintained that such a defense system would be ineffective against enemy missiles. See M. V. Zakharov, "On Guard of Socialism and Peace," *Partinaya zhizn'*, May 1969, p. 16. See also news items in the *New York Times*, May 1, 1969, and *Pravda*, March 8, 1970. Soviet leaders similarly sought to dissuade American officials from deploying MIRV in early 1970 by asserting that it would jeopardize the SALT talks. See *Izvestiya*, March 14, 1970, and the *New York Times*, March 15, 1970.

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TABLE IV

STRATEGIC CLAIMS MADE BY SOVIET LEADERS, 1964-1968 AND 1969-1970

Table IV-A

Nature of Claim	*1964-1968*	*1969-1970*
Offensive	53%	60%
Defensive	31%	21%
Ambiguous	17%	20%
Total	101% (N=320)	101% (N=92)
	X^2=3.515	
	df=2	
	N.S.	

Table IV-B

Assertiveness of Claim	*1964-1968*	*1969-1970*
Very Strong	51%	41%
Strong	38%	39%
Moderate	11%	20%
Total	100% (N=320)	100% (N=92)
	X^2=5.513	
	df=2	
	N.S.	

Table IV-C

Strategic State Claimed	*1964-1968*	*1969-1970*
Superiority	49%	24%
Parity	23%	49%
Not Ascertainable	28%	27%
Total	100% (N=320)	100% (N=92)
	X^2=26.328	
	df=2	
	Sig. @ .001	

that, instead, Soviet leaders sought to communicate a position of strategic strength.

There may have been three reasons for this. First, Soviet parity claims suggest a reversal in Soviet strategic thinking during 1969-1970. Their increase can be interpreted as a reflection of growing strategic strength vis-à-vis the United States, as can increased claims of offensive capabilities. This point is confirmed by Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev's major policy address in early 1970.[25]

Second, the Soviets may have been disinclined to increase their

[25] *Pravda*, April 15, 1970.

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claims of superiority because these might have further accelerated the arms race with the United States. No significant difference was found between offensive claims in the two periods: the USSR apparently desired to communicate strong offensive capabilities throughout the entire seven-year period. In the early period, strong offensive claims were presumably utilized to compensate for Soviet strategic inferiority; in the latter period they reflected the Soviet position of nuclear strength.

Third, the Soviets may have eschewed making more claims of superiority since such action would have undermined the Nixon "sufficiency" doctrine, proclaimed in early 1969. President Nixon declared then that he was not seeking a position of strategic superiority in relation to the USSR, but only a position of "sufficiency." There were numerous critics of this doctrine.[26] We contend that Soviet leaders were content with the new American position, since it would relieve pressure on the USSR to match U.S. defense spending,[27] and thus had reason not to provide ammunition to Nixon's critics by claiming that they had achieved superiority.

Our data therefore lend some support to the interpretation that the Soviets used their claims of strategic strength, in spite of certain cross-pressures, to attempt to influence domestic American debates during 1969-1970. This interpretation concurs with that given to Soviet attempts to influence American Presidential elections. Basically, the Soviets have sought to communicate to American debates a posture of strategic strength, irrespective of actual capabilities.

The findings in this area are highly tentative. Separating the diverse variables that influence the relationships we have analyzed is a difficult undertaking. We admit the possibility of other causal or intervening variables. However, we think it significant to have found empirical evidence which suggests that Soviet strategic claims are related to two important American issues. Perhaps these interpretations will serve as a heuristic base for other suggestions

[26]For instance, in late 1969 the House Appropriations Committee restated its long-standing conviction that the United States had to maintain its military superiority over the USSR. (*New York Times,* December 4, 1969.) For a comprehensive critique of the Nixon "sufficiency" doctrine, see Halperin, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-86.

[27]The *New York Times,* November 26, 1969, viewed Brezhnev's remarks on maintaining sufficient Soviet forces as evidence that top Soviet leaders were influenced by Nixon's policy of nuclear sufficiency. Many U.S. disarmament officials interpreted the Nixon doctrine as a major step in inducing the Soviet government to enter the SALT talks. John Finney elaborated on this thesis in *ibid.,* November 19, 1969.

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regarding the Soviet use of strategic claims for purposes of international communication.

Soviet Claims and the Soviet Military

The final question in our study concerned the claims made by various high-ranking Soviet military officials. The importance of this question is reflected in Western analysts' comments on the salience of such claims to the policy formulation process in the USSR. We explored two common generalizations found in the literature.

First, it has been suggested that Soviet marshals act as an important pressure group. Accordingly, Western analysts have attributed greater significance to their roles and their public pronouncements than to those of lower-ranking military officers.[28] In addition, it has been posited that marshals may act as spokesmen for the entire Soviet military establishment.[29] This contention is based on the assumption that marshals, by virtue of their roles, are in a position to influence policy alternatives.

Second, similar assessments have been made regarding the high-ranking military officers who are members of the Party Central Committee (PCC).[30] The suggestion here is that the senior-ranking officers, who are members of the PCC, have greater access than their subordinates to the Politburo. Therefore, they are in a better position to influence policy alternatives than their military colleagues who are non-PCC members.

In order to analyze the relative influence in the Soviet Union of the various military elites, we considered each group in terms of the strategic claims made. We posited the null hypothesis that no differences would be found between the claims made by top-echelon Soviet military officers and those made by lower-echelon military officers. This hypothesis was tested, using two different classifications of military officials. We first analyzed the kinds of claims marshals made and compared those claims with the ones made by generals and colonels (representing non-marshals). We then analyzed the kinds of claims made by military PCC officers (officers, including marshals, generals and colonels, who hold membership in the Party Central Committee) and compared those claims with the ones made by military non-PCC officers

[28]Raymond L. Garthoff, "Khrushchev and the Military," in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Westin, editors, *Politics in the Soviet Union* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1966), pp. 271-273.
[29]Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 322-349.
[30]Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy, op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

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(representing all other Soviet military officers in our sample, including marshals, generals and colonels). Tables V-A, V-B and V-C and Tables VI-A, VI-B and VI-C show the relationships between the four military groups and the nature, assertiveness and strategic state of each group's claims, while controlling for the three time periods.

TABLE V

STRATEGIC CLAIMS BY MARSHALS (M) AND NON-MARSHALS (N-M)
(controlling for three time periods)

Table V-A

Nature of Claim		1964-1965		1966-1968		1969-1970	
		M	N-M	M	N-M	M	N-M
	N	39	23	83	91	34	30
Offensive	%	62	48	49	53	68	47
Defensive	%	23	4	35	36	18	30
Ambiguous	%	15	48	16	11	15	23
		X^2=9.182 df=2 Sig. @ .025		X^2=.834 df=2 N.S.		X^2=2.884 df=2 N.S.	

Table V-B

Assertiveness of Claim		1964-1965		1966-1968		1969-1970	
		M	N-M	M	N-M	M	N-M
	N	39	23	83	91	34	30
Very Strong	%	56	61	43	53	56	37
Strong/Moderate	%	44	39	57	47	44	63
		X^2=.118 df=1 N.S.		X^2=1.527 df=1 N.S.		X^2=2.363 df=1 N.S.	

Table V-C

Soviet Strategic State Claimed		1964-1965		1966-1968		1969-1970	
		M	N-M	M	N-M	M	N-M
	N	39	23	83	91	34	30
Superiority	%	54	57	40	48	18	27
Parity	%	31	39	33	14	47	43
Not Ascertainable	%	15	4	28	37	35	30
		X^2=1.878 df=2 N.S.		X^2=8.244 df=2 Sig. @ .025		X^2=.778 df=2 N.S.	

These findings, based on the Chi Square test of independence, led us to conclude that there was little difference between the strategic claims made by marshals and non-marshals or between

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those made by military PCC officers and military non-PCC officers. Therefore, we confirmed the null hypothesis that significant differences would not be found in the kinds of strategic claims made by top-echelon Soviet military officers and lower-echelon officers.

As will be seen in Tables V-A, V-B and V-C, only two time periods gave evidence of a statistical difference between the claims made by marshals and non-marshals. A significant difference was found for the years 1964-1965 with respect to the nature of the claim; marshals during this period tended to make more offensive claims than did non-marshals.[31] A significant difference was also found for the years 1966-1968 on the strategic state claimed by the Soviets; during these years the non-marshals made more claims of superiority and fewer claims of parity, while the marshals' claims were more evenly distributed between those two categories.[32] All other tables comparing the claims made by marshals and non-marshals indicated no statistical differences.

Similarly, Tables VI-A, VI-B and VI-C indicate only one statistical difference between the claims made by military PCC officers and military non-PCC officers. This difference, found for the years 1966-1968, was in the assertiveness of the claims. The data indicated that for this period the non-PCC officers tended to make more assertive claims than military PCC officers.[33] The other tabulations reveal no significant difference in the strategic claims made by these two groups.

We have posited three possible explanations for this uniformity. First, the Soviet military may be a homogeneous body and as such seeks to influence decision-makers in order to defend its interests. It is suggested that as an interest group it possesses several functional objectives:[34] (A) It seeks authority to influence defense allocations. The military is interested in maintaining high levels of spending in heavy industry, since this is the sector most closely related to the defense industry's basic needs. (B) It seeks to in-

[31]One explanation for this difference is that select Soviet marshals (and admirals), such as R. Ya. Malinovskii and A. A. Grechko, may have been assuming political roles at that time. We suggest that they attempted to enter into a dialogue over strategic American priorities. (Throughout this article, *marshals* has been used to designate both Soviet marshals and Soviet admirals.)

[32]This period was one of continued research and development in Soviet strategic weapons systems; the Soviets have shown a propensity for making exaggerated claims during such periods.

[33]We offer no explanation of this aberration. It may be due to a chance distribution rather than to some underlying relationship.

[34]Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Military," a preliminary draft of a chapter for H. Gordon Skilling *et al.*, editors, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 18-23.

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TABLE VI

STRATEGIC CLAIMS BY NON-PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS (NON-PCC) AND PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS (PCC)
(controlling for three time periods)

Table VI-A

Nature of Claim		1964-1965		1966-1968		1969-1970	
		Non-PCC	PCC	Non-PCC	PCC	Non-PCC	PCC
	N	54	29	161	66	62	27
Offensive	%	63	55	55	39	63	59
Defensive	%	19	21	34	41	23	19
Ambiguous	%	19	24	12	20	15	22
		X^2=.527 df=2 N.S.		X^2=4.954 df=2 N.S.		X^2=.849 df=2 N.S.	

Table VI-B

Assertiveness of Claim		1964-1965		1966-1968		1969-1970	
		Non-PCC	PCC	Non-PCC	PCC	Non-PCC	PCC
	N	54	29	161	66	62	27
Very Strong	%	52	59	54	36	42	44
Strong	%	41	24	39	46	45	26
Moderate	%	7	17	7	18	13	30
		X^2=3.331 df=2 N.S.		X^2=9.398 df=2 Sig. @ .01		X^2=4.725 df=2 N.S.	

Table VI-C

Soviet Strategic State Claimed		1964-1965		1966-1968		1969-1970	
		Non-PCC	PCC	Non-PCC	PCC	Non-PCC	PCC
	N	54	29	161	66	62	27
Superiority	%	63	55	46	44	26	22
Parity	%	26	24	20	27	50	41
Not Ascertainable	%	11	21	34	29	24	37
		X^2=1.411 df=2 N.S.		X^2=1.160 df=2 N.S.		X^2=1.544 df=2 N.S.	

fluence the formulation of strategic and defense policies. As noted by Western observers, the Soviet military began to demand a greater role in policy formulation after the ouster of Khrushchev. (C) As a group, it is predisposed to depict the international environment as aggressive and threatening to the Soviet Union. In this it is perhaps motivated by an underlying desire to present a rationale for large military budgets to the political leadership.

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The military's statements on the "worsening" international situation are usually related to the party's attempts to reduce its status and allocations, or other desiderata.

The second explanation concerns the hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over the military. The fact that no differences were discerned in the claims made by top-echelon officers suggests that the CPSU has usurped the authority to formulate strategic doctrine and policy in the USSR. In these circumstances strategic claims would be largely uniform for PCC/non-PCC members, as well as for marshals and non-marshals. This inference is consistent with the contention, advanced by many Western specialists, that in the post-Khrushchev period political controls over the military have increased in both scope and intensity.[35] It is highly probable that such controls may be tacitly acceptable to top military officials: we know that on several of the key military issues discussed since 1964, members of the Soviet High Command have solidly backed the party.[36] Thus, uniformity in strategic statements made by military leaders would suggest that they, as a group, were expressing prevalent party policies and doctrines.

Third, the discernible uniformity of claims made by senior Soviet military officers and their subordinates may be explained by the marshals' exalted role and possible domination of the lower-ranking officers. It was suggested that Soviet marshals act as spokesmen for the military in senior party circles. As such, they presumably have an important political role in the Soviet polity. This role seems to stem from the influence they exert over specific policy issues, rather than from any overt political ambitions on their part. It appears also to depend largely on shifting political alignments rather than on military preferences of the political leaders. When political leaders disagree on specific policy issues,

[35]Garthoff, "Khrushchev and the Military," *op. cit.*, p. 273. For a more recent assessment of the party's growing hegemony over the Soviet military, see Paul Wohl, "Military Hold in Kremlin Ebbs," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 1971. Also see Alfred L. Monks, "Evolution of Soviet Military Thinking," *Military Review*, March 1971, pp. 89-92.

[36]For example, such marshals as R. Malinovskii, A. A. Grechko, I. Kh. Bagramyan, M. V. Zakharov, I. I. Yakubovskii and Fleet Admiral K. Vershinin have concurred that the CPSU represents the decisive source of Soviet military power. For selective examples of their statements, see Malinovskii, "October and the Construction of the Armed Forces," *Kommunist*, January 1967, p. 36; Grechko, "Fifty Years on Guard of the Conquests of the Great October," *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 24, 1968; Bagramyan, "On Guard of the Fatherland," *Kommunist Armenii*, February 22, 1968; Zakharov, "Powerful Shield of the Motherland," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, February 23, 1969; Yakubovskii, "A Noble Mission," *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 23, 1969; Vershinin, "The Nation and the Army," *Trud*, February 23, 1969.

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there is greater scope for the military to influence policy outcomes. Lower military officers may feel constrained from expressing views which differ from those of their superiors because of the fact that top military officials exercise political as well as military control over them.

Conclusion

This study has enabled us to examine several interpretations of the various functions associated with Soviet strategic claims and the meanings that can be inferred from such claims. Our findings, based on data obtained from Soviet open literature, may be summed up as follows:

Soviet Claims and Actual Capabilities

The data reject the contention that strategic claims represent an accurate assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities during the years 1964-1970. We submit that Soviet claims are designed to serve political purposes, such as concealing vulnerability and enhancing credibility. Moreover, they appear to fulfill a changing function; in the years under consideration they were not intended to convey accurate information until the USSR had achieved some measure of parity with its major adversary.

Soviet Claims and the Communication Function

The communication function is used by Soviet leaders in an attempt to influence the outcome of American political debates. Empirical evidence suggests that Soviet claims were related to two important American debates during this period. The data tentatively indicate that through the use of claims the Soviets sought to communicate their position of strategic strength to the United States.

Soviet Claims and the Soviet Military Elites

The data show no discernible differences in the strategic claims made by top-echelon and lower-echelon military officers. This uniformity indicates that: (1) the Soviet military may be a homogeneous interest group; (2) the party may be supreme over the military; and (3) the top-echelon officers may dominate subordinates.

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APPENDIX I
Soviet Open Literature

A. *Soviet National Prestige Newspapers*

1. Trud
2. Izvestiya
3. Leningradskaya Pravda
4. Pravda
5. Sovetskaya Rossiya
6. Sovetskaya Torgovlya
7. Komsomolskaya Pravda
8. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta

B. *Soviet Republic Newspapers*

1. Bakunskii Rabochii
2. Kazakstanskaya Pravda
3. Kommunist Armenii
4. Kommunist Uzbekistana
5. Kommunist Tadzhikistana
6. Moskovskaya Pravda
7. Pravda Ukraina
8. Sovetskaya Belorussiya
9. Sovetskaya Latviya
10. Sovetskaya Moldavaya
11. Turkmenskaya Iskra
12. Sovetskaya Estoniya
13. Kommunist Litvii
14. Kommunist Kirgiza
15. Pravda Vostoka

C. *Soviet Military Newspapers*

1. Krasnaya zvezda
2. Sovetskii patriot

D. *Soviet Military Journals*

1. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil
2. Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika
3. Morskoi sbornik
4. Sovetskii voin
5. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal
6. Voennye znaniya
7. Voennyi vestnik
8. Vestnik Protivovozdushnoi Oborony
9. Tyl i Snabzhenie

E. *Soviet Nonmilitary Journals*

1. Agitator
2. Kommunist
3. Partinaya zhizn'

F. *Books*

1. Istoriya Voennogo Iskusstva (History of Military Art), 1966.
2. Voennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), 1968.
3. Shichit Mirovykh Neb (Shield of the Peaceful Skies), 1964.
4. V. I. Lenin i Sovetskie Vooruzhennye Sily (V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces), 1967.
5. Pyat'desyat Let Vooruzhennykh Sil Sovetskogo Soiuza (Fifty Years of the Soviet Armed Forces), 1968.
6. Sovetskie Sukhoputnyie Voiska (Soviet Ground Forces), 1968.
7. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union), 1969.
8. Problemy revolutiutsii v voennom dele (Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs), 1965.
9. Sovremmennaya Revoliutsiya voennykh del i ee znachenie (The Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs and its Meaning), 1965.
10. Marksizm-Leninizm o Voine i Armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army), 1965.

APPENDIX II
Soviet Strategic Claims Coding Sheet

I. NATURE OF THE CLAIMS

(a) Offensive — ICBM/MRBM, SLBM, or Long-range Bombers
(b) Defensive — ABM, SAMS, Aircraft, Anti-submarine
(c) Ambiguous — Used in cases where the claim indicated an uncertainty either in terms of offensive or defensive capabilities or a general statement such as: "Our armed forces are better than your armed forces."

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II. ASSERTIVENESS OF THE CLAIMS (based on the use of key expressions)

(a) Very Strong — Used to denote the superlative or absolute, as:
"We have achieved superiority over the USA in . . . ."
"Only we have the . . . ."
"We can destroy all your . . . ."

(b) Strong — Used to denote the absolute with a qualification, as:
"We can virtually (*faktycheskii*) penetrate the American ABM."
"Our missiles are virtually invulnerable."
Also associated with the word pairs "any of your" and "most (many) of your," as:
"We can destroy *any* of your . . . and *most* of your . . . ."

(c) Moderate — Used to denote adequacy or low-keyed claims, as:
"We have all that is necessary to . . . ."
"We have enough missiles to . . . ."
"Our military power is capable of . . . ."

III. STRATEGIC STATE CLAIMED BY THE SOVIETS (based on the use of key expressions)

(a) Parity* — Used to denote an equivalence between the strategic capabilities of the two superpowers and/or the capability of each superpower to inflict unacceptable damage upon the other even after suffering a first strike, as:
"Our forces are on a par with those of the USA."
"If we are attacked we can deal a crushing blow to the attacker."

(b) Superiority — Used to denote a first-strike or virtual first-strike capability, and consequently, the ability to destroy another state's strategic forces in a first-strike blow, as:
"Our missiles can successfully penetrate the American ABM system."
"In a future war, the USSR would survive but the enemy would not."

(c) Not Ascertainable — Used to denote an inability to classify a claim as indicating either parity or superiority, as:
"Our missiles possess a high degree of precision."
"The capability of our ABM forces is constantly improving."
"The capability of our armed forces has improved."

IV. POSITION OF OFFICIAL MAKING CLAIM
(a) Not able to classify (claims made in unsigned journal articles)
(b) Marshals and Admirals
(c) Generals and Colonels
(d) Party Political Officials

V. PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
(a) Not able to classify
(b) Non-PCC Military Officers
(c) PCC Military Officers
(d) PCC Political Officials

VI. DATE OF CLAIM (date reported by month and year)
January 1, 1964 to December 31, 1970

*The term parity must be used with caution since much ambiguity surrounds its definition. See Horelick and Rush, *op. cit.*, pp. 165, 178, and Urs Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik, *Strategic Terminology* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 82.

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BRAZIL'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN THE SEVENTIES: A CONFERENCE REPORT

THIS report summarizes the discussion at the Conference on Brazil's International Role in the Seventies held at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York on May 19-20, 1972 under the sponsorship of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The conference focused on three major themes: (1) economic trends; (2) political trends; and (3) implications of these trends for Brazilian foreign policy in the next decade. Throughout the conference an effort was made to assess the nature of the economic and political factors shaping Brazil's international role.

Economic Trends

Discussion of this topic opened with a series of general observations about the phenomenal expansion of the Brazilian economy. Over the past five years Brazil, with an annual rate of increase approaching 10 per cent, has enjoyed one of the world's most rapidly growing economies. The specific causes of this growth, however, were disputed by the conferees. Some argued that expansion was the inevitable result of past developments and fortuitous circumstances. Others attributed it to governmental policies and the relatively stable socio-economic climate created by the military government. While the overall view was that some combination of these two factors was responsible for Brazil's economic growth, no agreement emerged as to the precise mix of these elements.

The participants were in general agreement that the Brazilian leadership has pursued highly successful neo-capitalist economic policies. The military government has achieved remarkable results through cooperation with indigenous elites and foreign business interests. However, serious questions were raised regarding the nature and probable future course of this collaboration. Many participants were clearly impressed by the unprecedented growth rates attained under the military regime. Others questioned the cohesiveness of this elite coalition and expressed reservations about the depth of economic and administrative talent below the immediate circle of the Minister of Finance, Delfim Netto.

Although a majority acknowledged that past growth was largely attributable to a combination of fortuitous circumstances and

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reforms which could not be repeated, the prognosis was for continued expansion. Most participants agreed that growth rates exceeding 10 per cent might be difficult to duplicate in the years ahead but thought that, barring political discontinuities, Brazil was likely to realize rates of 7 to 9 per cent during the early 1970's.

The discussion then turned to a consideration of persistent flaws in the economy that have remained largely unaltered by high growth rates. One participant took to task the facile notion that growth is, in and of itself, productive of beneficial results. He noted the uneven distribution of Brazil's newly-created wealth. Frustrations induced by increasing modernization and the highly uneven distribution of wealth could eventually undermine the stability on which economic expansion is based. Other conferees noted divisions in Brazilian society between (1) modern and traditional sectors of the economy, (2) upper and lower social classes, (3) urban and rural populations, and (4) developed and underdeveloped regions. The radically different effects growth has had upon particular economic groups, social classes and geographical regions were discussed at some length. In each case, some argued that the benefits of growth have accrued largely to those already advantaged. However, the conferees were sharply divided on the importance of these divisions.

A spirited debate evolved between those favoring a continuation of present economic policies and those stressing the pursuit of policies which would serve to ensure a wider and more equal distribution of wealth. Some felt that it would be inopportune as well as unnecessary to recommend changes in governmental policies designed to redistribute wealth, primarily because of the possible obstacles they could create to further growth. Disregard of distribution issues, it was countered, was unjust and potentially disruptive. Such disregard would delay the development of a viable internal market. Thus, to some participants large-scale redistribution of wealth during the 1970's appeared premature; according to others, it should have been undertaken earlier.

Several conferees spoke at length on specific problems facing the Brazilian economy: unemployment, agriculture, inflation, population growth and urbanization. Unemployment and underemployment were held to pose serious difficulties. Several noted that simple economic growth will not necessarily result in major improvement in these areas. Since Brazil is still not unified economically, socially and geographically, it is difficult to achieve

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an equitable distribution of growth benefits throughout the nation. Even though the current unemployment level (which was seen as no worse than that of many other Latin American states) can probably be tolerated, this remains a long-term problem that will eventually have to be confronted. The inadequacy of economic statistics, especially in the field of unemployment, was discussed at some length.

It was noted that agriculture has been one of the neglected sectors in Brazil's economy. Agricultural production has grown only fast enough to meet the nation's pressing needs. Efficiency, in general, is low, and land ownership highly concentrated. Virtually no land reform has been attempted — probably because of unwillingness to affront existing owners and fear that production might initially decrease. Conferees generally agreed, however, that more equitable land distribution would not only contribute to social stability but eventually result in increased production.

Inflation also received considerable attention. Participants agreed that the government had been successful in reducing the exorbitant inflation of the early 1960's to a level of about 20 per cent. However, many questioned whether Brazilian economic planners actually want further reductions, since attempts at inflation control normally retard growth. One participant expressed the view that a 20 per cent rate of inflation is natural to a growing Brazil and is not harmful to her economy. Another argued that it is the stability of Brazil's inflation which is significant, and not its absolute level. The consensus was that inflation was likely to remain a persistent problem in the early 1970's.

In a discussion of demography and urbanization, participants pointed out that although the remarkably balanced growth experienced by Brazil's cities continues, it has been accompanied by social difficulties characteristic of such a trend. The population growth does not appear to be excessive for a nation with such vast resources and high rates of economic growth. Noting the unevenness of economic development, however, one participant suggested that high growth rates in São Paulo and the presence of valuable resources in Mato Grosso do not necessarily alleviate population pressures among the poor in an area such as Pernambuco. Migration from backward regions to areas of economic progress was viewed at best as an imperfect solution to the problem of basic disparities between regional economic levels.

According to one participant, Brazil possesses two of the three characteristics of a great power: a large population and an ex-

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tensive national territory. What is still required is a dramatic increase in the *quality* of the human element, including better opportunities for education, more extensive use of technology and further national integration. Although economic growth provides the resources for this process, it does not guarantee that basic improvements in levels of skills will take place.

In considering the major theoretical issues involved in Brazil's "neo-capitalistic" approach to development, the goals of economic strategy were a matter of primary concern. It was suggested that a subtle interrelationship exists between "pure" economic growth and a wider policy of national development. The simplistic notion that growth and development are identical was challenged. Although the participants agreed that development is the long-term aim of Brazilian policy, there was considerable controversy over the means to this end.

One group, apparently in consonance with Brazilian thinking, held that growth was a precursor to development. The chief danger to Brazilian progress was seen to be the premature dissipation of accumulated capital in "non-productive" areas. Moreover, it was argued that current policies had much more developmental fall-out than was generally appreciated (in health and education, for example). Those opposed to this view expressed the belief that development and growth could certainly be approached in a more balanced fashion than has been the case thus far. It was also suggested that wider distribution of benefits would hurt short-run growth less than was generally believed and, over time, would be essential for sustained economic expansion.

Most conference participants, however, expressed a general appreciation of the official Brazilian position on these matters. The government perceives a direct and causal link between its policies and Brazil's prosperity. Considering its "pure growth" strategy to be broadly consistent with the aim of national development, it seeks to build on its record of economic success and is committed to its current policies. In short, the neo-capitalist approach of the Brazilian government will probably continue. Barring political reverses or economic problems beyond Brazilian control, growth will continue also.

Considerable attention was devoted to Brazilian foreign trade options. No consensus developed, however, with regard to the importance of international commerce as a factor contributing to economic growth. Skeptics pointed to its insignificance in comparison with internal markets and its marked vulnerability to fluc-

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tuation. Those who saw foreign trade as important to the Brazilian economy pointed out that it accounted for 8 per cent of the GNP. In addition, they noted that foreign trade is essential for the acquisition of advanced technology vital to Brazil's development.

It was generally acknowledged that the extraordinary rate of growth in Brazil's foreign trade — 20 per cent annually from 1968 to 1971 — had resulted from unusual circumstances which were unlikely to be repeated in the near future. The 15 per cent annual increase over the course of the 1970's predicted by the government was held to be ambitious. Brazil might reasonably expect creditable levels of 10 to 15 per cent in annual growth but the achievement of these levels will not be easy. Numerous psychological, technical, administrative and policy questions remain unanswered, and the ability of the government to remove obstructions created by powerful and well-connected vested interests has still to be demonstrated. Despite these reservations, conference participants were optimistic about Brazil's foreign trade prospects.

The probable direction of the country's overseas economic relations during the next decade was a related topic of discussion. The United States will no doubt retain a major part of Brazil's trade, and Japan and African states may increase their trade with Brazil sharply. The growth in West European trade levels will keep pace with the expansion of the economies of the European Community. The role the Soviet Union and East European countries assume as trading partners depends mainly upon political factors.

Although a significant change in current Brazilian economic policy was considered unlikely, participants did not view modifications as unthinkable. Particularly in the event of an economic down-turn, some policy changes would be conceivable. One participant noted that there were potential pressures for change in three areas: in the existence of latent hostility toward foreign private investment, in the regional distribution of benefits, and in the relative allocation of these gains to specific social classes. These pressures are now held in check by prosperity and various national programs.

Political Trends

Consideration of Brazilian politics began with general agreement that the present regime has had notable success in achieving political stability *and* economic growth.

According to several participants, the government's efforts to increase institutionalization and the perception of political

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legitimacy were most important, but judgment on the course of these policies and their effectiveness sharply divided the group. Formal institutionalization in the conventional sense was recognized to be a distant goal. One significant strand of opinion, however, held that the Brazilian regime has achieved, to a surprising degree, an "informal" institutionalization of current procedures. Consideration of general policy questions is restricted to a workable, if obscure, decision-making group within the military. Decisions are, in turn, carried out by a faithful and relatively competent bureaucracy.

The apparent permanence of these arrangements and the largely credible claims of their success have produced a steady increase in the "legitimacy" of the regime. Several participants cited polls and statistics indicating a rising level of acceptance of Brazil's present political order, although the continued alienation of some intellectuals and continued opposition by other groups was also noted.

Few participants were willing to speculate about the tenure of the present government. The governing military, maintaining a residual commitment to a more open system, often indicates a willingness to return to democracy *after* the society has been "cleansed" and developed. This ideal may in the long run be confounded by habit and self-interest. No participant was able to identify political groups potentially capable of challenging the system. Only major discontinuities would lead to the emergence of such groups.

The role of the military within Brazilian society was briefly examined. It was generally agreed that the armed forces of Brazil have played a significant role in history. Having inherited much of its "moderating power" from the monarchy, the army has been tacitly accepted as the ultimate guardian of the social system. In recent years, however, the armed forces have abandoned their traditional "negative" role — the simple ouster of malefactors and the restoration of authority to untainted civilian hands. The contemporary military seems determined to exercise indefinite control over the social environment. Adding their administrative talent (a considerable input) to the skills of acceptable civilians, the Brazilian generals hope to make a significant break with the familiar Latin American pattern of cyclical government. One participant related this movement to a worldwide trend emphasizing performance over traditional governmental forms.

The military plays a dominant role in matters of internal securi-

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ty, defense and foreign policy. In the economic and social spheres, however, policymaking and administration (if not ultimate responsibility) are shared with a group of technically-oriented civilians. The technocrats around Finance Minister Delfim Netto enjoy a great degree of autonomy. In the private sector considerable freedom of action is permitted, even among those clearly out of favor with the current regime. The government, aware of its dependence upon a civilian technocracy, has subtly and successfully created a delicate balance among its technocrats, the internal and foreign business elites, and the principal factions within the military.

Continued success in the government's management of the economy depends essentially on two factors: (1) the extent to which the military maintains unity and resists the temptation to exercise direct control over the economy, and (2) the judiciousness with which the social factor is added to the economic and political mix. Divisions within the military were recognized, as were the continuous pressures created by such issues as inflation, unemployment and the unequal distribution of wealth. An economic down-turn, it was held, could draw these elements into sharper focus. On the other hand, the pride engendered among Brazilians by the government's successes and the seeming political skill of the military elite offer promising prospects for the continued viability of the political system.

Nationalism was also seen as a significant factor in contemporary Brazil, though it was noted that manifestations of national feeling were relatively low-key. One Brazilian participant offered a most elucidating view of this phenomenon. In his opinion, Brazilian nationalism was still quite strong and potentially capable of violent manifestations. At the present time, however, it could most accurately be characterized as "pragmatic." Brazil will interact with other nations to optimize its own interests rather than to gratify overweening national pride, because Brazilians have come to view concerted efforts to further their interests as much more "nationalistic" than noisy yet ineffectual posturing. He argued that Brazil may well emerge as a maverick within the international political system, relatively immune to classification within traditional typologies. There is little likelihood that the country could act as a tool of the United States in foreign or domestic policy. Instead, it will act in accordance with perceptions of Brazilian interests.

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Implications of Economic and Political Trends for Brazilian Foreign Policy

The conference next addressed itself to the implications of domestic political trends for Brazil's foreign policy. A large majority of participants believed that Brazil has strong aspirations not only to continue its economic development but also to seek an augmented regional role, and eventually even to acquire status as a major power. Many noted that these goals constitute a virtual article of faith among most segments of Brazilian society. Nearly all economic groups, social classes and political factions, both military and civilian, appear to subscribe to them. In fact, many of the divisions in society are attributable more to divergent opinions on how best to achieve increased international stature than to basic disagreement about the goals themselves.

There is Brazilian consensus, moreover, that insufficient industrialization, inadequate development of resources, and the low educational and technological level of the population preclude early achievement of these goals. In a certain sense, therefore, alternative political developments in Brazil are irrelevant. Virtually any regime in the 1970's was held likely to push for development and major power status.

Although the regimes of the past have envisaged this status as tied to varying global roles (Quadros and Goulart, for example, may have seen Brazil as a leader of the Third World), the governing group clearly recognizes that the country is inextricably involved in the Western, noncommunist, Christian tradition. Since the previous discussion had concluded that the present regime is likely to remain in power, some attention was devoted to an examination of its goals. No definitive agreement was reached about the priority attached to such goals as societal stability, maintenance of military discipline, economic development and the attainment of great-power status. It was generally assumed, however, that an effort would be made to achieve all four objectives.

Participants saw little evidence that domestic events would result in overtly antagonistic policies toward Latin American neighbors. Brazil will probably be preoccupied with internal matters and will not assume an overbearing attitude toward her neighbors for fear of provoking a hostile reaction in Latin America. Moreover, a surprisingly great number of her political and economic contacts are, and will continue to be, with the United States, Europe and other areas beyond the hemisphere.

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These objective realities will not, however, completely neutralize Latin American perceptions of a Brazilian hegemony.

This negative undertone may affect relations with other Latin American states in several ways. Historically, Brazil has often been viewed as expansionist, and the growth of her domestic capabilities in recent years may increase the perception of threat by the small bordering states — Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia — and her traditional rival, Argentina. These fears are aggravated by the not uncommon view that Brazil may be engaged in some form of collusion with the United States.

From another aspect, some participants pointed to the cross-national impact of the Brazilian regime. One can hardly ignore the fact that it was the first of Latin America's three current modernizing military regimes, followed by those in Argentina and Peru. The success of the Brazilian military as a developmental elite has had a particularly disquieting effect on the internal affairs of several sister republics, and was alleged to have contributed to the desire for change in Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and Panama.

The significance of Brazilian nuclear capabilities also elicited attention. While nuclear technology is at an embryonic stage and appears to be directed solely toward peaceful applications, Brazil does have the most advanced missile capabilities in South America. The military is not unaware of the potential of both of these programs. The general conference opinion was that Brazil could conceivably acquire a crude nuclear delivery system in this decade and that such a development would cause considerable concern among her neighbors.

There was little optimism about the prospects for greater cooperation between Brazil and other Latin American countries. The formation of an effective political-security system was deemed utopian and even the evolution of a looser association infeasible in the foreseeable future. Serious definitional questions divided the participants on the issue of Brazilian leadership in South America. It appeared to some that "leadership" was simply a function of regional primacy in terms of population, natural resources, economic power and other such traditional measures. By these criteria it is clear that Brazilian "leadership" is steadily growing. If, however, as other participants maintained, "leadership" implies a degree of hegemony acquired through persuasive or coercive capacities, Brazil does not qualify. One participant called

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into question the efficacy of the entire notion of "leadership" in a world of increasingly flexible international relationships.

Conferees differed about the extent of Brazil's interest in achieving a hegemonic position in Latin America. Some noted her military development in the nuclear field and her independent stand vis-à-vis other nuclear powers, and this led to the suggestion that the shape of her foreign policy ambitions could already be discerned in increased influence over neighboring nations such as Bolivia. Others, observing that there was no evidence of an urge to assume either economic, political or military leadership in Latin America, pointed to the lack of interest in regional activities, for example, LAFTA. Brazilians do not see themselves as restricted to any one particular political grouping. Thus, while Brazil is part of the inter-American system, she simultaneously holds membership in the Group of 77, the "West" and the Luso-Brazilian community.

One participant discussed Brazil's possible role in the South Atlantic region. This area has not felt the full weight of Brazilian influence. In view of cultural ties with Portuguese Africa and a potentially symbiotic economic relationship, however, this situation may well change.

There was general agreement that trade between Brazil and the communist bloc might increase in the next decade. Some participants made the point that, although such links could be developed, any significant change in economic relations would be dependent on political factors. Another countered this opinion, citing as evidence of Brazil's pragmatic approach to economic relations the acceptance by the present government of banking and currency arrangements reached with China by the Quadros-Goulart Administration.

Speculation about the future course of Brazilian-U.S. relations is necessarily based on assumptions about developments within both countries. Most participants foresaw a continuation of a "low profile" U.S. strategy toward Latin America, and Brazil in particular, in accordance with which the United States will eschew an actively interventionist role in Brazilian political, social and economic affairs. It was predicted that private American investors will have an even greater interest in Brazil in the 1970's than over the past decade, during which time U.S. investment in the country rose sharply.

Yet foreign affairs will not hold a pre-eminent position in matters of public policy in Brazil. Questions of political succession, the

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long-term role of the military, and maintenance of prosperity will be the principal concerns. There is little likelihood that any presidential aspirant will rely on foreign policy as a major issue area to bolster his political ambitions. Real or perceived economic interests will provide the only potential source of conflict with the United States (e.g., the 200-mile limit). Issues such as hemispheric security, relations with Cuba, or Soviet and Chinese influence are unlikely to lead to confrontation. One participant expressed the belief that ties between the two countries will gradually loosen in a mutually acceptable manner, although the process may be punctuated by occasional disagreements on relatively superficial matters. While acknowledging the unlikelihood of "confrontation," another participant noted possibilities for "divergence" of interests. Differences of opinion could be quite real (Brazilian nuclear policy), somewhat superficial (the 200-mile limit), or ephemeral but strongly perceived (threats to Brazilian sovereignty in the Amazon basin).

A third participant, while in basic agreement with these conclusions, commented on areas of U.S.-Brazilian compatibility during the 1970's. As large and prosperous nations, both Brazil and the United States will have a compelling interest in the stability of international relationships. In particular, both will favor maintenance of the legal and organizational integrity of the existing hemispheric system and the sanctity of international obligations. Thus it was seen as unlikely that Brazil will unilaterally expropriate foreign-owned corporations.

It was further noted that U.S. and Brazilian elites have generally enjoyed good relations in the past. They have developed a level of mutual respect which promises to endure. This basic compatibility is apt to be broadened as Brazil emerges as a "big country" with interests and problems similar to those of the United States. Finally, many North American elites are pleased with the economic success registered by Brazil. Hence the United States will probably maintain a positive attitude toward "the Brazilian model" of national development.

Various opinions were voiced about the implications of the "low profile" U.S. strategy for Brazil. One participant observed that this American policy is little more than recognition of the limitations on the capacity of the United States to exercise influence in world affairs. Brazil is likely to play a greater role in Latin America and, in fact, can hardly escape increased responsibilities. However, she may not seek to assume the traditional trappings of

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international leadership, preferring, rather, to play an independent role and maximize the interests she considers vital.

Brazil's economic standing, another participant suggested, is already having an effect on U.S.-Brazilian relations, since American and other foreign investors are making a concerted effort to take advantage of Brazilian investment opportunities. This situation serves to increase contacts between the two governments and at the same time provides Brazil with a unique opportunity to negotiate agreements favorable to Brazilian interests. Such arrangements seem likely to preclude the emergence of any real controversy over the dominating role of American private investment in the Brazilian economy.

Conclusions

Economic Considerations. In recent years the Brazilian economy has experienced phenomenal growth. This growth should continue during the next decade, at scarcely diminished rates, although such problems as inflation, lower growth rates in agriculture, and the effects of rapid, uneven economic development must be faced. The government will continue to pursue "pure growth" economic policies. At some point in time a wider distribution of economic gains will probably become necessary in order to ensure the stability of the existing order and provide for adequate growth of the internal market. The fundamental question, however, is when this "point in time" will arrive.

Despite these unresolved internal questions, Brazil's international economic influence will probably increase. Beyond expanding her already considerable markets in the Western world, she may play a greater economic role in the developing countries of Africa and may experiment with a "pragmatic approach" to trade with communist states. By the end of the decade she will also find her economic influence in Latin America enhanced. Whether she will attempt to participate more extensively in Latin American affairs remains an unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, question. The likely response of Latin American neighbors to future Brazilian economic policies produced no conference-wide consensus.

Political Considerations. Economic success, nationalist sentiments and a combination of fortuitous circumstances have given the current government a chance to establish a more viable political system. The military is deftly attempting to assure the "legitimacy" of its procedures, and thus far has enjoyed a grati-

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fying sense of accomplishment, although unforeseen events could have deleterious effects on efforts to broaden the base of its domestic support. There was agreement among participants that the current regime will plan to retain power over the next decade, and some felt that in the long run habit and self-interest will hamper attempts to "liberalize" the system.

Most participants agreed that the ostensibly "technocratic and apolitical" Brazilian development policy has the *political* consequence of strengthening existing elites. Although economic dislocation caused by political problems could weaken the regime, the government has succeeded thus far in maintaining a delicate balance among all important economic actors on the Brazilian scene.

Implications for Foreign Affairs. The impressive growth in Brazil's economic and political capabilities has had a significant effect upon her international relations. This trend can be expected to continue. Over the next decade, she will strengthen her position as the leading power in South America. This will make her the key element in any Latin American cooperative endeavors. It will present auspicious opportunities, but also the prospect of discord with neighbors resentful of her predominant position. Most participants, in fact, saw a greater likelihood of discord than cooperation between Brazil and other South American states. Historical animosities and the growth of Brazilian military power may well contribute to serious friction. Several Latin American states may feel threatened simply by the success of the military as a developmental elite. Moreover, Brazil's political contacts with extrahemispheric states are likely to increase and to follow the course of her economic ties. Such countries as Japan and South Africa may loom larger in her international affairs.

By and large, the conference saw Brazil's assumption of a greater role in foreign affairs to be compatible with the "low profile" policy of the United States. The two nations have virtually identical goals and increasingly similar interests. From time to time, however, disagreements will occur. There was a consensus that respect for these differences and a judicious cultivation of the long-standing affection between Brazilians and Americans provide the basis for an effective policy for the United States in its relations with the emerging Brazil of the 1970's.

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Conference Participants

Morris Allen
Director, American Republics Division
Office of International Commercial Relations
U.S. Department of Commerce

Dr. Denisard Alves
Research Associate
The Brookings Institution

Dr. Carlos A. Astiz
Department of Political Science
State University of New York at Albany

Dr. Norman Bailey
Department of Political Science
Queens College of the City University of New York

The Honorable Milton Barall
Consultant to the Organization of American States

Dr. Joel Bergsman
The Urban Institute

Niles W. Bond
Consultant

Miss Donna L. Brodsky
Administrative Assistant
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Dr. Marta Cehelsky
Department of Political Science
Brooklyn College
City University of New York

Dr. Douglas Chalmers
Latin American Institute
Columbia University

Dr. Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez
Chairman, Latin American Studies
Queens College of the City University of New York

Dr. William R. Cline
Research Division
Department of the Treasury

Dr. Robert T. Daland
Department of Political Science
University of North Carolina

Dr. and Mrs. Milton de Campos
Department of Chemistry
Dartmouth College

Dr. Kenneth Erickson
Department of Political Science
Hunter College
City University of New York

Dr. Hugo Faria
Area Chief Loan Administrator
Inter-American Development Bank

Dr. David Garza
Department of Political Science
Richmond College
City University of New York

Dr. Lincoln Gordon
Professor of International Economy
School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

Dr. Alberto Guerreiro-Ramos
School of Public Administration
Von Kleinschmidt Center for International and Public Affairs
University of Southern California

Dr. Harley Hinrichs
Department of Economics
U.S. Naval Academy

Dr. David C. Jordan
Chairman, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs
University of Virginia

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Dr. John J. Kennedy
Director, Program of Latin American Studies
University of Notre Dame

Dr. William R. Kintner
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute

George Little
Little and Wilgus, Inc.

Dr. M. S. Marzouk
Department of Economics
Atkinson College
York University

Dr. Michael Morris
Research Associate
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Dr. Walter L. Ness, Jr.
Department of Finance
Graduate School of Business Administration
New York University

Dr. Covey T. Oliver
School of Law
University of Pennsylvania

William Perry
Research Assistant
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute

Dr. Rollie E. Poppino
Department of History
University of California at Davis

Dr. Heinrich Rattner
Center for Urban and Regional Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic
Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs
University of Virginia

Dr. Stefan H. Robock
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University

Michael A. Samuels
Brazilian Affairs
Department of State

Dr. John Saunders
Department of Sociology
University of Florida

Dr. Ronald Schneider
Department of Political Science
Queens College of the City University of New York

Dr. Wayne A. Selcher
Chairman, Department of Political Science
Elizabethtown College

Dr. William N. Simonson
Director, Inter-American Studies Center
Temple University

Wayne Smith
Intelligence and Research—Soviet Affairs
Department of State

Dr. Istvan Szent-Miklosy
Department of Political Science
Queens College of the City University of New York

Dr. Jose A. Villegas
Institute of Latin American Studies
Columbia University

Harry Weiner
Assistant Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

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Gerald West
Research Associate
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Dr. Arthur P. Whitaker
Emeritus Professor of History
University of Pennsylvania

Dr. Jan Peter Wogart
Department of Economics
University of Miami

Dr. Jordan Young
Department of History
Pace College

THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO PEKING ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

by WILLIAM R. KINTNER

"If you want to read the kind of inside, probing, hard-headed memorandum which should be circulating at the top levels of the American Government, William R. Kintner's *The Impact of President Nixon's Visit to Peking on International Politics* is that kind of reading. It goes to the heart of things. The author has the credentials to be heard—and heeded. The 'Kintner Papers' are not classified, but they would be if they had been written in the White House."—*Roscoe Drummond, syndicated columnist.*

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Reviews

Will Clayton's Philosophy of Trade*

by Benjamin J. Cohen

President Nixon's New Economic Policy is now more than a year old. In its international aspects, this program has completely reversed a tradition of foreign economic policy stretching back more than a quarter of a century. Previously, America's attitude toward international trade relations, particularly with our industrial trading partners in Europe, Canada and Japan, was one of cooperation, even forbearance. For the sake of unity and strength in the Free World, we sponsored creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We negotiated multilateral tariff concessions on a wide variety of imported products, sometimes deliberately weighted to favor our friends largely at our own expense. We occasionally even tolerated forms of discrimination against U.S. exports built into the commercial practices of our allies.

Now, however, all has changed. The Nixon Administration has served notice that "Santa Claus is dead." No longer will we be so submissive to the interests of our trading partners. From now on our own commercial interests will be the paramount concern of policy. We have demanded wholesale revision of the commercial practices of our allies. We have demanded unilateral concessions on all kinds of import and export items. We have even demanded a renegotiation of the General Agreement itself.

Not unexpectedly, our allies have reacted with something less than enthusiasm. In fact, they have been both hostile and resentful, especially in the European Common Market. There, governments are determined to defend their joint tariff and agriculture arrangements at all costs, even if it means outright economic warfare with the United States; Japan and Canada, too, seem prepared to go to considerable lengths to protect their vital commercial interests. Global trade discussions involving all of the industrial countries, under the auspices of GATT, are due to begin sometime in 1973. In the meantime, the fate of the liberal and open postwar trading order hangs in the balance.

Obviously, this is a time for thinking anew about international trade policy. What better time could there be for publishing the *Selected Papers of Will Clayton,* edited by Frederick J. Dobney? As Assistant Secretary and then Under Secretary of State from 1944 to 1948, Clayton was the principal architect of America's postwar policies in the trade field—father

**Selected Papers of Will Clayton.* Edited by Frederick J. Dobney. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 298 pp. $8.50.

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of the tradition that has now been reversed by the Nixon Administration. He personally led the U.S. delegation in negotiating the General Agreement as well as the (stillborn) International Trade Organization. He also was largely responsible for shaping the British-American financial agreement in 1945 and the Marshall Plan in 1947. Even after he left government service in 1948, the stamp of his intellect remained firmly on American policy. In a very real sense, thinking anew about trade policy means thinking anew about Clayton's ideas.

I

Will Clayton was one of the more striking and original personalities to serve the United States in recent decades. A self-made businessman of modest origins, he rose to become a national policy-maker and world statesman of the first order. The central theme of his career was free trade (or at least liberalized trade policies), a cause to which he became converted, apparently, while still a teenager in Tennessee working evenings as a secretary. One evening he typed a speech for William Jennings Bryan, blaming the economic difficulties of the South on the protective tariff imposed by the Republican Party and eastern business interests— and was convinced. For the remainder of his life he was to be an uncompromising exponent of free enterprise principles in international commerce. He was also to be entirely realistic in his advocacy. That free trade "is essential to world peace and a rising standard of living," he argued, "no one can successfully deny; that it will be vigorously opposed by selfish minority pressure groups here and elsewhere is unfortunately certain." (p. 75.)

Clayton's fortune was made in the cotton business. Like most businessmen, he was an anti-New Dealer in the early 1930's. Unlike most businessmen, however, in 1936 he returned to the Democratic Party and endorsed President Roosevelt for re-election. His reason: the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program of Cordell Hull. As he told the press at the time: "A vote for President Roosevelt is a vote to keep Secretary Hull in office, where his work, just beginning to bear fruit, may go forward with infinite benefit to the nation and the world." (p. 6.)

In 1940 Clayton went to work in Washington, first in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, then in a succession of increasingly important government posts. The four years from December 1944, when he was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (becoming Under Secretary in 1946), until his resignation in November 1948, were the peak of his Washington career. Along with Dean Acheson he quickly became one of the two most influential men in the State Department. Clayton used this influence in every possible instance to promote his liberal philosophy of trade. It is that philosophy which is challenged and at issue today.

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II

Clayton's philosophy of trade was quite simple; it was also profound. Its intellectual heritage traced back directly to Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Its substance rested on the doctrine or law of comparative advantage. Multilateral free trade, he argued, would enable every country to specialize in the export of whatever it could produce relatively most cheaply, in exchange for what others could produce at comparatively lower cost. And this, in turn, would enable all countries to gain from the international division of labor. Economies would operate as efficiently as possible, incomes and productivity would be raised to their maximum, and businesses and consumers alike would benefit. Free trade would also serve as a vital instrument of world peace. With markets equally open to all, nations would have no need to resort to such weapons of economic warfare as preferences, discriminations, exchange controls, and the like. The tide of economic nationalism would be stemmed, and with it the forces of political and military nationalism as well.

Clayton carried this argument everywhere, with vigor and determination. In testifying before Congress in 1945, for instance, in favor of renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, he said: "Thus in the years before the war the trade-agreements program was an instrument for defense against an epidemic of destructive and demoralizing trade warfare. Today, with the end of the great holocaust finally within sight, this same instrument is transformed into a powerful device for shaping a better world. . . . Our purpose in the commercial-policy sphere is to move toward the goal of expanding world trade open to private enterprise, on a competitive and nondiscriminatory basis. We know of no better way than this to serve the economic interests of all peoples and to create the economic conditions which are conducive to the preservation of peace." (pp. 123, 124.)

Likewise, at the Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City in 1945, where he headed the economics section of the U.S. delegation, Clayton assured the nations of Latin America that the United States fully intended to help their economies make the transition from war to peace. But, he added, the United States (through the Export-Import Bank) would not make loans "for the establishment of enterprises which can only make their way through government subsidies or excessive tariffs. . . . it is our intention to work actively for international agreements to remove all discriminations in trade, to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade. . . ." (pp. 118, 119.)

This same intention was carried into the negotiations for the 1945 British-American financial agreement. Clayton knew that the British were in dire straits economically, that they needed assistance badly. He also knew that there was no way that Britain could immediately eliminate the Imperial Preference system then in opera-

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tion among the members of the empire. Nevertheless, he insisted that any aid be accompanied by an explicit British commitment to remove all such discriminations, and to help reconstruct a multilateral trade regime, early in the postwar period. "It would be unwise even to supply the funds as a credit without laying down conditions that would insure a sound advance towards our post-war objectives." (pp. 147-148.) This, he was convinced, was at least as much in Britain's interest as our own. In the end, such a *quid pro quo* (albeit in watered-down form) was attached to the $3.75 billion British loan when it was announced in December 1945.

The high point of Clayton's campaign for a multilateral trade regime was reached in the negotiations for the GATT in Geneva in 1947 and for the ITO charter in Havana in 1948. Both the GATT and the ITO charter reflected his intention to work toward elimination of as many barriers to trade as practicable. Both were grounded in the principles of nondiscrimination and reciprocity. Both envisioned a gradual approach, with the fewest possible exceptions, toward his ultimate objective of free and unrestricted world trade.

III

Several interesting questions are raised today by this philosophy of trade that Clayton pushed so hard and in so many different areas. In the first place, there is the question whether free trade per se really is as beneficial as he always insisted. He recognized no economic justification whatsoever for trade barriers. Tariffs, quotas, subsidies and the like were nothing more than a jungle to be cleared away as quickly and as thoroughly as possible, so that enterprising businessmen could get on with the task of maximizing world efficiency. Such an attitude was understandable in a man who had himself been a notably enterprising businessman. But such a prescription was not necessarily vindicable as a guarantee of maximum efficiency. Economic theory has developed somewhat since Clayton's day. Economists now understand that the argument for free trade holds only under conditions of perfect competition. In our more imperfect world, trade intervention may sometimes be justifiable on welfare grounds, even if only as a "second-best" instrument of policy.

For example, Clayton tended to underplay the problem of infant industries. This was especially clear in his remarks to the Latin Americans at the Chapultepec Conference; it was also clear in his insistence at Geneva and Havana that the principles of nondiscrimination and reciprocity be strictly applied to *all* countries involved, with minimum exceptions, even to the least developed among them. He was of course well versed in U.S. economic history. He knew the important role protective tariffs had played in fostering development of an industrial base in his own country. He also knew of the potential for similar industrialization elsewhere. Nevertheless, he

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apparently was never able to convince himself of the advantages of special exceptions for the purpose of promoting economic development. He was much more impressed by the possible abuses that might occur. Protection might be extended to so-called infants that in reality had no hope of ever growing up.

This aspect of Clayton's trade philosophy has come under increasing fire in the years since his retirement from public life. By now most governments have moved away from his position. Special exceptions for the purpose of promoting economic development are now the rule in international trade negotiations, rather than the exception. In the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations completed in 1967, the less-developed participants were released entirely from the obligation of reciprocity: they benefited from all tariff reductions while offering few if any concessions in return. More recently, the LDC's have also benefited from special tariff preference schemes instituted by, among others, the Common Market, Japan and Australia. Clayton would probably not be happy with this erosion of the principles he held so dear. But he would probably not be surprised, either, by the inefficiencies that, in practice, have so often been the main result. His concern about possible abuses is still a relevant issue today.

IV

A related question raised by Clayton's philosophy concerns the distribution of the gains from liberal or free trade policies. Is free trade really as beneficial *for all* as he insisted? Or is it possible that most of the gains would simply go to the most powerful—namely, the United States? Revisionist historians have already developed a comprehensive set of hypotheses concerning the motivation of U.S. foreign policy in the immediate postwar years. The principal objective, so the argument goes, was establishment of an American hegemony, a Pax Americana. In the trade area, the principal objective was to ensure maximum advantage for American business. Since the European and Japanese economies were prostrate, actually the only thing called for was elimination of foreign barriers to competition. The strength of American corporations could be relied upon to do the rest. Control of vital sources of raw materials as well as outlets for surplus industrial capacity would be consolidated; the American Empire would be assured. The "imperialism of free trade," it has been called—equal opportunity for unequals.

Ironically, evidence for such a radical view of history can be found, if one wants to look for it, in the papers of Will Clayton. In a speech delivered in Detroit in May 1945, Clayton said of U.S. trade policy: "Now, there is not one single element of the 'Santa Claus' philosophy in this policy. On the contrary . . . the United States will be one of its principal beneficiaries. . . . As you know so well here in this great industrial City of Detroit, we have enormous-

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ly increased our productive capacity during the war. . . . This productive capacity is now far beyond our domestic requirement. If we are to reach a satisfactory level of post-war employment, we must find markets abroad for this surplus production." (p. 131.)

However, it would be a sad injustice to Clayton's memory to pick a few quotations like these out of context, and to describe them as truly representative of his objectives as policymaker. A broader reading of his papers leaves no doubt that his motivations were much more universal. A charitable and generous man, he seems to have been concerned at least as much for the well-being of foreign populations as he was for the welfare of Americans. As he said in another speech in August 1946: "The United States is committed to the support of all sound measures which will contribute to an increase in the production and consumption of goods throughout the world to the end that people everywhere will have more to eat, more to wear, and better homes in which to live." (pp. 168-169.)

Still, the question remains: would U.S. trade policy have been quite so liberal after the war if our competitive advantage had not been quite so great? Would we have tolerated equal opportunity for unequals if it had happened that we, and not they, were the less equal? While in government service Clayton never directly addressed himself to this important question. (He never had to.) Yet it has become a real issue today. The American competitive advantage has clearly declined over the last quarter-century. Europe and Japan have not only recovered from the war: they have developed a dynamic competitive superiority in many lines of industrial output—from cameras to cars, from shoes to ships, from textiles to television sets. As a result, protectionist sentiment has been rising rapidly in this country, particularly since the conclusion of the Kennedy Round. To a large extent the Nixon Administration's New Economic Policy is a direct reaction to these trends in world markets and domestic politics. The issue at hand is whether this was the appropriate response to make —whether a traditionally liberal policy on trade relations really ought to have been abandoned so casually simply because our foreign trade position had begun to decline. One suspects that Will Clayton, for one, would not so readily have deserted his principles just because the shoe happened now to be on the other foot.

V

One last question raised by Clayton's trade philosophy concerns economic regionalism. Clayton himself abhorred trade blocs or other preferential arrangements, "in which a group of nations which cannot solve their problems by letting the rest of the world in, try to solve their problems by shutting the rest of the world out." (p. 127.) Blocs, in his opinion, reduced the benefits of trade, lowered economic efficiency, and even-

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tually even threatened the peace of the world. They were "the road to economic nationalism, restrictionism and regimentation, leading inevitably to international irritations and retaliation, and the creation of an atmosphere in which the seeds of conflict are sown." (p. 131.) Hence his determination to force the British to abandon Imperial Preference, and his insistence on including the principle of nondiscrimination in the GATT and the ITO charter. Clayton was an apostle of multilateralism.

On the other hand, he was not unalterably opposed to economic regionalism if it could serve as a steppingstone toward multilateralism. It all depended on the use to which regional discrimination was put. For example, in the policy discussions leading to the development of the Marshall Plan in 1947, Clayton became a principal advocate of cooperation and mutual tariff reductions among the European countries themselves. He was instrumental in creating the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. He went so far as to propose a full-fledged customs union throughout all of Western Europe. Free trade among the Europeans, he felt, would help to restore a healthy European economy, and thus hasten the day when free trade could be achieved for all.

Clayton would probably be disappointed by the use to which regionalism in Europe has been put in recent years. Free trade among the Europeans has not hastened the approach to free trade for all. Quite the opposite, despite the forbearance of the United States. The proliferation of preferential trading arrangements by the Common Market has served only to deepen the divisions of the trading world, and to encourage parallel discriminatory responses elsewhere. To some extent, this too helps to explain the Nixon Administration's tough new stand on trade policy. Again, the issue is whether it was the appropriate response to make; this may be the most pressing issue of trade policy calling for rethinking today. Should the United States respond to the challenge of the Common Market by consolidating a rival bloc of our own (and perhaps encourage the Japanese to consolidate a bloc of their own as well)? Or should we remember Will Clayton's advice about where that road leads? Much more than merely trade may depend on the outcome.

Moscow-Peking Relations: An Inside View*

by Vladimir Petrov

There have been many books written by outsiders about the Sino-Soviet rift, some of considerable academic stature. Many more have treated the subject as part of a broader study of Soviet — or Chinese — foreign relations. All have been based on printed materials, monitored broadcasts, chance

**Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye Otnosheniya, 1945-1970* (*Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970*). By O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov. Moscow: "Mysl'," 1971. 480 pp. $2.50.

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observations on the spot, and helpful conjectures. The picture of the conflict that emerges from these studies satisfies our intellectual curiosity. We feel that we know enough to understand what is going on and to explain major moves of the two protagonists. And there is always a handy working hypothesis around, to serve as a foundation for U.S. policy decisions vis-à-vis Moscow and Peking.

The thousands of statements, articles, brochures and books emanating from Moscow and Peking have either dealt with limited aspects of the conflict or been so blatantly propagandistic as to be near-worthless as documents. Now, with the appearance of *Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye Otnosheniya*, we have an opportunity to comprehend the conflict as it is seen by Soviet officialdom—a comparable volume is yet to be produced in China.

The present work by O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov not only surveys the whole range of Sino-Soviet relations over twenty-five years but has been developed from impressive research in the archives of the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the CPSU and other Soviet agencies involved in dealings with Peking. There are few of the footnotes we are so used to in Western studies, but direct references to specific exchanges, statements made at secret meetings and conversations of high officials are scattered throughout the book. Much of it is based on debriefings of Soviet technicians who had worked in China, diplomatic reports, and experiences of hundreds of journalists, artists, scientists and others who had visited China before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. The events of the Cultural Revolution and the savage molestations of Soviet officials, sailors, diplomats and their families, form the last chapters of the volume. Lavish space is given to the border incidents, especially after the clash on Damanskii Island in March 1969.

This is by no means an "objective" study: no party to a conflict of such dimensions ever produces objective studies. It is a carefully documented and well composed Soviet indictment of Maoist China. The authors, besides having solid academic credentials, have been personally involved in the convolutions of the conflict on the highest operational level, and it is safe to assume that the book was issued as a basic document reflecting the official Soviet view of the origins and evolution of Mao's heresy and the fundamentally anti-Soviet orientation of Maoist leadership.

Because this is a political document, there is greater stress on Chinese hypocrisy, perfidy and hostility than on episodes and developments indicating an effective Soviet-Chinese collaboration vis-à-vis the common enemy—Western, and particularly American, "imperialism." But since the book is primarily concerned with the bilateral relationship or, at the most, with the relations of the Soviet Union and China within that exclusive club, the Socialist Commonwealth and the international

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communist movement, its academic integrity need not be questioned too harshly on this ground.

As seen by the authors, periods of "good" relations between the two countries (and their communist parties) have been few, and even when they appeared "normal" the underlying tension continued and mutual suspicions were rife. Borisov and Koloskov pinpoint so many "turns to the worse" —in 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1969—that one's impression is of a steadily accelerated deterioration from some high point. This high point is not easy to establish but it probably was in 1954, when Khrushchev first visited Peking. Chinese cooperativeness, when it took place, appears to have been determined by Peking's pragmatic need for Soviet aid to build up China's economy and to arm the country against external enemies. The Chinese paid for this aid by "opening up" to the USSR, all along resenting the necessity of letting the Soviet influence in.

Externally, the Chinese became aware of the limitations of the fraternal aid in 1958 when, without prior consultation with Moscow, they launched an attack on Quemoy and Matsu; and a year later when they started a border war with India, a client already courted by the Soviets. In both cases, a perfunctory propaganda backing was accompanied by behind-the-scenes remonstrations. But as the signs of Mao's resolve to go it alone were registered in Moscow, the Soviets decided to pull their thousands of technicians out of China. This led to new tensions and moves toward greater independence on the part of the Chinese, and to the ultimate challenge to Moscow's role in the world communist movement.

The authors readily acknowledge that the early manifestations of Mao's anti-Sovietism—traced back to the 1940's and even the 1930's—had either been unknown at the time or dismissed by Soviet "China-watchers" as temporary aberrations. It appears that, aside from technical assistance and economic aid, Moscow has never had significant leverage in Peking. What may be called a pro-Moscow faction in the Chinese Communist Party was never strong; Mao began purging pro-Soviet elements while still hiding in the caves of Yenan—and liquidated the rest of them by 1960.

One gets a strong feeling that in the absence of a direct and immediate threat from a common enemy, ideological affinity simply was not sufficient to preserve the alliance. The fact that both China and the Soviet Union are still regarded—and regard themselves—as integral parts of world communism is attributable more to the pressures against a total break from other ruling and nonruling fraternal parties (which may or may not benefit from the Sino-Soviet conflict) than to the good will and determination of the antagonists themselves.

To be sure, Borisov and Koloskov, carefully measuring their conclusions, leave the door for recon-

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ciliation open, quoting to that effect Brezhnev's and Kosygin's recent statements. But the overall impression is that few people in Moscow entertain such hope; that in moderating their responses the Soviets merely conduct a holding operation, trying to prevent a bad situation from getting much worse too rapidly. The authors' implied contention that Mao is first and foremost a "great-power chauvinist" seems to be justified by Peking's foreign policy reversal since the book was published. The motivation behind this change—and the authors are quite explicit on this point—is not the Chinese fear of a Soviet armed attack but a desire to turn China into a fully independent global power. Given the communist nature of China's socio-political structure, this independence can only be achieved by assuming an anti-Soviet stance, so appealing to the United States and other "Western imperialists."

By Soviet standards, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye Otnosheniya* is remarkably low-keyed and almost devoid of propaganda overtones. It is to be hoped that the book will be published in English, making a valuable addition to our understanding of one of the most momentous conflicts of our time.

1914 AND 1941: THE MILITARY PARALLELS*

by William J. Spahr

The first volume of Aleksander Solzhenitsyn's latest work, *August 1914,* leaves the reader with powerful impressions of the author as a man and of his story as political allegory. These do not extend to questions of Russian literary style, about which the present writer is not qualified to comment in any case, or historical accuracy. My observations, consequently, are not intended as a review, but to point out some possible implications that may have been considered when the novel was presented for publication in the Soviet Union.

Utilizing the opening battles on the Eastern Front in World War I as his setting, Solzhenitsyn depicts the agony of the clumsy initial Russian advance into East Prussia which wasted the flower of the Imperial Army in an effort to relieve the German pressure on France. Unsparing in his criticism of the operation's concept and execution, he nevertheless does not use the defeat as an anti-war vehicle. Instead, he impresses as a Russian patriot with classic views of the need to defend the nation militarily and the role of enlightened leadership in that defense. He rejects pacificism and Tolstoyism, as he dissects the inept military and diplomatic leadership that led to the Russian defeats in the first month of the war. Here his attitudes appear to coincide with long-held Soviet views on pacificism and the need for competent leadership if the Russian people and land are to survive.

Why, then, could this novel not be published in the Soviet Union? Was Solzhenitsyn being punished for past transgressions? Was it be-

**Avgust Chetyrnadtsatogo* (*August 1914*). By A. Solzhenitsyn. Paris: YMCA Press, 1971. 573 pp. $10.00.

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cause he, a stubborn man as well as a courageous one, insisted on spelling *Bog* (God) with a capital "B"? Or was it because his analysis of the failures in Russian leadership in 1914 showed them to be remarkably similar to those of 1941? To a thinking man such as Solzhenitsyn, the parallels between August 1914 and the summer of 1941 must have been obvious; to the Soviet people who have suffered because of 1941, they could have been easily perceiveable; to those responsible for Soviet ideological purity, they were anathema.

Early in the book the reader becomes aware that Solzhenitsyn seems to be describing familiar situations and relationships. Having campaigned in the Baltic Uplands in 1945, he has, of course, seen the locale of what the Germans chose to call the Second Battle of Tannenberg. It is not surprising that he can evoke a credible mental picture of the East Prussian frontier towns which probably appeared much the same in 1945 as they did in 1914. Certainly, the evergreen forests, well kept by a new generation of *forstmeister,* were still as neat and the firebrakes were still accurately plotted on the German maps of the area.

These details are only part of the story's facade. What seems uncannily accurate are Solzhenitsyn's descriptions of the incompetence of the Russian high command, the lack of a plan, the absence of communications, the failure of intelligence, and, as the German Army exploits these shortcomings, the tragic fate of those who must make the final payment. Then it occurs that the events of August 1914 are remarkably parallel to those of the summer of 1941, and that Solzhenitsyn has been, like others of his generation, intimately involved in a similar catastrophe.

At first glance, the opening phases of the two World Wars seem to have been completely different: in 1914 the Russian Army took the offensive against the German forces in East Prussia; in 1941 the Red Army was caught by surprise and driven back from the frontier with heavy losses. In both cases, however, the soldiers of Russia were executing faulty strategic plans. In 1914 the undertrained, badly led, poorly equipped Imperial Army attempted to envelop the German forces in East Prussia by attacking concentrically with two armies, between which there was limited physical and signal communications contact, over terrain of scattered lakes and forests that severely restricted lateral communication. The Germans, in addition to having the advantage of defending terrain familiar to them, enjoyed a superior rail network to their rear and a signal intercept service that permitted them to anticipate the movements of the Russian units.

In 1941 the Red Army was indoctrinated with what Khrushchev later characterized as the "bragging tone" of the Soviet press and communist political propaganda, which proclaimed that if an enemy violated Soviet soil he would be stopped, ejected, and then defeat-

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ed on his own territory. The hold on Stalin of this self-delusion was so strong that Soviet units along the border were ordered to counter-attack the day after the Germans crossed the frontier, even though the strength and disposition of the enemy were not known and the Red Army was reeling backward in confusion.[1] These untimely attacks facilitated rather than hindered the German advance.

The competence of the field commands in 1914 and in 1941 was suspect. Solzhenitsyn outlines the relationships among the senior officers in the Tsarist army's high command and the role of court intrigues in their appointment. Samsonov, the commander of the ill-fated Second Army, had not spoken to Rennenkampf, the First Army Commander, since the Russo-Japanese War. Zhilinskiy, Commander of the Northwestern Front (army group), owed his appointment to War Minister Sukhomlinov, who was close to the court of the Dowager Empress. The position of the Supreme Commander, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, the Tsar's cousin, was uncertain because of the attitude of the Empress Alexandra. The Russian high command in 1914, with few individual exceptions, has been almost unanimously judged to have been incompetent.[2]

In 1941 the Soviet commanders of the Western and Kiev military districts, the geographical commands that bore the brunt of the initial German attacks, had also received their appointments as the indirect result of a type of political intrigue—the deadly intrigues of Stalin and his secret police in 1937 and 1938 which had led to the baseless "repression," to use the Soviet euphemism for execution, of "thousands of leading workers of the army and the fleet."[3] In June 1941, D. G. Pavlov, commander of the Western Special Military District, and M. P. Kirponos, commanding the Kiev Special Military District, were each the fourth commanders of their respective districts since the onset of the purges in 1937. Both were evaluated by the young graduates of the Academy of the General Staff as being far out of their depth. L. M. Sandalov, one of the Academy's first graduates, found Pavlov to be lacking in the broad operational-strategic outlook necessary for the commander of the important Western Military District.[4] I. Kh. Bagramyan, a classmate of Sandalov's at the Academy, remarks that Kirponos had made a remarkable leap from command of a division to command of one of the most important military districts in one year. He also quotes

[1]Cf. G. K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya* (Moscow: Novosti, 1969), pp. 259, 260; L. M. Sandalov, *Perezhitoye* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1966), p. 114.

[2]See, e.g., Geoffrey Evans, *Tannenberg 1410: 1914* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1971), p. 158; G. L. McEntee, *Military History of the World War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), pp. 96, 99, 107.

[3]Yu. P. Petrov, *Partiynoye Stroitel'stvo v Sovetskoy Armii i Flote 1918-1961* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1964), p. 302.

[4]Sandalov, *op. cit.*

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the comment of the Chief of Staff of the Kiev Military District, General Purkaev, on the appointment of Kirponos: ". . . Our cadres of senior leaders are exhausted. There is no one to choose from."[5]

The personal fates of these unfortunate selections for command in 1914 and in 1941 were also sadly similar. In 1914 Samsonov killed himself when his Second Army was surrounded; Rennenkampf and Zhilinskiy were relieved in disgrace. In 1941 Pavlov was shot as a traitor and Kirponos was killed attempting to escape the German encirclement at Kiev.

The hero of Solzhenitsyn's new work, the fictional Colonel Vorotyntsev, a recent graduate of the Academy of the General Staff, is allowed to move freely over the battle area as the personal representative of the Supreme Commander. He serves Solzhenitsyn as an expert witness to the events he tries futilely to influence. In desperation, he organizes a band of stragglers to attempt to hold the advancing Germans. Mentally he reviews the possible arguments he can use to make the men fight—the Tsar, the Church, the Alliance—and realizes there is only one basis, Russian patriotism in its most profound expression, that can make these men return to the battle. In 1941 and 1942 Stalin, faced with a similar problem, arrived at a similar solution, evoking the traditional symbols of Russian, not Soviet, patriotism to inspire the people to resist.

[5] *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal,* January 1967, p. 57.

Vorotyntsev also represents for Solzhenitsyn the ideal of the professional staff officer who must experience the yearnings and needs of the soldier and who must touch the ground over which the units have passed before he can really understand the campaign. Through Solzhenitsyn's consciousness of history, Vorotyntsev anticipates that another serious defeat similar to that suffered in the war with Japan will damage permanently the Russian nation's backbone.

Although the scope of Vorotyntsev's activities and those of the other actors in the novel provides a broad view of all echelons of the army, Solzhenitsyn's main concern is with the leadership. He rejects, as contrary to twentieth-century experience, Tolstoy's thesis that the troops are not led by the generals. For him, it was the failure of Russian leadership in the first battles in 1914 that defined the entire course of the war.

In 1941, the first graduates of the Academy of the General Staff, which had reopened in 1936, were observer-participants in the general chaos that followed the German attacks. Only one, M. V. Zakharov (until recently Chief of the General Staff) has been credited with influencing significantly the situation of the unit to which he was assigned at the start of the war. Zakharov, as Chief of Staff of the Odessa Military District, dispersed his aircraft and alerted his troops and thus avoided the heavy losses suffered by other districts on June 22, 1941. However, the influence of the other graduates increased

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gradually as Stalin found from experience that following his own intuition and the advice of such favorites as Voroshilov, Budyenniy, Mekhlis and Kulik led only to disaster. By late 1942 Stalin was turning to such professionals as Zhukov and Vasilevskiy for advice, and the General Staff itself had stabilized with the arrival of A. I. Antonov. It took Stalin eighteen months to learn the lesson. No one knows the number of casualties this tedious process cost the Red Army.

Russian casualties in the initial battles on the Eastern Front in 1914 are estimated to have been as high as 300,000 men.[6] General Guderian claims that 665,000 prisoners were taken in and around Kiev in September 1941.[7] In terms of individual human tragedy, these numbers are almost beyond comprehension. Whether they are exact or not, whether they have been exaggerated by 10 or 20 per cent, is irrelevant, both because of the immeasurable suffering inflicted on relatives by casualties on any scale and because of the damage such losses do to the fabric of an army.

Expressing anguish over the Second Army's losses in 1914, Solzhenitsyn's hero, Vorotyntsev, cries out: "If this were a purely military question you could convince me and I would be silent. Really, it could be corrected in other places, in other battles. But this is not a military question, do you understand? This is a *moral* question! To lead your people unprepared to the sacrifice—this is beyond the limits of strategy. Having endured to the end! . . . They take it upon themselves to *endure* all of *our* sufferings! . . and to the end! —without ever visiting the front lines! . . ."

To which Vorotyntsev's friend replies: "All the same you won't help anything. . . . Everything will remain the same and you will break your head. Russia must without fail be led by fools, Russia can't be otherwise. I'm telling you the facts. Sit smartly and work quietly." (p. 554.)

The scope of the initial defeats in 1941 has been a historical embarrassment to a political party which develops its plans and policies using the "scientific" methods of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Among the Soviet people the question has remained alive even though it has been answered many times in officially-approved histories of the war. In 1914 "they" who had taken it upon themselves to endure the sufferings of the troops were the high command, the ruling clique around the Tsar. In 1941 "they" were Stalin and his henchmen who had arrogated to themselves the complete direction of the defense effort. Despite the de-Stalinization campaign of the Khrushchev years, many of them and their heirs still hold the reins of power in the Soviet Union. They have never fully answered for 1941.

[6]McEntee, *op. cit.*, p. 109. This figure includes casualties up to September 11, 1914, when Zhilinskiy was relieved.

[7]Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1961), p. 173.

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Solzhenitsyn has planned *August 1914* to be the first part of a trilogy. Judging by the first volume, the entire novel will be concerned with the failure of the Russian national leadership in the 1914-1917 period and the corroding influence of the resulting military defeats on the social fabric of the nation. It is a theme that has universal application although it is expressed in historical Russian terms. Whether or not there will be parallels in subsequent volumes between the Russian and Soviet experience will only be answered if they are published. That there must be doubt about this is due not only to life's uncertainties but also to the possibility that the Soviet regime may somehow prevent their publication. This situation provides the final ironic parallel between 1914 and 1941. *August 1914* will not be published in Russia under the Soviets nor could it have been published in Russia under the Tsars.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION—NATION-STATE INTERACTION
An Annotated Bibliography

Edited by David Burtis, Farid Lavipour, Steven Ricciardi, Karl P. Sauvant

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I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Basic Cases in Public International Law. Edited by Aurie N. Dunlap. New York: MSS Educational Publishing Company, 1971. 391 pp. $10.00. The thirty-six cases included in this volume are designed to be used in conjunction with lecture materials on fundamental concepts and problems of public international law.

The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume III: Conflict Management. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 413 pp. $12.50. Eleven experts seek to assess the role of law in the management of conflict, analyzing both current conditions in the world and the prospects for the legal control of international violence. An introductory chapter by Cyril Black focuses on "Conflict Management and World Order." Among the other contributors are William Bader, Arnold Kramish and Mason Willrich, who discuss how conventional and nuclear weapons might be controlled to reduce the risk of future wars.

Major Ideologies: An Interpretative Survey of Democracy, Socialism and Nationalism. By Alexander J. Groth. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971. 244 pp. $7.50 ($3.95, paper). This survey of three ideological mainstreams of the contemporary world gives the novice student background information about each ideology and discusses their complex interrelationships, similarities and differences. Particular attention is paid to the institutional and policy expressions associated with each ideology.

The Multinational Enterprise in Transition: Selected Readings and Essays. Edited by A. Kapoor and Phillip D. Grub. Princeton, N.J.: The Darwin Press, 1972. 505 pp. $14.95. These thirty-four readings provide a comprehensive guide to all phases of the multinational enterprise. MNE's are examined with regard to their origins and role in the world economy; organizational structure and management; accounting, finance and taxation; manufacturing and industrial competition; marketing, product planning and advertising; political risks and relations with host governments, and future prospects.

Politimetrics: An Introduction to Quantitative Macropolitics. By Ted Robert Gurr. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 214 pp. $4.95 (paper). In this examination of the basic methods used for the quantitative comparative study of political groups, institutions and nations, Professor Gurr surveys principles and problems associated with operationalization, data collection, data analysis, and interpretation of results. Three contrasting case studies are utilized to illustrate how practicing researchers applied these principles and dealt with these problems.

Principles of World Politics. By George Modelski. New York: The Free Press, 1972. 370 pp. n.p. Part I of this text examines the evolution of world politics,

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including globalization, autonomy, the state as an organization, and nationalization. Part II deals with the nation-state system, discussing the role of the great powers, diplomacy, responsibility, and the reality of world society. Part III expounds the various principles of world politics: the complex international system, and survival, order and justice. Using both traditional and behavioral treatments of the subject, the author sees world politics as a continuing process of dealing with problems of order and justice.

Readings on National and Regional Foreign Policies. Edited by Aurie N. Dunlap. New York: MSS Educational Publishing Company, 1971. 199 pp. $5.00 (paper). A custom-made book of readings prepared for use in the editor's course in world politics. The selection of articles on the foreign policies and problems of individual nation-states and of certain regional groupings stresses recent developments and trends.

The Riot Makers. By Eugene H. Methvin. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1970. 586 pp. $10.00. This analysis of the "technology of social demolition" provides valuable insights into how riots are organized and instigated and how they can be defused. The author, an Associate Editor of *Reader's Digest,* draws his materials from ten years of eyewitness experiences, extensive research into communist and noncommunist writings and practices, and interviews with hundreds of police, diplomats, educators, intelligence agents, communist party members and ex-members, and riot leaders, participants and victims. Although the study grew out of the author's concern with riots abroad, he focuses his attention on riots in the United States since 1964, such as those in Berkeley, Detroit, Newark, Chicago, Atlanta, New York (Harlem and Columbia University), Los Angeles (Watts) and Washington, D.C.

Theory and Policy in International Relations. Edited by Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 250 pp. $8.50 ($2.95, paper). A collection of articles, also issued as a special supplement to *World Politics,* ascertaining the relevance and usefulness of international relations theory for policymaking. In their introduction, the editors assess the "state of the art," the importance and liabilities of theory for the policymaker, and the problems of organizing knowledge to meet the needs of the policy community. In succeeding chapters Robert North and Nazli Choucri discuss mediated stimulus-response models for long-term decision-making; Morton Halperin and Graham Allison consider a bureaucratic politics model; and Davis Bobrow and Alan Whiting evaluate these theoretical contributions and suggest where further research and theorizing may be needed.

The Year Book of World Affairs 1971. Volume 25. New York: Praeger, for the London Institute of World Affairs, 1971. 343 pp. $16.50. Besides the usual articles on a wide variety of topics and the extensive annual review of world affairs, this volume includes a cumulative analytical index of the major contributions in twenty-five years of series publication. In their selections the editors strive to preserve a balance between theoretical and practical approaches and to emphasize political, institutional, economic and other problems.

II. United States and Canada

Crises of the Republic. By Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1972. 240 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). The crises of the last decade in the United States are viewed, in this collection of essays, as challenges to the republican form of government. From the standpoint of a political philosopher, Dr. Arendt examines, defines and clarifies the current concerns of the American citizen.

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The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem. By Edward L. King. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972. 246 pp. $6.95. In this scathing indictment of the U.S. Army, a Lieutenant Colonel, who served twenty-three years in the army before retiring in 1969, condemns the military on almost all conceivable counts: poor training of troops in boot camp, favors extended to the armaments industry at taxpayers' expense, deliberate misrepresentations to Congress about the state of readiness, blatant racial prejudice, unrealistic and shortsighted strategies in Germany, Korea and Viet Nam, aggressiveness and laxity of ethics in career officer mentality, and special privileges in assignments and promotions given to West Point graduates. He warns of the dangers of an all-volunteer army and offers a blueprint for extensive reform to revitalize the military machine.

Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938. By Stephen E. Ambrose. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971. 352 pp. $2.45 (paper). American involvement in World War II, the Cold War, the Korean conflict, the Berlin crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion and Viet Nam are related to the United States' rise to, and maintenance of, global power. The author also seeks to ascertain how such traits of the American character as economic aggressiveness, racism and fear of communism impinged on the development of foreign policies to support this global role.

Strategic Power and National Security. By J. I. Coffey. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972. 214 pp. $9.50. Dr. Coffey, Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and veteran analyst of national security affairs with service on the White House staff and the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State, surveys weapons technology and its military and political implications for the 1970's. After examining such issues as deterrence and defense, alliance relationships, communist military strategy and capabilities, nuclear proliferation, and arms control, he refutes the argument that American security requires "superior" strategic offensive forces or extensive air and missile defenses.

Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making. By Bruce Thordarson. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972. 231 pp. $2.95 (paper). This study assesses Prime Minister Trudeau's protracted reappraisal of Canada's foreign policy undertaken during the first years of his administration, 1968-1970. Although the review did not produce any major new insights into practical foreign policy problems, it did serve a useful domestic function by stressing the limitations of Canadian power and developing a more precise concept of the national interest.

The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. By John Lewis Gaddis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 396 pp. $12.50 ($3.95, paper). In this "post-revisionist" account of the origins and causes of the Cold War, Dr. Gaddis, Associate Professor of History at Ohio University, acknowledges the contributions of New Left scholars; argues that their stress on economic considerations in U.S. diplomacy has provided too narrow a focus; points out that "internal influences in the Soviet Union—the search for security, the role of ideology, massive postwar reconstruction needs, the personality of Stalin—together with those in the United States—the ideal of self-determination, fear of communism, the illusion of omnipotence fostered by American economic strength and the atomic bomb"—produced a hostile confrontation; and concludes that, while neither side can bear sole responsibility for the onset of the Cold War, U.S. officials had a narrower range of policy alternatives open to them than did Stalin and his comrades.

III. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? By Josef Korbel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 302 pp. $10.00. Dr. Korbel discusses in detail the changes

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in mood, policy and relationships that have ushered in a new era in intra-European relations. He gives major credit for the relaxation of tension to the Soviet bloc countries which have on numerous occasions submitted concrete proposals for the solution of critical problems; points out that this initiative has facilitated rapprochement policies, such as West Germany's *Ostpolitik,* but has also weakened the political and cultural ties that have bound West Germany to the United States; and concludes that any designs for a stable European détente must be accompanied by a reduction of tensions between the superpowers themselves.

Duce! By Richard Collier. New York: Viking Press, 1971. 447 pp. $12.50. A fascinating account of the rise and fall of Benito Mussolini. Besides depicting the magnetism and the complexity of Mussolini's own personality, the author portrays the many conflicting elements in Italy during the rule of the flamboyant fascist dictator.

Ireland's English Question: Anglo-Irish Relations 1534-1970. By Patrick O'Farrell. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 310 pp. $11.50. In this reinterpretation of Anglo-Irish history, Professor O'Farrell identifies as the major reason for British failure to solve the Irish question the fact that the problem has not been primarily a political one, but rather an historical and religious one—a question of identity. He examines the Irish nationalist movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and Irish-Vatican relations, and notes the suspicion with which the Church has regarded the secular political movements.

Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson. Edited by A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 338 pp. $10.00. The present Countess Lloyd George preserved the record of her romance with the eminent British statesman who was one of the "Big Four" at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Included in this diary are her memories of international conferences she attended with Lloyd George as his confidential secretary, and descriptions of many personalities in British public life during and after World War I, from Herbert Asquith and Lord Kitchener to Winston Churchill and the then Prince of Wales.

Nuclear Politics: The British Experiment with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970. By Andrew J. Pierre. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. 378 pp. $18.75. This survey of Britain's nuclear experience examines domestic political issues as well as the broader concerns of arms control, disarmament, nuclear collaboration, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and military strategy. Dr. Pierre states that the security of Britain and Western Europe rests more and more upon a policy of political and military integration, with nuclear collaboration as the first step in this direction.

The Unique Partnership: Britain and the United States. By Arthur C. Turner. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971. 216 pp. $6.95. Professor Turner reviews the history of the Anglo-American "special relationship," assesses its current benefits and liabilities for both partners, and offers a view of its future possibilities. Because the partnership springs from a perceived common interest based on tradition and history, he believes Britain is unlikely to make a clear and final choice between her special ties with the New World and the new links she is forging with the Continent.

The West German Legislative Process: A Case Study of Two Transportation Bills. By Gerard Braunthal. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. 290 pp. $11.50. A detailed description and assessment of the West German legislative process, focusing on two highly contested bills—the Transportation Finance Act of 1955 and its companion Highway Relief Act. Utilizing unpublished materials to develop his case study, the author sheds light on the

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interplay and power relationships of political parties and institutions, interest groups, elites and the public. In his conclusions, he ponders whether the legislative process in this case reflected the democratic nature of the political system and whether the political actors were satisfied with how the system performed in terms of their own expectations.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The Medvedev Papers: The Plight of Soviet Science Today. By Zhores A. Medvedev. London: Macmillan, 1971. 470 pp. $11.95. This book, by a Soviet biochemist and gerontologist who also wrote *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko,* is both a personal document on the problems of Soviet science and a plea for the rationalization of the Soviet bureaucratic system. Medvedev does not oppose the Soviet system, but he finds its preoccupation with red tape and secrecy both frustrating and wasteful. The book is a translation of two *samizdat* manuscripts, "Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World," and "Secrecy of Correspondence Is Guaranteed by Law." The central theme of both is the waste and duplication brought about by the restrictions on travel and communication imposed on Soviet scientists by the bureaucracy—less often deliberately than as a result of the "normal" irrational functioning of the system.

The Rosa Luxemburg Contraceptive Cooperative. By Leopold Tyrmand. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 287 pp. $5.95. In the guise of a handbook on how to live under communism, a well known Polish emigré details the indignities that confront the citizen of a Marxist state from birth to death. He provides a humorous and sobering account of life in a Marxist society for those who wonder what it is really like.

The Soviet State: An Aging Revolution. By Robert G. Wesson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972. 222 pp. $3.95 (paper). This abbreviated version of the same author's *The Soviet Russian State* is aimed at a wider audience. It begins with a brief comparison of life in the Soviet Union and the United States, traces Russian history from Tsarist times through the building of the Soviet state, and then discusses the work of the Communist Party in managing the government, the economy, public opinion, the military and the many ethnic minorities. The final chapter reviews trends in the tightening and loosening of party authority and considers possible directions of change. The author stresses the leading role of the party and the legitimizing (as opposed to operational) role of Marxism-Leninism. He sees Soviet society as reasonably stable and orderly, with its conservative, aging leadership unwilling to give up any of its power and privileges.

The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union. By Marshall I. Goldman. Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1972. 372 pp. $7.95. A major purpose of this book is to document the fact that the Soviet Union suffers environmental disruption as extensive as our own. Professor Goldman, a specialist on the Soviet economy, believes the speed of industrialization and not the form of government is the cause of the problem. Both the disadvantages and the advantages of state control are discussed in the process of analyzing how the current situation has come about. The conclusion is that, while Soviet priorities lie with production rather than conservation, there are state controls which could be applied to make the Soviet Union one of the most successful conservationist nations.

V. Middle East and Africa

Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel. By Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein. New York: David McKay, 1972. 246 pp. $6.95. Mr. Schiff, a member of the editorial board of *Ha'aretz,* Israel's leading newspaper, and Mr. Rothstein, the

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Ha'aretz correspondent in New York since 1968, have collaborated on this account of the Palestinian Arab fedayeen. They describe fedayeen origins, military capabilities, ideological doctrines, relations with Moscow and Peking, aerial hijackings and other acts of terrorism, internecine squabbling, and political successes and setbacks, including their rise to a position of strength in Jordan and subsequent collapse. In a final chapter, they appraise the prospects for the fadayeen guerrillas, for the Palestinian Arab people, and for peace between Israel and her neighbors.

Nasser: A Political Biography. By Robert Stephens. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971. 631 pp. $12.50. The Foreign Editor of *The Observer,* longtime *Observer* correspondent in the Middle East, and author of *Cyprus: A Place of Arms,* describes Nasser's roles as a reformist military officer, charismatic hero of Egyptian and Arab nationalism and revolution, leader of the anticolonial revolution in the Third World, and main protagonist in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1958-1968. By Walter Laqueur. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. 267 pp. $1.65 (paper). In this revised edition of a book published in 1969, Mr. Laqueur reviews the events of 1945-1958 and discusses such topics as the neutralization of the Northern Tier; Soviet relations with Israel; the Soviets' gradual penetration into the Middle East and relations with Arab governments; Moscow's use of trade and aid as policy tools; the importance of petroleum to the Kremlin and the communist bloc; the Soviet military presence, especially the advisers in Egypt and the navy in the Mediterranean; and the strength of communism vis-à-vis Arab socialism.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

Asia and the International System. Edited by Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose and Gavin Boyd. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1972. 383 pp. $7.95 ($5.95, paper). These essays portray the foreign policies of the Asian states and the role of the superpowers both in and with regard to Asia. Each author, a specialist on the countries or problems about which he has written, follows general guidelines and boundaries set by the editors, although no attempt has been made to impose a false unity upon Asian diversity. In each analysis, attention is paid to the strategic setting in which the state or group of states conducts its policy, the internal determinants of choice, and the political process of decision-making, and an effort is made to analyze foreign policy in the context of historical trends and goals.

Communications and National Integration in Communist China. By Alan P. L. Liu. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 225 pp. $8.50. In assessing the role the mass media play in promoting national integration in Communist China, the author points out that it reflects three objectives: structural integration (between the party and the media), developmental integration (close coordination "between the stages of economic development that China went through from 1949 to 1966 and the changes of content in the mass media"), and the linkage of the media with face-to-face communications. He considers the third function a major innovation of the Chinese communists because it enables them to overcome regionalism, illiteracy and the lack of a common language.

Imperial Tragedy. By Thomas M. Coffey. New York: World Publishing Company, 1970. 531 pp. $12.95. By using the words, thoughts, feelings and actions of the Japanese, from Emperor and Prime Minister down to lowliest shopkeeper, the author provides a comprehensive view of Japanese society and culture during World War II.

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Problems of Defense of South and East Asia. Edited by K. K. Sinha. Bombay: Manaktalas, 1969. 479 pp. Rs50.00. In defining the security problem of this region as an aspect of the superpower struggle, the papers in this volume offer suggestions for regional defense arrangements and discuss the possibility of a general framework of cooperation among Asian nations. Contributors include Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing on the problems and considerations of American globalism; Norman Palmer, on the defense of Southern Asia; and Alastair Buchan, on the prospects for an Asian balance of power.

The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937. Edited by Paul K. T. Sih. New York: St. John's University Press, 1970. 385 pp. $10.00. A product of a symposium sponsored by St. John's University, this volume examines the domestic and foreign policies of the Kuomintang. Contributors include Joseph W. Ballantine, writing on China's international role in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; Dison Hsueh-feng Poe, on China's political reconstruction from 1927 to 1937; and Arthur N. Young, on China's fiscal situation in these years.

The Village Culture in Transition: A Study of East Pakistan Rural Society. By S. M. Hafeez Zaidi. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970. 159 pp. $6.50. Professor Zaidi explores the dynamics of change and conflict in East Pakistan (now Bangla Desh) as traditional institutions, rituals, rites and superstitions are challenged by the modernization process.

VII. Latin America

Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution. By John Patrick Bell. Austin: University of Texas Press, for the Institute of Latin American Studies, 1971. 192 pp. $7.00. Analyzing the events of 1940-1948 that climaxed in a successful armed uprising in Costa Rica, the author examines in detail the difficulties of the Calderón regime in its efforts to rule and the role of José Figueres Ferrer in marshaling disparate groups into a cohesive movement which was able to seize and hold power for eighteen months as a provisional dictatorship.

Latin America: New World, Third World. By Stephen Clissold. New York: Praeger, 1972. 394 pp. $13.50. A broad historical and political overview of Latin America with the unifying theme that much of the area is experiencing the tensions and problems of the newly decolonized regions of the Third World. A first section sketches the pre-Columbian world and the Spanish and Portuguese colonial heritage. A second section is devoted to historical descriptions of each Latin American state since independence. The final section surveys the contemporary scene, including indigenous social, economic and political patterns, and gives some attention to Latin American international relations.

Latin America and the United States in the 1970's. Edited by Richard B. Gray. Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1971. 369 pp. $10.00 ($5.95, paper). A useful reader for students of Latin American politics, featuring diverse viewpoints on a wide variety of topics pertinent to an understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations. The underlying theme is change, and the central questions are whether the trends emerging in Latin American societies are likely to be peaceful or revolutionary and what response the United States may make to them.

Modern Brazil: New Patterns and Development. Edited by John Saunders. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971. 350 pp. $12.50. Thirteen essays, by a distinguished group of Brazilian and American scholars, provide detailed and instructive views on the sociological dimension of Brazilian development, giving particular attention to the impact of education and industrial expansion

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on the future of Brazilian society. The intent, in the words of the editor, is to "explore . . . Brazil's potential for the achievement of great power status within the next century."

Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean. Edited by Emanuel de Kadt. London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972. 188 pp. $12.00. This collection of articles examines the political, economic and social effects resulting from the unavoidable dependence of the small Caribbean states on major powers. Cuba, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam and the Dutch and French Antilles are treated in some depth. The articles also observe new trends of external influence, such as the multinational corporation, and their implications for U.S. policy.

The Political Themes of Inter-American Relations. By Edward J. Williams. Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press, 1971. 178 pp. n.p. (paper). The themes chosen for analysis vary from the traditional question of intervention to the more recent issues of the Cold War, communism, aid to dictatorships, and Latin American ties with the rest of the Third World. The author concludes by offering policy prescriptions for each of these basic themes of inter-American political intercourse.

Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917. By P. Edward Haley. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970. 294 pp. $10.00. This diplomatic history of the policies of Presidents Taft and Wilson toward the revolt in Mexico is divided into two sections: the initial part explores the setting of the conflict and investigates the response of the Taft Administration; the second deals with Wilson's attempt to control the course of events.

Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958. Volume I of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro. Edited by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1972. 471 pp. $12.50. This anthology of Castro's writings, including letters, manifestoes and proclamations as well as the Cuban leader's most significant contribution, "History Will Absolve Me," takes us through the guerrilla period and up to the overthrow of the Batista government on January 1, 1959. The Introduction, written by the editors, contains a political history of Cuba, valuable as the background to Castro's political life.

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Monographs and Reports Received

The Army in Papua-New Guinea: Current Role and Implications for Independence. By Robert J. O'Neill. Canberra: Australian National University Press, a publication of The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1971. (Distributed by International Scholarly Book Services, Inc., P. O. Box 4347, Portland, Oregon.) 31 pp. $1.95.

Black Africa: The Growing Pains of Independence. By L. Gray Cowan. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 210, April 1972. 63 pp. $1.00.

Defense Implications of International Indeterminacy. By Robert J. Pranger. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study No. 4, May 1972. 31 pp. $2.00.

East European Dissent. (Two volumes: I, 1953-1964; II, 1965-1970.) Edited by Vojtech Mastny. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972. 292 pp., 255 pp. $4.95, each. $8.95, both.

European Organizations and the Environment. By Jon McLin. Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, West Europe Series, January 1972. 11 pp. $1.00.

International Cooperation for Pollution Control. By Daniel Serwer. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Report No. 9, April 1972. 73 pp. $2.50.

Israel & the Arabs: Prelude to the Jewish State. Edited by Anne Sinai and I. Robert Sinai. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972. 248 pp. $4.95.

The Limits to Freedom: Poland in World Affairs, 1964-1972. By John J. Lenaghan. Ottawa: Carleton University, School of International Affairs, Occasional Papers, No. 23, May 1972. 53 pp. n.p.

National Directory of Latin Americanists. (Second edition.) Compiled by the Hispanic Foundation Reference Department, Library of Congress. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. 683 pp. $4.25.

The United Nations System and the Stockholm Conference. By Jon McLin. Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, West Europe Series, April 1972. 12 pp. $1.00.

United States Foreign Policy, 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Department of State Publication 8634, March 1972. 604 pp. $2.75.

U.S. Foreign Policy, 1972-1973: The Critical Issues. Prepared by the Editors of the Foreign Policy Association. New York: Collier Books, 1972. 99 pp. $1.25.

U.S. & Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1956. Edited by John Donovan. New York: Facts on File, Inc., May 1972. 282 pp. $4.95.

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William R. Kintner, Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; author of *Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense* (Hawthorn, 1969) and *Peace and the Strategy Conflict* (Praeger, 1967).

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Associate Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; coauthor of *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Lippincott, 1971).

Walter F. Hahn, Associate Director for Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute; currently engaged in research for a book on West Germany's *Ostpolitik.*

F. Stephen Larrabee, Research Analyst, Radio Free Europe, Munich, West Germany; currently engaged in a study of Soviet-West German relations since the fall of Khrushchev.

Ernest W. Lefever, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution; author of *Ethics and United States Foreign Policy* (World, 1957) and *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

Horst Mendershausen, Senior Staff Member, Social Science Department, The RAND Corporation.

John Simpson, Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, England; specialist in the field of weapons procurement.

Frank Gregory, Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, England; specialist in British defense policy and transnational weapons procurement.

Thomas C. Wiegele, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University.

Anthony James Joes, Assistant Professor of Politics and Coordinator of the International Relations Program, St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia.

T. C. Rhee, Associate Professor of History, University of Dayton; author of numerous articles on Japan, China and Korea.

Alfred L. Monks, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming; currently engaged in research on Soviet images of the Middle East conflict.

Kenyon N. Griffin, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming; currently studying Catholic, Protestant and Jewish attitudes toward the Middle East and Viet Nam conflicts.

Benjamin J. Cohen, Associate Professor of International Economic Relations, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; author of *Balance-of-Payments Policy* (Penguin, 1969) and *The Future of Sterling as an International Currency* (Macmillan, 1971).

Vladimir Petrov, Professor of International Affairs, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University.

William J. Spahr, Colonel USA (ret.); former U.S. Army Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Moscow; consultant on Soviet foreign and military policies.

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